David Rose On Homophoric Reference, Contact And Instantiation

David Rose wrote to SYSFLING on 24 Jun 2024, at 19:35:

Homophoric reference is characteristic of contraction, instantiating close contact, discussed in English Text, eg from p531... 

... 

Leaving homophoric ‘the’ unsaid instantiates even closer contact.

and again at 21:27:

This little quote from Working with Discourse Ch 9 encapsulates it...

Contraction refers to the amount of work it takes to exchange meanings, and the idea that the better you know someone the less explicitness it takes... Technically speaking, the less information a homophoric reference contains, the tighter the community it constructs and the more people it excludes.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the instance under discussion is:

in the scene where the couple realise they are being stalked by the iconic masked killers, they get into the car trying to escape and the guy says:

[1] To be clear, if the speaker had said the car won't start, the reference would be exophoric to the car they are sitting in, not homophoric (self-specifying). But he could also have used other Deictics, such as our or my, which do not serve as reference items.

[2] To be clear, the proposed relation here would be realisation, not instantiation, since this is concerned with the relation between context and language. Instantiation is the relation between potential and instance.

[3] Rose's claim here is that the reason why the Deictic could be omitted in this instance is because of the amount of contact between the interlocutors, husband and wife. This suggests that if the speaker's addressee, sitting beside him in the car, had been a hitchhiker he had just met, and he had said simply car won't start, the addressee would need to have the referent clarified, with something like which car?

David Rose On The 1961, 1992 And 2024 Models Of Context And Instantiation

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 20 Mar 2024, 20:48:

In both 1961 and 92 models, context is realised by language (and other modalities), and language systems are  instantiated as text. In the 92 model, context is described as semiotic systems that are also instantiated as text (rather than as ‘settings’ in situations). Doran, Martin, Herrington supply the 2024 update.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. Scale-&-Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) does not construe levels as related by realisation, and neither does it construe a cline of instantiation as part of the theory.

[2] To be clear, Martin's notion that non-language (context) is instantiated as language (text) contradicts, inter alia, Martin's acknowledgement that the process of instantiation does not cross strata.

[3] This is misleading because it misrepresents settings and situations. In SFL Theory, a situation is an instance of context, the culture as a semiotic system. This contrasts with what Hasan calls the 'material situational setting' which is the first-order material environment from which is projected the second-order instance of language (text) and the semiotic context (situation) that it realises.

[4] To be clear, according to Doran, the update supplied by Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024) retracts the claim in Martin (1992) that context is instantiated as text.

David Rose On The "Slippage" Between The 1961 And 1992 Models Of Language And Context

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 20 Mar 2024, at 16:19:

The slippage is between 1961 and 92 models of lg and context 

61...

Lg described as semiotic systems instantiated as text (after Saussure, Firth)

Context modelled as culture instantiated as situation (after Malinowski)

Situation modelled as instantial categories of field, tenor, mode (not described as semiotic systems) 

92...

Context modelled as semiotic systems instantiated as text (after Hjelmslev)

Text instantiates systems at all strata (no ‘situation’ outside of semiosis)

Doran, Martin, Herrington describe field, tenor, mode systems as ‘resources’

Earlier classification model incorporated as ‘principles’ of instantiation

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Scale and Category Grammar differed from SFL Theory in that it had no system networks, no metafunctions, no cline of instantiation, and the level between grammar and situation was called context, not semantics. The architecture of language proposed by Scale and Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) was as follows:

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. Scale and Category Grammar ("the 1961 model") did not include a cline of instantiation.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. In Scale and Category Grammar ("the 1961 model"), 'context' referred to the equivalent of semantics in SFL Theory, and 'situation' referred to the equivalent of context in SFL Theory.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. In Scale and Category Grammar ("the 1961 model"), there were no metafunctions, and so, no metafunctional categories of situation.

[5] This is misleading because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, context is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, and field, tenor and mode constitute the projection of the metafunctions, modes of meaning, onto the culture as semiotic system.

[6] To be clear, this is the model of Martin (1992) in which Halliday's culture as semiotic system is mistakenly stratified into two perspectives on language variation: genre and register. In SFL Theory, genre, in the sense of text type, and register are at the midway point of the cline of instantiation: text type is register viewed from the instance pole, and register is text type viewed from the system pole of the cline.

[7] On the one hand, this is misleading because it falsely implies that Martin (1992) was the first to model context as semiotic. On the other hand, this is a self-contradiction, because text is an instance of language, whereas context is distinguished from language in Martin's stratification hierarchy.

