David Rose Misunderstanding Markedness

David Rose replied to Brad Smith on asflanet on 2 Sept 2024, at 21:21:

As you say, it’s related to instantiation, specifically the probability of instantiation... less likely choices are more marked. That gets you into knots with tone 1 imperatives here, which you say are ‘unmarked’ but are no more frequent than other tones in your data. A problem may be ambiguity of the term ‘neutral’. It can mean unmarked, but in Halliday’s key system it means neutral force, in contrast to mild, strong etc.

PS Key treats grammar/tone couplings as delicate mood choices, but another perspective is delicate speech function and appraisal choices... ‘what a command is trying to get done ‘

and on 3 Sept, at 13:27:

In contrast, marked/unmarked are used technically as feature labels in textual systems, theme and information focus. Could we perhaps avoid using these terms quasi-technically in pedagogic contexts, and reserve them for textual features? The ‘good reason’ is textual prominence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no problem here because markedness is not defined by frequency. Halliday (2005 [1991]: 68):

An unmarked term is a default condition: that which is selected unless there is good reason for selecting some other term. It is not defined by frequency, but it is likely to correspond to the more probable term in a system whose probabilities are skew.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 169) identify the different speech functions realised by imperative mood realised by different tones as follows:

command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)
invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)
request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t
plea: tone 4

The frequency of a selected tone will thus vary with the frequency of a selected speech function realised by imperative mood in a given text type, and this varies with the tenor relations of the interlocutors.

[2] This misunderstands the distinction between a feature and a classification of feature. In Halliday's system of KEY, Halliday & Greaves (2008: 208) 'neutral' is one of the features, not a classification of a feature as neutral or unmarked:

[3] This misrepresents the SFL model. To be clear, SPEECH FUNCTION (semantics) is realised by MOOD (lexicogrammar), and different features of KEY (lexicogrammar), realised by different features of TONE (phonology), differentiate the SPEECH FUNCTION of a MOOD into more delicate types. An example is the case of commands being differentiated into invitations, requests and pleas according to the tone selection, as in [1] above.

[4] To be clear, the unmarked/marked distinction is not restricted to features of textual systems, as demonstrated by the unmarked/marked distinction for the system of TONE, which realises interpersonal systems. Another interpersonal example is the unmarked choice of Subject; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 194):

For any clause, there is one choice of Subject that is ‘unmarked’ – that is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In a giving clause (offer or statement), the unmarked Subject is ‘I’; while in a demanding clause (question or command), the unmarked Subject is ‘you’.

An experiential example is unmarked/marked distinction for present tense, which varies according to PROCESS TYPE. 

[5] This misunderstands the 'good reason' principle. To be clear, 'textual prominence' is what choosing an element as Theme or New affords, and this is the case whether the choice is unmarked or marked. The 'good reason' principle, on the other hand, is what lies behind the choice of a marked option in preference to the unmarked option.

Brad Smith On Markedness Not Explained In Theoretical Terms

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 11:05:

Saying unmarked is the option one chooses except where there is 'some good reason', while helpful in learning how to analyse markedness, doesn't really explain the concept in theoretical terms. So far, until better educated, I am sticking with my discourse semantics motivation: imperative mood, phylogenetically and functionally, is the option to enact a command - to get that job done; and other options, co-selected with tone choices, are used to enact more complex moves such as polite command: '//1 ^ can I / start the order with your */ phone number please // ('give me your phone number' + deference)

and again at 14:17:

I guess my question with theoretical terms and concepts is, what am I asking this term/concept to do for me? We can never, sadly or not, get away from 'language turned back on itself' and all that implies... (including if we use multimodal semiotics as metadiscourse... mathematicians and scientists take note!)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is linguistic data produced by speakers and writers that are analysed, not markedness. Once data are theorised as a system network, relative markedness can be assigned by a linguist to alternative features in a system.

[2] To be clear, glossing 'unmarked' as the default or neutral choice explains the concept in everyday terms. On the other hand, Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7) explain the concept in terms of the theoretical dimensions of axis, instantiation and stratification:

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[3] To be clear, this is Halliday's theory, not Martin's discourse semantics.

[4] For some of the theoretical problems that invalidate the model of discourse semantics, see e.g.

• Review of English Text
• Review of Bateman's Review of English Text
• Review of Working With Discourse

[5] To be clear, like any theoretical concept, markedness is a means of understanding how language functions. For example, if a selection is marked, then there is a motivation for the selection to be sought. 

