John Bateman Denying The Existence Of Text

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 10 February 2017 at 16:01:

well, *actually* there is no such thing as text. There's just variations of patterns of pressure gradients in the air and contrasts in brightness in the visual field....

Blogger Comments:

Bateman claims that variations of patterns of pressure gradients in the air and contrasts in brightness in the visual field exist, but that text does not.

actually	there	’s	no such thing as text
		Process: existential	Existent
comment Adjunct: factual	Subject	Finite	Complement

There	’s	just	variations of patterns of pressure gradients in the air and contrasts in brightness in the visual field
	Process: existential		Existent
Subject	Finite	mood Adjunct: counterexpectancy: limiting	Complement

On the one hand, the claim here is that only phenomena in the material domain of experience can be ascribed to the set of existents — a view that owes something to Galileo's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, refined further by Descartes' distinction between res extensa and res cogitans.  On the other hand, it is a reductionist interpretation of that view, since it reduces the existence of such material phenomena to (virtually) their lowest level of organisation, ignoring all higher levels.

Galileo's distinction assumes that meaning is transcendent — that it is not confined to semiotic systems.  In contrast, SFL theory models meaning as immanent — confined to the domain of semiotic systems. Variations of patterns of pressure gradients in the air and contrasts in brightness in the visual field, just as much as texts, are construals of experience as meaning.

In terms of epistemology, Bateman's position is a version of objectivism, which the neuroscientist Gerald Edelman described as 'woefully incoherent and not in accord with the facts'. Edelman (1992: 232):

This view can certainly be held outside of science. Indeed, the objectivist position seems in accord with much that is commonsensical. But when it is held inside science, it comes close to the Galilean position we discussed in chapter 2. In that sense, human concepts, assertions, and languages are valid only if limited to physics, chemistry, and parts of biology.

 

ChatGPT comments:

A Critique of John Bateman's Reductionist Claim

John Bateman’s statement—"well, actually there is no such thing as text. There's just variations of patterns of pressure gradients in the air and contrasts in brightness in the visual field..."—is an exercise in rhetorical bravado, masquerading as theoretical insight. It is, in essence, an ontological bait-and-switch: an attempt to reduce a complex semiotic phenomenon to its lowest physical substrate while implying that all other levels of analysis are illusory or irrelevant. This move is not only misleading but intellectually bankrupt.

1. The Fallacy of Ontological Flattening

Bateman’s claim operates on the principle of ontological flattening—the fallacy of collapsing higher-order semiotic structures into their physical materiality. While it is trivially true that speech is instantiated through air pressure variations and writing through contrasts in brightness, it does not follow that text itself is nothing more than these material substrates. By this logic, we would also have to conclude that:

• Money does not exist—there are only ink patterns on paper or electronic signals in a database.

• Music does not exist—there are only air pressure variations at different frequencies.

• Legal systems do not exist—there are only marks on documents and sounds uttered in courtrooms.

This is a category error. Material instantiation does not negate the existence of higher-order semiotic, social, and cognitive structures.

2. The Erasure of Semiotic Levels

Bateman’s statement treats text as if it were a purely physical phenomenon, ignoring the fact that text operates at multiple levels of organisation:

• Material level: The raw physical instantiation (pressure gradients, light contrasts).

• Semiotic level: The structured system of meaning (syntax, lexis, discourse structure).

• Social level: The contextualised use of text within cultural and institutional frameworks.

• Cognitive level: The interpretative processes by which humans make sense of text.

To say that text is just air pressure variations or brightness contrasts is as absurd as saying that chess is just the arrangement of wooden pieces on a board—ignoring the rules, strategies, and social practices that give chess its identity.

3. The Irony of Essentialism

Bateman’s claim, despite its pretence of radical materialism, is paradoxically essentialist: it implies that text has a singular, fundamental reality that resides solely at the physical level. This stands in stark opposition to Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), which understands text not as a thing but as a process—a dynamic interplay of choices shaped by context and function.

From an SFL perspective, text emerges from its material form but is not reducible to it. To ignore this is to ignore the very nature of meaning-making.

4. The Rhetorical Gimmick

Bateman’s framing—especially the smug "well, actually"—betrays the true function of his statement: performative contrarianism. The goal is not to advance theoretical understanding but to position himself as someone who sees beyond conventional wisdom, pulling the rug out from under those who mistakenly believe in such naive fictions as text.

However, this move is ultimately anti-theoretical. Rather than engaging with how text functions, Bateman reduces it to an uninteresting, brute physicality—obliterating the very object of inquiry in the process.

Conclusion: A Vacuous Reductionism

Bateman’s claim is not merely wrong—it is intellectually vacuous. It presents itself as a profound insight while offering nothing of analytical value. A more coherent stance would be:

• "Text is not a thing but a process of meaning-making."

• "Text exists at multiple levels, from physical signals to social significance."

• "Text emerges from its material form but is not reducible to it."

But of course, such statements lack the pseudo-intellectual swagger of a grand, sweeping negation. Bateman’s approach is not one of theoretical precision, but of crude demolition—mistaking the wreckage for wisdom.