[8] This is misleading because it is untrue. Hjelmslev did not model context as semiotic systems instantiated as text. Like Halliday before him, Martin used Hjelmslev's notion of a connotative semiotic as a semiotic that has a denotative semiotic, such as language, as its expression plane. Martin, however, misunderstood Hjelmslev on two counts. First, he mistook the content plane of the connotative semiotic, context, for the entire connotative semiotic. Then he mistook varieties of a denotative semiotic, genres and registers, for connotative semiotics.

[9] This repeats the self-contradiction of language (text) as an instance of non-language (context).

[10] This is misleading because it falsely claims that situation, as an instance of culture, is not modelled as semiotic, in Halliday's model.

[11] To be clear, in their model of field, tenor and mode as resources, Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024: 1) confuse context with semantics: 

In this paper, we review recent work in SFL which focuses on modelling register as a resource — reconceiving field as a resource for construing phenomena, tenor as a resource for negotiating social relations, and mode as a resource for composing texture. 

That is, having first misconstrued language (register) as context, Martin is now, with his colleagues, misconstruing context (field, tenor, mode) as language.

See also

• Negotiating Tenor: Enacting Affiliation In Dialogue And Monologue (Yaegan Doran)
• A Close Examination Of Yaegan Doran's 2023 ASFLA Plenary Abstract

[12] To be clear, the proposal of Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024: 12) is to remove Poynton's CONTACT and STATUS from tenor systems to make way for their misinterpretation of tenor as interpersonal semantics:

Accordingly, we will propose below that these dimensions [of contact and status] be interpreted as principles of instantiation, rather than as tenor options within the realisation hierarchy.

David Rose Confusing Misunderstood Stratification With Instantiation

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 20 Mar 2024, at 10:28:

Not easy to describe realisation and instantiation together in a gotcha friendly soundbite...

Genre configures recurrent dynamic couplings of selections in field, tenor, mode systems. Cultures assign names to these recurrent configurations ...story, conversation, argument, ceremony... SFL names them as features in system networks. Named features generalise recurrent instances. Features in field, tenor, mode systems are of a different order...item, activity, property; tender, render..

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the "soundbites" are 'situation' for an instance of context, and 'text' for an instance of the content plane of language.

[2] This confuses stratification with instantiation. On the one hand, in Martin's model of stratified context, where functional varieties of language are misunderstood as the full potential of the culture as a semiotic system, the relation between the strata of genre and register, like any other strata, is simply realisation: the stratum of genre (e.g. narrative) is construed as realised by the stratum of register (e.g. the tenor relations between speakers and addressees).

On the other hand, "recurrent dynamic couplings of selections" describes the vector of instantiation ('dynamic couplings of selections') at the level of instance type ('recurrent'). 

David Rose Misconstruing Nominal Groups, A Subjacency Duplex, And 'Instantiate'

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 11 Feb 2024, at 15:08:

Subjacency duplexes are dependency structures that are not recursive (not hypotactic series)

 

Proportionality first...

some days ago : some of those days long ago ::

adv gp : nom gp 

Also...

a little while ago : an example of those days a little while ago ::

adv gp : nom gp

 

Adverbial group structure is Modifier^Head 

long	ago
b	a

This is a subjacency duplex with adverb as Head. (Ago can only instantiate the Head.)

 

The Modifier can be an embedded nom gp 

[a little while]	ago
b	a
nom gp

Here [a little while] specifies how long ago.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are nominal groups and cannot be adverbial groups (see [4]).

[2] To be clear, even if subjacency duplex were a valid type of structure, this does not satisfy its condition of not being expandable beyond a single modifier, e.g. not so very long ago. In SFL terms, this is simply an adverbial group 'with adverb as Head'. 

[3] This seriously misunderstands 'instantiate'. Instantiation is the relation between potential and instance. The relation here is between a word and its function as Head at group rank, which is realisation.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the Premodifier of an adverbial group cannot be an embedded nominal group because it is inconsistent with the characterisation of an adverbial group having no lexical premodification. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 419-20):

The adverbial group has an adverb as Head, which may or may not be accompanied by modifying elements. … Premodifiers are grammatical items like not and rather and so; there is no lexical premodification in the adverbial group. … The items serving as Premodifiers are adverbs belonging to one of three types – polarity (not), comparison (more, less; as, so) and intensification.

David Rose Misleading Through Misunderstanding And Misrepresenting Context Of Culture And Situation

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 18/9/23 at 9:04:

Let’s try to clear up the confusion between situation/culture and register/genre, since it still befuddles sysflingers in my generation...

