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David Rose On Adverbial Group Agnation

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 16 Apr 2024, 20:00:

agnation for the consumer

and again on 17 Apr, at 15:11:

... as subtypes of intensification

The nominal realisation is downranked and metaphorical (as with [in the past]). Like congruent adverbial realisations, it can be further intensified and combine with polarity and comparison (but not identically).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is part of Rose's argument that 4.5 billion years ago is an adverbial group. Here he claims that it is agnate with the adverbial group long ago, in that the two are related through the adverbial group system of intensification. There are two problems with this claim.

First, intensification is not a system of the adverbial group, so the two variants are not systemically related through intensification. Instead, 'intensification' describes a type of adverb serving as a Premodifier. Clearly, an embedded nominal group is not a type of adverb. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 420-1):

The items serving as Premodifiers are adverbs belonging to one of three types – polarity (not), comparison (more, less; as, so) and intensification. … Those of intensification indicate higher or lower intensity; they are either general intensifiers that are interpersonally neutral (very, much, quite, really, completely, totally, utterly; rather, fairly, pretty; almost, nearly), including the interrogative adverb how, or specific ones that derive from some interpersonally significant scale (amazingly, astonishingly, awfully, desperately, eminently, extraordinarily, horribly, incredibly, perfectly, terribly, terrifically, unbelievably, wonderfully).

Second, if the nominal group 4.5 billion years is interpreted as premodifying ago, then it specifies the temporal extent of ago, not its intensification.

Instead, 4.5 billion years [ago] is a nominal group that is agnate with the nominal group 4.5 billion years [in the past], since they differ only in how a feature of the QUALIFICATION system is realised: as an embedded adverbial group (ago) or an embedded prepositional phrase (in the past). Matthiessen (1995: 669):

On the basis of Matthiessen's network, the feature they both realise is enhancing qualification: time: past.

[2] To be clear, in the case of the two nominal groups, 4.5 billion km away and 4.5 billion years ago, the Qualifiers away and ago are embedded adverbial groups, not ranking adverbs (as Rose would have it). This can be shown by the potential for modification:

• 4.5 billion km further away [than that]
• 4.5 billion years longer ago [than that]

[3] As demonstrated above, it is the adverbial group ago that downranked like the prepositional phrase in the past, not 4.5 billion years.

[4] To be clear, this potential is available to nominal groups:

not so very many years [as that]

David Rose On Focus Structures

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 14 Apr 2024, at 22:17:

The argument in IFG 6.2.5 is elegantly designed to explain nom gps with two Heads, ‘a phenomenon that from one point of view appears as a single entity and from another point of view as two’.

It begins by positing a dual experiential/logical structure at group rank, in order to then posit a post-modifier function in the logical structure, in which the experiential Thing is embedded in the Complement of a downranked prep phrase. This model is then applied to a series of nom gp structures, culminating with this one.

What if we were to argue instead from this example backwards? As facet is just one of the semantic options for this type of structure (richly captured in IFG Table 6-11), we could generalise its function name, e.g. as Focus. While the Deictic and Thing in this nom gp are realised by words, the Focus is realised by a downranked nom gp, that is linked to the hills by the structure marker ‘of’, whose function we could label LK for Linker.

As the Thing in the Focus nom gp is downranked, do we need an additional logical structure in which the primary Thing is downranked?

Working backwards, similar structures are analogous with this one, such as those classified as Classifier/Head in IFG.

Or Epithet/Head

This last one is ‘a more restricted type’ which seems to have evolved as an idiomatic realisation of attitude, on the model of the more common Focus structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is not true. To be clear, a nominal group has only one logical Head. Rose's misunderstanding is resolved by the part of the quote he omitted. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 396): 

In all such nominal expressions where Head and Thing are not conflated although both are clearly present, what is being construed is a phenomenon that from one point of view appears as a single entity and from another point of view as two.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. To be clear, the experiential Thing is not embedded. It is the nominal group serving as Facet that is embedded in the experiential analysis. The Thing in the experiential structure conflates with the Head of an embedded nominal group in the logical structure.

[3] To be clear, this merely describes the general function of the Extended Numerative in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 395), with Matthiessen's 'Extended Numerative' rebranded as Martin's 'Focus'.

[4] To be clear, this creates a theoretical inconsistency, since 'linker' is a class of conjunction that marks a paratactic relation, whereas of is not a conjunction and does not mark a paratactic relation.

[5] To be clear, there is no Thing function in the logical structure of a nominal group. Moreover, the logical structure is necessary in such instances to show that the Head and Thing are dissociated.

