David Rose Misunderstanding Markedness

David Rose replied to Brad Smith on asflanet on 2 Sept 2024, at 21:21:

As you say, it’s related to instantiation, specifically the probability of instantiation... less likely choices are more marked. That gets you into knots with tone 1 imperatives here, which you say are ‘unmarked’ but are no more frequent than other tones in your data. A problem may be ambiguity of the term ‘neutral’. It can mean unmarked, but in Halliday’s key system it means neutral force, in contrast to mild, strong etc.

PS Key treats grammar/tone couplings as delicate mood choices, but another perspective is delicate speech function and appraisal choices... ‘what a command is trying to get done ‘

and on 3 Sept, at 13:27:

In contrast, marked/unmarked are used technically as feature labels in textual systems, theme and information focus. Could we perhaps avoid using these terms quasi-technically in pedagogic contexts, and reserve them for textual features? The ‘good reason’ is textual prominence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no problem here because markedness is not defined by frequency. Halliday (2005 [1991]: 68):

An unmarked term is a default condition: that which is selected unless there is good reason for selecting some other term. It is not defined by frequency, but it is likely to correspond to the more probable term in a system whose probabilities are skew.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 169) identify the different speech functions realised by imperative mood realised by different tones as follows:

command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)
invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)
request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t
plea: tone 4

The frequency of a selected tone will thus vary with the frequency of a selected speech function realised by imperative mood in a given text type, and this varies with the tenor relations of the interlocutors.

[2] This misunderstands the distinction between a feature and a classification of feature. In Halliday's system of KEY, Halliday & Greaves (2008: 208) 'neutral' is one of the features, not a classification of a feature as neutral or unmarked:

[3] This misrepresents the SFL model. To be clear, SPEECH FUNCTION (semantics) is realised by MOOD (lexicogrammar), and different features of KEY (lexicogrammar), realised by different features of TONE (phonology), differentiate the SPEECH FUNCTION of a MOOD into more delicate types. An example is the case of commands being differentiated into invitations, requests and pleas according to the tone selection, as in [1] above.

[4] To be clear, the unmarked/marked distinction is not restricted to features of textual systems, as demonstrated by the unmarked/marked distinction for the system of TONE, which realises interpersonal systems. Another interpersonal example is the unmarked choice of Subject; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 194):

For any clause, there is one choice of Subject that is ‘unmarked’ – that is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In a giving clause (offer or statement), the unmarked Subject is ‘I’; while in a demanding clause (question or command), the unmarked Subject is ‘you’.

An experiential example is unmarked/marked distinction for present tense, which varies according to PROCESS TYPE. 

[5] This misunderstands the 'good reason' principle. To be clear, 'textual prominence' is what choosing an element as Theme or New affords, and this is the case whether the choice is unmarked or marked. The 'good reason' principle, on the other hand, is what lies behind the choice of a marked option in preference to the unmarked option.

Brad Smith On Markedness Not Explained In Theoretical Terms

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 11:05:

Saying unmarked is the option one chooses except where there is 'some good reason', while helpful in learning how to analyse markedness, doesn't really explain the concept in theoretical terms. So far, until better educated, I am sticking with my discourse semantics motivation: imperative mood, phylogenetically and functionally, is the option to enact a command - to get that job done; and other options, co-selected with tone choices, are used to enact more complex moves such as polite command: '//1 ^ can I / start the order with your */ phone number please // ('give me your phone number' + deference)

and again at 14:17:

I guess my question with theoretical terms and concepts is, what am I asking this term/concept to do for me? We can never, sadly or not, get away from 'language turned back on itself' and all that implies... (including if we use multimodal semiotics as metadiscourse... mathematicians and scientists take note!)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is linguistic data produced by speakers and writers that are analysed, not markedness. Once data are theorised as a system network, relative markedness can be assigned by a linguist to alternative features in a system.

[2] To be clear, glossing 'unmarked' as the default or neutral choice explains the concept in everyday terms. On the other hand, Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7) explain the concept in terms of the theoretical dimensions of axis, instantiation and stratification:

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[3] To be clear, this is Halliday's theory, not Martin's discourse semantics.

[4] For some of the theoretical problems that invalidate the model of discourse semantics, see e.g.

• Review of English Text
• Review of Bateman's Review of English Text
• Review of Working With Discourse

[5] To be clear, like any theoretical concept, markedness is a means of understanding how language functions. For example, if a selection is marked, then there is a motivation for the selection to be sought. 

