Mick O'Donnell On 'That Means'

Mick Donnell replied to Emma Vale on asflanet on 16 October at 22:50:

Be careful when saying:

you could take out the 'that means' and experientially the clause means the same thing, hence my suggestion that 'that means' is redundant

Just because it does not serve an experiential function does not mean it it redundant. It serves a logical function, and removing it loses the logical connectivity of ideas.

Shooshi says that "that means" is not conjunction but rather reference, and that is true if looked at in terms of grammar. But discoursally, "that means" is one discoursal strategy to link one clause to another as a consequence. For instance, would you take the following two clauses as saying the same thing:

The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun,

that means that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.

The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun.

Consequently, the Southern hemisphere is tilting away

For me, this is a case where a semantic relation between two processes can be mapped onto lexicogrammar in distinct ways.

And getting back to your example, the fact that "consequently" can be dropped without affecting the experiential meaning of the second clause does not mean "consequently" is redundant, just that it serves a logical not experiential function.

Blogger Comments:

 To be clear, the two clause complexes under discussion are:

When the Northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun that means that it is summer in the Northern hemisphere.

And because the northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun that means that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.

[1] Importantly, the inclusion of that means that is the student's step towards mastering grammatical metaphor. See Tilting Towards Grammatical Metaphor. Removing this wording makes the clause complexes more congruent:

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The wording that means serves the experiential functions Token and Process: relational: identifying: intensive: sign. The logical relation between the clauses in each complex is marked by the conjunction of the dependent clause: when (temporal) and because (cause: reason).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The reference is made by that, not that means.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The two wordings are not saying the same thing. The first pair of clauses (not a complex) are related by cohesive reference (that) and do not express the meaning 'consequence', whereas the second pair of clauses are related by cohesive conjunction and do express the meaning 'consequence'.

Agnate wordings of the first pairing include:

• The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun; that indicates that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.
• The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun; that suggests that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.
• The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun; that implies that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.

See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 269).

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The conjunctive Adjunct consequently, which does not feature in the original example under discussion, functions textually, not logically, since it marks a relation of cohesive conjunction.

∞

See also:

The Promotion Of Anti-Intellectualism In The SFL Community
Mick O'Donnell Falsely Accusing The Sys-Func Moderator Of Misogyny.

Mick O'Donnell On The Differences In Martin's Model

Mick O'Donnell replied to Attia Rasool on Sysling on 16/9/23 at 19:39:

My take on the differences in Martin's model:

1. What Halliday called "context of situation" was renamed as "Register" in the Martin approach. In the Halliday model, a register is "a variety of language, corresponding to a variety of situation", so is basically the language pattern appropriate to a context of situation. Martin lifted the term up to apply to the situation, not to the language used in the situation.

2. Martin and others (Rothery, Christie, etc.) added in a level of Genre above context of situation. As Annabelle said, this change was never adopted by Halliday, Hasan, and their followers. But it has proved popular in the area of Language Education, where it has proved useful to have individual genres existing as names in the theory, while in Halliday's approach, what a genre exists as a set of contextual features scattered across Field, Tenor and Mode (except since Matthiessen 2015 where terms like expounding, reporting, recreating, etc. are covered under Field).

3. Halliday's "Semantic" stratum is largely (but not entirely) a level of meaningful abstraction over the clause (or clause complex). Martin's "Discourse Semantics" has been described as "grammar above the clause", e.g., capturing patterns which don't respect the borders of clauses, e.g., reference, evaluation, logical relations, exchange, etc. Neither characterisation is totally true, but there is definitely a difference in orientation here. And certainly Hasan's work explored deeply patterns outside the clause (she introduced the notion of cohesion, cohesive harmony, schematic structure etc.)

