David Rose Misunderstanding The Immanence/Transcendence Distinction

David Rose wrote to SYSFLING on 8 Feb 2025, at 15:09:

The bot’s synopsis reads to me like a long struggle over the material and relational versions...

In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

Immanence and transcendence carry so much religious baggage. Could we simply say that SFL rejects the dualizing of meaning and form? Then ask how that plays out stratally.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the "bot's synopsis" identified philosophers whose ideas were compatible in some way with the epistemological assumptions of SFL Theory. See here.

[2] To be clear, the immanence/transcendence distinction carries no "religious baggage" whatsoever, since it is simply the question of whether or not meaning is seen as solely a property of semiotic systems.

[3] To be clear, on the one hand, the meaning and form of semiotic systems is irrelevant to the epistemological question of meaning as immanent or transcendent. On the other hand, SFL does "dualise" meaning and form, most obviously through the natural relation between meaning (e.g. process) and form (e.g. verbal group) against which grammatical metaphor is measured. SFL models lexicogrammar as form interpreted in terms of its function in realising meaning.

∞

See also The Practice Of Public Bluffing In The SFL Community.

Ed McDonald On Halliday's Grammar-Centrism

Edward McDonald continued sys-func on 8 Jul 2024, at 14:44:

Ok, so this is not "linguistic imperialism" but it does seem like "grammar-centrism". It strikes me that, though I'm not aware if anyone has ever made this argument, that both (adult) language and music could equally be seen as "outgrowths" of protolanguage, particularly if we look at spoken language and singing. Given that music lacks the line of arbitrariness, i.e. that musical meanings are in the first instance indexical, not symbolic, the argument for the priority of grammar seems less convincing in this instance.

Any multimodalists like to weigh in here about other semiotic systems? Do they all depend on the prior existence of grammar? It would seem to me that systems depending on iconicity don't necessarily.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday's view that language is the only semiotic system with a grammar is merely the view that is consistent with his Systemic Functional Theory and the assumptions on which is based.

[2] To be clear, song lyrics are language, as are musical notation and theory. The question of whether music itself requires its makers to have language, depends on how music is defined. If music is narrowly defined as restricted to humans, then music is defined as requiring its makers to have language. However, if music is more broadly defined to include the structured use of rhythm and pitch variation in other species, most notably birdsong and whalesong, then music is not defined as requiring its makers to have language. This still leaves open the question of whether music is social (value) or semiotic (symbolic value), in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy of complex systems.

[3] Given that no evidence is given for musical meanings, or a natural indexical relation between such meanings and their expression, this is an instance of the bare assertion (ipse dixit) fallacy.

[4] Lest this be misunderstood, the question is whether the users of non-linguistic semiotic systems have a grammar. Halliday (2002[1996]: 389): 

On the other hand, human adults also develop numerous non-linguistic semiotic systems: forms of ritual, art forms, and the like; these have no grammar of their own, but they are parasitic on natural language – their meaning potential derives from the fact that those who use them already have a grammar.

[5] To be clear, one way to assess whether a semiotic system requires its users to have a grammar is to look for such a system in species without a grammar. To date, no other species have been demonstrated represent their experience iconically by drawing pictures, and the earliest evidence of human cave painting long postdates the estimated emergence of language.

Ed McDonald On Halliday's Linguistic Imperialism

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 8 Jul 2024, at 08:49:

We've often had this debate before, and presumably if music has no "grammar" it has no "semantics" either. I would agree, in the sense that those two terms are traditionally applied to language and so come with all sorts of associations and presuppositions. … 

But as a semiotic system - by definition (IMFFHO) - must have the two mutually defining strata of what in general terms I like to call interpretation and expression: specifically for music, what I call "phonotactics" and "e/motion" - see my 2021 paper in Language, Context, Text, then it presumably has a "grammar" of sorts, in the sense of distinctive patterns with significant interpretations. In a separate step, In relation to music, I also depart from orthodoxy in characterising the expression stratum of phonotactics as purely textural (= textual), with the other metafunctions coming in only at the stratum of e/motion, whether interactional (= interpersonal) or figurative (= ideational) (I haven't found the need to distinguish between experiential and logical). …

Halliday "privileging" language in this way for me invokes the spectre of what, following Horst Ruthrof, I call "linguistic imperialism"; and the fact that Social Semiotics (again IMFFHO) is shot through with linguistic imperialism for me explains why Ruqaiya for one didn't "believe in" multimodality, in the sense of a model of same that wasn't simply parasitic on the theory of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here McDonald is commenting on Halliday's view (2002[1996]: 388-9) that language is the only semiotic system that has a grammar, in his sense of the term.

[2] This misunderstands Halliday. On Halliday's model, if music is a social semiotic system, then it has content and expression, but its content is not stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar. For Cléirigh, on the other hand, in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy of complex systems, music is social, not semiotic. That is, it carries value, but not symbolic value. In terms of Edelman's neuroscientific theory, music selects perceptual categorisations of positive or negative value, and such value systems play an important rôle in the experience of emotions.