[6] To be clear, language is the most powerful semiotic system, so using language to model language is using the most powerful semiotic system to model language.

[7] To be clear, 'metadiscourse' is literally discourse about discourse. From an SFL perspective, what gets classified as metadiscourse is non-ideational meaning: aspects of interpersonal and textual meaning. It may be that Smith meant 'metalanguage', but this only applies to linguistic theory — language about language — not to (language about) mathematics and (language about) science.

Brad Smith On Phonological Congruence And His Problem With Markedness

Brad Smith replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 9:43 :

… in the SFL material I was browsing through yesterday afternoon, the terms unmarked and congruent seemed to be used more or less interchangeably.

I am not seeking to find the canonical definition to follow, but working out my own ideas on this (I believe, as a Doctor, this is not only my right but my responsibility!). The quoted passage from my YouTube lecture script, I think, is probably where I land on this: congruence, at least, relates, as you have said, to an inter-stratal relation, specifically what is being demanded of clause and tone group by the discourse semantics (that's my current take on this aspect). …

There are other, similarly troublesome issues of terminology and symbolism in SFL: for example, the same symbol, with minor, inconsequential adjustment, is used for both structural ordering and for a silent Ictus! …

In terms of intonation, however, unlike much of the rest of his work, this has not, relatively speaking, happened as much as I think Halliday wished or expected - for example, the functions of tonicity are still discussed in terms of (Given-New) structure; when the real game, for me, has always been, what gets chosen as focus against the background of what could have been chosen?...i.e. what is the systemic potential for a textual choice? (which, when you start to consider it, is a question with a lot of implications, including for theoretical accounts). 

Markedness is not a systemic description, it is a post hoc account of the valeur of certain choices: we consider, for example, which systemic option in the system of mood is unmarked; but this assignment of markedness, however, is not itself a systemic description - the systemic description of mood is declarative, polar interrogative etc. - We still have to work out what the actual potential for choice is for systems of tonicity, salience etc. (eg within/outside of the mood block can, in some texts, be consequential).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as demonstrated in the previous post, Smith's 'current take' on the interchangeability of 'unmarked' and 'congruent' is a theoretically invalid misunderstanding.

[2] To be clear, the troublesome issue here is using the symbol ^ for ordering (a^b) and the symbol ‸ for silent Ictus (/‸ /).

[3] To be clear, every non-tonic salient syllable realises what could have been selected as the tonic that realises the Focus of New information. The choice of the Given + New structure of an information unit, on the other hand, is a grammatical selection: tonicity is the phonological means of realising it.

[4] This misunderstands 'valeur'. To be clear, 'valeur' (Saussure) is the value of a term in a system in relation to the other terms.

[5] To be clear, descriptive terms like 'declarative', 'polar interrogative' etc. are features that describe language, whereas theoretical terms like 'unmarked' describe the features.

[6] To be clear, a selection of tonic placement realises a selection of a Focus of New information, which gives textual prominence to one or more functional elements of mood (and transitivity and thematic) structure.

David Kellogg On Identifying Clauses

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 23 Dec 2023,  at 12:24:

I am not sure if "typical" structures are the object of interest here: after all we are talking about verbal art. But even in ordinary life, I'm quite wary of making statements about "canonical" order without any corpus evidence.

For example, what about questions? Consider:

a) "What is your name?"

b) "What, after all, are names?"

You can see that in a) the order is Token Value, but the Token doesn't map onto the Subject but rather onto the Complement.

In b), which is surely much less common in life if more typical of verbal art, the order is Value-Token and the Subject does map onto the Token…

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. Token does map onto Subject, and Value onto Complement. Cf. What serves as your name? The information that the clause demands is the decoding of a Token by reference to a Value.

[2] To be clear, the sequence is Value^Token because the sequence is Complement^Subject. The information that the clause demands is the encoding of a Value by reference to a Token.

. 

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 180):

In other words, ‘identifying’ clauses select for voice; they have an ‘operative’ and a ‘receptive’ variant. The difference is entirely systematic, once we recognise the structure of Token and Value: the ‘operative’ voice is the one in which the Subject is also the Token (just as, in a ‘material’ clause, the ‘operative’ is the variant in which the Subject is also the Actor. The most important difference is that the typical verb of the ‘identifying’ clauses, namely be, has no ‘passive’ form; so clauses like the villain is me and I am the ugly one do not look like ‘receptive’ clauses. But they are. This appears clearly when we substitute a different verb, one which has a ‘passive’ form, as in the villain is played by me.