[6] To be clear, language is the most powerful semiotic system, so using language to model language is using the most powerful semiotic system to model language.

[7] To be clear, 'metadiscourse' is literally discourse about discourse. From an SFL perspective, what gets classified as metadiscourse is non-ideational meaning: aspects of interpersonal and textual meaning. It may be that Smith meant 'metalanguage', but this only applies to linguistic theory — language about language — not to (language about) mathematics and (language about) science.

David Rose On Halliday's Instantiation/Stratification Matrix

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 21 Mar 2024, 15:00:

This matrix from a talk MAKH gave to computer scientists in 95 may help to flesh out the SFL timeline a little.

It is based on ideas he first proposed in 1961. Subsequent research was overwhelmingly in the bottom row – on LG systems. Cells above that are proposals for research. He comments “Semantic representations of the instance — the instance as meaning — are still quite unsatisfactory, and there is much work to be done in this respect. Likewise for the instantial situation: we tend to work with informal word-pictures, like the stage directions in the printed edition of a play; but the basic concept of situation as instance has advanced very little in recent decades” (2005:255).

The upper and middle left-hand cells were the focus of Jim Martin and colleagues’ research through the 80s, culminating in English Text in 92. Metafunctional semantic systems were described as discourse semantics. Systems were also described for ‘potential clusterings of values of field, tenor, mode’, that were named genre systems. Appliability was one motivation for prioritising genre systems. Systems were proposed for field, tenor, mode, but it took another two decades for this research to be taken up in earnest, starting with Jing Hao on field, followed by a series of studies, culminating in Doran, Martin, Herrington 2023 (and Yaegan’s recent course at Usyd).

A crucial advance in this research is description of field, tenor, mode systems as semiotic systems that are instantiated, not by ‘informal word-pictures’, but by ‘selection expressions’, as the matrix specifies for LG and semantic systems.

Another major step forward is the reconstrual of what MAKH calls ‘values’ in the top row as ‘principles’ of instantiation, and ‘domains’ of individuation. This potentially integrates research using different SFL models into a commensurate whole.

It also helps resolve an anomaly in the upper right-hand cell, in which instances of socio-semiotic systems are named ‘particular social semiotic situation events’, whereas instances of LG and semantic systems are simply named ‘particular texts’. A social semiotic event is of course a (multimodal) text.

"The left-hand upper cell is taken up with contextual networks: it contains a theory of the possible semiotic situations that collectively constitute a culture – taxonomies of institutions and of doings and happenings, manifested as possible clusterings of values of field, tenor and mode.” Halliday 2005: 255

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) did not include a cline of instantiation, nor Malinowski's notions of context, nor a semantic stratum:

[2] To be clear, it is important to recognise that Halliday himself never proposed system networks to represent the systems of context.

[3] This is misleading. Martin (1992) rebranded the lexicogrammatical systems of the textual metafunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976) as his discourse semantic systems and distributed them across the different metafunctions. To these systems he added Halliday's semantic system of speech function and rebranded it as his discourse semantic system of negotiation.

[4] To be clear, Martin (1992) mistook registers for the contextual systems (field, tenor, mode) that are realised by registers, thereby proposing that a functional variety of language was not language, but context. Martin (1992) then confused two meanings of 'genre', genre as mode and genre as text type, and located the confusion stratally above register in context. This had the effect of proposing that text types were realised by field, tenor, and mode, instead of the reverse, thereby upending the realisation relation.

[5] To be clear, Hao and Doran were Martin's students and use Martin's model that proposes that functional varieties of language are not language, but context.

[6] This is cleverly misleading. First, Halliday did not describe field, tenor and mode as instantiated by 'informal word pictures'. Halliday used 'informal word pictures' to describe instances of field, tenor and mode, because he didn't have formal systems of field, tenor and mode to model the potential. Second, in Martin's model, context is realised by an instance of language, text, whereas this advance by Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024) rejects Martin's model, so that context systems are now instantiated by context, not by language (text).