A ‘context of situation’ is a specific instance of a general ‘context of culture’. These terms were borrowed a century ago by Firth, from the anthropologist Malinowski. They were handy metaphors, long before SFL had a model of tenor, field and mode realised in metafunctions of language, or of semiotic systems instantiated as texts. In contrast, genre and register are terms in SFL theory. 

A genre is a configuration of recurrent selections in tenor, field and mode systems, that is recognised by members of a culture. These are all cultural systems, so ‘context of situation’ is not an appropriate cover term for tenor, field and mode. Instead, the term ‘register’ was appropriated to include tenor, field and mode systems. Genres are realised by selections in register systems. Systems of genre are realised by systems of register, which are realised by systems of language and other modalities.

That’s the perspective of realisation between strata, a synoptic view. Instantiation is more dynamic. As a text unfolds, it instantiates selections in genre systems, register systems and language systems, in each moment.

These are all semiotic systems (systems of meanings), so there is no longer any need for notions of ‘culture’ or ‘situation’ outside of meaning. But metaphors like ‘context of situation and culture’ can be very sticky. How about we prise them loose.

Blogger Comments:

Having previously claimed there are no important differences between the models of Martin and Halliday & Hasan, here Rose proposes replacing Halliday's model of context with Martin's.

[1] To be clear, this confusion began when Martin (1992: 495) incongruously proposed replacing the instantiation relation between culture and situation with a realisation relation between genre and register:

The tension between these two perspectives will be resolved in this chapter by including in the interp[r]etation of context two communication planes, genre (context of culture) and register (context of situation), with register functioning as the expression form of genre, at the same time as language functions as the expression form of register.

[2] To be clear, the only ones befuddled are those who trust Martin to understand SFL Theory for them. See The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

[3] This misleading, because it confuses instantiation with delicacy. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5):

One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation): see Table 4(4).

[4] This is very misleading indeed. The claim here is that 'genre' and 'register' are (genuine) SFL terms, whereas 'context of culture' and 'context of situation' are not, because they are merely "handy metaphors" that precede SFL Theory. The truth is that all four terms are used in SFL Theory. 

Halliday models context as the culture as a semiotic system, with situation as an instance of culture. The term 'register' is used by Halliday for a subpotential of language, varying for context, whereas Martin misunderstands register as a system of context. 

The term 'genre' was introduced by Hasan, at first to refer to a rhetorical mode, but then to refer to a register that realises a rhetorical mode, whereas Martin misunderstands genre as a system of context.

[5] This misunderstands stratification. Martin's model posits his genre as a higher level of symbolic abstraction than his register, so his genre can not be a configuration of selections from his lower stratum, anymore than lexicogrammar can be a configuration of phonological selections. 

Moreover, the process of selection is the process of instantiation, so selections refer to instances, and recurrent selections refer to instance types, not to systems of potential. So the theoretical point that Rose misunderstands here is that a situation type — i.e. "recurrent" selections of tenor, field and mode — is realised by a text type.

[6] This is a very serious misunderstanding of stratification and instantiation. To be clear, 'context of situation' is an appropriate term because it refers to an instance of the context of culture, the systems of tenor, field and mode.

[7] To be clear, it was Martin who rebranded Halliday's context as register. This "appropriation" was not appropriate, because it models a functional variety of language as not being language. This is tantamount to claiming that dairy cattle and beef cattle are not cattle. More technically, in Hjelmslev's terms, it mistakes a variety of a denotative semiotic for (the content plane of) a connotative semiotic.

[8] This confuses stratification with instantiation. To be clear, the claim here is that genres (systems) are realised by instances of registers, since selecting in register systems is the instantiation of register systems.

[9] To be clear, this contradicts the previous statement, since here genre and register are both described at the system pole of the cline of instantiation. However, the claim is that systems like story genres are realised by systems like status and contact relations between the speakers producing the story.

[10] To be clear, here the claim is that genres like narratives, anecdotes etc. are not language.

[11] To be clear, Rose's 'synoptic view' of realisation between strata is confused with the 'dynamic view' of instantiation. See [5], [6] and [8] above.

[12] This misunderstands both instantiation and stratification. Firstly, a text does not instantiate selections in systems; a text is the instantiation of systems, and selection is the process of instantiation. Secondly, a text cannot be the instantiation of Martin's genre and register systems, since text is an instance of language potential, whereas genre and register systems are not language potential, but context potential.

[13] This is very misleading because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, context of culture is not "outside of meaning". Context is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, a system of meaning, and a situation is an instance of that system.

[14] To be clear, since context of situation and culture, when understood, are consistent with SFL Theory, and Martin's misconstrual of language varieties as not language is not, the intelligent response would be try to understand what the terms context of situation and culture mean, and "prise loose" Martin's self-contradictory model.