[6] To be clear, these analyses fail to (i) recognise the dissociation of Head and Thing, (ii) distinguish between Classifier and Epithet, and (iii) distinguish these structures from Extended Numeratives. As such, they have reduced explanatory power, and can be discarded on that basis.

[7] This is a bare assertion since it is unsupported by evidence: the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit.

David Rose On Symmetrical And Transitive Relations

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 14 Apr 2024, at 12:02:

Later in the chapter, Michael reveals that he is indeed talking to knowers of formal logic...

‘The relations of projection and expansion, which (when combined with parataxis and hypotaxis) constitute the ‘logical’ component of a natural language, are not reducible to elementary logical relations of a non-linguistic kind...’ (p460)

His use of symmetrical and transitive is indeed taken from formal logic...

A symmetric relation is a type of binary relation. An example is the relation "is equal to", because if a = b is true then b = a is also true.

Transitive relation, a binary relation in which if A is related to B and B is related to C, then A is related to C.

This usage is not explained, although the discussion is hard to understand without knowing it. Which makes things a little confusing for us benighted non-knowers. 

So Christian may like to adjust or explain this table and discussion for IFG5. While status and sequence are SFL categories, the use of symmetry and transitivity here are not.

This is pretty significant, as these terms are used to define parataxis and hypotaxis on p452, and a series of caveats on p460. Eg, ‘although each implies the other, they are not identical in meaning, because while parataxis is a symmetrical relationship, expansion is not’. Which is why I suggested to Jing that

My friend, John, ≠ John, my friend, ...

(in my ignorance)

 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is not true. The Halliday quote merely points out to the linguist reader that the logical relations of natural language are not reducible to the logical relations of designed systems.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. This usage has been explained in all four editions of IFG. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 452):

In principle, the paratactic relation is logically (i) symmetrical and (ii) transitive. This can be exemplified with the ‘and’ relation. (i) ‘salt and pepper’ implies ‘pepper and salt’, so the relationship is symmetrical; (ii) ‘salt and pepper’, ‘pepper and mustard’ together imply ‘salt and mustard’, so the relationship is transitive.

[3] This is misleading because it is not true. All four terms are used as properties of taxis in SFL Theory, as the table makes clear.

[4] To be clear, Rose had argued that the two were not equal on the basis of parataxis:

The thing about parataxis is it’s not reversible (realised by sequence), whereas hypotaxis is reversible (realised by status). So these two aren’t equivalent...

My friend John, ≠ John, my friend

but, as his Halliday quote explains, the asymmetry is in the expansion relation, elaboration, not in the paratactic relation.

David Rose On Nominal Group Structure

David Rose replied to Christian Matthiessen on SYSFLING on 14 Apr 2024, at 08:36:

here are some of the examples from your nom gp table described as Focus structures. From above the types of Focus are semantic categories (class/part/facet/group), from around they are compared with agnate examples, from below they are all linked by the structure marker ‘of’.

class (+/- attitude)

[my hero] of a friend

[my kind] of a friend

[that genius] of a student

[that type] of a student

part

[the city] of Rome

[the suburbs] of Rome

facet (abstract)

[the concept] of friendship

[the reality] of friendship

My own preference for this analysis is its simplicity, compared with a double experiential/logical analysis with moveable Head. My students also find it relatively simple. Their main difficulty is distinguishing ‘of’ as structure marker of Focus, from ‘of’ as preposition in Qualifier.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 394):

[2] To be clear, the experiential function that Martin merely rebrands with the textual term 'Focus' was previously described as

• Pre-Deictic and Pre-Numerative in Halliday (1985, 1994),
• Facet in Matthiessen (1995), and
• Extended Numerative in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004, 2014).

[3] To be clear, 'part' is a relation of extension, whereas the relation here is elaboration.

[4] To be clear, the 'Focus' analysis is an experiential analysis. It doesn't dispense with the need for a logical analysis. On the contrary, the analysis only arises from comparing the experiential and logical functions.

[5] To be clear, the logical Head does not move. In the above examples, it is always served by the word that precedes the structure marker of. What varies here is the experiential function that conflates with the logical Head.

[6] Trivially, of is both a structure marker and preposition in both cases.

David Rose On Parataxis

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 13 Apr 2024, at 15:53:

The thing about parataxis is it’s not reversible (realised by sequence), whereas hypotaxis is reversible (realised by status). So these two aren’t equivalent...