4. Semantics was not highly specified by Halliday himself, and those who followed have proposed different components to the semantics. Most share some kind of Experiential and Logical semantics, and Speech Function as part of an Exchange semantics, some form of Thematic Progression, and Cohesion resources. The nature of these descriptions varies though, Hasan's "message semantics" takes a different turn that Eggin's (in the Martin camp) speech function network. And approaches to cohesive resources, while a common base in Hasan's work, varies in the way it is applied. Martin's model adds in other areas of semantics, e.g., Martin and White added in attitudinal, engagement and graduation models (part of Appraisal). And other components as well.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin (1992) rebranded Halliday's context — from potential to instance — as register. Context of situation is merely an instance of context. Despite modelling register as context instead of language, an instance of Martin's register is nevertheless an instance of language: a text. This inconsistency is exacerbated by Martin's acknowledgement that instantiation does not cross stratal boundaries (such as from context to the strata of language.

[2] To be clear, in Halliday's model, register is a subpotential of language, a point of variation at the midway point on the cline of instantiation between potential and instance. As such, it realises context at a point of variation at the midway point on the cline of instantiation between potential and instance: a situation type. Because situation is an instance of context, it is realised by an instance of language: text, not register.

[3] To be clear, this is a serious misunderstanding of the stratification of levels of symbolic abstraction. Locating genres, as text types, above context is misconstruing varieties of language as not being language and as more abstract than culture.

[4] To be clear, Martin's notion of genre is unwittingly scattered over various dimensions of SFL theory. As text type, genre is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. The types of genre are categories within rhetorical mode, context, and the stages of genres are semantic structures of text types.

[5] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) outline the explanatory advantages that motivate modelling semantics at a low level of abstraction above the grammar:

But in modelling the semantic system we face a choice: namely, how far "above" the grammar we should try to push it. Since the decision has to be made with reference to the grammar, this is equivalent to asking how abstract the theoretical constructs are going to be. We have chosen to locate ourselves at a low point on the scale of abstraction, keeping the semantics and the grammar always within hailing distance. There were various reasons for this.  

First, we wanted to show the grammar at work in construing experience; since we are proposing this as an alternative to cognitive theories, with an "ideation base" rather than a "knowledge base", we need to posit categories such that their construal in the lexicogrammar is explicit.  

Secondly, we wanted to present the grammar as "natural", not arbitrary; this is an essential aspect of the evolution of language from a primary semiotic such as that of human infants.  

Thirdly, we wanted to explain the vast expansion of the meaning potential that takes place through grammatical metaphor; this depends on the initial congruence between grammatical and semantic categories.

But in any case, it is not really possible to produce a more abstract model of semantics until the less abstract model has been developed first. One has to be able to renew connection with the grammar.

[6] To be clear, "patterns which don't respect the borders of clauses" are modelled in terms of cohesion in SFL Theory (Halliday & Hasan 1976). Martin (1992) rebranded these lexicogrammatical systems as his discourse semantic systems, rebranding reference and ellipsis-&-substitution as identification, lexical cohesion as ideation, and cohesive conjunction as conjunction (later connexion).

[7] To be clear, reference, evaluation, logical relations and exchange are all Halliday, not Martin. But see [10] below.

[8] This is misleading because it is untrue. See, for example, the 618-pages of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999). 

[9] This is potentially misleading, since speech function is Halliday, not Martin.

[10] The systems of APPRAISAL differ from all the other discourse semantic systems in that they were developed through the collective efforts of Martin's colleagues and PhD students, with a first, early version of the key subsystem of ATTITUDE set out in 1994 by Iedema, Feez and White in their monograph, Media Literacy. Martin is possibly often regarded as the founder of the theory on the basis of references he made to APPRAISAL in a 1997 paper ("Analysing Genre: Functional Parameters") and/or his fuller treatment in his 2000 paper ""Beyond Exchange: Appraisal Systems in English". (The 1997 chapter presented an account of the sub-system of APPRECIATION, which was also developed through collaboration, most notably through Rothery's work on visual arts education.) However, key elements of what is now the widely referenced version of the theory were first presented in White's 1998 PhD thesis and then in White's 2002 paper, "The Language of Evaluation and Stance" (Handbook of Pragmatics.)". The version of the theory now most widely deployed in textual analysis was outlined in Martin and White's 2005 The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English. It includes accounts of the following sub-systems: AFFECT (drawing on earlier work by Martin), JUDGEMENT (collaboration by Martin, Iedema, Feez and White), APPRECIATION (collaboration by Martin and Rothery), ENGAGEMENT (from White's 1998 PhD thesis), GRADUATION (White and Martin collaboration).

