Shooshi Dreyfus On Circumstantial Meaning

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote to SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, 16:00:

Right, so here’s where I’d like to push us to think beyond clause constituents and up to circumstantial meaning, which can be realised a cross a range of grammatical structures. For example:

On the table (circumstance location place) there is a book

The book on the table (Qualifier) is mine

The book is on the table (Participant in relational clause – not going to argue about which)

How does one explain how this meaning can move around like this? By thinking of it as more than a clausal constituent. 

H&M and JRM point to this in different places but Jing Hao I have a paper on this if anyone is interested. 

It makes SO much more sense to think like this (sorry if that’s notional Jim) and helps students NOT make the errors of analysing beta enhancing clauses (eg when the book was on the table, I spilt my tea on it) and Qualifiers etc as Circumstances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday does far more than merely "point" to this — it is his model. Circumstantiation constitutes one domain of manifestation of the transphenomenal fractal types of expansion and projection — transphenomenal because they operate across various categories of phenomena, and fractal because they are organising principles across different scales; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 268).

That is, the meanings that are realised as circumstances are also realised across a range of other grammatical domains, as outlined by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 670-3), who exemplify this for 'cause' as follows:

[2] To be clear, this type of variation can be explained by the fact that a prepositional phrase that realises the meaning 'spatial location' can serve as a circumstance or circumstantial participant of a clause, or be rankshifted to serve as the Qualifier of a nominal group.

[3] To be clear, these types of student errors reflect an inability to analyse formal constituency, since:

• mistaking a β clause for a circumstance is mistaking a clause for a prepositional phrase, and
• mistaking a Qualifier for a circumstance is mistaking a rankshifted prepositional phrase for a ranking one.

Shooshi Dreyfus On 'Does'

After William Armour wrote to sys-func on 29 January at 13:19

1) Is the function of the 'does' in

While this notion does make sense on the surface,

one of emphasis, or something else?

2) How does it compare to

While this notion makes sense on the surface,

? No emphasis?

Shooshi Dreyfus replied on 12 February at 07:49:

And building on these comments, surely you can’t look at this properly till you see the co-text? Firstly, it’s a dependent clause and in order for us to understand it we need to see not only the independent clause with which it must be paired but also the rest of the text so we can see the prosody being “carried” through the rest of the text? Surely the “does”, in part, gets its meaning from all those other meanings around it that are contributing to whatever “argument” is being built here?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be sure, the significant differences between the two clauses can be "looked at properly" by applying SFL theory, even in the absence of co-text:

While	this notion	does	make	sense	on the surface
	Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	comment Adjunct: qualified: validity
'reservation'				'reservation'
Given		New: contrastive	Given		New: contrastive

While	this notion	makes		sense	on the surface
	Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	comment Adjunct: qualified: validity
'reservation'
Given					New: contrastive

To be clear, both variants could be instantiated with the exact same co-text.

[2] To be sure, it is not necessary to see any other clauses in order to understand the differences between the two presented for discussion, as [1] above demonstrates.

[3] To be sure, any prosodies "being carried through the rest of the text" are relevant to the rest of the text.  The prosody "being carried through" the instances in question is TONE 4 which here realises the KEY feature 'reservation'.  However, this doesn't distinguish the two clauses, since it is instantiated in both.  The distinction between them is informational (textual), dependent on whether or not the Finite can be highlighted as contrastive.

[4] To be sure, the meaning of does is realised by its congruent grammatical function in this instance.

Shooshi Dreyfus Mistaking Non-Defining For Defining Relative Clauses

Shooshi Dreyfus replied to Sarah on sys-func on 11 Nov 2018, 11:33:

Here’s my version of your analysis – but it’s only one version and you could analyse the last bit as a second clause but I think this works too:

Third, the crisis [[(that is) in the European and the global economy]] [ACTOR – with downranked spatial meaning ie NOT a circumstance but a Qualifier realising circumstantial meaning] has entered [PRO: MATERIAL] a second phase, [[(that is) characterized by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //and (which) is uneven [ATTRIBUTE] across countries]]

Basically, this way, you’ve got one clause with lots of embedding, which is typical of highly written text. And you’ve got circumstantial meaning being realised across numerous lexicogrammatical structures – see my attached paper (and have another one forthcoming on circumstantial meanings)

Blogger Comments:

[1] The proposed analysis can represented as follows:

Third	the crisis [[in the European and the global economy]]	has entered	a second phase [[characterised by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //  and is	uneven	across countries]]
	Actor	Process: material	?	Attribute	?

[2] To be clear, the instance in question is a complex of four clauses:

Third, the crisis in the European and the global economy has entered a second phase	characterised by a recovery	that is proceeding at a faltering pace	and is uneven across countries
α	= β
	α	= β
		1	+ 2

Suggested transitivity analyses of the four clauses can be viewed here.

[3] Trivially, this is an embedded phrase ([ ]), not an embedded clause ([[ ]]).

[4] Trivially, // marks a tone group boundary, not a clause boundary (||).

[5] The primary source of Dreyfus' confusion — analysing a complex of four clauses as a single clause — is her mistaking non-defining relative clauses (hypotactic elaboration) for defining relative clauses (embedded clauses serving as nominal group Qualifier).