[7] This is misleading, because this major step forward is major step backward. Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024) have reinterpreted the features of field, tenor and mode systems as 'principles of instantiation' in order to make room for semantic systems which they misconstrue as contextual.  That is, having first misconstrued language (register) as context, Martin is now, with his colleagues, misconstruing context (field, tenor, mode) as language. See also

• Negotiating Tenor: Enacting Affiliation In Dialogue And Monologue (Yaegan Doran)
• A Close Examination Of Yaegan Doran's 2023 ASFLA Plenary Abstract

[8] For some of the inconsistencies that invalidate Martin's model of individuation, see

• David Rose Endorsing Martin's Misunderstandings Of Individuation
• David Rose On Martin's Context-Bound/Free And Individuation As Allocation/Affiliation

[9] For some of the inconsistencies that invalidate Martin's integrated model, see

• David Rose On Jim Martin's Individuation
• David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Realisation, Instantiation And Individuation

[10] This is misleading, because there is no anomaly in the upper right-hand cell, though the false claim betrays a serious misunderstanding of the distinction between context and language. 'Particular social semiotic situation events' describes instances of context: the culture as semiotic potential. A text, on the other hand, is an instance of the content plane of language: semantics and lexicogrammar. A multimodal text includes instances of the content plane of semiotic systems other than language.

David Rose On ChatGPT Recognising Canonical Structure

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 1 Apr at 10:12:

I’m just looking for the limits of GPT and whatever it is that ‘context’ is supposed be...

These are each instances of a pedagogic register type in which a learner solicits knowledge.

GPT recognises the canonical structure, even when it’s initiated with a statement...

		speech function	exch role	register phase	interact
Mario	Your self is merely semiotic.	statement	K2	propose class	solicit knowledge
GPT	That is correct.	answer	K1	evaluate	approve
	As an AI language model, my "self" or programmed understanding of my existence and capabilities is based purely on symbols and algorithms.	statement	K1	elaborate class	impart knowledge

Keep in mind that these are just labels for structures. We give them functional labels because that’s the relation we interpret between ranks and strata. But GPT doesn't have to interpret them as ‘functions’... just predict appropriate structures in response.

and later that day at 22:01:

But note that GPT is also negotiating affiliation with Mario... positioning itself outside of human communities... no doubt ‘trained’ by its developers.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, ChatGPT produces texts from the lexical collocation frequencies in a reservoir of instances, not from an individuated repertoire of systems that are realised as structures. On this basis, ChatGPT is not an individuated meaner.

[2] To be clear, by 'context' Rose means Martin's misunderstanding of register as a stratum of context. So here Rose is presenting a text (language) as an instance of a type of context, despite context being opposed to language in Martin's stratification model.

[3] To be clear, importantly, it is not ChatGPT that recognises 'the canonical structure' but Rose. See [1] above.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'acknowledgement' is the expected response to a statement (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 137).

[5] To be clear, ChatGPT does not 'predict structures', because that is not how it operates; see [1] above.

[6] To be clear, ChatGPT is not 'negotiating affiliation', because ChatGPT is not an individuated meaner; see [1] above.

David Rose On Why Language Needs A Stratified Content Plane

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 28 Mar, 2023 at 9:11:

The way GPT ‘reads’ and ‘writes’ text as probabilistic strings of tokens highlights the question of why language needs a stratified content plane. It sounds something like dynamic processes of DS, as foreshadowed by Firth’s notion of ‘mutual expectancy’. The multiple ‘levels’ of its design could enable it to simultaneously predict and review appropriate structures at several scales and various functions, e.g. figures and figure sequences, lexical strings, reference chains, method of development, evaluation prosodies, exchange roles... [just *predicting structures* not making meanings as persona semiotica].

But lang requires these various scales of DS processes to be (re)organised in local processes of LG. Why?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is not that language "needs" a stratified content plane, but that, on the SFL model, a stratified content plane is what distinguishes language from other socio-semiotic systems.

[2] To be clear, here Rose is merely promoting Martin's discourse semantics, which confuses Halliday's textual grammar (lexical cohesion, reference etc.), Fries' textual grammar (method of development), Halliday's ideational semantics (figures and sequences), inter alia.

More importantly, the dynamics of one stratum, discourse semantics, are irrelevant to the stratification of content, because stratification is the relation between levels of abstraction, and so what stratification affords is the decoupling of congruent relations between strata to open up the enormous semogenic potential of grammatical metaphor. Moreover, as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) point out:

If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[3] This is misleading. Martin's discourse semantics is not organised into 'multiple levels' and 'several various scales'.