David Rose Misrepresenting IFG On Modality

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 25/7/22 at 17:44:

Thanks Chris, for another opportunity to compare the models.

Again, MODALITY is a described grammatical system, at clause rank in English, but the same term is used below for a semantic ‘domain’. And again, the account in IFG 1/2 differed from the account in IFG 3/4. In IFG1/2, MAKH described the implicit/explicit: subjective/objective orientations topologically, as interpersonal metaphors of modality. But in IFG 3/4 they are presented instead as features in the MODALITY system, within the MOOD system (Fig 4-13, Fig 4-23). The entry condition for this system is [clause], but the metaphorical realisations of subjective and objective orientations are projections and embedding (I think.../it is likely that...), blurring the line between grammar and semantics.

The described discourse semantic system is APPRAISAL: ENGAGEMENT: heterogloss, for which MODALITY is one resource to introduce additional voices into a discourse, alongside PROJECTION and CONCESSION.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading. Halliday (± Matthiessen) explicitly describes MODALITY as a semantic system. Halliday (1994: 356) and Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 691):

The reason this area of the semantic system is so highly elaborated metaphorically is to be found in the nature of modality itself … Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no – the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.

The fact that it is construed as a semantic system is also demonstrated by it having both congruent and metaphorical grammatical realisations. 

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Less importantly, it is only the explicit ORIENTATION that is metaphorical (Halliday 1994: 362). More importantly, the topological representation in IFG1/2 (and IFG3/4) does not describe MODALITY systems, but the relation of modality to polarity and mood. Halliday (1994: 367):

[3] This is misleading, because MODALITY is presented as a system network in IFG1/2 as well as IFG3/4. Halliday (1994: 358, 360):

Cf. Figure 4-23 in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 182):

[4] This is misleading. By including the system of MODALITY in his grammatical network of MOOD — Figure 4-15 in IFG3, Figure 4-13 in IFG4 — Matthiessen is interpreting grammatical form (modelled as a rank scale) in terms of its function in realising meaning, consistent with the modus operandi of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Contrary to Rose's claim, the rank of clause is the appropriate entry condition for clause rank complexing (projection) and  clause rank elements realised by embedded clauses.

[5] For some of the misunderstandings in Working with Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007) in this regard, see:

• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality, Obligation, Inclination And Ability
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Obligation
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Projections", "Polarity" And "Modality"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive But"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concession"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive Conjunctions"

Importantly, projection is not included as a logical system in discourse semantics (Martin 1992, Martin & Rose 2007). This is because the original intellectual source of Martin's CONJUNCTION is the system of cohesive conjunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976), and projection does not function cohesively. So, not only does discourse semantics fail to account for the semantics of projection, it also disables any attempt to account for grammatical metaphor in which projection is featured.

David Rose Misrepresenting Hasan's System As A Synthesis Of Martin's Systems

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 12/7/22 at 9:14:

What differs between the MESSAGE features in Figure 24.4 below and the mood features that realise them is their systemic valeur. The valeur of MOOD features is shaped by similarities and contrasts in the mood structures that realise them, exemplified in Table 24.4.

The valeur of message features is shaped by three factors as far as I can see. System G features by their position in exchange structures: verify/enquire etc. System F features by appraisal: precise/tentative; by field: specify/explain; again by exchange structure: prompted/unprompted; and again by field: global/particular...

In sum, the MESSAGE system attempts to synthesise the complementarity of two discourse semantic systems, NEGOTIATION and APPRAISAL. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the critical distinction between the semantic features of the SPEECH FUNCTION system and the lexicogrammatical features of the MOOD system is that each system of features is located at a different level of symbolic abstraction.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, the valeur of each MOOD system feature is its relations to other features in the system; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 96, 509). This misrepresentation of 'valeur' serves as a pretext for the misrepresentations that follow.

[3] To be clear, the valeur of each of Hasan's SPEECH FUNCTION system features is its relations to the other features in the system, and as such, they are not "shaped by" other systems such as APPRAISAL or FIELD, the latter being Martin's misunderstanding of ideational semantics as register misunderstood as context.

[4] This is very misleading indeed, because it misrepresents Hasan's (earlier) system as an attempt to synthesise Martin's (later) systems, one of which, NEGOTIATION, is Martin's rebranding of SPEECH FUNCTION.

