John Bateman Confusing Two Traditional Orientations Towards Meaning

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 16:34:

In Peircean terms, the representamen, the interpretant and the object *co-art[i]culate* one another; there is no reference from semiotic stuff magically reaching into non-semiotic stuff (that would, indeed, as Malonowski [and van Fraassen] would have it, actually *be* magic!).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is an example of logical fallacy known as 'the straw man':

A straw man argument is one that misrepresents a position in order to make it appear weaker than it actually is, refutes this misrepresentation of the position, and then concludes that the real position has been refuted. This, of course, is a fallacy, because the position that has been claimed to be refuted is different to that which has actually been refuted; the real target of the argument is untouched by it.

Bateman's (unsourced) notion of "reference magically reaching from semiotic stuff into non-semiotic stuff" confuses

• the transcendent view of meaning, where linguistic meanings refer to meanings outside language, such as physical objects or concepts, with 
• the immanent view of meaning, where non-meaning is transformed into meaning.  

As previously noted, SFL adopts the latter perspective.

[2] For what Malinowski actually *says* about magic, download a free copy of his Magic, Science And Religion (1948) here.

John Bateman Misunderstanding Firth

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 16:34: 

In this sense, Firth's turning language back on itself is just ('just' sounds a bit unfair here but is not intended evaluatively, only ideationally) the working through of the belated (OK, that one was evaluative...) Wittgensteinian (and already of course Peircean :-) ) realisation that we don't have any direct access to some 'out there' where we can attach labels. Got it, been there, bought the T-shirt.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the Firth quote 'language turned back on itself'.  It is not concerned with the realisation that Bateman attributes to Wittgenstein and Peirce.  It simply means that linguistics involves using language to model language.  Halliday (2002 [1996]: 384):

All systematic knowledge takes the form of ‘language about’ some phenomenon; but whereas the natural sciences are language about nature, and the social sciences are language about society, linguistics is language about language – “language turned back on itself ”, in Firth’s often quoted formulation.

To be clear, for Firth (1957: 190), the systematic constructs of linguistic theory 'are neither immanent or transcendent, but just language turned back on itself'.  On the SFL model, however, since meaning is held to be immanent (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 416), meaning about meaning (the systematic constructs of linguistic theory) is also immanent.

[2] To be clear, just serves no ideational function at all; its interpersonal function is to enact 'counterexpectancy' of the type 'limiting'; that is, it limits what is to be expected (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 188).

In this sense	Firth's turning language back on itself	is	just	the working through of the belated  Wittgensteinian (and already of course Peircean) realisation that we don't have any direct access to some 'out there' where we can attach labels
	Identified Token	Process: identifying		Identifier Value
conjunctive Adjunct: matter	Subject	Finite	mood Adjunct: intensity: counterexpectancy: limiting	Complement
	Mood			Residue

[3] On the SFL model, it is not a matter of having access to 'out there', because there are no meanings 'out there' to have access to.  Instead, we transform our experience of 'out there' into meaning, distinguishing two orders: the 'material' (phenomena) and the semiotic (metaphenomena).

[4] Apparently, this is a variation on an idiom that expresses the speaker's complete familiarity with a situation, with overtones of cynicism or exhaustion.  (This again is the language of bullying: 'I know this stuff backwards, so don't try to argue'.)

John Bateman On Instantiations Of Theory And Peircean Semiotics

John Bateman replied to David Rose on sysfling on 13 May 2018 at 22:50:

I think predictions/hypotheses have to have a different status to observations, and I think the suggestion of a cline between full (prediction) and partial (observation) loses important aspects, although that is part of what is going on. Presumably it is the status that these representations within some discourse of doing science that makes a big difference. Certainly very meta. 

So all together, perhaps indeed Peirce might help a bit. When we are making observations (and describing them) we are making use of instantiations of the theory (using those instantiations as a resource to impose sense). And that does not mean that observations are then 'just' instant[i]ations of theory as if that defined what observations are. 

So at first glance I like your object : representamen : interpretant ~ data : description : observation proposal...

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear — given the strategically omitted word here 'instantiation' — Bateman previously claimed (here) that both predictions and observations are partial instantiations of theory, while simultaneously asserting that the relationship between observation and theory is not one of instantiation.

[2] To be clear, since an instance of theory is an actual theory, rather than an observation or prediction, this is not "part of what is going on".

[3] It is worth pointing out here that this statement is consistent with the notion of instantiation, since instantiations of theory — that is, actual linguistic theories — are used in observations about, and descriptions of, language.

[4] As previously explained here, these proportionalities are invalid, since they misconstrue an observation as the meaning or ramification of a description.

David Rose On "Co-Instantiation" And Peircean Semiotics

David Rose replied to John Bateman on sysfling list on 13 May 2018 at 22:31:

At any rate, I’m certain that any semiotic instance is a co-instantiation of many systems at multiple strata 

And that any observation co-instantiates multiple theories, more or less consciously …

Could Peirce help us here, if data were his object, observation the interpretant, and description the representamen?

Blogger Comments:

[1] With the term "co-instantiation", Rose follows Martin in confusing the distinct dimensions of instantiation and stratification.  In SFL theory, instantiation is a token-to-type (attributive) relation between an instance and the system of which it is an instance.  This necessarily locates both the instance and the system on the same stratum.  The relation between (instances of systems across) strata is realisation, a token–value (identifying) relation. 

[2] Since an observation is not an instance of theory (potential) — see the earlier post — it does not "co-instantiate" multiple theories.

[3] This mapping of categories is invalid, if only because it misconstrues an observation as the meaning or ramification of a description.  In Peircean semiotics:

An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an interpretant.

An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the sign's more or less clarified meaning or ramification, a kind of form or idea of the difference which the sign's being true or undeceptive would make.

A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broadest possible sense of "represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about something. It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial.