David Kellogg On Non-Defining Relative Clauses

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 8 Apr 2024, at 21:32:

a) She tore up the letter, which upset me (because it was from someone I once loved).

b) She tore up the letter which upset me (because it was from someone who was blackmailing me.)

In b) the clause is indubitably rankshifted: it's a post-modifying qualifier in a nominal group--no different from "of England" in "the King of England's crown".

But why can't I consider the clause in a) to be a Circumstance of "She tore up" or some way of complexing the verbal group in the main clause? Why do I have to consider it a ranking clause in its own right?

and replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on sys-func on 10 Apr 2024, at 08:25:

I don't get why you are changing the subject, though. The question is about rank, The issue is whether the clause is part of a nominal group or part of a verb complex or (the standard interpretation) a clause complex. …

and again on 10 Apr 2024, 16:12:

I do not analyse the instance as a verbal group complex. In truth, I don't see any ambiguity whatsoever: one is a nominal group complex and the other is a hypotactic clause. 

If, however, I were applying Merge (or "subjacency"), I would have to argue that "which" is a merged conjunction and pronoun, and therefore the sentence is agnate to "She tore up the letter and upset me", which is a verbal group complex. One more reason for preferring the SFL account.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (a) is a hypotactic clause complex in which the elaborating dependent clause is a non-defining relative clause:

The fact that the relative clause is ranking, and not a constituent of the primary clause is demonstrated by the fact that, unlike true constituents, it cannot be made Theme of that clause.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (b) is a single clause in which the Qualifier of a nominal group is a defining relative clause, shifted to word rank:

[3] To be clear, the elaborating relative clause cannot serve as a clause circumstance because it is not a clause constituent — it cannot be thematised — and it does not serve as a Role, the only type of elaborating circumstance.

When confronted with the problems facing his 'circumstance' analysis, Kellogg falsely accused CLÉiRIGh of changing the subject (see here), and at the same time, without acknowledging the fact, moved the goalposts (a logical fallacy) so his claim now became that the relative clause is part of a nominal group, The problem here is that it treats a non-defining relative clause the same as a defining relative clause:

Then, perhaps as a correction to his first movement, Kellogg moved the goalposts again so his claim now became that the relative clause is embedded as one unit of a nominal group complex:

The problem here is that complexing is only possible with units of the same rank, and in hypotactic nominal group complexes, this means with adverbial groups or prepositional phrases. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 564):

While the dominant element has to be a nominal group, dependent elements can be adverbial groups or prepositional phrases.

[4] To be clear, after twice proposing a verbal group complex as a possible analysis, Kellogg owns that this is not his analysis. He then goes on to claim that She tore up the letter and upset me features a verbal group complex. However, in SFL Theory, a verbal group complex serves a single Process. In this instance, there are two distinct Processes, one material and one mental, so it is a clause complex, not a verbal group complex:

In Kellogg's analysis, where both verbal groups in the complex serve a single Process, neither the PROCESS TYPE nor any of the participants can be identified:

Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism

Yaegan Doran wrote to Sysfling on 25 August 2023 at 7:09:

… we should be wary of metafunctions being considered a basic theoretical parameter for the description of semiotic resources in general.

A basic argument I put in a paper once was:

‘If we take metafunctionality to be the one of the broadest means by which these traditions [SFL/Social Semiotics] conceptualize the intrinsic functionality of semiotic resources, by simply assuming metafunctions across semiosis, we run the risk of homogenizing descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described (i.e. English). That is, we risk watering down the specific functionality of each resource.’

Rather, following people working in language description at the time, I tried to tease these issues out for mathematical symbolism in the attached paper (and in more detail in my 2018 book Discourse of Physics), by attempting to ‘derive’ metafunctionality from axis (following Martin’s 2013 book on axis). Maths, I figured (with years of excellent help from many), would prove a useful point of contrast to language by virtue of regular common-sense comparisons that considered it to ‘be’ language/a language. But despite its comparability to language, I could find no evidence in the internal systemic/structural organisation of mathematical symbolism for an interpersonal component, and it was really pushing it to interpret an experiential component. But I tried to suggest that there was a major component comparable to the logical in language and a smaller independent one comparable to the textual. Nonetheless, I do think it much closer to language in this regard than most other resources, and so if even it struggles to fill out the full metafunctional complement, we should not assume it across the board (though metafunction is of course still a useful way in for analysis/application that is less concerned with descriptive/theoretical development – which I also tried to emphasise in the attached paper).