[15] To be clear, on the one hand, this diagram of Martin's model misrepresents text, an instance of language, as also being an instance of context, which Martin opposes to language. On the other hand, this diagram strategically omits the term that would make its other inconsistencies more obvious: 'register' is omitted from the stratum of field, tenor and mode, and from each cline of instantiation. If the term 'register' is given its place in Martin's model, then it yields:

• a system of genre,
• a register/text type of genre,
• an instance of genre,
• a system of register,
• a register/text type of register,
• an instance of register,
• a system of language,
• a register/text type of language,
• an instance of language (text). 

Moreover, if Martin's stratification is cross-classified with Martin's instantiation:

then it yields such anomalies as:

• a genre/register of genre,
• a text type of genre,
• a genre/register of register,
• a text type of register.

∞

See also

• The Practice Of Public Bluffing In The SFL Community
• David Rose Negatively Appreciating The Deployment Of Logic
• David Rose Positively Judging 'Being Wrong'

John Bateman On Dimensions Across Semiotic Modes

John Bateman replied to David Rose on Sysfling on 26/8/23 at 20:16:

… But the following [from Rose] is very nice to hear:

Metafunctionality as I tried to suggest, is a property of lg that its syntagmatic structuring has evolved to enable, together with ranks and strata. So it’s basic to lg but not to semiotic modes in general.

I'm wondering how well that statement goes down more generally: consequences should actually follow.

I think the question of what dimensions are common across semiotic modes is very interesting and also central for a semiotics. I'd readily take rank to have to be present, otherwise axis has no domain (s) to operate in. Structural configurations have to be configurations of something. Stratification is also a good bet. Moreover, since semiosis is inherently dynamic, we'll have instantiation and sedimentation relating to reservoires and repositories I'd expect. These would all seem to be necessarily bound up in a single 'definition' of a particular kind of signs for my money. This means there is no 'picking and choosing' to do. …

Metafunction again turns up there as a bit of a swamp... the original idea of "distinctive regions of relatively interdependent systems" gets tricky without sufficiently strongly motivated systems. And I am not yet sure to what extent the different kinds of structure (which I like a lot) actually match well with kinds of functions parallel to linguistically motivated metafunctions in nonverbal semiotic modes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not "very nice to hear" from a theoretical point of view. See David Rose Misunderstanding Metafunctionality And Axis (Inter Alia).

[2] To be clear, rank is one way of modelling formal constituency. In language, rank is a dimension of lexicogrammar and phonology/graphology. Therefore, in modelling semiotic systems without a grammar — that is, those other than language — rank can only be a dimension of the expression plane, not the content plane.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. To be clear, semantics has no rank scale because it has no forms to rank, and yet semantics is modelled with both axes, paradigmatic and syntagmatic; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

Bateman's false claim derives from two theoretical misunderstandings. Firstly, rank is not the domain of axis. Axis and rank are distinct local dimensions. Axis has two orders: the paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Rank has four orders: clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme in lexicogrammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

Secondly, structures are configurations of functions (Senser^Process) not rankscale forms (nominal group ^ verbal group). The sequencing of formal units is a syntagm.

[4] To be clear, without the stratification of content and expression, there can be no semiotic system. Semiosis requires that a Token means a Value. However, the stratification of the content plane is restricted to language, as demonstrated by the fact that only language can be read aloud, since the locutions that a Sayer projects are the wordings of the lexicogrammatical stratum.

[5] This is possibly a garbled reference to 'reservoir' and 'repertoire' in Martin's Bernstein-derived model of individuation.

[6] To be clear, this misrepresents the metafunctions. The metafunctions are "strongly motivated" as the basic types of meaning: construing experience as meaning, enacting intersubjective relations as meaning, and weaving these together as text. Each of these understandings of the metafunctions can be applied to semiotic systems. Indeed, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3) are sceptical of there being full semiotic systems without metafunctions:

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. … There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain.

Jim Martin Spruiking His Group's Work On Systemic Functional Semiotics

Jim Martin wrote to Sysfling on 25/8/23 at 11:43:

Cute, but let’s not be too cavalier about dismissing work that can reasonably be counted as SFS (such as that noted below). This work is explicit enough and comprehensive enough with respect to a range of semiotic modes that probing questions can be raised (and have been), including…

• Has enough attention been paid to materiality (the ‘etics’ materialising ‘emics’)?
• Has enough attention been paid to ‘constituency’ (ranks and taxis)?
• Has enough attention been paid to the interdependency of systems and their possible correlation with types of structure (re ‘metafunctions’)?
• Has enough attention been paid to stratification (is one stratum being made to do too much work)?
• Has enough attention been paid to instantiation (especially the modelling of abductive inferencing as texts unfold)?

The answer to each of these questions is some degree of “no”; in some cases extant SFL theory makes room for improvement (cf. van Leeuwen on the ‘materiality’ of sound or colour) and in other cases it is sorely lacking (e.g. how to model coupling, commitment and the abductive inferencing highlighted in the dynamic take on discourse semantics propagated by John and his colleagues).

The paper attached from the 2010 UTS ICOM meeting touches on many of the issues raised in this thread:

Multimodal semiotics: theoretical challenges. S Dreyfus, S Hood & M Stenglin [Eds.] Semiotic Margins: meaning in multimodalities. London: Continuum. 2011. 243-270.

images

Kress & van Leeuwen Reading Images

picture books

Painter et al. Reading Visual Narratives

animations

He ‘Towards a stratified metafunctional model of animation’ Semiotica 2021; 239; 1-35

paralanguage

Ngo et al. Modelling paralanguage using SFS

emoji

Zappavigna & Logi Emoji and Social Media Paralanguage (in press CUP)

infographics

Martin & Unsworth Reading Images for Knowledge Building

space

McMurtrie The Semiotics of Movement in Space

math symbolism

Doran The Discourse of Physics

chemistry symbolism

Yu Multimodal Knowledge Building in Secondary School Chemistry Textbooks (forthcoming Bloomsbury)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's concern here is not with whether theory has been understood and consistently applied in such work, but simply with whether the work is explicit and comprehensive enough to ask questions about what else needs to be done. The academic quality of the work is immaterial.

[2] To be clear, coupling and commitment are two of Martin's misunderstandings of SFL Theory. The notion of coupling derives from Martin's misunderstanding of metafunctions and strata as interacting modules (Martin 1992: 390ff). In fact, it merely makes the banal observation that features are selected with other features in instantiation. 

The notion of commitment derives from Martin's misunderstanding of delicacy and instantiation, namely: that speakers can choose the degree of delicacy they traverse in systems during instantiation, with greater delicacy corresponding to greater commitment. In fact, it is only by traversing the entire system to the most delicate features that lexical items can be specified.

[3] To be clear, abductive inferencing is not the best available mode of reasoning:

Abductive reasoning (also called abduction, abductive inference, or retroduction) is a form of logical inference that seeks the simplest and most likely conclusion from a set of observations. It was formulated and advanced by American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce beginning in the last third of the 19th century. Abductive reasoning, unlike deductive reasoning yields a plausible conclusion but does not definitively verify it. Abductive conclusions do not eliminate uncertainty or doubt, which is expressed in retreat terms such as "best available" or "most likely".

In later years his view came to be: 

Abduction is guessing. It is "very little hampered" by rules of logic. Even a well-prepared mind's individual guesses are more frequently wrong than right.

Moreover, abductive reasoning is formally equivalent to a logical fallacy:

Abductive reasoning allows inferring a as an explanation of b. As a result of this inference, abduction allows the precondition a to be abduced from the consequence b. Deductive reasoning and abductive reasoning thus differ in the direction in which a rule like "a entails b" is used for inference. As such, abduction is formally equivalent to the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent (or Post hoc ergo propter hoc) because of multiple possible explanations for b.

[4] Trivially, the papers in this publication are from the 2007 conference at the University of Sydney titled 'Semiotic Margins'. Non-trivially, Martin's paper in this collection includes his classic misunderstanding of Saussure and Hjelmslev. Martin (2011: 245):

To be clear, Saussure's signifié and signifiant correspond to Hjelmslev's content and expression, and it is these that are the focus of linguistics. The relation between these two levels of symbolic abstraction is simply realisation. 

[5] With regard to the work by Martin and his colleagues on paralanguage, see:

• Buyer Beware!
• Martin's Model Of Paralanguage

[6] For a critique of some of the theoretical misunderstandings in these works, see the earlier post Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism.

David Rose On What Makes Us Human And Fooled

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 31 Mar 2023 at 9:23:

I was thinking of Shooshi’s what makes us human... dirty jokes ;-))

Re pickiness of humans... I have a sneaking suspicion GPT’s telling us something important about us, not just itself. How much are we fooled by our synoptic view of systems and texts? We can see emergent patterning when we stare at enough printed text, and then represent it as weighted options in systems. But how much do we actually know about how we process text above the lower ranks of expression? What actually is the relation between structural probabilities in text production and ‘meaning’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Halliday, it is the stratified content plane of language that "makes us human". Halliday (2002 [1996]: 388):

The more complex type of semiotic system is that which evolves in the form of Edelman’s “higher order consciousness”. This higher order semiotic is what we call language. It has a grammar; and it appears to be unique to mature (i.e. post-infancy) human beings. In other words, it evolved as the “sapiens” in homo sapiens.

