Oh, then we’d have to allow meanings to be made on two lg strata, that may be coupled to realise register!
Jing Hao opens that meta-window wide for us in Analysing Scientific Discourse. (Essential reading, folks.)
All I’d add here is that
- Thing doesn't realise a discourse semantic entity (interstratally).
- It realises the grammatical feature [nominal group] (axially).
- It’s the nominal word (complex) realising Thing (rankwise) that realises an entity (interstratally).
- Thing and entity are distinct meanings.
- But as Thing is the core function of a nominal group, the whole nominal group may also realise the entity (along with clause participation).
- (Note [entity] is a discourse semantic feature, whereas ‘class’ implies a rank scale.)
- And yes, Jing unpicks ideational metaphor brilliantly.
- So, while axial relations make meaning within strata and ranks,
- it seems function/class relations enable discourse semantic features to be both realised by and coupled with lexicogrammatical features
Blogger Comments:
[1] To be clear, SFL stratifies the content plane into meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar), but wording is interpreted in terms of its function of realising meaning. And register is a language subpotential that realises a contextual configuration of field tenor and mode, not the contextual configuration of field tenor and mode. The latter is Martin's (1992) misunderstanding — see, e.g. here — but accepted without question by his one-time students Rose and Hao.
[2] To be clear, 'entity' is Hao's rebranding of the type of element known as a 'simple thing' in the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 182). It is congruently realised in lexicogrammar by a participant at clause rank, which is congruently realised by a nominal group, whose structure may include 'Thing' as a functional element.
[3] To be clear, axially, the system of the nominal group is realised by the entire structure, not just the function 'Thing'.
[4] To be clear, it is not the word realising Thing, but the entire nominal group (that realises a participant) that realises a simple thing (entity).
[5] To be clear 'Thing' is one function in nominal group structure in the lexicogrammar, whereas 'entity', as 'simple thing', is a type of participant in the semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).
[6] To be clear, 'entity' is Halliday & Matthiessen's semantic element 'simple thing' rebranded by Hao as a feature of Martin's discourse semantics.
[7] This is a bare assertion, without supporting evidence.
[8] To be clear, axial relations don't "make meaning". The syntagmatic axis (Token) realises the paradigmatic axis (Value). This is another example of the Martin-derived confusion of semogenesis (making meaning) with realisation, though this time applied axially instead of stratally.
[9] To be clear, on the one hand, this conclusion cannot be validated by the preceding series of misunderstandings. On the other hand, the claim is that an intrastratal relation of realisation in lexicogrammar enables an interstratal relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, both of realisation and coupling.
With regard to realisation, there is no "enabling" here; it is just the same relation at different locations in the architecture. With regard to "coupling", this is a matter of instantiation, the selection of features during logogenesis, which is a distinct from the realisation relations between axes and strata.