David Rose On Ideational Metaphor

David Rose wrote to Johanna Salomonsson on SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, at 09:52:

My apologies, I missed this example, "A happy baby makes a happy mother" 

This can only be identifying, as it is simple present (so not material) and reversible (so not attributive). 

It seems odd because of the ‘cause-in-the-clause’ logical metaphor (‘if a baby is happy, then a mother is happy’). The identifying grammatical meaning is in tension with a consequential discourse semantic meaning. 

A fuller account would ask the function of the metaphor in the discourse sequence. The consequential meaning is a link in a chain of reasoning. The identifying meaning is non-negotiable. It reads like a wise old proverb. 

The sequence as a whole realises the ‘grounds’ for a proposal at register level...

Grounds...

Your child will thrive on Glaxo

when all else fails

because it is a natural substitute for breast milk

(now we all know) A happy baby makes a happy mother

(so) Your happy Glaxo baby will make you a happy mother

Conclusion...

(You should buy Glaxo)

(Another point for your readers – realisation between strata)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, Rose didn't "miss" the example, he misanalysed it as an assigned attributive clause, as his own words make plain:

your second examples are caused attributive relations, in which Attributor is additional Agent from ergative perspective

[2] This misunderstands the grammatical metaphor. This instance is not a contrast between 'identifying grammatical meaning' and 'consequential semantic meaning', not least because both the identifying relation and the cause-conditional relation feature on both strata. 

Grammatically the cause-conditional relation is construed metaphorically as a Process of an identifying clause, instead of congruently as a relator of clauses in a clause complex.

Semantically, the clause both congruently realises an identifying figure of being and incongruently realises a sequence of figures in a cause-conditional relation. See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243, 244, 272, 278, 283) on ideational metaphor as a 'junctional' construct.

[3] To be clear, Rose has here invented an imaginary text. The original query (here) presented three separate instances, with no suggestion that they formed a continuous text:

Your child will thrive on Glaxo when all else fails because it is a natural substitute for breast milk

A happy baby makes a happy mother

Your happy Glaxo baby will make you a happy mother

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. The presence of a Mood element in this declarative clause opens it up for negotiation:

A happy baby makes a happy mother

— Yes, it does.

— No, it doesn't.

[5] To be clear, as explained elsewhere, Rose follows Martin in misunderstanding register as a stratum of context rather than a sub-potential of language. In Martin's model, functional varieties of language are not considered language, which is analogous to functional varieties of dog — cattle dog, sheep dog — not being regarded as dogs.

Mick O'Donnell On The Difference Between 'Should Not Fail To See' And 'Should See'

After Wendy Bowcher asked on Sysfling on 6 May 2021 at 19:15:

I am wondering why (semantically/contextually) the advertisers might chose to use the 'not fail to' form. Why not just use sentence (2) in the headline?

(1) EVERY MOTHER WHO VISITS THE SHOW SHOULD NOT FAIL TO SEE GLAXO EXHIBIT

(2) EVERY MOTHER WHO VISITS THE SHOW SHOULD SEE GLAXO EXHIBIT

Mick O'Donnell replied on Sysfling on 6 May 2021 at 20:32:

I think the real difference between the alternative wordings can be brought out by an alternative transitivity analysis:

In the first, the mother construes herself either as a failer or succeeder, depending which polarity she chooses to produce by her action.

In the second, she is a perceiver or a non-perceiver (or more in line with a material interpretation, a visitor or non-visitor):

Our society invests a lot more personal judgement in failure/success than it does in perceiving/ignoring (as Bradley commented, bring in the Appraisal angle).

Adding in "should", Australians are more likely to accept an admonition to succeed than an admonition to visit something. Admonitions are more acceptable when the recommended action is to the benefit of the addressee (e.g., imperatives are fine in a recipe but less so from student to teacher), and telling someone to success could be seen as working for their benefit).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the difference between the two wordings is that, in the first wording, should not fail to see, the Process is realised by a verbal group complex, and so by two Events, whereas in the second wording, should see, the Process is realised by a verbal group, and so by just one Event.

The verbal groups in the complex are related hypotactically, and the semantic relation between them is conation: trying and succeeding (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 572)

[2] To be clear, these are not alternative analyses of the original wordings; see [1]. Moreover, they are not consistent with SFL Theory, since the first misinterprets the secondary verbal group as part of the Goal, and the second misinterprets the mental clause as material (as if it were Mother visited something):

[3] To be clear, it is not the mother, but the speaker/writer, who construes experience as Mother, and construes her as an Actor of a material Process which was unsuccessful.