Along similar lines, Yu Zhigang followed this up by looking at the range of symbolism used in chemistry and concluded similarly – that the logical dominated, that there was little evidence for an interpersonal, that there was an even smaller textual component than maths, but there was in fact something comparable to an experiential. But he went a little further, and noted that some structuring principles that we often associate with interpersonal meaning in language – i.e. prosodic structure – occurred in various chemical symbolisms, but seemed to have become ‘ideationalised’ in that they were used to realise meaning related to field, not tenor.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not just an argument against the metafunctional dimension of the theory, but against any dimension of the theory, and so against the theory itself, since in this view, using a theory that was devised for English, SFL, runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. The same argument could be made against generalising Newton's theory of gravitation from falling apples to orbiting heavenly bodies, since it runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. 

[2] To be clear, the metafunctions cannot be derived from axis, even if axis is properly understood. This is not least because they are independent dimensions, with different scopes, and organised according to different principles. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):

That is, the local distinction between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders of axis entails nothing about the global distinctions between construing experience as meaning, enacting intersubjective relations as meaning, and creating text from the two.

For some of the theoretical misunderstandings of axis in Martin (2013), see the review here.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, mathematics is a contextual semiotic that is realised in language (e.g. algebraic equations) and a pictorial semiotic (e.g. geometric diagrams). The proof that equations, for example, are language is that, unlike non-language, they can be read aloud. This is because what is projected by saying, locutions, constitutes the lexicogrammatical stratum, and language is the only semiotic system with a stratified content plane. This is why bi-stratal systems, like pictorial semiotics, cannot be read aloud.

[4] To be clear, this is the logical fallacy known as the Argument from ignorance:

Argument from ignorance (from Latin: argumentum ad ignorantiam), also known as appeal to ignorance (in which ignorance represents "a lack of contrary evidence"), is a fallacy in informal logic. It asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false or a proposition is false because it has not yet been proven true. This represents a type of false dichotomy in that it excludes the possibility that there may have been an insufficient investigation to prove that the proposition is either true or false.

Here Doran has misconstrued absence of evidence as evidence of absence. The evidence for the interpersonal metafunction in mathematical symbolism is manifold. For example, mathematical symbolism is language, so it enacts interpersonal meaning. As language, the equation E = mc² is a proposition realised by a declarative clause that can argued as valid or not whether it is expressed this way or as energy equals mass times the speed of light squared. If there were no interpersonal meaning in mathematical symbolism, then mathematicians would not be able to argue for or against their validity.

[5] To be clear, mathematical symbolism is deployed in many sciences precisely because it construes experience as meaning. As language, a mathematical equation is a figure of being realised by an intensive identifying relational clause, and the solving of an equation is the iterated elaboration of the clause until one or more unknown Tokens is decoded by reference to a Value.

[6] To be clear, the logical metafunction is concerned with the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection, so it requires experiential meanings to relate logically to one another. Every equation is an intensive identifying clause that construes an elaborating logical relation between a Token and a Value, and the solving of an equation entails a clause complex in which all clauses are logically related through elaboration. The logical relation of extension, for example, is manifested in processes of addition and subtraction.

[7] To be clear, none of the metafunctions is independent of the others. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

More specifically, the textual metafunction requires the other metafunctions, since its function is to operationalise them. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8, 398):

The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared. … 

The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them…

Every mathematical equation is organised in terms of Theme and information; see [4] above.

[8] To be clear, given the explanatory power of the metafunctions, it would be more prudent to assume that they are a dimension of a semiotic system until it is proved otherwise. As explained above in [4], Doran mistook his inability to identify the metafunctions in mathematical symbolism for evidence that they are not a dimension of its systems. 

[9] To be clear, Yu Zhigang is Doran's collaborator, rather than a scholar working independently of Doran. More importantly, what is said above about mathematical symbolism also applies to chemical symbolism. For example:

∞

See also Yaegan Doran Failing To Recognise The Interpersonal Metafunction In Mathematics.