[3] Again, this misunderstands Halliday. For Halliday, the "two mutually defining strata" are the content and expression planes, following Hjelmslev. This is a prerequisite of semiotic systems, but it does not entail that content is stratified to include a grammar, in Halliday's sense, as 'an entirely abstract semiotic construct that emerges between the content and the expression levels of the original, sign-based primary semiotic system' (ibid.).

[4] To be clear, the problem with reconstruing 'content' as 'interpretation' is that the latter is the perspective of the listener only.

[5] This misunderstands the metafunctions. The metafunctions are types of meanings, and so are a dimension of the content plane only. For example, phonological systems are not metafunctional; they realise metafunctional meanings of the content plane.

[6] As demonstrated above, McDonald's accusation of "linguistic imperialism" is entirely unwarranted, since it derives only from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's theorising.

David Rose On Halliday's Instantiation/Stratification Matrix

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 21 Mar 2024, 15:00:

This matrix from a talk MAKH gave to computer scientists in 95 may help to flesh out the SFL timeline a little.

It is based on ideas he first proposed in 1961. Subsequent research was overwhelmingly in the bottom row – on LG systems. Cells above that are proposals for research. He comments “Semantic representations of the instance — the instance as meaning — are still quite unsatisfactory, and there is much work to be done in this respect. Likewise for the instantial situation: we tend to work with informal word-pictures, like the stage directions in the printed edition of a play; but the basic concept of situation as instance has advanced very little in recent decades” (2005:255).

The upper and middle left-hand cells were the focus of Jim Martin and colleagues’ research through the 80s, culminating in English Text in 92. Metafunctional semantic systems were described as discourse semantics. Systems were also described for ‘potential clusterings of values of field, tenor, mode’, that were named genre systems. Appliability was one motivation for prioritising genre systems. Systems were proposed for field, tenor, mode, but it took another two decades for this research to be taken up in earnest, starting with Jing Hao on field, followed by a series of studies, culminating in Doran, Martin, Herrington 2023 (and Yaegan’s recent course at Usyd).

A crucial advance in this research is description of field, tenor, mode systems as semiotic systems that are instantiated, not by ‘informal word-pictures’, but by ‘selection expressions’, as the matrix specifies for LG and semantic systems.

Another major step forward is the reconstrual of what MAKH calls ‘values’ in the top row as ‘principles’ of instantiation, and ‘domains’ of individuation. This potentially integrates research using different SFL models into a commensurate whole.

It also helps resolve an anomaly in the upper right-hand cell, in which instances of socio-semiotic systems are named ‘particular social semiotic situation events’, whereas instances of LG and semantic systems are simply named ‘particular texts’. A social semiotic event is of course a (multimodal) text.

"The left-hand upper cell is taken up with contextual networks: it contains a theory of the possible semiotic situations that collectively constitute a culture – taxonomies of institutions and of doings and happenings, manifested as possible clusterings of values of field, tenor and mode.” Halliday 2005: 255

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) did not include a cline of instantiation, nor Malinowski's notions of context, nor a semantic stratum:

[2] To be clear, it is important to recognise that Halliday himself never proposed system networks to represent the systems of context.

[3] This is misleading. Martin (1992) rebranded the lexicogrammatical systems of the textual metafunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976) as his discourse semantic systems and distributed them across the different metafunctions. To these systems he added Halliday's semantic system of speech function and rebranded it as his discourse semantic system of negotiation.

[4] To be clear, Martin (1992) mistook registers for the contextual systems (field, tenor, mode) that are realised by registers, thereby proposing that a functional variety of language was not language, but context. Martin (1992) then confused two meanings of 'genre', genre as mode and genre as text type, and located the confusion stratally above register in context. This had the effect of proposing that text types were realised by field, tenor, and mode, instead of the reverse, thereby upending the realisation relation.

[5] To be clear, Hao and Doran were Martin's students and use Martin's model that proposes that functional varieties of language are not language, but context.

[6] This is cleverly misleading. First, Halliday did not describe field, tenor and mode as instantiated by 'informal word pictures'. Halliday used 'informal word pictures' to describe instances of field, tenor and mode, because he didn't have formal systems of field, tenor and mode to model the potential. Second, in Martin's model, context is realised by an instance of language, text, whereas this advance by Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024) rejects Martin's model, so that context systems are now instantiated by context, not by language (text).

[7] This is misleading, because this major step forward is major step backward. Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024) have reinterpreted the features of field, tenor and mode systems as 'principles of instantiation' in order to make room for semantic systems which they misconstrue as contextual.  That is, having first misconstrued language (register) as context, Martin is now, with his colleagues, misconstruing context (field, tenor, mode) as language. See also

• Negotiating Tenor: Enacting Affiliation In Dialogue And Monologue (Yaegan Doran)
• A Close Examination Of Yaegan Doran's 2023 ASFLA Plenary Abstract

[8] For some of the inconsistencies that invalidate Martin's model of individuation, see

• David Rose Endorsing Martin's Misunderstandings Of Individuation
• David Rose On Martin's Context-Bound/Free And Individuation As Allocation/Affiliation

[9] For some of the inconsistencies that invalidate Martin's integrated model, see

• David Rose On Jim Martin's Individuation
• David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Realisation, Instantiation And Individuation

[10] This is misleading, because there is no anomaly in the upper right-hand cell, though the false claim betrays a serious misunderstanding of the distinction between context and language. 'Particular social semiotic situation events' describes instances of context: the culture as semiotic potential. A text, on the other hand, is an instance of the content plane of language: semantics and lexicogrammar. A multimodal text includes instances of the content plane of semiotic systems other than language.