Mick O'Donnell On The Appraisal In A Metaphorical Clause

Michael O'Donnell wrote to the lang-eval list on 13 Jan 2023, at 01:32:

'the bright sunlight gave a false impression of warmth'

The sunlight is being metaphorically construed as a conscious communicating being. Within the metaphorical domain, the sunlight could be said to be evaluated negatively for veracity. 

Ignoring the potential animalisation, I would need to say appreciation:quality, with "false" acting as a graduating token lessening the appreciation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The metaphorical clause construes the bright sunlight as the Token of a Value:

If the bright sunlight had been construed as 'a conscious communicating being', it would have been construed as the Sayer of a verbal process. And even unpacking the metaphor yields mental processes, not verbal processes:

when someone saw the bright sunlight, they falsely inferred that the weather was warm.

Here O'Donnell has engaged in the 'notional semantics' that he has previously denounced in others, instead of 'following the grammatical principles that Halliday established' that he has previously insisted upon; see Mick O'Donnell On Following SFL Analytical Principles.

[2] To be clear, in the metaphorical clause, the negative assessment is a feature of the Value a false impression of warmth, not the Token the bright sunlight. The negative judgement of the bright sunlight, in terms of veracity, derives from misconstruing the relational clause as verbal, with the Sayer deemed to be dishonest, for communicating a falsehood.

[3] To be clear, if the metaphor is ignored, then the congruent rendering becomes the focus of the analysis. In this case, the assessment is one of negative judgement, in terms of capacity: falsely inferred. The function of the metaphor, therefore, is to conceal this judgement, since it omits its target: someone.

[4] To be clear, the target of the negative appreciation is the impression of warmth in the metaphorical clause. However, false enacts the attitude itself, not a graduation of it. That is, false does not "lessen" the negative appreciation. From the Appraisal Theory website:

Graduation

Values by which (1) speakers graduate (raise or lower) the interpersonal impact, force or volume of their utterances, and (2) by which they graduate (blur or sharpen) the focus of their semantic categorisations.

1. (FORCE ) slightly, somewhat, very, completely
2. (FOCUS) I was feeling kind'v woozy, they effectively signed his death warrant; a true friend, pure folly

Mick O'Donnell On The Stifling Of Work In SFL

Mick O'Donnell replied to David Rose on sys-func on 14/7/22 at 9:16:

… But in moving forward, we cannot apriori know which aspects of the established model are ones that need to change.

We cannot assume SFL as developed by MAKH or by Ruqaiya Hasan or by Jim Martin is God's Truth, immutable for all time. History has shown that models are always superseded as we apply the model to reality.

To me, too much work in SFL has been stifled by the need to stay within the bounds of the establishment. We have been trying to grow the theory outwards, or in complexity, without touching the Hallidayan core.

Jim Martin has always impressed me as someone who, while respecting the whole, is willing to change core assumptions, when the needs of linguistic modeling require it. In the late 1970s, trying to handle genres within the established model, and failing, he and others broke out functional tenor as a stratum above, which I for the most part buy as necessary. But whether you accept this modification or not is not important, what is important is that Jim has been (and continues to be) willing to throw out established ideas (even his own) if they don't fit new data. And anyone who is not willing to do similarly is kidding themselves if they think they are doing linguistic science.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The internal self-consistency of a model can be assessed purely by deduction, without reference to empirical data, and any model that is internally inconsistent, such as Martin's (evidence here)or Fawcett's (evidence here), is one that needs to change.