Shooshi Dreyfus Mistaking Non-Defining For Defining Relative Clauses

Shooshi Dreyfus replied to Sarah on sys-func on 11 Nov 2018, 11:33:

Here’s my version of your analysis – but it’s only one version and you could analyse the last bit as a second clause but I think this works too:

Third, the crisis [[(that is) in the European and the global economy]] [ACTOR – with downranked spatial meaning ie NOT a circumstance but a Qualifier realising circumstantial meaning] has entered [PRO: MATERIAL] a second phase, [[(that is) characterized by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //and (which) is uneven [ATTRIBUTE] across countries]]

Basically, this way, you’ve got one clause with lots of embedding, which is typical of highly written text. And you’ve got circumstantial meaning being realised across numerous lexicogrammatical structures – see my attached paper (and have another one forthcoming on circumstantial meanings)

Blogger Comments:

[1] The proposed analysis can represented as follows:

Third	the crisis [[in the European and the global economy]]	has entered	a second phase [[characterised by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //  and is	uneven	across countries]]
	Actor	Process: material	?	Attribute	?

[2] To be clear, the instance in question is a complex of four clauses:

Third, the crisis in the European and the global economy has entered a second phase	characterised by a recovery	that is proceeding at a faltering pace	and is uneven across countries
α	= β
	α	= β
		1	+ 2

Suggested transitivity analyses of the four clauses can be viewed here.

[3] Trivially, this is an embedded phrase ([ ]), not an embedded clause ([[ ]]).

[4] Trivially, // marks a tone group boundary, not a clause boundary (||).

[5] The primary source of Dreyfus' confusion — analysing a complex of four clauses as a single clause — is her mistaking non-defining relative clauses (hypotactic elaboration) for defining relative clauses (embedded clauses serving as nominal group Qualifier).

[6] To be clear, the circumstantial meanings in this instance are realised grammatically as

• locational Qualifier (nominal group): in the European and the global economy;
• circumstance of Manner (clause): at a faltering pace;
• circumstance of Location (clause): across countries.

David Banks On "Complex Verbal Groups"

In answer to the query:

1. In a structure like: "Honey, don't forget to pay the bill before the week is over" should I say that 'forget to pay' is a complex verbal group? O should I say that 'forget' is a mental process that projects the clause complex 'to pay the bill before the week is over'? 

2. If I compare these two uses of "want":

1. "I want to visit the Vatican"
2. "I want Mary to visit the Vatican"

I'd say that in number 1, 'want to visit' is a complex verbal group, where 'want' shows inclination phase, while in number 2, 'want' is a process that projects 'Mary to visit the Vatican' am I right?  

3. Finally, a case similar to the one with 'forget': in a clause like "that afternoon, we decided to go over the wall" should I say that "decided to go" is a complex VG or should I say that "decided" is a mental process that projects "to go over the wall"

 David Banks wrote to sysfling on 5 October 2018 at 19:47:

1. It seems to me that you can only say that it is a complex verb group if there is only one process involved (e.g. continue to pay). Here, it seems obvious that forgetting and paying are quite separ[a]te processes, so it is not a complex verb group. 

2. It does not seem logical to have completely different analyses for these two examples. The fact that English "understands" the subject of "visit" in 1, to be the same as the subject of "want" does not alter the fact that it is basically the same structure as 2. 

3. The answer to this is the same as for No.1.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, a verbal group complex is not a complex verbal group.  The former is a complex of verbal groups, and a theoretical term, whereas the latter is a single verbal group deemed to be "complex".

[2] To be clear, it is important to distinguish between Process (clause rank) and Event (group rank).  A verbal group nexus construes two Events as one Process; examples provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 569, 574, 580, 587) include:

• decides to write
• would like to paint
• forget to do
• remind to do
• want to do
• ask to do
• anticipate doing
• profess to do.

That is, the instances in question, forget to pay and decided to go, can be interpreted as verbal group complexes that construe two Events as a single Process.

[3] The two different analyses correspond to the preferred analyses of Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584-6), who provide the reasoning on which the analytical distinction is based.

But, to be clear, the two instances do not have "basically the same structure", since, if both are interpreted as projecting clause nexuses, the second projected clause includes a topical Theme, an Actor and an explicit Subject, and so a Mood element, whereas the first has none of these.