David Kellogg On Viewers Of Cave Paintings Not Requiring Language

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 5 Dec 2023, at 00:17:

Implicit in Halliday's last two sentences is either:

a) Prelinguistic infants are not engaged in human semiosis, or.

b) Language exists from birth.

It seems to me that both of these are clearly false.

Instead of Mondrian, consider the attached cave painting. Imagine that the floor of the cave preserves the footprints of the artists who made this mural.

1. The involuntary meaning of the footprints of the artists who made the mural. This seems no different from the meaning that deer tracks convey to a non-human predator. 

2. The intentional meaning of the picture of the herdsmen (hunters?) recording their labor. This seems very different, as it invites (because its intention is to allow) the viewer to "reverse engineer" the story, for amusement or profit. 

3. The strategically placed hand print done in red ochre. This too seems different again: although it resembles 1) in form and 2) in intension, it probably signals authorship and in that sense has a textual as well as an interpersonal function.

None of these seem to me to require the Hallidayan assumption that the viewer possesses language. All of them merely require the Vygotskyan assumption that the object (or "objective") can be inferred from the remains of the object-oriented action.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the last two sentences in the quote (Halliday 2003: 4) were:

All that needs to be said in the present context is that other human semiotics are dependent on the premise that their users also have language. Language is a prerequisite; but there is no need to insist that language can mean it all.

[2] To be clear, neither of these propositions are implicit in the quote, since Halliday's 'present context' is a discussion of human 'post-infancy' semiotic systems.

[3] This is true, as demonstrated by Halliday's extensive work on human protolanguage.

[4] To be clear, the observation of deer tracks by a non-human predator is, according to Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, simply perceptual categorisation on value. No linguistic meaning is involved. The observation of footprints by humans is the construal of experience as the first-order meaning of language.

[5] To be clear, according to comparative mythologist Joseph Campbell, cave paintings are expressions of mythic symbolism, and mythic symbolism is the use of (lexical) metaphor to adapt consciousness to its physical and social environments, which requires that the participants had language — as does the fact that the painting is, at most, only about 13,000 years old.

[6] To be clear, the cave painting is to be found in The Cave Of Hands, in Argentina, and since, according to comparative mythologist Joseph Campbell, such sites were used for male initiation rites in hunter-gatherer societies, the great number of hand images in this cave might be taken to suggest that they identify the initiates in those rituals. Again, this demonstrates that the participants had language.

[7] As the above demonstrates, this is the exact opposite of what is true. All three require that the human participants had language, and the dating of the cave art provides corroborating evidence.

Ed McDonald On Musical Meanings As Concrete And General

Edward McDonald wrote to: sys-func on 20 Nov 2023, at 09:59:

… This reflects my understanding of the nature of musical meaning as concrete but general. Musical meanings are concrete, again in my opinion but informed by a wide range of research across a number of disciplines, because they express our human embodiment: music represents a kind of semiotic transformation of our experience of our own and other people’s bodies moving through space and time. 

At the same time, musical meanings are general, because, to borrow the insight of one philosopher of music, music is like body language: when we observe someone’s body language, including their gait, posture, facial expression, and gaze, we can “read off” its meaning, but only in general terms. We can tell that someone is sad, but not why; we can pick up that someone is highly agitated, but we don’t know the circumstances that gave rise to that agitation – unless we use language to ask them about it. 

So language, in contrast to music, is more abstract, more detached from our embodied experience, but at the same time because it supplies us with a system of categories we can apply to that experience, linguistic meanings are more specific. 

So from this point of view, we can see that soundtrack / expression music – “songs with words” – and score / mood music – “songs without words” – take on, as you might expect, the general semiotic characteristics of the systems of language and music with which they are mostly closely identified in each case.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this reason for musical meanings being 'concrete' is based on a misunderstanding, since it has the (Token–Value) relation backwards. It is the movement of bodies — in playing instruments — that expresses music, not the other way around. That is, McDonald claims that musical meanings are concrete because he misconstrues them as the more concrete Token instead of the more abstract Value.

[2] To be clear, this is another instance of the logical fallacy known as Appeal to accomplishment – an assertion is deemed true or false based on the accomplishments of the proposer.

[3] To be clear, one way to understand the difference between music and body language is through the theory of experience that has naturally evolved in English. Music is the Scope of the material Process of playing, whereas body language is a behavioural Process that 'manifests states of consciousness' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 302).

[4] To be clear, this reason for musical meanings being 'general' is based on a misunderstanding, since it confuses elaboration (generality) with enhancement (cause: reason).

[5] To be clear, this is another instance of the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit, a bare assertion, since no supporting argument has been made, and the claim that the meanings of music are concrete is based on a misunderstanding; see [1].