[4] On the one hand, this misunderstands the relation between strata, and on the other hand, it is very misleading. Semantics and lexicogrammar constitute different levels of symbolic abstraction, so the lower level (Token) is not a local reorganisation of the higher level (Value): the lower level (lexicogrammar) is a realisation of the higher level (semantics). 

In all of Martin's work, which Rose continually promotes, there is a failure to understand strata as different levels of symbolic abstraction. For example, Martin (1992) misunderstands strata as modules (of the same level of abstraction), and confuses stratification with semogenesis ('all strata make meaning').

The reason why this is misleading is that it presents Halliday's lexicogrammar as a "reorganisation" of Martin's discourse semantics, whereas, in terms of theorising, Martin's discourse semantics is a reorganisation of Halliday's lexicogrammar (cohesion) and semantics (speech function). 

David Rose On The Absence Of Semantic Structures In Halliday's Model

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 1/8/22 at 17:09:

MAKH’s procedure for semantic networks was taken up by RH, who generalised their application, specifying the entry condition as messages, realised by clauses (Hasan, Cloran, Williams, & Lukin 2005)...

Naturally, the focus had to be not on a context specific semantic network, but on a language-exhaustive one, or contextually open...

What remained the same was classification of sub-types, still realised as features in grammar systems, rather than semantic structures. In RH’s 1983 system below, features classify sub-types of questions, by more general grammatical criteria than MAKH 1972.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the procedure that Hasan (1983) took up from Halliday (1972) was simply the use of system networks to model semantics paradigmatically.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The networks in Halliday (1972) do not specify how semantic features are realised lexicogrammatically; see previous post. 

[3] This is misleading. As can be seen by examining the semantic network in Hasan (1983), the features are distinguished on the basis of meaning, not on grammatical criteria.

∞

It is important to understand the nature of Rose's argument in these posts. His claim is that Halliday's model of semantics does not include structures, and his method of arguing is to seek out old papers (1972, 1983) that were written before semantic structures were discussed in the modern framework. That is, Rose studiously ignores later evidence, such as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), in which, for example, grammatical metaphor is modelled as a Token-Value relation between semantic structures. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 208-9):

It is the fact that metaphor multiplies meanings within the semantic system that opens up the possibility of metaphorical chains, with one congruent starting-point and another highly metaphorical end-point (A"' stands for A" stands for A' stands for A; e.g. 'engine failure' stands for 'the failing of an engine' stands for 'an engine failed'). The semantic system is being expanded along the dimension of the metaphorical token-value relation; but the expansion is still within the semantic system itself. 

 

As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429) explain:

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

∞

As Peter Medawar once wrote of another author:

Its author can be excused of dishonesty only on the grounds that before deceiving others he has taken great pains to deceive himself. 

David Rose Misrepresenting Hasan's System As A Synthesis Of Martin's Systems

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 12/7/22 at 9:14:

What differs between the MESSAGE features in Figure 24.4 below and the mood features that realise them is their systemic valeur. The valeur of MOOD features is shaped by similarities and contrasts in the mood structures that realise them, exemplified in Table 24.4.

The valeur of message features is shaped by three factors as far as I can see. System G features by their position in exchange structures: verify/enquire etc. System F features by appraisal: precise/tentative; by field: specify/explain; again by exchange structure: prompted/unprompted; and again by field: global/particular...

In sum, the MESSAGE system attempts to synthesise the complementarity of two discourse semantic systems, NEGOTIATION and APPRAISAL. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the critical distinction between the semantic features of the SPEECH FUNCTION system and the lexicogrammatical features of the MOOD system is that each system of features is located at a different level of symbolic abstraction.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, the valeur of each MOOD system feature is its relations to other features in the system; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 96, 509). This misrepresentation of 'valeur' serves as a pretext for the misrepresentations that follow.

[3] To be clear, the valeur of each of Hasan's SPEECH FUNCTION system features is its relations to the other features in the system, and as such, they are not "shaped by" other systems such as APPRAISAL or FIELD, the latter being Martin's misunderstanding of ideational semantics as register misunderstood as context.

[4] This is very misleading indeed, because it misrepresents Hasan's (earlier) system as an attempt to synthesise Martin's (later) systems, one of which, NEGOTIATION, is Martin's rebranding of SPEECH FUNCTION.

Mick O'Donnell On Semantics–Grammar Mappings

 Mick O'Donnell replied to David Rose on sys-func on 11/7/22 at 22:01:

Firstly, one example from a non-Martin model does not validate your claim that ALL Hallidayan models map 1-to-1 from Semantics to Grammar.

Secondly, Yes, I agree that there is an apparent one to one mapping from Speech Function to Grammatical Realisation in Geoff's model. But in this case, I take this as a good thing. If we take seriously the claim that differences in form relate to differences in meaning, there should be semantic differences between the different grammatical metaphors.

The problem really stems from whether you are looking at the mapping of partial semantic specifications (which should have alternative realisation possibilities) or whether you are looking at mapping full semantic specifications (which should constrain the possibilities down to a single form).

In things I have looked at, it is often the case that two sentences are ideationally the same, but textually (informationally) different (e.g., John gave Mary a book vs Mary was given a book by John; or John might be leaving vs. John is possibly leaving). Just looking at the ideational meaning in isolation, there are multiple ways the meaning can be realised. But when one takes ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning all together at once, the [sic] will ideally be a single utterance that realises that meaning.

(exceptions here:

i) I am ignoring here the possibility that some models allow Context of Situation to "skip" semantics and affect lexico-grammatical choices without mediation of semantic choices. Add to this Context of Culture difference (which may lead to different ways in which a meaning is mapped onto form)

ii) some differences in form may not have any correlation in meaning, e.g., is there a meaning difference between "the man that I saw" and "the man who I saw"? Or between [sic]

In the case of Geoff's network, the difference in ways to ask for information are not so much cross-metafunction, but intra-metafunction: the different sub-choices reflect different interpersonal strategies for getting information. And as this network offers a complete speech-functional account of the possibilities, the end-points can be attached to definite lxg realisations.

We only get a many-to-one mapping between semantics and form when we work on partial semantic descriptions (e.g., demand:information). As I say above, a complete specification of meaning should result in a complete specification of form (barring as I said above models where context skips semantics to directly affect form choices)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday's theory distinguishes between 'compact' and 'dispersed' grammatical realisations of semantic systems, and adds that compactly realised systems 'may become dispersed in their realisation through grammatical metaphor'  (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 666-7).

[2] To be clear, the speech function network under discussion is from Hasan (1983), and its gloss includes one-to-many mappings between semantic features and grammatical realisations; see the previous post.

[3] Here again O'Donnell follows Fawcett in misconstruing the semantics-grammar relation as a relation between meaning and form. To be clear, in SFL Theory, grammatical form is modelled as a rank scale, and forms (e.g. nominal group) are interpreted in terms of their function in realising meaning (e.g. Phenomenon). In the absence of metaphor, semantics and grammatical function agree (are congruent).

[4] To be clear, the notion of different forms realising different meanings is independent of grammatical metaphor, and grammatical metaphor is not a meaning-form relation, but an incongruence between the function of a form (grammar) and the meaning that it realises (semantics).

[5] To be clear, here O'Donnell introduces two 'red herrings': agnate structures and the integration of metafunctional meanings into a single syntagm, as evidence on the question of whether or not there are one-to-one mappings between semantic and lexicogrammatical features.

[6] To be clear, the notion of semantics being "skipped" is nonsensical. Linguistic strata are the same phenomenon viewed at different levels of symbolic abstraction. In terms of the ideational metafunction, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) write:

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning.

[7] To be clear, SPEECH FUNCTION is an interpersonal system, and since the network from Hasan (1983) is part of her SPEECH FUNCTION system, it is necessarily "intra-metfunction".

[8] To be clear, although O'Donnell begins by continuing his argument against Rose's false claim that Halliday's theory posits a one-to-one mapping between semantic and grammatical features (first paragraph), he soon forgets what side of the argument he is on, and switches to arguing for Rose's claim, and ends by concluding in its favour (final paragraph). The switch begins when O'Donnell assesses what he wrongly accepts as a one-to-one mapping as 'a good thing' (second paragraph).

David Rose Misrepresenting Speech Function

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 11/7/22 at 22:00:

As the systems below show, the grammatico-semantic model assumes a bijective or one-to-one relation between LG features and semantic features. What differs is the intrastratal relations between the features. The semantic networks appear to re-systemicise the LG systems.

Crucially, the names given to the semantic features imply moves in unfolding exchanges. They are therefore potentially complementary with the exchange systems first proposed by Margaret Berry and further developed in ET as the discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading, because it is not true. As Table 24.4 details, the semantic feature 'alternative' has multiple systemic lexicogrammatical realisations.

 

[2] To be clear, a semantic network represents a higher level of symbolic abstraction than a lexicogrammatical network.

[3] The implication here is misleading. To be clear, Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION, part of which Hasan (1983) develops in Figure 24.4, has always been concerned with 'moves in unfolding exchanges'. The title of the chapter on mood in IFG, has always been 'clause as exchange'.

[4] This is very misleading indeed. The original work is by Halliday and Hasan. The reason why the work of Berry and Martin is "complementary" is that both are based on the original work. Rose's wording falsely suggests that they are parallel independent developments. For a close examination of Martin's system of NEGOTIATION, see here (English Text) and here (Working With Discourse).

David Rose Denying The Revisionism Of Martin's Discourse Semantics

After David Kellogg wrote on sys-func on 8/6/22 at 6:50:

e) … The idea that the "discourse semantics" of Martin and Rose is somehow "implicit" in the examples of MAKH is a classic revisionist move on the part of Rose. In this case, it's an extremely weak revisionist move, since the theoretician (MAKH) is also the primary data gatherer and data interpreter, and he explicitly rejects this possibility. …

 

David Rose responded To David Kellogg on sys-func on 8/6/22 at 17:10:

DK’s argument seems reasonable until perhaps point e) when for some reason, judgement overtakes reason (which DK himself might admit;).

Far from revisionism, each of us can do no more than apply and extend the old man’s work, which is what makes us an SFL family (though we may have favourites among our siblings;). My own clumsy wordings were merely an invitation to look again at his evidence, from another perspective. So what does himself say?

Nigel at 14mths... ‘Here for the first time a system of experiential meaning (three personal names) becomes separated from, and freely combinable with, a system of interpersonal meaning (two moods). This is the child's first step towards a lexicogrammatical stratum.

…by 18 months he has embarked on the transition to the mother tongue. Some signs are disappearing, while the others have become lexicalised and have formed the basis of a rapidly expanding vocabulary, now around a hundred items…

In the month from 1;6 to 1;7 Nigel's lexicogrammatical resources expanded very quickly, extending beyond single words to utterances of two words and then three… In the next two weeks, however, a remarkable change took place… Any rising tone utterance demanded a response… A falling tone utterance, on the other hand…was semiotically self-sufficient and with these Nigel did not press for a response…’ [Halliday 2004]

I should have added earlier that infants of course engage in exchanges with carers, but they are mainly controlled by the adult. The resources MAKH documents enable the child to start controlling them. It interests me that MAKH does in fact make their discourse semantic function explicit.. ‘Any rising tone utterance demanded a response’, i.e. initiating a knowledge exchange.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See David Rose Evoking Negative Judgement Of David Kellogg.

[2] To be clear, the work of Martin, which Rose incessantly promotes, is not so much revisionism of Halliday's original work as appropriation. This is because Martin simply relabels Halliday's work (SPEECH FUNCTION and COHESION) as his own (discourse semantics). The "other" perspective that Rose invites his reader to take is Martin's appropriation (NEGOTIATION) of Halliday's model (SPEECH FUNCTION); see further below.

[3] To be clear, Rose's metaphor of an SFL family, and Martin's interest in affiliation, bonding and rallying round icons betrays their true philosophical orientation. Bertrand Russell, in his History Of Western Philosophy (pp 21-2), provides an explanation of both Martin's foregrounding of social cohesion and heroism, and his hostility to scientists:

Throughout this long development, from 600 BC to the present day, philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them.  With this difference, others have been associated.  The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, either old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in greater or lesser degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically.  They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that ‘nobility’ or ‘heroism’ is to be preferred.  They have had a sympathy with irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion.  The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passion, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion.  This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of what we recognise as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought.  In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.

[4] To be clear, Rose's argument is again that initiating and responding moves validate Martin's discourse semantic model, in preference to Halliday's semantic model, because these are exclusively features of his system of NEGOTIATION. The problem here is that, since Martin's discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION is appropriated from Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION, initiating and responding moves were previously modelled by the original system. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

[5]  To be clear, in SFL theory, the commodity that is given or demanded in an exchange is not knowledge but either information or goods-&-services, and in SFL theory, 'knowledge' is modelled as meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: x):

we are saying that cognition "is" (that is, can most profitably be modelled as) not thinking but meaning: the "mental" map is in fact a semiotic map, and "cognition" is just a way of talking about language. In modelling knowledge as meaning, we are treating it as a linguistic construct: hence, as something that is construed in the lexicogrammar. Instead of explaining language by reference to cognitive processes, we explain cognition by reference to linguistic processes. … a semantic approach, where "understanding" something is transforming it into meaning, and to "know" is to have performed that transformation.

