Brad Smith On Intonational Prominence

Brad Smith replied to David Rose on asflanet on 9 Sept 2024, at 11:54:

yes: 'good reason' is purpose, or function, which is stratal (in relation to higher strata). 

So far as intonational prominence goes, though, it is at the speaker's discretion whether to assign a marked/non-congruent choice greater prominence (eg whether a marked mood-tone co-selection, as realisation of complex interpersonal discourse semantics and tenor relations, is given textual prominence, eg through tonicity) — 

however, I do observe, as a general rule, that when a marked choice is made in an intonation system (eg marked tonicity), there is found to be a decided excess in the phonetic expression - speakers will make sure the listener hears the marked choice (in the same way they might more carefully articulate a particular lexical choice). But this is probably way too complex a topic for me to be delving into while in the middle of other work :)

 

and David Rose replied at 12:09:

//5 ^ ba / rill iant // 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This re-expresses a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[2] To be clear, looking to the higher stratum to find the reason for a marked choice is what the text analyst does, whereas making the marked choice is what the speaker does.

[3] As previously explained, in SFL Theory, 'marked' and 'non-congruent' are not synonymous. Congruence only applies to the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar on the content plane. Applying it to the relation between lexicogrammar and phonology invents the non-existent resource of "phonological metaphor".

[4] This confuses metafunctions and axes. To be clear, the tonic realises an element of structure as the Focus of New information (textual, syntagmatic), not a "marked mood-tone" co-selection (interpersonal, paradigmatic).

[5] This exemplifies a point made by a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236):

In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’].

[6] See David Rose Positively Judging And Appreciating Brad Smith.

Brad Smith On Markedness Not Explained In Theoretical Terms

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 11:05:

Saying unmarked is the option one chooses except where there is 'some good reason', while helpful in learning how to analyse markedness, doesn't really explain the concept in theoretical terms. So far, until better educated, I am sticking with my discourse semantics motivation: imperative mood, phylogenetically and functionally, is the option to enact a command - to get that job done; and other options, co-selected with tone choices, are used to enact more complex moves such as polite command: '//1 ^ can I / start the order with your */ phone number please // ('give me your phone number' + deference)

and again at 14:17:

I guess my question with theoretical terms and concepts is, what am I asking this term/concept to do for me? We can never, sadly or not, get away from 'language turned back on itself' and all that implies... (including if we use multimodal semiotics as metadiscourse... mathematicians and scientists take note!)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is linguistic data produced by speakers and writers that are analysed, not markedness. Once data are theorised as a system network, relative markedness can be assigned by a linguist to alternative features in a system.

[2] To be clear, glossing 'unmarked' as the default or neutral choice explains the concept in everyday terms. On the other hand, Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7) explain the concept in terms of the theoretical dimensions of axis, instantiation and stratification:

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[3] To be clear, this is Halliday's theory, not Martin's discourse semantics.

[4] For some of the theoretical problems that invalidate the model of discourse semantics, see e.g.

• Review of English Text
• Review of Bateman's Review of English Text
• Review of Working With Discourse

[5] To be clear, like any theoretical concept, markedness is a means of understanding how language functions. For example, if a selection is marked, then there is a motivation for the selection to be sought. 

[6] To be clear, language is the most powerful semiotic system, so using language to model language is using the most powerful semiotic system to model language.

[7] To be clear, 'metadiscourse' is literally discourse about discourse. From an SFL perspective, what gets classified as metadiscourse is non-ideational meaning: aspects of interpersonal and textual meaning. It may be that Smith meant 'metalanguage', but this only applies to linguistic theory — language about language — not to (language about) mathematics and (language about) science.

Brad Smith On Phonological Congruence And His Problem With Markedness

Brad Smith replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 9:43 :

… in the SFL material I was browsing through yesterday afternoon, the terms unmarked and congruent seemed to be used more or less interchangeably.

I am not seeking to find the canonical definition to follow, but working out my own ideas on this (I believe, as a Doctor, this is not only my right but my responsibility!). The quoted passage from my YouTube lecture script, I think, is probably where I land on this: congruence, at least, relates, as you have said, to an inter-stratal relation, specifically what is being demanded of clause and tone group by the discourse semantics (that's my current take on this aspect). …

There are other, similarly troublesome issues of terminology and symbolism in SFL: for example, the same symbol, with minor, inconsequential adjustment, is used for both structural ordering and for a silent Ictus! …

In terms of intonation, however, unlike much of the rest of his work, this has not, relatively speaking, happened as much as I think Halliday wished or expected - for example, the functions of tonicity are still discussed in terms of (Given-New) structure; when the real game, for me, has always been, what gets chosen as focus against the background of what could have been chosen?...i.e. what is the systemic potential for a textual choice? (which, when you start to consider it, is a question with a lot of implications, including for theoretical accounts). 

