David Rose Misunderstanding Delicacy And Instantiation

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz on Sysfling on 9 Sept 2023 at 18:50:

The more delicate a system, the more instantial it is, so the more it couples features from multiple systems, eg DEIXIS and IDENTIFICATION

The IFG discussion of DEIXIS is interesting as it shifts back and forth between LG and DS

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. It is the whole system, along the dimension of delicacy, that is located on the cline of instantiation from potential to subpotential/instance type to instance. Clearly, the more delicate system of attributive and identifying process types, for example, is not more "instantial" than the system that includes material and mental process types. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 219).

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 327):

Instantiation is the relation between the system and the instance. When we shift attention along this scale, we are moving between the potential that is embodied in any stratum and the deployment of that potential in instances on the same stratum (between the climate and the weather, to use the analogy from our illustration below). Again, this move can be made at any degree of delicacy. 

Delicacy is the relation between the most general features and the most specific. When we shift attention from, say, 'recreation' to 'hockey' at the level (stratum) of context, or from 'syllable' to long open nasal syllable' to /pã:/ in phonology, we are moving in delicacy. Again, we can do this at any point along the instantiation scale.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. The number of co-selected ("coupled") features from different systems does not increase down the cline of instantiation. What is true is that the co-selection of features differs at points of variation along the cline of instantiation. That is, registers (subpotentials) differ from one another in which features are co-selected; texts (instances) differ from one another in which features are co-selected.

[3] To be clear, DEIXIS is a system of the nominal group, whereas IDENTIFICATION is Martin's misunderstanding of REFERENCE — Halliday & Hasan's system of grammatical cohesion — relocated to his stratum of discourse semantics and rebranded as his own system. Evidence here.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. Unsurprisingly, the discussion of DEIXIS in IFG is only concerned with Halliday's lexicogrammar, not Martin's discourse semantics. This deception is merely an attempt to legitimate Martin's model by incorporating it into Halliday's exposition of the grammar.

Beatriz Quiroz On The Nominal Group System Of Deixis

Beatriz Enriqueta Quiroz Olivares replied to David Rose on SYSFLING on 9 Sept 2023 at 11:29:

So you say in IFG4 [selective] and [non-selective] may not be LG choices? And that they are instead be comparable to ET [non-directed] and [directed] respectively? It does make sense, but I wonder... Because Table 6-3 in the same section of IFG4 shows non-specific determiners and that table does include [selective] and [non-selective] for [non-specific: partial] - something that is inconsistent with the system network shown on p. 366.

And on 10 Sept 2023 at 00:12: 

And yes, the kind of DS semantic discussion in IFG on determiners is something that most non-SFL grammarians at this point take into account when looking at determiners, at least in Spanish.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this does not make sense, since features in lexicogrammatical systems, like those of the nominal group are, by definition, are lexicogrammatical, not semantic.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. There is no inconsistency, since Table 6-3 merely provides features that specify non-specific DEIXIS and which are not provided for that system in Figure 6-2. The feature 'selective' just means there are more delicate selections to be made, and so can appear anywhere in a network where such a distinction needs to be made.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 366, 368):

[3] To be clear, there is no discourse semantic discussion in IFG on determiners or on anything else, because IFG, as the name suggests, is an introduction to Halliday's functional grammar, not an introduction to Martin's discourse semantics.

David Rose Misconstruing Discourse Semantic Systems As More Delicate Grammatical Systems

David Rose replied to Beatriz Enriqueta Quiroz Olivares on Sysfling on 9/9/23 at 9:32:

Which brings us to IFG Fig.6-2 The nominal group system network: determination

 

Deixis articulates lexicogrammar with discourse semantics, but I’m not sure this network distinguishes LG and DS criteria. The personal/demonstrative and determinative/interrogative systems are clearly LG, but more delicate systems are DS - interactant/non-interactant and selective/non-selective (ET’s directed/undirected).

That may explain its fuzziness of selective/non-selective criteria (system not named)?

How to represent more clearly??

PS In Australian lgs, personal Deictics precede Thing and demonstrative Deictics follow Thing. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this metaphor is theoretical nonsense. DEIXIS is a lexicogrammatical system of the nominal group; lexicogrammar and semantics are different levels of symbolic abstraction.

[2] To be clear, this is theoretical nonsense. A grammatical network does not "distinguish discourse semantic criteria" because it models grammatical potential, not semantic potential.

[3] To be clear, this is theoretical nonsense. The more delicate systems of a grammatical systems are, unsurprisingly, grammatical, not semantic, since semantic systems are on the semantic stratum, not the grammatical stratum.

[4] To be clear, the feature 'selective' merely provides the entry condition for more delicate selections, in number and proximity, whereas the feature 'non-selective' does not.

[5] To be clear, this claim is contradicted by Rose's previously posted analysis of his own data, where the demonstrative nani 'this' precedes the Thing daluk 'woman':

David Rose Mistaking Realisation Rules For Function Structures And Paradigmatic Features For Syntagmatic Units

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 30/8/23 at 22:41:

Just some parameters...

In a rank scale, the initial entry condition for systems is a syntagmatic unit eg clause. Their features e.g. [indicative] are realised by function structures at that rank ↘︎S^F, and each function within that structure e.g. Subject is realised by a syntagm at the next rank ↘︎nom gp.

Phonemes are syntagmatic units at the base of a rank scale. Features at syllable rank are realised by function structures eg ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme, and each function is realised by a phoneme (complex). Phonemes are produced by tongue and lip postures with voicing, but these lie outside language in the biology of the vocal tract... Jim’s materiality (the ‘etics’ materialising ‘emics’)

So yes, it seems adult social semiosis minimally requires two syntagmatic ranks

Im interested in how that emerges from unranked protolg

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The entry conditions to paradigmatic systems are paradigmatic features, not syntagmatic units. The rank scale construes formal constituents as a system of features, with the selection of a feature satisfying the entry condition to the systems of that rank.

[2] This is very misleading because it is a serious misunderstanding. Features are not realised by function structures. Importantly, in Rose's first example, ↘︎S^F is not a function structure, but a realisation statement that specifies 'Subject before Finite'. Moreover, it is activated by the selection of the feature 'declarative', not 'indicative'. The feature 'indicative' activates the insertion of a Mood element (Subject and Finite). See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162).

In Rose's second example, ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme is not a function structure, but a realisation statement of an unidentified feature that specifies 'optional Onset before Rhyme'.

[3] To be clear, the systems that specify phonemes are those that 'label tongue and lip postures with voicing' (and more), so this is not the distinction between phonology and phonetics. The difference is stratal: phonology is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than phonetics. Moreover, the materiality of phonetics is hardly Martin's discovery.

[4] Clearly, SFL Theory maintains that four ranks are required to model formal constituency in lexicogrammar and phonology. But rank only applies to the expression plane of semiotic systems without a lexicogrammar.

David Rose Misrepresenting IFG On Modality

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 25/7/22 at 17:44:

Thanks Chris, for another opportunity to compare the models.

Again, MODALITY is a described grammatical system, at clause rank in English, but the same term is used below for a semantic ‘domain’. And again, the account in IFG 1/2 differed from the account in IFG 3/4. In IFG1/2, MAKH described the implicit/explicit: subjective/objective orientations topologically, as interpersonal metaphors of modality. But in IFG 3/4 they are presented instead as features in the MODALITY system, within the MOOD system (Fig 4-13, Fig 4-23). The entry condition for this system is [clause], but the metaphorical realisations of subjective and objective orientations are projections and embedding (I think.../it is likely that...), blurring the line between grammar and semantics.

The described discourse semantic system is APPRAISAL: ENGAGEMENT: heterogloss, for which MODALITY is one resource to introduce additional voices into a discourse, alongside PROJECTION and CONCESSION.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading. Halliday (± Matthiessen) explicitly describes MODALITY as a semantic system. Halliday (1994: 356) and Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 691):

The reason this area of the semantic system is so highly elaborated metaphorically is to be found in the nature of modality itself … Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no – the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.

The fact that it is construed as a semantic system is also demonstrated by it having both congruent and metaphorical grammatical realisations. 

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Less importantly, it is only the explicit ORIENTATION that is metaphorical (Halliday 1994: 362). More importantly, the topological representation in IFG1/2 (and IFG3/4) does not describe MODALITY systems, but the relation of modality to polarity and mood. Halliday (1994: 367):

[3] This is misleading, because MODALITY is presented as a system network in IFG1/2 as well as IFG3/4. Halliday (1994: 358, 360):

Cf. Figure 4-23 in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 182):

[4] This is misleading. By including the system of MODALITY in his grammatical network of MOOD — Figure 4-15 in IFG3, Figure 4-13 in IFG4 — Matthiessen is interpreting grammatical form (modelled as a rank scale) in terms of its function in realising meaning, consistent with the modus operandi of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Contrary to Rose's claim, the rank of clause is the appropriate entry condition for clause rank complexing (projection) and  clause rank elements realised by embedded clauses.