Halliday (2003 [1995]: 390, 430n):

In this paper I have tried to identify, and to illustrate, certain aspects of language which seem to me critical to a consideration of language and the human brain. In doing so I have assumed that language is what defines the brain of homo sapiens: what constitutes it as specifically human.

The emergence of grammar … is the critical factor in the development of higher-order consciousness; homo sapiens = homo grammaticus. See Halliday (1978a, 1979b); Painter (1984, 1989); Oldenburg (1986).

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 25):

This stratification of the content plane had immense significance in the evolution of the human species – it is not an exaggeration to say that it turned homo ... into homo sapiens (cf. Halliday, 1995b; Matthiessen, 2004a). It opened up the power of language and in so doing created the modern human brain. 

[2] To be clear, in the case of ChatGPT, "we" are not fooled by "our synoptic view of systems and texts", but by ascribing systems to an AI model of language that generates texts from (the lexical collocation probabilities of) instances, not systems.

[3] To be clear, this relation is given by the architecture of language proposed by SFL Theory: structures are specified systemically in the realisation statements attached to features whose probability of instantiation varies according to register. 'Meaning', in the narrower sense, is the stratum of semantics: its systems that are realised as structures, and instantiated as texts.

But importantly, ChatGPT does not use systems that specify structural probabilities to generate texts. Instead, it uses the lexical collocation probabilities garnered from a 'reservoir' of texts, each of which is the instance of the system of the meaner who produced it. (In lexicogrammar, collocation is the syntagmatic dimension of lexis, whereas structure is the syntagmatic dimension of grammar.)

David Rose On The Reluctance To Divorce Language From Consciousness

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 26 Mar 2023, 14:02:

A more general anxiety about relations between language and personhood exists in our own community. …

But SFL would not have progressed without separating out the systems from their uses and users.

One way our anxiety is expressed is a reluctance to divorce language from consciousness. Yet consciousness is a property of individual persons but language systems are a property of communities. They exist before, after and without the individual persons who use them.

By systems we mean both potential and actual – system and text. Instantiation is a relation between texts and systems, irrespective of persons.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday makes a useful distinction between 'person' as a social individual and 'meaner' (language user) as a socio-semiotic individual. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 610):

The human individual is at once a biological "individual", a social "individual" and a socio-semiotic "individual":

as a biological "individual", s/he is an organism, born into a biological population as a member of the human species.

as a social "individual", s/he is a person, bom into a social group as a member of society. "Person" is a complex construct; it can be characterised as a constellation of social roles or personae entering into social networks … .

as a socio-semiotic "individual", s/he is a meaner, born into a meaning group as a member of a speech community. "Meaner" is also a complex construct. 

[2] To be clear, this "progress" in SFL is Martin's confused model of individuation and affiliation (critiqued here). Martin et al (2013):

[3] To be clear, for neuroscientist Edelman (e.g 1992), it is language that distinguishes higher-order consciousness from the primary consciousness that humans share with many other species. For Halliday (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999), the theory of experience that has evolved in language equates the content plane of language with the content of consciousness. Ideationally, consciousness is the interior symbolic processing of sensing, and the exterior symbolic processing of saying, which create content through projection, and interpersonally, consciousness is the self enacted as meaner: as an interactant in exchanges.

[4] To be clear, on the SFL model, the collective nature of language entails that human consciousness is also collective. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

Edelman's interpretation of higher-order consciousness referred to above suggests that this form of consciousness (unlike primary consciousness) is constituted in language. Language is a socio-semiotic system, so it follows that higher-order consciousness is constituted socio-semiotically; and since socio-semiotic systems are collective, it follows that higher-order consciousness must also be collective. Collective consciousness is an attribute of human social groups — the members of a given culture. But we need to distinguish between the consciousness of a social group and the consciousness of a species, whose collective construal of experience is codified in the structure of the brain. All human populations have the same brain, and to that extent all construe experience in the same way. But humans live in social groups, and their local environments vary one from the other; to that extent, different groups construe experience in different ways. The significance of this for us is that language is the resource for both: both what is common to the species as a whole, and what is specific to the given culture. In the way these two components are construed in the grammar, we cannot tell them apart. But it is the role of language in the construction of experience as meaning — as shared activity and collaboratively constructed resource — that gives substance to the concept of collective consciousness as an attribute of the human condition.