My friend John, ≠ John, my friend

and again at 20:11:

Funnily enough I was thinking of another line from the same tea party

they cried out when they saw Alice coming

...which is hypotactic and reversible (though not logically symmetrical). In contrast,

they saw Alice coming and then they cried out

...is paratactic and not reversible (which is what I meant).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis. Because parataxis is symmetrical, my friend, John does imply John, my friend. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 452):

Parataxis is the linking of elements of equal status…. Both the initiating and the continuing elements are free, in the sense that each could stand as a functioning whole. In principle, the paratactic relation is logically (i) symmetrical and (ii) transitive. This can be exemplified with the ‘and’ relation. (i) ‘salt and pepper’ implies ‘pepper and salt’, so the relationship is symmetrical; (ii) ‘salt and pepper’, ‘pepper and mustard’ together imply ‘salt and mustard’, so the relationship is transitive.

Hypotaxis is the binding of elements of unequal status… . The dominant element is free, but the dependent element is not. The hypotactic relation is logically (i) non-symmetrical and (ii) non-transitive. For example, ‘whe n’: (i) ‘I breathe when I sleep’ does not imply ‘I sleep when I breathe’; (ii) ‘I fret when I have to drive slowly’ and ‘I have to drive slowly when it’s been raining’ together do not imply ‘I fret when it’s been raining’.

[2] To be clear, in terms of parataxis, they saw Alice coming and they cried out imply they cried out and they saw Alice coming. It is the introduction of the logico-semantic relation of time (then) that backgrounds this paratactic symmetry.

[3] To be clear, this cannot be what Rose originally meant, since there was no temporal relation in his original example of parataxis my friend, John.

David Rose On Qualifiers

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 13 Apr, at 12:25:

Qualifiers specify a Thing, so the semantic probe (from ‘above’) is which or whose Thing?

Which year?

The year [1920]

Which city?

The city [of Rome]

and again at 12:45:

Focus attends to some aspect of the Thing – a facet, part, class or group. The Thing doesn't specify the Focus. Focus is realised by an embedded nom gp, usually linked to the nom gp by the structure marker ‘of’.

[green leaves of] the trees, [some historic buildings of] Rome

Qualifier is realised by an embedded clause or prep phrase

In The city [of Rome], ‘of’ is a preposition, specifying which city.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the Deictic, Numerative, Epithet, Classifier all serve to characterise the Thing (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 382), so the probe 'Which Thing?' does not uniquely identify a Qualifier. For example,

• which year? this year: Deictic
• which year? the third year: Numerative
• which year? a good year: Epithet
• which year? a leap year: Classifier

Likewise

• which city? her city: Deictic
• which city? the next city: Numerative
• which city? a polluted city: Epithet
• which city? the eternal city: Classifier

[2] To be clear, 'Focus' is Martin's use of a textual concept to rebrand embedded experiential elements preceding the Thing in a nominal group.

[3] This should go without saying, since it is the Thing that is characterised in a nominal group.

[4] To be clear, these are simply nominal groups with Qualifiers:

• green leaves [of the trees]
• some historic buildings [of Rome]

[of the trees] qualifies leaves in terms of type, [of Rome] qualifies buildings in terms of location.

[5] Trivially, Qualifier is also realised by an embedded adverbial group, as in

• some 4,000 million years [ago]

[6] Clearly, the structure-marking preposition of does not specify which city:

• which city? of.

David Kellogg On Non-Defining Relative Clauses

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 8 Apr 2024, at 21:32:

a) She tore up the letter, which upset me (because it was from someone I once loved).

b) She tore up the letter which upset me (because it was from someone who was blackmailing me.)

In b) the clause is indubitably rankshifted: it's a post-modifying qualifier in a nominal group--no different from "of England" in "the King of England's crown".

But why can't I consider the clause in a) to be a Circumstance of "She tore up" or some way of complexing the verbal group in the main clause? Why do I have to consider it a ranking clause in its own right?

and replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on sys-func on 10 Apr 2024, at 08:25:

I don't get why you are changing the subject, though. The question is about rank, The issue is whether the clause is part of a nominal group or part of a verb complex or (the standard interpretation) a clause complex. …

and again on 10 Apr 2024, 16:12:

I do not analyse the instance as a verbal group complex. In truth, I don't see any ambiguity whatsoever: one is a nominal group complex and the other is a hypotactic clause. 