David Rose On Exchange, Marxian Theory And Halliday (1961)

David Rose responded to Kieran McGillicuddy on sys-func on 3 June 2022 at 11:08:

Perhaps [Halliday's] greatest contribution was to show us how ‘production’ and ‘exchange’ happen simultaneously, through grammatical metafunctions, that it is in fact a co-production between speakers. But this co-production is necessarily sequenced in time – one person then another. And each person evaluates the other as they speak or gesture. That’s what the ‘exchange’ metaphor attempts to capture... to technicalise and iconise.

I’m interested in the fields these metaphors are imported from. Put ‘exchange’ together with ‘powerhouse where meaning are made’, with what we know of the old man’s history and what motivated his career, and we get the field of Marxist theory of economic production and exchange, combined with Hjelmslev’s theory of semiotic strata.

In my view this helps to explain how he conceptualised the grammar/semantics relation in 1961, when his research focus was grammar... with grammar as the productive ‘base’ where meanings are made, that redounds with a semantic ‘superstructure’ of these meanings.

Blogger Comments:

[1] For some, Halliday's greatest contribution was his formulation of a scientifically rigorous theory of language.

[2] To be clear, Halliday did not show that language is  'a coproduction between speakers … sequenced in time'. This has been the experience of language users since time immemorial. This is one aspect of the data that is modelled in his theory.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The "exchange metaphor" does not attempt to "capture…to technicalise and iconise" any reciprocal evaluation by interlocutors. Exchange means giving and demanding (to be given) information or goods-&-services: the system of SPEECH FUNCTION. Whether or not interlocutors actually evaluate each other in their texts is another matter entirely.

[4] To be clear, this is nonsense. On the one hand, exchange is not Marxian theory; as a social phenomenon, it is data that can be interpreted in terms of Marxian, or any other, theory. On the other hand, the word 'powerhouse' was Matthiessen's addition to his editions of IFG (2004, 2014) and it was used to elaborate Halliday's original (1985, 1994) metaphor, drawn from the functioning of a computer, of grammar as the central processing unit of language, not to evoke "economic production and exchange". 

[5] To be clear, as levels of symbolic abstraction in linguistic theory, strata ultimately derive from Saussure's sign, where Signified is the higher level and Signifier is the lower level. Hjelmslev conceived of the higher level as content, and lower level as expression, in his characterisation of a denotative semiotic. Hjelmslev distinguished this from a connotative semiotic, which has a denotative system as its expression plane, and Halliday adopted this to model culture as the content plane and language as the expression plane of a connotative semiotic.

[6] This misrepresents the theoretical architecture of Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961). Halliday (2002 [1961]: 39):

The words 'semantics' and 'semantic' were not used in Halliday (1961). The word 'context' in the above diagram was characterised by Halliday (ibid.) as follows:

The context is the relation of the form to non-linguistic features of the situations in which language operates, and to linguistic features other than those of the item under attention: these being together “extratextual” features. … Context is in fact (like phonology) an interlevel relating form to extratextual features.

And again, the compositional relation between a productive base and its superstructure is not analogous to the symbolic abstraction relation between grammar and semantics.

David Rose On How Halliday's Marxism Influenced The Various Dimensions Of His Model

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 2 June 2022 at 7:01:

It would be intriguing to know just how MAKH’s Marxism influenced the various dimensions of his model, as politics prevented him from making it explicit.

For example, he often describes grammar in terms like the ‘engine’ or ‘powerhouse’ in which ‘meanings are made’. The image is of industrial production, of labour and machines. The meanings produced are then ‘exchanged’, as Kieran discusses here.

The Marxian image of an economic base of production and exchange becomes more sharply outlined in the grammar/semantics relation. H&M’s 1999 Construing Experience is a description of the ideational meanings made by the grammar. It construes semantics as an ideational superstructure emerging from the production processes of the grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in the first two editions of IFG (1985, 1994), Halliday characterised the grammar in terms of computer technology: as the central processing unit of language. Halliday (1985: xxxiv-v):

In the two editions of IFG edited by Matthiessen (2004, 2014), the word 'powerhouse' was added as an elaboration of the computer technology metaphor. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 22):

Grammar is the central processing unit of language, the powerhouse where meanings are created;

[2] This misleading, because it is untrue. The image of central processing unit is simply that of computer hardware performing functions; and the image of a powerhouse is a thing or person of great energy, strength or power.