Moreover, here Rose even contradicts the models that he is promoting. In Martin's models, a language user (persona) is an individuation of a culture, and their meaning potential (repertoire) is an individuation of the meaning potential of the community (reservoir).

[5] Clearly, languages do not exist without the individual persons who use them, as demonstrated by the phenomenon of 'language death'.

[6] This misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, 'system' refers to potential, and 'text' to the instance of that potential.

[7] This is not misleading, because it is true.

David Rose Abducing That ChatGPT Learnt The Language System By Experiencing Instances Of Its Features

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 Mar 2023 at 23:16:

My own contributions have been merely observations, using the tools of systemic functional semiotic text analysis.

I observe that the texts produced by the machine instantiate semiotic systems. To be able to do this, we are told the machine reads 1000s of texts, i.e. other instances of these systems. It is reasonable to abduce that the machine has learnt these systems by experiencing multiple instances of their features (not just the fields it gleans from Wikipedia), given our language based theory of learning.

The people programming the machine, with ‘reasoners’ as Mick puts it, have no more conscious knowledge of these systems and the processes of realisation and re-instantiation, than the machine does.

The machine itself tells us that its understanding of its “self” is ‘based purely on symbols and algorithms’. This resonates with your insistence that all it is doing ‘is producing nonrandom sequences of characters’. My analogy of a closed book was intended to evoke the contrast between the material recording of characters and the semiotic reading of those characters as instantiating expression systems, that realise content systems, that realise register and genre systems. …

My point is that all the semiotic systems instantiated in the texts it produces are ‘not learned in any direct way’. Neither the machine nor the “tech gurus” that program it can explain this to our satisfaction. The publications that you cite are undoubtedly illuminating, but our contribution can only be based on text analysis, which I submit will produce very different (possibly complementary) explanations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not a reasonable abduction, because it is nowhere near the "best available" conclusion to infer.

Abductive reasoning (also called abduction, abductive inference, or retroduction) is a form of logical inference that seeks the simplest and most likely conclusion from a set of observations. It was formulated and advanced by American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce beginning in the last third of the 19th century. Abductive reasoning, unlike deductive reasoning, yields a plausible conclusion but does not definitively verify it. Abductive conclusions do not eliminate uncertainty or doubt, which is expressed in retreat terms such as "best available" or "most likely".

ChatGPT uses the lexical collocation frequencies in its database. While it is true that these frequencies instantiate the probabilities in the language systems of the people who wrote the texts, there is no evidence to support the claim that ChatGPT is using systems of features in producing its own texts. It just uses lexical collocation frequencies.

"Our language-based theory of learning" does not apply here, because the learning and "experiencing" of ChatGPT are material processes, not the mental processes of a language learner.

[2] To be clear, the argument here is that, since neither humans nor ChatGPT have conscious knowledge of the language system, both must use that system to produce texts. Clearly, a lack of awareness of X does not logically entail the presence of X.

[3] To be clear, here Rose is referring to Martin's self-contradictory misunderstanding of stratification, wherein functional varieties of language are modelled as context, instead of language, despite being instantiated as language (text). In SFL Theory, registers are context-specific varieties of language, viewed from the system pole of the cline of instantiation. Martin's genre, on the other hand, is scattered across SFL's architecture of language. As text type, genre is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, as purpose, genre is rhetorical mode (narrative etc.), and its structures are of the semantic stratum, though not organised according to metafunction.

[4] To be clear, a contribution that is only based on text analysis is a very limited contribution indeed. It is an understanding of SFL theory that has the potential of providing valuable insights into the issues raised by the coherence of texts produced by ChatGPT.

David Rose Misunderstanding Lexicogrammatical Form (inter alia)

David Rose wrote to sys-func and sysfling on 5/8/22 at 14:17:

3. Re linguistic ‘progress’...

The term realisation is also used for relations between strata. Like axis, it is a relation of abstraction, but of a different order.

In his foreword below, MAKH refers to phonology and grammar as ‘these two strata of linguistic form’. In the terms developed below, form is associated with perceivability of structures. The form of phonological structures is ‘sounding’ (i.e. patterns of sounds); the form of grammatical structures is ‘wording’ (patterns of words). The axial relation resolves the dualism of form and meaning, as patterns of forms at each stratum are at once patterns of meanings.