If, however, I were applying Merge (or "subjacency"), I would have to argue that "which" is a merged conjunction and pronoun, and therefore the sentence is agnate to "She tore up the letter and upset me", which is a verbal group complex. One more reason for preferring the SFL account.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (a) is a hypotactic clause complex in which the elaborating dependent clause is a non-defining relative clause:

The fact that the relative clause is ranking, and not a constituent of the primary clause is demonstrated by the fact that, unlike true constituents, it cannot be made Theme of that clause.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (b) is a single clause in which the Qualifier of a nominal group is a defining relative clause, shifted to word rank:

[3] To be clear, the elaborating relative clause cannot serve as a clause circumstance because it is not a clause constituent — it cannot be thematised — and it does not serve as a Role, the only type of elaborating circumstance.

When confronted with the problems facing his 'circumstance' analysis, Kellogg falsely accused CLÉiRIGh of changing the subject (see here), and at the same time, without acknowledging the fact, moved the goalposts (a logical fallacy) so his claim now became that the relative clause is part of a nominal group, The problem here is that it treats a non-defining relative clause the same as a defining relative clause:

Then, perhaps as a correction to his first movement, Kellogg moved the goalposts again so his claim now became that the relative clause is embedded as one unit of a nominal group complex:

The problem here is that complexing is only possible with units of the same rank, and in hypotactic nominal group complexes, this means with adverbial groups or prepositional phrases. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 564):

While the dominant element has to be a nominal group, dependent elements can be adverbial groups or prepositional phrases.

[4] To be clear, after twice proposing a verbal group complex as a possible analysis, Kellogg owns that this is not his analysis. He then goes on to claim that She tore up the letter and upset me features a verbal group complex. However, in SFL Theory, a verbal group complex serves a single Process. In this instance, there are two distinct Processes, one material and one mental, so it is a clause complex, not a verbal group complex:

In Kellogg's analysis, where both verbal groups in the complex serve a single Process, neither the PROCESS TYPE nor any of the participants can be identified:

David Rose On Institutional Marginalisation And Comparing Theories

 After ChRIS CLÉiRIGh replied to David Rose on asflanet on 25 Mar 2024, at 15:34:

So when it comes down to choosing between theories, say, Newton's or Einstein's construal of gravity, it comes down to feelings: which one the community feels happier with. Perhaps a more appropriate example would be a fundamentalist religious community choosing between Natural Selection and Creationism, on the basis of which one they feel happier with.

 

 David Rose replied on asflanet on 26 Mar 2024, at 20:56:

An example closer to home might be the persistent marginalisation of SFL in international linguistics. The people ignoring or locking it out of courses and departments all have PhDs in linguistic reasoning.

Couldn’t resist sharing this re comparing theories...

‘There is a distinct difference between having an open mind and having a hole in your head from which your brain leaks out’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Rose is invoking the siege mentality of his faith community. From The Culture Of Strong Social Cohesion In The SFL Community at What Lies Beneath:

The origin of strong social bonds within the SFL community can be traced back to the early general exclusion of SFL Theory from linguistic departments and linguistic publications, due to the once overwhelming popularity of Chomskyan Formal Linguistics.

This helped to induce a general 'siege mentality' in the early SFL community: a collective state of mind in which a group of people believe themselves constantly attacked, oppressed, or isolated in the face of the negative intentions of the rest of the world, among the consequences of which are social conformity, and a strong sense of social cohesion.

This strong sense of social cohesion has remained ever since, despite SFL Theory becoming less excluded from linguistic departments and linguistic publications.

One intellectually debilitating consequence of a culture of strong social cohesion is the increased likelihood of 'groupthink'. Groupthink is a phenomenon that occurs when the desire for group consensus overrides people's common sense desire to present alternatives, critique a position, or express an unpopular opinion. Here, the desire for group cohesion effectively drives out good decision-making and problem solving.

From The Tactics Of The Disciplinarian Head Of The Martin Faith Fellowship at What Lies Beneath:

The way Martin constructs a socially bonded community around him is to invoke a 'siege mentality', both with regard to the SFL community in relation to the rest of the linguistic community, and with regard to his own community in relation to the rest of the SFL community.

[2] To be clear, this implies that SFL academics, unlike other linguists, do not have PhDs in linguistic reasoning. 

[3] To be clear, here Rose unwittingly presents a 2005 quote from the opponent of pseudoscience, the late James Randi, as if it supports Rose's anti-intellectualism rather than condemns it. The same point had been made previously by his friend, Richard Dawkins, in a public lecture in 1996:

By all means let's be open-minded, but not so open-minded that our brains drop out

and similar wordings have been attributed to Carl Sagan and Groucho Marx.