However, a functional theory gives priority, in grammatical reasoning, to the view from above: to system and function, rather than to structure and form (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 49).  From above, the two instances differ in terms of the interpersonal meaning being realised.  In the first clause complex, I want to visit the Vatican, the desiderative Process projects an offer, whereas in the second, I want Mary to visit the Vatican, it projects a command.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584) explain:

We saw in Chapter 7, Section 7.5.4.2 that a mental process of desideration projects an exchange of the goods-&-services type, i.e. a proposal. If the Subject of the projection is the same as that of the mental process clause, the proposal is an offer, as in she wants to do it; if the two are different, then the proposal is a command, as in she wants you to do it. In the first type, the Subject is not repeated, but is carried over from the desiderative clause. (It can then be made explicit by a reflexive, as in she wants to do it herself.)

Moreover, the second clause complex is also an instance of an interpersonal metaphor of modality, being the metaphorical counterpart of Mary should visit the Vatican; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 693).

Mick O'Donnell On "Main And Support Verbs"

In answer to the query:

1. In a structure like: "Honey, don't forget to pay the bill before the week is over" should I say that 'forget to pay' is a complex verbal group? O should I say that 'forget' is a mental process that projects the clause complex 'to pay the bill before the week is over'?

 Michael O'Donnell wrote to Sysfling on 5 October 2018 at 18:40:

There are arguments for both analyses, here. 

I would argue for grouping "forget to pay" and "forget that..." as both instances of mental processes.

1. if you follow your precedent and treat "She forgot to pay" as a complex verbal group, then would you do the same with "She SAID to pay at the counter". So, where do you draw the line in determining whether the first verb is the main verb or the support verb? 

2. In Construal Analysis (analysing a document to see what participant roles particular entities fill), it would probably be beneficial to treat the participant as both construed Sensor and Actor. Alternatively, in "he started to think", I don't see the value of recording a participant role for "starting". 

3. In a case like:

A: Did you pay him?
B: I forgot. 

...where the second is elliptical for "I forgot to pay him", it seems strange to say "forget" is not the main verb. It is certainly the main activity reported. 

None of these arguments are conclusive. I think the issue of where the dividing line lies between aspectual verbs and projecting verbs is very blurred, with different linguists placing the involved verbs on different sides. I have always gone with the criteria that if the verb involves mental or verbal action (semantically), then this should be recognised, allowing it to group with the other cases where the projection takes the form of a that-clause, a present participle clause, or a nominal group.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, a verbal group complex is not a complex verbal group.  The former is a complex of verbal groups, and a theoretical term, whereas the latter is a single verbal group deemed to be "complex".

[2] To be clear, while 'forget (that…)' is unambiguously an instance of a mental Process, 'forget to pay' can alternatively be analysed as a verbal group complex that construes two Events, 'forget' and 'pay' as a material Process; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 574).

[3] This is a non-sequitur, since the two instances differ markedly.  In She forgot to pay, a proposition is mentally projected with the same Subject as the projecting clause; whereas, in She said to pay at the counter, a proposal is verbally projected with a different Subject from the projecting clause.

[4] To be clear, in terms of SFL theory, the question is whether

• the verbal groups form a complex to realise a single process in a clause simplex, or
• each verbal group realises a different process in a clause complex.

What O'Donnell calls "the main verb" is the verb serving as the Event of the verbal group that serves as the Process of a projecting clause in a clause complex; what O'Donnell calls "the support verb" is the verb serving as the Event of the projecting verbal group of a verbal group complex.  In focusing on verbs, O'Donnell is focusing on form (the view from below) instead of function (the view from above).

[5] Here O'Donnell is largely consistent with Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014) — though unwittingly so, since he presents the analysis as his own.

[6] For reasoning with regard to the distinction between projection in clause complexes and projection in verbal group complexes, see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584-92).

[7] Here O'Donnell misinterprets the question of what rank complexing takes place, clause or group, as a distinction between "aspectual and projecting verbs".  Moreover, this distinction reduces the vast array of potential relations between (what are) verbal groups in verbal group complexes to time phase elaboration ("aspectual") and projection.  The systemic potential of verbal group complex is given in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584-92) as:

[8] To be clear, the issue is not what linguists do, but whether analyses are consistent with the theory said linguists are using.

[9] This criterion is oblivious to the question of what rank, clause or group, the "mental or verbal action" is to be "recognised".