[4] To be clear, the mental interpretation of the clause, which forms one thread of O'Donnell's argument, is inconsistent with his analysis of the clause as material.

[5] To be clear, this is meant to explain why the advertisers chose the first wording over the second, but instead of making use of SFL Theory, it just makes generalisations about reader reactions.

Using SFL Theory, the use of should in both wordings can be explained by reference to context and semantics. In terms of context, the rhetorical mode of the text is one of exhortation, since its function is to urge readers to take a particular course of action. For Matthiessen (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 34), this (textual) mode is oriented to (interpersonal) tenor, rather than (ideational) field. The unmarked interpersonal semantic realisation of exhortation mode is the speech function 'command', and in both wordings, the command is realised metaphorically by a modulated declarative. This interpersonal metaphor is itself motivated by the tenor relations between advertiser and reader, including their relative status and contact.

Moreover, the rhetorical mode of exhortation also provides an explanation for why the first wording was used by the advertisers, since should not fail ramps up the exhortation to coercion: every mother who visits the show should not fail…, which might be taken to imply that readers would be failing their children as mothers if they were not to see (the) Glaxo exhibit.

Also relevant here is the double negative (grammatical not and lexical fail) of the primary verbal group, which might be taken as an emphasis of positive polarity.

See also (The) Glaxo Exhibit: Theme, Transitivity & Mood.

David Rose On Jim Martin's Coupling/Co-instantiation

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on SYSFLING on 24 Aug 2020 at 13:36:

Ed McDonald:

2. The idea of co-instantiaton is also an interesting one:

My gloss for coupling, defined by Martin et al. (2013, p. 469) as ‘the co-selection of linguistic resources across ranks, metafunctions, strata, and modalities which are not specified by system/structure cycles’.

Systems at each stratum make distinct contributions…eg variations in tone and mood couple to instantiate variations in speech function

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's definition of 'coupling' is invalid, because system/structure cycles do not specify any co-selection of paradigmatic features ("linguistic resources"). To explain:-

The process of instantiation is the selection of paradigmatic features and the activation of realisation statements which specify how systemic options are realised along the syntagmatic axis, whether structural or cohesive. System/structure cycles are the iteration of this realisation relation between axes during logogenesis, the unfolding of text. On this basis, system/structure cycles do not specify which features are (co-)selected; feature (co-)selection is the paradigmatic dimension of system/structure cycles.

[2] To be clear, this confuses instantiation with realisation. Instantiations of "variations in speech function" are the speech function features that are selected during logogenesis. The relation between speech function and mood, and between mood and tone, is realisation, since these three systems are located on three different strata: semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology.

However, strictly speaking, the system of TONE does not realise the system of MOOD, but the system of KEY, which is associated with the system of MOOD (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 168). It is the combination of KEY and MOOD that realises SPEECH FUNCTION.

David Rose On Imperative Mood And Obligation

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 12 Aug 2019 at 08:50:

Subjunctive mood is not recognised in SFL… 

Semantically, imperative mood realises obligation, obligating the Subject to act. In modern English this is normally the addressee, so that imperative mood congruently realises a command to the addressee. 

These clauses are relics of archaic systems with a non-addressee Subject, that obligate the Lord/God to act. Stepping up to the stratum of register, it was/is the role of priests to speak to God on behalf of the people, and to the people on behalf of God. Here the priest exhorts God to bless, forgive or be with the addressee, who is realised grammatically as Complement or Adjunct, whereas God is Subject. Paradoxically, the priest is exhorting God while addressing the people. Maybe that’s why such blessings sound archaic… they don’t make sense ;-)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'subjunctive mood' is recognised in SFL theory, but in its description of English, it is a system of the verbal group, not the clause, and termed 'subjunctive mode' to distinguish it from the clause rank systems of MOOD.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 143n):

Note that the system of MOOD is a system of the clause, not of the verbal group or of the verb. Many languages also have an interpersonal system of the verb(al group) that has been referred to as ‘mood’: it involves interpersonal contrasts such as indicative/subjunctive, indicative/subjunctive/optative. To distinguish these verbal contrasts from the clausal system of MOOD, we can refer to them as contrasts in mode. The subjunctive mode tends to be restricted to the environment of bound clauses – in particular, reported clauses and conditional clauses having the sense of irrealis. In Modern English, the subjunctive mode of the verb is marginal, although there is some dialectal variation.