[2] On the one hand, this is deployment of the 'straw man' logical fallacy, since it postulates an absurd position as the one that is to be invalidated. On the other hand, this is O'Donnell once again invoking a religious stance that he attributes to others.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, models are semiotic systems, and as such, evolve as the environment in which they function changes, with semiotic systems being one source of that environmental change.

[4] To be clear, SFL Theory was devised by Halliday, and everyone else is using his theory. What gives the "Hallidayan core" its value, is, inter alia, its internal consistency as a theory, and its explanatory potential in modelling language. It "stifles" work in SFL in just the same way that Quantum Theory and General Relativity "stifle" work in physics.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Ignoring the motivation of personal ambition, Martin's models do not arise because they better fit the data, but because Martin misunderstands Halliday's model; evidence here.

[6] To be clear, this would be true, if this was, in fact, what Martin has actually done.

Mick O'Donnell Confusing Stratification With Instantiation And Delicacy

Mick O'Donnell replied to David Rose on sys-func on 11/7/22 at 22:07:

David Rose wrote: The semantic networks appear to re-systemicise the LG systems.

But that is exactly the role of semantics, a more abstract representation of the utterance. I also note the "systemicisation" in the semantics may reflect a totally different way choices are realised in the grammar. For instance, the choices in the speech functional network reflect lexicogram choices in clause mood and mood-tag, but also in intonation, and in one case the clause complex. So, the SEMANTIC NETWORK generalises over various forms across the grammar, which is what one would want.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the hierarchy of stratification with the cline of instantiation. To be clear, the semantic stratum is more abstract than lexicogrammatical stratum, whereas the utterance is the text, an instance of the system.

[2] This confuses the hierarchy of stratification (symbolic abstraction) with the scale of delicacy (generalisation).

Mick O'Donnell On Semantics–Grammar Mappings

 Mick O'Donnell replied to David Rose on sys-func on 11/7/22 at 22:01:

Firstly, one example from a non-Martin model does not validate your claim that ALL Hallidayan models map 1-to-1 from Semantics to Grammar.

Secondly, Yes, I agree that there is an apparent one to one mapping from Speech Function to Grammatical Realisation in Geoff's model. But in this case, I take this as a good thing. If we take seriously the claim that differences in form relate to differences in meaning, there should be semantic differences between the different grammatical metaphors.

The problem really stems from whether you are looking at the mapping of partial semantic specifications (which should have alternative realisation possibilities) or whether you are looking at mapping full semantic specifications (which should constrain the possibilities down to a single form).

In things I have looked at, it is often the case that two sentences are ideationally the same, but textually (informationally) different (e.g., John gave Mary a book vs Mary was given a book by John; or John might be leaving vs. John is possibly leaving). Just looking at the ideational meaning in isolation, there are multiple ways the meaning can be realised. But when one takes ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning all together at once, the [sic] will ideally be a single utterance that realises that meaning.

(exceptions here:

i) I am ignoring here the possibility that some models allow Context of Situation to "skip" semantics and affect lexico-grammatical choices without mediation of semantic choices. Add to this Context of Culture difference (which may lead to different ways in which a meaning is mapped onto form)

ii) some differences in form may not have any correlation in meaning, e.g., is there a meaning difference between "the man that I saw" and "the man who I saw"? Or between [sic]

In the case of Geoff's network, the difference in ways to ask for information are not so much cross-metafunction, but intra-metafunction: the different sub-choices reflect different interpersonal strategies for getting information. And as this network offers a complete speech-functional account of the possibilities, the end-points can be attached to definite lxg realisations.