[6] To be clear, this point has not been demonstrated; see [1] to [5] above.

Ed McDonald On Musical Meanings And Their "Re-expression"

Edward McDonald wrote to: sys-func on 20 Nov 2023, at 09:59:

As for language being able to "re-express" musical meanings, my reading of many reviews of performances, as well as screeds of scholarly expositions of musical styles and meanings, has left me deeply sceptical of any such possibility. Certainly aspects of a particular semiotic system can be "re-realised" (?) in another semiotic — as the custom of setting words to music clearly shows — but even in such cases, the musical tends to express meanings that language doesn't, or at least doesn't do so easily, and vice versa.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the fact that music does not express socially agreed meanings would suggest that music is not a social semiotic system, and the fact that the meanings of music cannot be identified — e.g. what are the meanings of Mike Oldfield's Tubular Bells and how are those meanings realised? — suggests that music is not a semiotic system at all.

Instead, if music is viewed in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy, it is a system of social value that is not construed symbolically. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 507, 509):

As we conceive of it, the term "semiotic" is framed within a linear taxonomy of "physical — biological — social — semiotic"; … A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" … . A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning". Meaning can be thought of (and was thought of by Saussure) as just a kind of social value; but it is value in a significantly different sense — value that is construed symbolically. … Semiotic systems are social systems where value has been further transformed into meaning.

But music differs from the systems of value in other social species — e.g. whalesong, birdsong — in that it is made by linguate beings, who can complement music with the social semiotic that is language (lyrics), represent music socio-semiotically (notation), and evolve its value potential through the social semiotic that is language (realising music theory).

It is because music cannot be modelled as a social semiotic system that McDonald feels the need to redefine what constitutes a semiotic system.

[2] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509) claim that language is the only semiotic system into which all other semiotic systems can be "translated". McDonald could not be making these meanings with any social semiotic other than language.

[3] To be clear, this is not the re-expression of the meanings of one semiotic system in another semiotic system. It is simply the complementation of language and music.

[4] To be clear, if music really did express meanings, McDonald would be able to draw a system network of musical meanings that specified how such meanings are expressed in musical sounds.

Ed McDonald On Language Not Being Prototypical In The Historical Sense

Edward McDonald wrote to: sys-func on 20 Nov 2023, at 09:59:

I think I'd agree with David on this one:

language is "prototypical" but only in the Eleanor Rosch sense and not in the historical sense. That is, language is central and dominant among socio-semiotic systems but not originary or primeval.

I've read the Halliday / & Matthiessen claims before, and to me they read like just what you'd expect linguists to say: to me they come across as axiomatic claims and not conclusions based on empirical evidence.

For me, it's the experience of being a practising — and trained — musician that makes me doubtful about awarding any such primacy to language. When I was learning piano, which I did from ages 8-21 with a number of different teachers, I learned in the appropriate "classical" style which was based on two things: 1. interpreting the notation - i.e. the process of turning the notated score into actual musical performance, and 2. explaining the technique - i.e. the process of what you do with your fingers, hands, arms, (torso, legs etc etc) in order to achieve certain sounds and musical effects. Now the presence of notation in the Western classical tradition means that 1. inevitably involves language — the musical notation is clearly dependent on the prior existence of a writing system for language — the very earliest examples of notation in Europe, devised for the vocal music we now call "Gregorian chant", consisted of "intonation-style graphics" written over the top of the verbal text — and every feature of the notation has its appropriate linguistic label. But not all styles even of Western music depend on notation — perhaps most folk and pop musicians can't "read" — and in the absence of 1., 2. can be carried out largely by demonstration, although the presence of a labelling system, i.e. a technical vocabulary, is very useful for transmission, although not for performance, which in such traditions is largely equivalent to improvising on the basis of fixed "formulae".

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. To be clear, observations of child development provide empirical evidence that language is ontogenetically prior to other social semiotic systems, and the fact that the earliest known cave paintings are only about 40,000 years old, suggests that language is also phylogenetically prior to other social semiotic systems.

[2] This is an instance of the logical fallacy known as Circumstantial ad hominem – stating that the arguer's personal situation means that their conclusion is wrong.

[3] To be clear, this is an instance of the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit: a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. Moreover, McDonald ignores the reasons that Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509-10) provide for regarding language as the prototypical social semiotic system:

Language is set apart, however, as the prototypical semiotic system, on a variety of different grounds: it is the only one that evolved specifically as a semiotic system; it is the one semiotic into which all others can be "translated"; and (the least questionable, in our view) it is the one whereby the human species as a whole, and each individual member of that species, construes experience and constructs a social order. In this last respect, all other semiotic systems are derivative: they have meaning potential only by reference to models of experience, and forms of social relationship, that have already been established in language. It is this that justifies us in taking language as the prototype of systems of meaning. …

[4] This is an instance of the logical fallacy known as Appeal to accomplishment – an assertion is deemed true or false based on the accomplishments of the proposer.

[5] To be clear, both 'interpreting the notation' and 'explaining the technique' require the prior ontogenesis of language in both teacher and learner. And teaching and learning by demonstration only happens after the prior ontogenesis of language in both teacher and learner.