[5] For some of the misunderstandings in Working with Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007) in this regard, see:

• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality, Obligation, Inclination And Ability
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Obligation
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Projections", "Polarity" And "Modality"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive But"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concession"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive Conjunctions"

Importantly, projection is not included as a logical system in discourse semantics (Martin 1992, Martin & Rose 2007). This is because the original intellectual source of Martin's CONJUNCTION is the system of cohesive conjunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976), and projection does not function cohesively. So, not only does discourse semantics fail to account for the semantics of projection, it also disables any attempt to account for grammatical metaphor in which projection is featured.

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday On Semantic Structure

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 19/7/22 at 10:24:

Re semantics/grammar relations and axis...

Halliday (1972), cited in Hasan, Cloran, Williams, & Lukin (2005), is a key document in the history of SFL, as it is the foundational text for the semantic network research project, and excuses semantic networks from the axial realisation statements required for grammar and phonology. The key discussion on semantics/grammar relations are extracted here (p21-24). It concludes by suggesting approaches to describing semantic system and structure, but this was ‘a matter of speculation’. This conclusion could also be taken as foundational for the study of discourse semantics.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1972). Towards a sociological semantics. Urbino: Università di Urbino.

(cited as Halliday 1973b in...

Hasan, R., Cloran, C., Williams, G., & Lukin, A. (2005). Semantic networks: The description of linguistic meaning in SFL. In Continuing discourse on language: a functional perspective (pp. 697-738). Equinox Publishing.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. In this very early paper from 1972, Halliday is considering arguments for and against the theoretical value of including semantic structure in the model. In the time since then, semantic structure has been part of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, in the model of discourse semantics (Martin 1992), the system networks do not include realisation statements that specify discourse semantic structures. On the other hand, in the model of discourse semantics (Martin 1992), the notion of structure is deployed inconsistently. 

For NEGOTIATION, the system derived from Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION, structure is the internal syntagmatic dimension of a unit, which is consistent with the notion of structure within and beyond SFL Theory. 

However, for IDENTIFICATION, IDEATION and CONJUNCTION, the systems derived from the lexicogrammatical systems of COHESIVE REFERENCE, LEXICAL COHESION and COHESIVE CONJUNCTION, units do not have internal structure, but instead link up to each other to form structures. This anomaly arises from the fact that cohesive relations are not structural relations.

Robin Fawcett On Michæl Halliday's Grammatical Systems As Semantic

Robin Fawcett wrote to Sysfling on 23 Jun 2019 at 15:49:

My concern in my short memoir was to remind us all of his role in welcoming and re-enforcing the fundamental message of Halliday''s important 1966 paper — and in particular through his insightful introductions to the sections of the book. These were the first intimations of a concept that Halliday was exploring — and often seems completely committed to — in his writings on the late 1960s and early 1970s (and indeed in Halliday 1985, though less so in Halliday 1994). This was the concept that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and LOGIOC-SEMANTIC RELATIONS provide choices between meaning — i.e. semantic features), not forms …

Blogger Comments:

See the immediately preceding post.

For the second time in two days, Fawcett uses the tragic untimely death of a colleague as a pretext for promoting the SFL theoretical architecture that Halliday abandoned after 1978, largely because Fawcett mistakenly believes that Halliday's superseded model leaves room in the SFL architecture for his theory of syntax at the level below semantics.

For why Fawcett's model does not withstand close scrutiny, see the explanations here.

With regard to Fawcett and tragic untimely deaths, see here for Fawcett's public dishonest treatment of me at the time of my mother's cruel, premature death from mesothelioma.