We only get a many-to-one mapping between semantics and form when we work on partial semantic descriptions (e.g., demand:information). As I say above, a complete specification of meaning should result in a complete specification of form (barring as I said above models where context skips semantics to directly affect form choices)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday's theory distinguishes between 'compact' and 'dispersed' grammatical realisations of semantic systems, and adds that compactly realised systems 'may become dispersed in their realisation through grammatical metaphor'  (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 666-7).

[2] To be clear, the speech function network under discussion is from Hasan (1983), and its gloss includes one-to-many mappings between semantic features and grammatical realisations; see the previous post.

[3] Here again O'Donnell follows Fawcett in misconstruing the semantics-grammar relation as a relation between meaning and form. To be clear, in SFL Theory, grammatical form is modelled as a rank scale, and forms (e.g. nominal group) are interpreted in terms of their function in realising meaning (e.g. Phenomenon). In the absence of metaphor, semantics and grammatical function agree (are congruent).

[4] To be clear, the notion of different forms realising different meanings is independent of grammatical metaphor, and grammatical metaphor is not a meaning-form relation, but an incongruence between the function of a form (grammar) and the meaning that it realises (semantics).

[5] To be clear, here O'Donnell introduces two 'red herrings': agnate structures and the integration of metafunctional meanings into a single syntagm, as evidence on the question of whether or not there are one-to-one mappings between semantic and lexicogrammatical features.

[6] To be clear, the notion of semantics being "skipped" is nonsensical. Linguistic strata are the same phenomenon viewed at different levels of symbolic abstraction. In terms of the ideational metafunction, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) write:

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning.

[7] To be clear, SPEECH FUNCTION is an interpersonal system, and since the network from Hasan (1983) is part of her SPEECH FUNCTION system, it is necessarily "intra-metfunction".

[8] To be clear, although O'Donnell begins by continuing his argument against Rose's false claim that Halliday's theory posits a one-to-one mapping between semantic and grammatical features (first paragraph), he soon forgets what side of the argument he is on, and switches to arguing for Rose's claim, and ends by concluding in its favour (final paragraph). The switch begins when O'Donnell assesses what he wrongly accepts as a one-to-one mapping as 'a good thing' (second paragraph).

Mick O'Donnell On Semantics And Grammar

Mick O'Donnell replied to David Rose on Sys-func on 11/7/22 at 17:57:

I would not think any Hallidayan would ever posit a 1-to-1 mapping between Semantics and Grammar. That would invalidate the need for Semantics as a separate stratum. …

So, the mapping between Semantics and Grammar always needs to be seen as a many-to-many mapping.

- language provides multiple forms for realising a particular meaning.

- a particular form can express alternative meanings

(but yes, "Construing Experience" can be read (misread?) to suggest a one to one mapping between semantic process type selection and Transitivity selection in the grammar. Something I and other have argued against in the past. And not something that I think was intended by the authors, Christian and MAKH).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is metaphor that motivates semantics as a stratum of content. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237):

If the congruent pattern had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[2] Here O'Donnell misconstrues the distinction between semantics and grammar as a distinction between meaning and form. To be clear, the distinction in SFL Theory is between meaning and wording, where wording is form (the rank scale) interpreted in terms of its function of realising meaning; e.g. verbal group (form) as Process (function).

[3] This is misleading. On the one hand, PROCESS TYPE is a grammatical system within the larger system of TRANSITIVITY (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 219, 354-5), so, in this sense, the notion of a 'one to one mapping' of 'process type selection' to 'transitivity selection' is nonsensical.

On the other hand, in the absence of grammatical metaphor, the process type served by a verbal group is congruent with its semantic value. Moreover, in the case of grammatical metaphor, the incongruence is not between one process type and another, but between a process and some other element, as when a Process is realised grammatically by a Range participant, as he had a bath.