Ed McDonald On The Nature Of Semiosis

 Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 19 Nov 2023, at 14:02:

(3) … Can language be taken as the model / interpretant of all other semiotic systems …  

(McDonald 2013):

If social semiotic approaches are to free themselves from their current reliance on linguistic models, they will need to understand the nature of semiosis, in other words, to explicitly theorise the iconic and/or indexical and/or symbolic referential processes involved in recognising the links between expression and interpretation in the case of each modality, before they will be able to understand how modalities combine in ‘‘performance’’. Until we have, not a Semantics and the Body, to use the title of Ruthrof’s 1997 work, but a semantics of the body, the challenge of accounting for a multimodal text like opera in a semiotically democratic way will remain a question in search of an answer.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'nature of semiosis' depends on the theory used to model it, which in turn, depends on the assumptions on which the theory is founded. The notion of a 'nature of a phenomenon' takes a transcendent view of meaning, which contradicts the the immanent view of meaning taken in SFL Theory. 

[2] To be clear, this confuses data with theory. Iconic and/or indexical and/or symbolic referential processes are not data to be theorised, but one way of theorising the data — that of Peirce. Moreover, Peirce's semiotics is inconsistent with SFL Theory in terms of the triadic sign relation, and in terms of icons, indexes and symbols referencing their objects (see here).

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, McDonald first construed perceptible expression and interpretable behaviour as two poles of the context of a semiotic system, and then reconstrued these as the two poles of the semiotic system itself.

[4] To be clear, McDonald's notions of perceptible expression and interpretable behaviour construe the perspective of the listener only. The speaker and the musician — the performers — are excluded from this model of 'performance'.

[5] To be clear, the use of the word 'democratic' implies that other approaches are socially unjust, and that the approach McDonald advocates will right a wrong. As a logical fallacy, this might be termed an appeal to emotion.

Ed McDonald On The Largely Symbolic Nature Of Linguistic Signs

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 19 Nov 2023, at 14:02:

(3) … Can language be taken as the model / interpretant of all other semiotic systems …

 (McDonald 2013):

[F]rom the point of view of a general semiology, it is the very difficulty of accounting for the largely symbolic, unmotivated nature of linguistic signs that makes a clear understanding of linguistic meaning very hard to attain. At the same time, whether or not we regard language as functioning as the (potential) interpreter of all other semiotic systems, it is undeniable that it tends to be used that way by many semioticians, especially Social Semioticians, very often in the same breath as denying that language has any special status. A refocusing on communication as multimodal may well be being forced on us by developments in communicative technologies, as Machin suggests, but it also represents a long overdue recognition of the importance of embodied semiotics in much human interaction, as Ruthrof shows.… Much multimodal work in the Social Semiotic tradition seems curiously visually-biased, and at the same time largely unproblematically ‘analogising’ concepts from linguistics for the analysis of other semiotic systems, without seemingly feel much need, as Machin notes, to engage with existing scholarship in those areas.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a pair of bare assertions (ipse dixit), each without supporting argument. They are:

[A]: the largely symbolic nature of linguistic signs is difficult to account for.

[B]: [A] makes a clear understanding of linguistic meaning very hard to attain.

With regard to [A], the largely symbolic nature of linguistic signs is accounted for by the fact that it evolved in the species from symbolic protolinguistic signs (phylogenesis) and develops in the individual from symbolic protolinguistic signs (ontogenesis). So the question is, rather, why should protolinguistic signs be largely symbolic? On Halliday's model, the symbolic nature of protolinguistic signs can be understood as motivated by the general functions that protolanguage serves: the personal, interactional, instrumental and regulatory microfunctions.

With regard to [B], this is clearly false, since a clear understanding of linguistic meaning is demonstrated whenever the users of language understand each other's meaning, and a clear theoretical understanding of linguistic meaning is proposed by linguistic theories such as SFL.

[2] To be clear, McDonald provides no evidence in support of his ad hominem attack.

[3] To be clear, SFL Theory explicitly models language as "embodied" semiotics in human interaction. Halliday (2003: 13):

[4] To be clear, written language is also "visually-based".

[5] To be clear, scholarship framed in terms of other theories needs to be reframed in terms of the theory being used. In the immanent view of meaning that SFL Theory takes, there is no ultimate theory of phenomena that can be reached by cherry-picking from different theories. Instead, there are applications of each theory that are either valid or invalid in terms of that theory.

Ed McDonald On The Two Poles Of A Semiotic System

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 19 Nov 2023, at 14:02:

… a system like language or music acts as a semiotic mediation between two kinds of contexts:

1. the material context of sound or gesture as perceptible expression

2. the social context of language or music …as interpretable behaviour

A semiotic system like language or music hence has two poles

1. expression (vis-à-vis material context)

2. interpretation (vis-à-vis social context) …

(McDonald 2013, Embodiment and meaning: moving beyond linguistic imperialism in social semiotics)

The need to understand the relation of interpretation(s) to expression(s) independently for each semiotic system is one that for me follows naturally from Saussure’s understanding of meaning in language, whose implications have been usefully explored by a number of scholars like media and communication studies scholar David Machin already mentioned above, and literature and philosophy of language scholar Horst Ruthrof

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Having previously advocated an approach to non-linguistic semiotic systems that does not assume that linguistic models are appropriate (see previous post), McDonald begins his approach to non-linguistic semiotic systems with Halliday's model of linguistic systems. Halliday (2003: 13):

[2] To be clear, gestures are behaviours, and sounds are the products of behaviours. Each can be viewed materially and/or in terms of some social function. 