Relations between the strata are patterns-of-patterns... patterns of lexicogrammatical structures are realised by patterns of phonological structures. Discourse semantics proposes that the semantic stratum is also organised axially (as MAKH predicted in 1972). Its structures are discourse structures... and patterns of discourse structures are realised by patterns of both lexicogrammatical structures and phonological structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. Realisation is precisely the same relation (Token-Value) in each case. The difference lies in what is related: lower stratum to higher stratum (stratification) vs structure to system (axis).

[2] This again mistakes a lower level of abstraction for perceivability (see previous post).

[3] To be clear, 'sounding' refers to the stratum of phonology. A phonological system is not a 'pattern of sounds'; a phonological system models 'sounding' choices.

[4] This is a very serious misunderstanding. SFL Theory models lexicogrammatical form as a rank scale. The term 'wording' refers to lexicogrammar as a stratum, in which lexicogrammatical form (e.g. verbal group) is interpreted in terms of its function of realising meaning (e.g. process). A lexicogrammatical system is not a 'pattern of words'; a lexicogrammatical system models 'wording' choices.

[5] This is a very serious misunderstanding. The axial relation does not 'resolve the dualism of form and meaning'. Form and meaning are located on both axes in the lexicogrammar. (There is meaning, but not form, on the semantic stratum, and form, but not meaning, on the expression plane.)  Paradigmatically, each formal rank unit is the entry condition to systems of functions, and syntagmatically, each element of function structure is realised by a formal unit of the rank below.

[6] This misunderstands stratification. There are no 'patterns of form' on the semantic stratum, and no 'patterns of meaning' on the expression plane. On the lexicogrammatical stratum, form is interpreted in terms of its function in realising meaning.

[7] This is misleading. SFL Theory, as the name implies, gives priority to system over structure. Systemically, a pattern is a pattern of instantiation, that is: a pattern of selecting features and activating realisation statements. The notion that 'patterns of lexicogrammatical structures are realised by patterns of phonological structures' not only gives priority to structure, but also confuses instantiation ('patterns') with stratification ('are realised by').

[8] This is misleading by implication. Rose has previously falsely claimed that Halliday does not model semantics in terms of both system and structure, despite the role semantic structure plays in grammatical metaphor, and despite explicit contradictions such as the following provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones.

[9] This is misleading. Halliday (1972) weighs up the theoretical pros and cons of proposing structure for the semantic stratum, as demonstrated in previous posts. No "predictions" were made.

[10] This again gives priority to structure over system and confuses instantiation ('patterns') with stratification ('are realised by'); see [7] above.

David Rose Misunderstanding Halliday's "Axial Breakthrough"

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald to sys-func and sysfling on 5/8/22 at 8:34:

2.

Thanks to Ed, for the challenge presented by your reading of my diagram below as ‘(paradigmatic) "features" and (syntagmatic) "structures"’.

The diagram is meant to show that structures are part of systems, not opposed to them as the system/structure and paradigmatic/syntagmatic terms might suggest. Structures don’t realise systems, but features in systems. Structures are perceivable tokens of the abstract values of features. Each instance of structure is recognisable by its similarity to other instances of the same structure, and its difference from other types of structure. Similarity is represented in the diagram by hexagons, and difference by the system. The entry condition to a system is a more general similarity that is shared by its structures, e.g. the structure +Subject;+Finite is shared by the structures Subject^Finite and Finite^Subject. These similarities and differences in structure realise similarities and differences in features, such as indicative: declarative/ interrogative. Hence the system of features is a mirror of the system of structures. They are two faces of a system. This is my understanding of MAKH’s axial breakthrough.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[2] This is a very serious misunderstanding. Systems and structures are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction (elaboration + identity), whereas the relation that obtains between a whole and its parts is composition (extension). A part of a system is a subsystem, whereas a structure (e.g. of a group) is part of a larger structure (e.g. of a clause).

[3] This is a very serious misunderstanding. It is the entire system of a rank unit that specifies how its entire structure is realised, and this is achieved through realisation statements, not features.

[4] This confuses lower abstraction with perceivability. The structure of a nominal group cannot be perceived, unless, like its system, it is represented theoretically.

[5] This confuses the realisation (token-value) relation between structure and system with the instantiation (token-type) relation between instances and instance type.

[6] This confuses instance type (similarity) with paradigmatic order (difference).

[7] This confuses instance type (similarity) with the entry condition of a system. In the grammar, the first entry condition of a system is a formal unit on the rank scale.

[8] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Difference in system is difference between paradigmatic features, such as declarative vs interrogative, whereas difference in structure is difference in elements, such as Subject vs Complement.

[9] To be clear, the claim that "Halliday's axial breakthrough" is that system and structure are "two faces of a system" derives from the multiple misunderstandings identified above.