[4] To be clear, O'Donnell misunderstands the system of PROCESS TYPE, largely because he fails to recognise verbal group complexes. See, for example:

Mick O'Donnell On Process Types [1]

Mick O'Donnell On Process Types [2]

Mick O'Donnell On The Number Of Process Types

Mick O'Donnell On Process Types

Mick O'Donnell On The Difference Between 'Should Not Fail To See' And 'Should See'

Mick O'Donnell Confusing SFL's Architecture Of Language With Models

After ChRIS CLÉiRIGh wrote to sys-func on 28/6/22 at 11:54:

When someone uses the architecture of SFL, they mean what the theoretical architecture means. Inconsistencies arise when the architecture is not understood.

Mick O'Donnell responded on sys-func on 28/6/22 at 19:37:

Your language implies that you believe that there is one architecture of SFL. I have always enjoyed the plural nature of SFL, with multiple alternative architectures to choose from.

To me, the biggest threat to SFL as a continuing school is the attitude that only the word of God (MAKH) is true, and everything else is heresy. …

Pluralism is good. Even if it involves different choices in fundamental architecture. Choice is good. What is not good is continual sniping at those who choose to differ from Halliday in details (but not in fundamentals).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, SFL does propose only one architecture for language. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20) outline its dimensions as follows:

Importantly, all models proposed within SFL Theory use this architecture, including those of Martin and Fawcett. Importantly, because these dimensions are precisely specified, they can be used to identify models that misunderstand the architecture. For example, it can be seen that Fawcett's model (2010: 36) — which O'Donnell supports — misunderstands stratification and confuses axis with instantiation: 

[2] To be clear, here O'Donnell confuses the architecture with models using that architecture. The 'multiple alternatives' are the models, not the architecture.

[3] For me, "the biggest threat to SFL" is the inability of its community of users to understand the theory and, consequently, to detect misunderstandings of the theory.

[4] To be clear, here O'Donnell betrays his own religious orientation by projecting it onto others. Importantly, SFL Theory is a scientific theory, in the sense that its theoretical architecture of language is systematically organised and precisely specified. This means that models within the theory are subject to scientific criteria, not just chosen like the sacred text of a preferred religious sect. 

[5] To be clear, here O'Donnell reduces all the reasoned argumentation on this blog, using hard-won knowledge of SFL Theory, to "continual sniping'. The validity of the argumentation is of no interest to O'Donnell. The pedagogical value of blog is of no interest to O'Donnell.

[6] To be clear, the type of pluralism that O'Donnell advocates is not good. It exemplifies just the type of anti-intellectualism deplored by Asimov:

Mick O'Donnell On The Difference Between 'Should Not Fail To See' And 'Should See'

After Wendy Bowcher asked on Sysfling on 6 May 2021 at 19:15:

I am wondering why (semantically/contextually) the advertisers might chose to use the 'not fail to' form. Why not just use sentence (2) in the headline?

(1) EVERY MOTHER WHO VISITS THE SHOW SHOULD NOT FAIL TO SEE GLAXO EXHIBIT

(2) EVERY MOTHER WHO VISITS THE SHOW SHOULD SEE GLAXO EXHIBIT

Mick O'Donnell replied on Sysfling on 6 May 2021 at 20:32:

I think the real difference between the alternative wordings can be brought out by an alternative transitivity analysis:

In the first, the mother construes herself either as a failer or succeeder, depending which polarity she chooses to produce by her action.

In the second, she is a perceiver or a non-perceiver (or more in line with a material interpretation, a visitor or non-visitor):

Our society invests a lot more personal judgement in failure/success than it does in perceiving/ignoring (as Bradley commented, bring in the Appraisal angle).

Adding in "should", Australians are more likely to accept an admonition to succeed than an admonition to visit something. Admonitions are more acceptable when the recommended action is to the benefit of the addressee (e.g., imperatives are fine in a recipe but less so from student to teacher), and telling someone to success could be seen as working for their benefit).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the difference between the two wordings is that, in the first wording, should not fail to see, the Process is realised by a verbal group complex, and so by two Events, whereas in the second wording, should see, the Process is realised by a verbal group, and so by just one Event.