[3] To be clear, the perspective presented by 'perceptible' and 'interpretable' is that of the listener only. Importantly, the speaker and the musician are excluded from this model.

[4] To be clear, this misrepresents McDonald's model. As he has explained, perceptible expression and interpretable behaviour are two poles of the context of a semiotic system, not the two poles of the semiotic system itself.

[5] To be clear, the use of the word 'imperialism' evokes a sense of social injustice. As a logical fallacy, this might be termed an appeal to emotion.

[6] To be clear, this is an instance of the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit: a bare assertion without supporting argument. Moreover, it cannot be true, since Saussure was concerned with the sign — content and expression form in Hjelmslev's terms — whereas McDonald's interpretable behaviour and perceptible expression are his model of context — content and expression substance in Hjelmslev's terms — misunderstood as a semiotic system.

Ed McDonald's Argument For An Obligatory Multi-Semiotic Theoretical Approach

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 19 Nov 2023, at 14:02:

Secondly, a recommendation for an obligatory multi-semiotic theoretical approach whichever semiotic system we're examining.

(2) What can they know of [metafunctions] who only [language] know

Given that those of us working in SFL, whatever else we are, are almost inevitably linguists, we can take it that we will always be "aware of" language - but at the same time we need, I believe, to acknowledge that other semiotic systems may not necessarily show the same configuration of stratification and metafunction as we take to be characteristic of language.…

McDonald (Understanding BL dramas / discourse analysis... in draft):

Although I said that a social semiotic perspective is a useful one here, in practice I find much of the actual analysis carried out within social semiotic frameworks inadequate for the purpose [of accounting for the text as a whole, in all its complexity but at the same time coherence], largely because scholars have struggled to free themselves from the theoretical influence of linguistics, and from the analytical practice of continually invoking the meanings of language in order to explain those of other semiotic systems.... 

My general criticism would be that while the social semiotic frameworks currently in use are very good at dealing with the “combination”, of delineating the whats and hows of the multimodal text as a whole, they are less good at accounting for the “contribution”, at capturing the basic duality of each semiotic system, what I like to call interpretation and expression, without constant resource to language as the ground of explanation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for those working in SFL, according to SFL Theory, following Hjelmslev, all semiotic systems are stratified into content and expression planes and, following Halliday, only the content plane of language is stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar. The fact that other semiotic systems do not include a lexicogrammatical stratum is demonstrated by the fact that they cannot be read aloud as language can. (It is the stratum of wording that is projected by the process of saying.)

With regard to the metafunctions, in SFL Theory, these are very general functions that lie behind all meaning making. Although different social semiotic systems can be expected to vary in the systems of each metafunction, the metafunctions themselves can be expected to be recognisable in virtually all adult social semiotic systems. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3) write:

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

[2] To be clear, the use of 'largely because' here presents a bare assertion (the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit) as if it were a reasoned argument. McDonald's unsupported claim is that social semiotic analyses of non-linguistic social semiotic systems are inadequate because they apply models theorised on the basis of linguistic social semiotic systems.

[3] To be clear, this is another bare assertion (ipse dixit). Here the previous bare assertion about the inadequacy of social semiotic analyses of non-linguistic social semiotic systems is elaborated by an unsupported claim of what they are 'less good at'.

David Rose Mistaking Realisation Rules For Function Structures And Paradigmatic Features For Syntagmatic Units

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 30/8/23 at 22:41:

Just some parameters...

In a rank scale, the initial entry condition for systems is a syntagmatic unit eg clause. Their features e.g. [indicative] are realised by function structures at that rank ↘︎S^F, and each function within that structure e.g. Subject is realised by a syntagm at the next rank ↘︎nom gp.

Phonemes are syntagmatic units at the base of a rank scale. Features at syllable rank are realised by function structures eg ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme, and each function is realised by a phoneme (complex). Phonemes are produced by tongue and lip postures with voicing, but these lie outside language in the biology of the vocal tract... Jim’s materiality (the ‘etics’ materialising ‘emics’)

So yes, it seems adult social semiosis minimally requires two syntagmatic ranks

Im interested in how that emerges from unranked protolg

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The entry conditions to paradigmatic systems are paradigmatic features, not syntagmatic units. The rank scale construes formal constituents as a system of features, with the selection of a feature satisfying the entry condition to the systems of that rank.

[2] This is very misleading because it is a serious misunderstanding. Features are not realised by function structures. Importantly, in Rose's first example, ↘︎S^F is not a function structure, but a realisation statement that specifies 'Subject before Finite'. Moreover, it is activated by the selection of the feature 'declarative', not 'indicative'. The feature 'indicative' activates the insertion of a Mood element (Subject and Finite). See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162).