Beatriz Quiroz On Markedness

Replying to Alice Caffarel-Cayron, Beatriz Quiroz wrote to sysfling and sys-func on 14 November 2016 at 01:16:

Wondering now about 'markedness' again in terms of the textual metafunction. If markedness has only to do with probabilities in lexicogrammatical choices, then it makes sense. I find this criterion problematic in Spanish, though, because then a number of other patterns would be indeed marked, but they don't make much sense from the point of view of text analysis - e.g. non-modally responsible Participants at initial position, which to me are NOT marked Themes, even though they are relatively infrequent. The reason is that they do seem to sustain the angle on the field and thus contribute to the method of development (in ways beta clauses and circu[m]stances don't) across registers. This may even be related to an explanation of 'doubling' in clitic-doubling varieties, such as Chilean and Buenos Aires Spanish. 

On the other hand, if we consider interactions with higher level choices (discourse-semantic, generic), how do we treat patterns that are indeed productive in text analysis (such as beta clauses at initial position)? You then suggest this would be solved by taking into account different layers, without talking about marked or unmarked Themes?

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the notion of markedness in SFL theory.  The unmarked option is 'the form we tend to use if there is no prior context leading up to it, and no positive reason for choosing anything else' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 58), in contradistinction to marked, which means that the option is less frequent and 'carries a special interpretation' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 207).  For example, the unmarked option for present tense in material processes is the present-in-present, and the marked option, the simple present, carries the 'special interpretation' of habitual.

Difference in probability of selection, on the other hand, is what distinguishes different registers.

[2] To be clear, "non-modally responsible Participants" means Complements and some Adjuncts (e.g. Beneficiaries and Agents realised by prepositional phrases).  In SFL theory, these are regarded as marked Themes in declarative clauses, because there is a textual motivation for these, rather than the Subject, to be thematic.

[3] The notion of "the angle on the field" is from Martin (1992: 452, 489). See the theoretical misunderstandings from which this notion proceeds identified at:

• Misinterpreting Theme And New
• Rhapsodising On Method Of Development

[4] The assumption here is that marked Themes do not contribute to a text's method of development.  This is inconsistent with the model being used, Martin (1992: 461):

The concept of modal responsibility is less obvious in propositions, and the meaning of Subject is hard to isolate because of the fact that in English declaratives and interrogatives Subject conflates with unmarked topical Theme. However, it is clear in contexts where marked Themes are used to scaffold a text's method of development that Subject selection is in principle independent of Theme selection.

Martin (1992: 474): 

Although it is harder to unpick the meaning of Subject in written monologue [than in spoken mode] from the meaning of Theme and Given, texts such as [6:36] above which realise their method of development through marked Themes demonstrate the significance of modal responsibility in this mode.

The source of the confusion may be a reading of Martin (1992: 452):

The main contrast is in the range of meanings woven through Theme and New. Only a few of the text's participants and processes are selected as unmarked topical Theme, with far greater variation in New. The Themes focus on the major participants involved in the anecdote, while the News tell the story. Putting this in more general terms, Themes angle in on a given field, reflecting a text's genre; News elaborate the field, developing it in experiential terms. This contrast in functions operates across text types …

[5] The mistaken notion of genre as a higher stratum derives from Martin (1992).  For some of the reasons why the notion of genre as a stratum of context is mistaken, see:

1. Problems With The Non-Argument For Genre As Context
2. Seven Problems With The First Justification For A Genre Stratum
3. Two Problems With The Second Justification For A Genre Stratum
4. Eight Problems With The Third Justification For A Genre Stratum
5. Two Problems With The Fourth Justification For A Genre Stratum
6. Two Problems With The Fifth Justification For A Genre Stratum

[6] The point is simply that the marked vs unmarked Theme distinction does not apply to dependent clauses in regressive sequences.  If the dependent clause is the point of departure for the clause nexus, then it is thematic.  It is not marked because there is no unmarked Theme of the clause nexus with which it can be contrasted. This misunderstanding derives from Martin (1992: 240, 241).

Margaret Berry On Beta Clause As Part Of The Alpha Clause

Margaret Berry wrote to sysfling and sys-func on 14 November 2016 at 00:47:

Geoff Thompson (2014) in the 3rd edition of his Introducing Functional Grammar, page 170, has a system network for Theme, in which one of the options for marked Theme is 'dependent clause'. He gives examples on page 160. 

It probably depends on whether you think a Beta clause is actually part of the Alpha clause. I do.

• After he'd finished his supper, he went straight to bed.
• After supper, he went straight to bed.