The verbal groups in the complex are related hypotactically, and the semantic relation between them is conation: trying and succeeding (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 572)

[2] To be clear, these are not alternative analyses of the original wordings; see [1]. Moreover, they are not consistent with SFL Theory, since the first misinterprets the secondary verbal group as part of the Goal, and the second misinterprets the mental clause as material (as if it were Mother visited something):

[3] To be clear, it is not the mother, but the speaker/writer, who construes experience as Mother, and construes her as an Actor of a material Process which was unsuccessful.

[4] To be clear, the mental interpretation of the clause, which forms one thread of O'Donnell's argument, is inconsistent with his analysis of the clause as material.

[5] To be clear, this is meant to explain why the advertisers chose the first wording over the second, but instead of making use of SFL Theory, it just makes generalisations about reader reactions.

Using SFL Theory, the use of should in both wordings can be explained by reference to context and semantics. In terms of context, the rhetorical mode of the text is one of exhortation, since its function is to urge readers to take a particular course of action. For Matthiessen (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 34), this (textual) mode is oriented to (interpersonal) tenor, rather than (ideational) field. The unmarked interpersonal semantic realisation of exhortation mode is the speech function 'command', and in both wordings, the command is realised metaphorically by a modulated declarative. This interpersonal metaphor is itself motivated by the tenor relations between advertiser and reader, including their relative status and contact.

Moreover, the rhetorical mode of exhortation also provides an explanation for why the first wording was used by the advertisers, since should not fail ramps up the exhortation to coercion: every mother who visits the show should not fail…, which might be taken to imply that readers would be failing their children as mothers if they were not to see (the) Glaxo exhibit.

Also relevant here is the double negative (grammatical not and lexical fail) of the primary verbal group, which might be taken as an emphasis of positive polarity.

See also (The) Glaxo Exhibit: Theme, Transitivity & Mood.

Mick O'Donnell On Process Types

Michael O'Donnell wrote to SYSFLING on 9 Apr 2021 at 21:35:

In my own practice, I have added a 7th process type modal-process, to cater to this type of process. For example, in English:

He allowed me to smoke.

They required us to teach long hours.

Verbs such as allow/permit/authorise, require/oblige, all allow projection. Yet they are not verbal in the sense that they do not necessarily involve communication, no addressee, etc. They are not mental, in that they are externalised in the real world, not just mental activity.

One could say that these last exclusion criteria are notional, while process type classification should be based on grammatical reactance. But in practice, our process type classification has always been somewhat of a hybridisation of semantic classification linked to common grammatical reactance. Halliday actually groups together various subtypes of verbal process, such as "she blamed him ..." (which do not project), the central verbals (say/tell etc,) which do project, and sometimes the non-projecting verbs such as talk/grumble etc. which in some issues of IFG are verbal. The only thing these all have in common is the shared notional involvement of verbal activity, or expanding out, communicative activity. But in the case of these "modal" processes, there is no necessary explicit communicative activity.

I haven't seen Halliday dealing with these verbs explicitly, but I may have missed it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here O'Donnell mistakes allowed and required for Processes of a clause in a clause complex, and on the basis of that misunderstanding proposes a new 'modal' PROCESS TYPE. In SFL Theory, each of these is the primary verbal group of a verbal group complex that serves as a material Process:

In hypotactic verbal group complexes, it is the (last) secondary verbal group that realises the PROCESS TYPE. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 568):

It is the secondary group, or last secondary group if there is more than one, that realises the process type of the clause, e.g. [material:] she seemed to mend it, [behavioural:] she seemed to laugh, [mental:] she seemed to like him, [verbal:] she seemed to tell us, [relational:] she seemed to be nice.

[2] To be clear, there is no projection in either of O'Donnell's examples, both of which are clause simplexes, not complexes. The relation between the verbal groups in each nexus is enhancement. See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 580, 582-4) on modulation in enhancing causative verbal group complexes.