In Rose's second example, ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme is not a function structure, but a realisation statement of an unidentified feature that specifies 'optional Onset before Rhyme'.

[3] To be clear, the systems that specify phonemes are those that 'label tongue and lip postures with voicing' (and more), so this is not the distinction between phonology and phonetics. The difference is stratal: phonology is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than phonetics. Moreover, the materiality of phonetics is hardly Martin's discovery.

[4] Clearly, SFL Theory maintains that four ranks are required to model formal constituency in lexicogrammar and phonology. But rank only applies to the expression plane of semiotic systems without a lexicogrammar.

John Bateman On The Necessity Of Rank Across Semiotic Systems

John Bateman replied to David Rose on Sysfling on 28/8/23 at 21:03: 

picking up on [your]:

Not sure about necessity of ranks, since lowest lg ranks have only next stratum to operate in

this is an interesting modelling issue. Formally, I would tend to want to include a category even if it is not expanded if it is a logical consequence of other components of the theory. I take rank in this sense — i.e. without some unit of structure there is no place for axis to start its magic.

Also wrt Jim's :

“As systemicists interested in genesis, should we be proposing a major component of our cartography (i.e. a rank, a metafunction or a stratum) in the absence of a distinctive system of valeur?” [Martin 2010]

maybe one ranked unit is enough?

In any case, if I had to put my finger on one reoccurring (quite serious) problem with many many multimodal analyses that I see (including some waving the SFS flag), it would be lack of attention to rank — mostly signalled by system networks hanging wonderously in the air and curious 'multiple options' (e.g. 'either-and' systems) going along with that, mostly, I suspect, because the units aren't clear.

So, I'd be very hesitant to leave out rank.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See David Rose On Ranks, Axis And Strata In Protolanguage.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. Firstly, rank is a means of modelling formal constituency, so it only applies to strata that feature formal constituents. In language, these are lexicogrammar on the content plane and phonology and graphology on the expression plane. Since other semiotic systems do not have a lexicogrammar — they cannot be read aloud — rank can only apply to their expression plane. Rank is a local dimension, not a global dimension (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32).

Secondly, the SFL model of ideational semantics demonstrates that rank is unnecessary, since it has axis, system and structure, but no rank. Instead of a rank scale of forms, there are types of phenomenon: sequence, figure and element (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 49), with each type being the entry condition to systems.

[3] See David Rose On Ranks, Axis And Strata In Protolanguage.

[4] To be clear, the problem here not the absence of rank, but the absence of entry conditions. These are provided by rank units in lexicogrammar and phonology/graphology, but there are no rank units on the content plane of a semiotic system other than language, because only language has a lexicogrammar.

[5] See [2] and [4].

John Bateman On Dimensions Across Semiotic Modes

John Bateman replied to David Rose on Sysfling on 26/8/23 at 20:16:

… But the following [from Rose] is very nice to hear:

Metafunctionality as I tried to suggest, is a property of lg that its syntagmatic structuring has evolved to enable, together with ranks and strata. So it’s basic to lg but not to semiotic modes in general.

I'm wondering how well that statement goes down more generally: consequences should actually follow.

I think the question of what dimensions are common across semiotic modes is very interesting and also central for a semiotics. I'd readily take rank to have to be present, otherwise axis has no domain (s) to operate in. Structural configurations have to be configurations of something. Stratification is also a good bet. Moreover, since semiosis is inherently dynamic, we'll have instantiation and sedimentation relating to reservoires and repositories I'd expect. These would all seem to be necessarily bound up in a single 'definition' of a particular kind of signs for my money. This means there is no 'picking and choosing' to do. …

Metafunction again turns up there as a bit of a swamp... the original idea of "distinctive regions of relatively interdependent systems" gets tricky without sufficiently strongly motivated systems. And I am not yet sure to what extent the different kinds of structure (which I like a lot) actually match well with kinds of functions parallel to linguistically motivated metafunctions in nonverbal semiotic modes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not "very nice to hear" from a theoretical point of view. See David Rose Misunderstanding Metafunctionality And Axis (Inter Alia).

[2] To be clear, rank is one way of modelling formal constituency. In language, rank is a dimension of lexicogrammar and phonology/graphology. Therefore, in modelling semiotic systems without a grammar — that is, those other than language — rank can only be a dimension of the expression plane, not the content plane.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. To be clear, semantics has no rank scale because it has no forms to rank, and yet semantics is modelled with both axes, paradigmatic and syntagmatic; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

Bateman's false claim derives from two theoretical misunderstandings. Firstly, rank is not the domain of axis. Axis and rank are distinct local dimensions. Axis has two orders: the paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Rank has four orders: clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme in lexicogrammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

Secondly, structures are configurations of functions (Senser^Process) not rankscale forms (nominal group ^ verbal group). The sequencing of formal units is a syntagm.

[4] To be clear, without the stratification of content and expression, there can be no semiotic system. Semiosis requires that a Token means a Value. However, the stratification of the content plane is restricted to language, as demonstrated by the fact that only language can be read aloud, since the locutions that a Sayer projects are the wordings of the lexicogrammatical stratum.