After he'd finished his supper and After supper have the same function, even though they differ in form. (SFL is supposed to be a functional grammar!) 

As you say, one has to decide what one wants to account for at what layer of organisation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the view of traditional grammar.  The explanatory advantages provided by the SFL distinction between tactic relations and embedding include the ability to distinguish:

• in expansion, between non-defining (hypotaxis) and defining (embedding) relative clauses, and
• in projection, between projected reports (hypotaxis) and pre-projected facts (embedding).

[2] These two forms, the beta clause and the prepositional phrase, do have the same function: Theme.  The principal difference between them is the domain in which each functions as Theme.  The beta clause functions as Theme in a clause nexus, whereas the prepositional phrase functions as (marked) Theme in a clause.

[3] SFG is a functional grammar, but what this means, in terms of the theory, is generally not well understood.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 31):

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a ‘semanticky’ kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself. 

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is one of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not of stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness (agnation).

Beatriz Quiroz On Beta Clauses As Marked Themes

Beatriz Quiroz wrote to sysfling and sys-func on 13 November 2016 at 03:11:

Thanks for all of your replies. I think I will still analyse beta clauses at initial position as marked Themes, since in all the texts I've been analysing (in Spanish, across registers) this pattern does seem to signal discontinuities/shifts very clearly, which is very helpful in text analysis. Perhaps, as you seem to suggest, the thing is to decide how carefully you want to account for different layers of textual organisation and on which grounds (clause to clause within complexes...or higher-level waves, as in the analysis put forward by e.g. Martin 1992 and Martin & Rose 2007).

I was just curious about that change in IFG! So in a way, perhaps, IFG's now sticking to (single) clause-wide patterns in a more strict way (without dismissing, neces[s]arily, the possibility of higher-level patterns, as the quote Hailing posted suggests)?

Blogger Comments:

[1] A beta clause in a regressive sequence is not a marked Theme of a clause nexus; it is merely the Theme of a clause nexus.  In order for it to be a marked Theme, there would have to be an unmarked Theme of a clause nexus with which it contrasts; there isn't.  This theoretical misinterpretation can be sourced Martin (1992: 445ff).

[2] There is no change in IFG on the matter of beta clause as Theme in a clause nexus.  The discussion has, instead, been given greater prominence in IFG4.

[3] The post from Hailing Yu included a quote (p551) from the discussion of beta clause as Theme in a clause nexus in IFG4 (pp549-53).

Mick O'Donnell On The Thematic Status Of Beta Clauses

After Beatriz Quiroz wrote to sysfling and sys-func on 12 November 2016 at 07:06:

Does anyone know why in IFG4 beta clauses at initial position are not considered marked Themes any longer (cf. IFG2 and IFG3)? I don't seem to find any reference to the previous analysis there. I've checked both the chapter on Theme and the chapter on clause complexes.

Michael O'Donnell replied on 12 November 2016 at 09:59:

Perhaps as beta clauses are not elements of the clause, they are no longer considered thematic in the alpha clause structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In IFG, beta clauses in regressive sequences have never been 'considered thematic in the alpha clause structure'.  The beta clause is thematic in the clause nexus.

[2] The beta clause in a regressive sequence is neither marked nor unmarked Theme.  The features unmarked or marked Theme — not both — are systemic options that are realised in clause structure. The misconstrual of beta clauses in regressive sequences as marked Themes can be traced to Martin (1992: 445).

[3] In IFG4, the discussion of Theme in clause complexes occurs in section 7.6 The Clause Complex as Textual Domain (pp549-53).  That is, in IFG4 the discussion has been made more prominent by being given its own separate section — in IFG3 it was included in the section 7.3 TAXIS: parataxis and hypotaxis (pp383-95), and in IFG2 it was included in the section 3.6 Clauses as Themes (pp54-8).

Mick O'Donnell Mistaking A Dependent Clause For A Circumstance

Michael O'Donnell wrote on sysfling on 3/7/12:

"we have been raised to love and care" 

Actor: -

Process: material (have been raised)

Goal: We

Circumstance: "to love and care" (which is maybe Result, as Reason/Purpose don't fit).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, O'Donnell's analysis here is:

However, systemically, the instance is agnate to 

The systemic difference here is just the finiteness of the dependent clause.

On this basis, the instance can be analysed as