[3] To be clear, this argumentation is irrelevant to the analysis of the two examples; see [1] and [2] above.

[4] To be clear, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Analysis requires taking a trinocular perspective, while giving priority to the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 48-9):

We cannot expect to understand the grammar just by looking at it from its own level; we also look into it ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, taking a trinocular perspective (Halliday, 1978: 130–131; 1996). But since the view from these different angles is often conflicting, the description will inevitably be a form of compromise. …

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a semanticky kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself.

[5] This is misleading, because it is not true. In the first edition of IFG (1985), the verbs talk and grumble do not feature at all. In the second edition (1994), these verbs are explicitly listed as exemplifying 'near verbal' behavioural processes. Halliday (1994: 139):

The two verbs are again listed as exemplifying behavioural processes in both the third edition (2004: 251), and the fourth (2014: 302).

[6] To be clear, what (genuine) verbal processes have in common is the symbolic exchange of meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 303, 304):

‘Saying’ has to be interpreted in a rather broad sense; it covers any kind of symbolic exchange of meaning … verbal processes might more appropriately be called ‘symbolic’ processes.

[7] To be clear, O'Donnell's notion of "modal" processes derives from a misunderstanding; see [1] above.

[8] When subsequently alerted to Halliday's (1994: 285Iff) analysis by Bartlett, O'Donnell replied:

Totally right, Tom. p287 actually gives examples of force/oblige/allow as causative structures.

Not that I will give up on my own approach.

Mick O'Donnell On Theme

Michael O'Donnell wrote to sysfling on 16 Jun 2019 at 18:24:

In Halliday's approach (for English), Theme stops with the first topical (experiential) element, which in this case is the circumstance of time, "in 1925". "Halliday" is thus Rheme. 

I myself am a proponent of the Berry approach (which I believe is similar to the Fawcett approach), whereby one has Subject-theme, and elements in front of that are also "Additional Theme", e.g. 

Additional-Theme	Subject Theme	Rheme
In May 1476,	he	He took part in an armed convoy sent by Genoa to carry a valuable cargo to northern Europe.
	He	docked in Bristol, Galway, in Ireland and was possibly in Iceland in 1477.
In 1479	Columbus	reached his brother Bartolomeo in Lisbon, keeping on trading for the Centurione family.
	He	married Filipa Moniz Perestrello, daughter of the Porto Santo governor, the Portuguese nobleman of Genoese origin Bartolomeu Perestrello.
In 1479 or 1480,	his son Diego	was born.

This approach better captures the continuity or discontinuity of the Subject selections, and allows for the presence of marked elements in front of the Subject.

Blogger Comments:

Applying this model yields:

Additional-Theme	Rheme	Subject Theme
blessed	are	the meek
on your left	is	the main bedroom
a little further on	is	the Rijksmuseum

Additional-Theme	Additional-Theme		Rheme	Subject Theme
where	precisely	in that case	are	they?

[1] This is the opposite of what is true. Unsurprisingly, the "continuity or discontinuity" of the Subject selections is shown by the selection of Subjects.  The question of the "continuity or discontinuity" of Subject selections as Theme is nullified by this approach, since all Subjects are claimed to be Themes.

[2] To be clear, this approach adds nothing with regard to "the presence of marked elements in front of the Subject", since 'Additional Theme' is just a rebranding of 'marked Theme', without acknowledging its markedness.  Moreover, it is the distinction between Theme and Subject that provides the criterion for the distinction between marked and unmarked Theme in declarative clauses.

∞

To be clear, this approach merely confuses the interpersonal selection of Subject, the carrier of modal responsibility in a clause as exchange, with the textual selection of Theme, the point of departure for a clause as message.  Subject is reprised in a Mood Tag; Theme is realised by everything up to and including the first experiential element.