But more importantly, an image 'of industrial production, of labour, of machines' is not Marxism. Such phenomena are data that can be analysed in terms of any socio-economic ideology.

[3] Following from the previous point, the mere exchange of commodities, information or goods-&-services, is not Marxism, as demonstrated by the exchange of Christmas greetings and presents.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. The relation between base and superstructure in Marxian theory is one of extension (composition) at the same level of symbolic abstraction. The relation between grammar and semantics, on the other hand, is one of elaboration at different levels of symbolic abstraction. That is, base does not symbolise superstructure, but grammar does symbolise semantics.

Mick O'Donnell On The Difference Between 'Should Not Fail To See' And 'Should See'

After Wendy Bowcher asked on Sysfling on 6 May 2021 at 19:15:

I am wondering why (semantically/contextually) the advertisers might chose to use the 'not fail to' form. Why not just use sentence (2) in the headline?

(1) EVERY MOTHER WHO VISITS THE SHOW SHOULD NOT FAIL TO SEE GLAXO EXHIBIT

(2) EVERY MOTHER WHO VISITS THE SHOW SHOULD SEE GLAXO EXHIBIT

Mick O'Donnell replied on Sysfling on 6 May 2021 at 20:32:

I think the real difference between the alternative wordings can be brought out by an alternative transitivity analysis:

In the first, the mother construes herself either as a failer or succeeder, depending which polarity she chooses to produce by her action.

In the second, she is a perceiver or a non-perceiver (or more in line with a material interpretation, a visitor or non-visitor):

Our society invests a lot more personal judgement in failure/success than it does in perceiving/ignoring (as Bradley commented, bring in the Appraisal angle).

Adding in "should", Australians are more likely to accept an admonition to succeed than an admonition to visit something. Admonitions are more acceptable when the recommended action is to the benefit of the addressee (e.g., imperatives are fine in a recipe but less so from student to teacher), and telling someone to success could be seen as working for their benefit).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the difference between the two wordings is that, in the first wording, should not fail to see, the Process is realised by a verbal group complex, and so by two Events, whereas in the second wording, should see, the Process is realised by a verbal group, and so by just one Event.

The verbal groups in the complex are related hypotactically, and the semantic relation between them is conation: trying and succeeding (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 572)

[2] To be clear, these are not alternative analyses of the original wordings; see [1]. Moreover, they are not consistent with SFL Theory, since the first misinterprets the secondary verbal group as part of the Goal, and the second misinterprets the mental clause as material (as if it were Mother visited something):

[3] To be clear, it is not the mother, but the speaker/writer, who construes experience as Mother, and construes her as an Actor of a material Process which was unsuccessful.

[4] To be clear, the mental interpretation of the clause, which forms one thread of O'Donnell's argument, is inconsistent with his analysis of the clause as material.

[5] To be clear, this is meant to explain why the advertisers chose the first wording over the second, but instead of making use of SFL Theory, it just makes generalisations about reader reactions.

Using SFL Theory, the use of should in both wordings can be explained by reference to context and semantics. In terms of context, the rhetorical mode of the text is one of exhortation, since its function is to urge readers to take a particular course of action. For Matthiessen (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 34), this (textual) mode is oriented to (interpersonal) tenor, rather than (ideational) field. The unmarked interpersonal semantic realisation of exhortation mode is the speech function 'command', and in both wordings, the command is realised metaphorically by a modulated declarative. This interpersonal metaphor is itself motivated by the tenor relations between advertiser and reader, including their relative status and contact.

Moreover, the rhetorical mode of exhortation also provides an explanation for why the first wording was used by the advertisers, since should not fail ramps up the exhortation to coercion: every mother who visits the show should not fail…, which might be taken to imply that readers would be failing their children as mothers if they were not to see (the) Glaxo exhibit.

Also relevant here is the double negative (grammatical not and lexical fail) of the primary verbal group, which might be taken as an emphasis of positive polarity.

See also (The) Glaxo Exhibit: Theme, Transitivity & Mood.