[6] To be clear, the circumstantial meanings in this instance are realised grammatically as

• locational Qualifier (nominal group): in the European and the global economy;
• circumstance of Manner (clause): at a faltering pace;
• circumstance of Location (clause): across countries.

Shooshi Dreyfus On The Transitivity Of 'Live'

In response to the following query on the Systemic Functional Linguistics Interest Group:

What kind of process is 'live' in the following sentence - We live in the same city. Is it relational??? Identifying circumstantial?

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote on 22 June 2016:

Not relational and there's conjecture whether it's material or behavioural. If you are a strict Hallidayan, it might be behavioural as only sensate beings can do behavioural processes whereas anything, sensate or non-sensate can do material processes. However, as a Martinian, behavioural clauses are those that seem like verbal and mental but can't project. Definitely NOT relational as relational relates one participant to another.

and on 23 June 2016:

[In the] example 'he is in the kitchen', 'in the kitchen' is not functioning as a circumstance in this instance, it's functioning as an Attribute. Circumstantial meanings are incredibly versatile and can move around the clause mapping onto all kinds of constituents … . And from above, living is NOT being. Though we could probably argue about that till the cows come home, … And I recall Fran Christie telling me that Michael Halliday told her that living and dying are material.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The clause we live in the same city is an intensive attributive relational clause — as opposed to material — on several grounds.

Viewed from above, it means 'we are in the same city' rather than 'we do in the same city'.  That is, in terms of the complementary perspectives of being-&-having and doing-&-happening, the construal is one of being.

Viewed from roundabout, the unmarked present tense is simple not the present-in-present, so relational not material.  If it were material, the simple present tense would be marked because it would carry the added feature 'habitual'.

A 'behavioural' interpretation is ruled out by the definition of behavioural processes as physiological and psychological processes as behaviours.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 171):

On the borderline between ‘material’ and ‘mental’ are the behavioural processes: those that represent the outer manifestations of inner workings, the acting out of processes of consciousness and physiological states.

[2] To be 'a strict Hallidayan' is merely to understand and apply the theory that is the brainchild of Halliday;  Cf 'a strict Einsteinian'.

synonyms: precise, exact, faithful, true, accurate, unerring, scrupulous, careful, meticulous, rigorous
antonyms: imprecise, loose

[3] This is not a criterion for distinguishing behavioural processes from material and relational processes.  Conscious beings can participate in all process types.

[4] In matters of grammar, Martin purports to be following Halliday — e.g. Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: i) — and so, any differences are misunderstandings, rather than competing interpretations. The treatment of behavioural processes in this work, Deploying Functional Grammar, is particularly confused, as demonstrated here.  Moreover, contrary to Dreyfus' claim, Martin et al. (2010: 124) analyse some projecting clauses as behavioural.

[5] This is misleading in two ways.  On the one hand, there are relational clauses with only one participant (Carrier).  This occurs when a quality is construed as a qualitative Process (it matters) rather than as a qualitative Attribute (it is important); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 222).

On the other hand, the prepositional phrases in the same city and in the kitchen serve as circumstantial Attributes; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 240-1).

With regard to the participanthood of Attribute, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 123) write:

… the Attribute cannot be mapped onto the interpersonal rôle of Subject.  This is because only participants in the clause can take modal responsibility, and the Attribute is only marginally, if at all, a participant.

[6] Hearsay is not argument, and in this case, it demonstrably misrepresents Halliday's view.  The function of a verb (verbal group) depends on the clause in which it figures.  The verb 'live' can serve as a material Process (he lives life to the max), as a relational Process (he lives in Japan), and as an existential Process (Elvis lives).

Shooshi Dreyfus On Behavioural Processes

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote on 30 October 2014 to sysfling:

I think this is the sensate Subject that I recall Carmel Cloran talking about. So to summarise (and add):

• Is the Doer a sensate being?

• Does it seem like a mental (or verbal) process but can't project eg speak and listen

• Is it a process of physiological or psychological behaviour (both conscious and unconscious) eg cough, sneeze etc (but not think Mick – isn't think mental, cos can project)

Blogger Comment:

This exemplifies the widespread and persistent error of classifying verbs in terms of process types.  The same verb can serve as different process types, because the Process is a function of the clause.  For example, the verb breathe can serve as  Process in a behavioural clause, as in she breathed a sigh of relief, where the Range of the clause, a sigh of relief, is a Behaviour, and it can serve as Process in a material clause, as in they breathe oxygen, where the Range of the clause, oxygen, is not a Behaviour, but the Scope of the breathing process.  See related analyses here.

Shooshi Dreyfus On Circumstantial Relational Processes

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote on 5 May 2014 to sys-func:

… I can't, (for some reason to do with what feels like ignoring the grammar to make way for the semantics, though perhaps that's not quite it) come at a circumstantial relational process (perhaps only because I have never heard of one – excuse my ignorance – point to them to read about please) …

Blogger Comment:

Circumstantial relational clauses are discussed in An Introduction To Functional Grammar (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 240-4).  Relational clauses are:

• either attributive or identifying (MODE OF RELATION), and
• either intensive, possessive or circumstantial (TYPE OF RELATION).

A system network for relational clause systems appears on page 217.