Markedness is not a systemic description, it is a post hoc account of the valeur of certain choices: we consider, for example, which systemic option in the system of mood is unmarked; but this assignment of markedness, however, is not itself a systemic description - the systemic description of mood is declarative, polar interrogative etc. - We still have to work out what the actual potential for choice is for systems of tonicity, salience etc. (eg within/outside of the mood block can, in some texts, be consequential).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as demonstrated in the previous post, Smith's 'current take' on the interchangeability of 'unmarked' and 'congruent' is a theoretically invalid misunderstanding.

[2] To be clear, the troublesome issue here is using the symbol ^ for ordering (a^b) and the symbol ‸ for silent Ictus (/‸ /).

[3] To be clear, every non-tonic salient syllable realises what could have been selected as the tonic that realises the Focus of New information. The choice of the Given + New structure of an information unit, on the other hand, is a grammatical selection: tonicity is the phonological means of realising it.

[4] This misunderstands 'valeur'. To be clear, 'valeur' (Saussure) is the value of a term in a system in relation to the other terms.

[5] To be clear, descriptive terms like 'declarative', 'polar interrogative' etc. are features that describe language, whereas theoretical terms like 'unmarked' describe the features.

[6] To be clear, a selection of tonic placement realises a selection of a Focus of New information, which gives textual prominence to one or more functional elements of mood (and transitivity and thematic) structure.

Brad Smith Confusing Markedness And Incongruence

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 2 September 2024 at 17:09:

With a yes/no question move, the polarity is at issue – that is what a yes/no question is all about! Hence, the unmarked, or congruent co-selection in mood and tone for a yes/no question is polar interrogative with rising pitch tone 2.

So when I say that the tone 1 imperative mood is the unmarked, or congruent choice for a command, I mean that these co-selections in clause and tone group are congruent with what a command is trying to get done with language – the issue of polarity is not at stake, hence we expect a command to have a falling tone 1 pitch contour. The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide (e.g polar interrogative + falling tone 1 for a polite command) are based on our understanding of what the congruent choices are, using such unconscious knowledge to motivate the use of language in non-congruent, or metaphorical ways.

The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide illustrate what happens when more complex contextual aspects are operating that make more demands of the language – and, in fact, such complexity is more common than not in social interactions!

Blogger Comments:

This confuses markedness with incongruence. Markedness is 'intra-system': whether a choice is the default/neutral one (unmarked) or not (marked). Congruence is 'inter-stratal' within content: whether the meaning and wording agree (congruent) or not (metaphorical). Importantly, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction only applies to the realisation relation between strata of the content plane, semantics and lexicogrammar, and is only made possible by the natural relation between them. 

That is, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction does not apply to the realisation relation between lexicogrammar and phonology — there is no "phonological metaphor". For example, in realising declarative mood, the relation between unmarked tone 1 and marked tone 2 is not metaphorical, since 'protesting statement' (tone 2) is not a metaphor for 'statement' (tone 1).

Bradley Smith On Music And Metafunction

Bradley Smith replied to Ed McDonald on Sysfling on 25/8/23 at 10:08:

in thinking about the semiosis/semiotics of music, it has always seemed to me that the same problem occurs as in intonation study: our scope for what we consider to be 'meaning'. In intonation study, much that I consider 'meaning' has been dismissed as emotional reflexes or some such, as though those reflexes aren't grounded in some communication of meaning! So, the same with music: what meanings are there in music, beyond those found in other semiotic modes? From there, in terms of metafunction, the next question I would ask is, can we see prosodies or periodicities in music, and how are they realised? I happen to have a fundamental faith in the theory of metafunction, distinguished via prosodic and periodic expression, I have found it essential to understanding how tone group and clause interact, together and with body language, for example, as in the recent Paralanguage book.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, to date, no-one has been able to devise system networks for the content plane of music, together with realisation statements specifying how the systems are realised structurally; nor has anyone been able to identify how content plane systems are realised by expression plane systems and their structures.

For the view that music is not a socio-semiotic system, but a social system expanded by socio-semiotic systems such as theory, notation and lyrics, see Making Sense Of Music.

[2] To be clear, prosodies and periodicities are the types of structure favoured by the interpersonal and textual metafunctions, so Smith's question is 'how are structures realised?'. In SFL Theory, function structures (e.g. Senser ^ Process) are realised by syntagms of classes of units at the lower rank (e.g. nominal group ^ verbal group). That is, the question presumes that music has not only a grammar, but a grammar with a rank scale of grammatical forms. For Halliday, on the other hand, language is the only semiotic system that has a stratified content plane with a grammar; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 602ff).

[3] To be clear, here Smith gives priority to the view 'from below', structure, and suggests that structure types distinguish the metafunctions. SFL Theory, on the other hand, gives priority to view 'from above', so that it is the metafunctions that engender different types of structure.

[4] See 

• Modelling Paralanguage Using Systemic Functional Semiotics (Ngo et al. 2022)
• Buyer Beware!
• Martin's Model Of Paralanguage