[2] To be clear, here Rose confuses SPEECH FUNCTION (proposal: command) with MODALITY (modulation: obligation).  In SFL, a command is specified as a demand for goods-&-services, whereas obligation is concerned with the semantic space between positive and negative POLARITY in proposals. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 177-8):

In a proposal, the meaning of the positive and negative poles is prescribing and proscribing: positive ‘do it’, negative ‘don’t do it’. Here also there are two kinds of intermediate possibility, in this case depending on the speech function, whether command or offer. (i) In a command, the intermediate points represent degrees of obligation: ‘allowed to/supposed to/required to’;

[3] For clarification, the clauses in question are:

The Lord be with you
God bless you
God forgive you your sins

[4] In SFL theory, tenor is a dimension of context, not register.  Register, on the other hand, is a sub-potential of language: a point of variation on the cline of instantiation.

In terms of the architecture of SFL theory, Martin's notion of register as a stratum of context is inconsistent with the notion of register, the notion of stratum, and the notion of context.  As functional varieties of language, registers are language, not context; as functional varieties, registers are sub-potentials, not a stratal system.  For evidence of Martin's misunderstandings of register, see here; for evidence of Martin's misunderstandings of context, see here.

[5] Trivially, the addressee you serves only as Complement in these clauses, specifically of the Predicators bless and forgive and of the minor Predicator with.

[6] For a deployment of SFL theory that demonstrates how and why such well-wishings do make sense, see the analysis here.

Robin Fawcett On Michæl Halliday's Grammatical Systems As Semantic

Robin Fawcett wrote to Sysfling on 23 Jun 2019 at 15:49:

My concern in my short memoir was to remind us all of his role in welcoming and re-enforcing the fundamental message of Halliday''s important 1966 paper — and in particular through his insightful introductions to the sections of the book. These were the first intimations of a concept that Halliday was exploring — and often seems completely committed to — in his writings on the late 1960s and early 1970s (and indeed in Halliday 1985, though less so in Halliday 1994). This was the concept that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and LOGIOC-SEMANTIC RELATIONS provide choices between meaning — i.e. semantic features), not forms …

Blogger Comments:

See the immediately preceding post.

For the second time in two days, Fawcett uses the tragic untimely death of a colleague as a pretext for promoting the SFL theoretical architecture that Halliday abandoned after 1978, largely because Fawcett mistakenly believes that Halliday's superseded model leaves room in the SFL architecture for his theory of syntax at the level below semantics.

For why Fawcett's model does not withstand close scrutiny, see the explanations here.

With regard to Fawcett and tragic untimely deaths, see here for Fawcett's public dishonest treatment of me at the time of my mother's cruel, premature death from mesothelioma.

Shooshi Dreyfus On 'Does'

After William Armour wrote to sys-func on 29 January at 13:19

1) Is the function of the 'does' in

While this notion does make sense on the surface,

one of emphasis, or something else?

2) How does it compare to

While this notion makes sense on the surface,

? No emphasis?

Shooshi Dreyfus replied on 12 February at 07:49:

And building on these comments, surely you can’t look at this properly till you see the co-text? Firstly, it’s a dependent clause and in order for us to understand it we need to see not only the independent clause with which it must be paired but also the rest of the text so we can see the prosody being “carried” through the rest of the text? Surely the “does”, in part, gets its meaning from all those other meanings around it that are contributing to whatever “argument” is being built here?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be sure, the significant differences between the two clauses can be "looked at properly" by applying SFL theory, even in the absence of co-text:

While	this notion	does	make	sense	on the surface
	Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	comment Adjunct: qualified: validity
'reservation'				'reservation'
Given		New: contrastive	Given		New: contrastive

While	this notion	makes		sense	on the surface
	Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	comment Adjunct: qualified: validity
'reservation'
Given					New: contrastive

To be clear, both variants could be instantiated with the exact same co-text.

[2] To be sure, it is not necessary to see any other clauses in order to understand the differences between the two presented for discussion, as [1] above demonstrates.

[3] To be sure, any prosodies "being carried through the rest of the text" are relevant to the rest of the text.  The prosody "being carried through" the instances in question is TONE 4 which here realises the KEY feature 'reservation'.  However, this doesn't distinguish the two clauses, since it is instantiated in both.  The distinction between them is informational (textual), dependent on whether or not the Finite can be highlighted as contrastive.

[4] To be sure, the meaning of does is realised by its congruent grammatical function in this instance.