David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Discourse Semantics Model

David Rose continued his third reply to Erich Steiner on sysfling on 16 May 2018 at 11:47 as follows:

The discourse semantic model attempts to resolve this contradiction, by treating the discourse/grammar relation as stratal abstraction, rather than instantiation. That is, the discourse semantic stratum consists of feature/structure systems that are instantiated in the discourse patterns of texts. These discourse semantic patterns are realised inter-stratally as grammatical patterns, that instantiate grammatical systems.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the previous post for why the said contradiction only arises from Rose's misunderstandings of instantiation and cohesion.  This clause thus begins the logical fallacy known as a straw man argument:

A straw man argument is one that misrepresents a position in order to make it appear weaker than it actually is, refutes this misrepresentation of the position, and then concludes that the real position has been refuted. This, of course, is a fallacy, because the position that has been claimed to be refuted is different to that which has actually been refuted; the real target of the argument is untouched by it.

[2] To be clear, treating discourse and grammar as two strata of symbolic abstraction is reinterpreting the word 'discourse' to mean 'semantics'.  A complicating factor here is that the stratum of discourse semantics (Martin 1992) was not theorised with an understanding of strata as different levels of symbolic abstraction.  Instead, Martin misinterpreted all strata as interacting modules of meaning. Martin (1992: 390, 392, 488):

Each of the presentations of linguistic text forming resources considered above adopted a modular perspective. As far as English Text is concerned this has two main dimensions: stratification and, within strata, metafunction. …

The modularity imposed by stratification is also an important issue. Discourse systems generate structures which in principle cut across grammatical and phonological ones. …

In this chapter a brief sketch of some of the ways in which discourse semantics interacts with lexicogrammar and phonology has been presented. The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface? What is the nature of the conversation among components? 

[3] There is a sense in which the relation between grammar and discourse is one of instantiation, though not the sense understood by Rose.  The relation between grammatical systems and the grammar of a text is instantiation, and for Halliday (2008: 78), text and discourse are two views on the same phenomenon:

I do make a difference between these two; but it is a difference in point of view, between different angles of vision on the phenomena, not in the phenomena themselves. So we can use either to define the other:

• 'discourse' is text that is being viewed in its sociocultural context, while
• 'text' is discourse that is being viewed as a process of language.

[4] A most serious shortcoming of the discourse semantic model (Martin 1992), in this regard, is that its system networks do not specify how choices in discourse semantic systems are realised as discourse semantic structures.  Moreover, attempts to do so would expose deficiencies in the theorising of structure.  For example, on the one hand, discourse* semantic units are not structures, since they have no internal organisation; and on the other hand, the relations between Martin's discourse* semantic units are not structural, since they are rebrandings of Halliday's (non-structural) cohesive relations.  Moreover, the type of structure Martin interprets them to be, co-variate, was later acknowledged by its source, Lemke (1988: 159), as not being a type of structure after all.  For more detailed critiques of discourse semantic structure, see here.

[5] A most serious shortcoming of the discourse* semantic model (Martin 1992), in this regard, is that its system networks do not specify how choices in discourse semantic systems are realised as choices in grammatical systems.  Moreover, attempts to do so would expose deficiencies in the theorising.  Two examples will illustrate this fact.  On the one hand, the logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION does not recognise the three most general types of expansion: elaboration, extension and enhancement; because of this, most, if not all, realisation relations between discourse semantics an grammar are incongruent, whether metaphorical or not.  On the other hand, the logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION does not include the major logical semantic system of projection, and so cannot account for projection relations anywhere at the level grammar.

* Martin's interpersonal discourse semantics is a general exception, because it is largely a rebranding of genuinely semantic systems and structures, devised by others, not Martin.

System Networks

System networks are not flowcharts.

Nothing flows through the network.

A speaker does not choose how far to go in delicacy.

System networks map how features relate to each other.  The architecture of the network can be understood in terms of the logical relations set out in the theory: specifically, the three types of expansion.

elaboration: delicacy

extension: conjunction, disjunction

enhancement: entry conditions

The arrows in a system network represent the relation of condition, not temporality.
A "traversal" of the network is a specific map of logically related features.

SFL's Architecture Of Language Classified By SFL Relations

A. system networks
i. delicacy = elaboration + attributive
ii. disjunction = extension: alternative
iii. conjunction = extension: addition
iv. entry condition = enhancement: condition
v. realisation statement = elaboration + identifying

B. rank scale = extension: composition

C. realisation = elaboration + identifying
1. higher stratum realised by lower stratum [stratification]
2. system realised by structure [axis]
3. function realised by form [rank scale]

D. instantiation cline = elaboration + attributive