[5] This is possibly a garbled reference to 'reservoir' and 'repertoire' in Martin's Bernstein-derived model of individuation.

[6] To be clear, this misrepresents the metafunctions. The metafunctions are "strongly motivated" as the basic types of meaning: construing experience as meaning, enacting intersubjective relations as meaning, and weaving these together as text. Each of these understandings of the metafunctions can be applied to semiotic systems. Indeed, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3) are sceptical of there being full semiotic systems without metafunctions:

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. … There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain.

Jim Martin Spruiking His Group's Work On Systemic Functional Semiotics

Jim Martin wrote to Sysfling on 25/8/23 at 11:43:

Cute, but let’s not be too cavalier about dismissing work that can reasonably be counted as SFS (such as that noted below). This work is explicit enough and comprehensive enough with respect to a range of semiotic modes that probing questions can be raised (and have been), including…

• Has enough attention been paid to materiality (the ‘etics’ materialising ‘emics’)?
• Has enough attention been paid to ‘constituency’ (ranks and taxis)?
• Has enough attention been paid to the interdependency of systems and their possible correlation with types of structure (re ‘metafunctions’)?
• Has enough attention been paid to stratification (is one stratum being made to do too much work)?
• Has enough attention been paid to instantiation (especially the modelling of abductive inferencing as texts unfold)?

The answer to each of these questions is some degree of “no”; in some cases extant SFL theory makes room for improvement (cf. van Leeuwen on the ‘materiality’ of sound or colour) and in other cases it is sorely lacking (e.g. how to model coupling, commitment and the abductive inferencing highlighted in the dynamic take on discourse semantics propagated by John and his colleagues).

The paper attached from the 2010 UTS ICOM meeting touches on many of the issues raised in this thread:

Multimodal semiotics: theoretical challenges. S Dreyfus, S Hood & M Stenglin [Eds.] Semiotic Margins: meaning in multimodalities. London: Continuum. 2011. 243-270.

images

Kress & van Leeuwen Reading Images

picture books

Painter et al. Reading Visual Narratives

animations

He ‘Towards a stratified metafunctional model of animation’ Semiotica 2021; 239; 1-35

paralanguage

Ngo et al. Modelling paralanguage using SFS

emoji

Zappavigna & Logi Emoji and Social Media Paralanguage (in press CUP)

infographics

Martin & Unsworth Reading Images for Knowledge Building

space

McMurtrie The Semiotics of Movement in Space

math symbolism

Doran The Discourse of Physics

chemistry symbolism

Yu Multimodal Knowledge Building in Secondary School Chemistry Textbooks (forthcoming Bloomsbury)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's concern here is not with whether theory has been understood and consistently applied in such work, but simply with whether the work is explicit and comprehensive enough to ask questions about what else needs to be done. The academic quality of the work is immaterial.

[2] To be clear, coupling and commitment are two of Martin's misunderstandings of SFL Theory. The notion of coupling derives from Martin's misunderstanding of metafunctions and strata as interacting modules (Martin 1992: 390ff). In fact, it merely makes the banal observation that features are selected with other features in instantiation. 

The notion of commitment derives from Martin's misunderstanding of delicacy and instantiation, namely: that speakers can choose the degree of delicacy they traverse in systems during instantiation, with greater delicacy corresponding to greater commitment. In fact, it is only by traversing the entire system to the most delicate features that lexical items can be specified.

[3] To be clear, abductive inferencing is not the best available mode of reasoning:

Abductive reasoning (also called abduction, abductive inference, or retroduction) is a form of logical inference that seeks the simplest and most likely conclusion from a set of observations. It was formulated and advanced by American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce beginning in the last third of the 19th century. Abductive reasoning, unlike deductive reasoning yields a plausible conclusion but does not definitively verify it. Abductive conclusions do not eliminate uncertainty or doubt, which is expressed in retreat terms such as "best available" or "most likely".

In later years his view came to be: 

Abduction is guessing. It is "very little hampered" by rules of logic. Even a well-prepared mind's individual guesses are more frequently wrong than right.

Moreover, abductive reasoning is formally equivalent to a logical fallacy:

Abductive reasoning allows inferring a as an explanation of b. As a result of this inference, abduction allows the precondition a to be abduced from the consequence b. Deductive reasoning and abductive reasoning thus differ in the direction in which a rule like "a entails b" is used for inference. As such, abduction is formally equivalent to the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent (or Post hoc ergo propter hoc) because of multiple possible explanations for b.

[4] Trivially, the papers in this publication are from the 2007 conference at the University of Sydney titled 'Semiotic Margins'. Non-trivially, Martin's paper in this collection includes his classic misunderstanding of Saussure and Hjelmslev. Martin (2011: 245):

To be clear, Saussure's signifié and signifiant correspond to Hjelmslev's content and expression, and it is these that are the focus of linguistics. The relation between these two levels of symbolic abstraction is simply realisation. 

[5] With regard to the work by Martin and his colleagues on paralanguage, see:

• Buyer Beware!
• Martin's Model Of Paralanguage

[6] For a critique of some of the theoretical misunderstandings in these works, see the earlier post Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism.