Re your earlier comment about ‘the need for Semantics as a separate stratum’... I think that takes us back to two first principles...One is that features in systems are no more substantial than the probabilities of their realising structures being re-instantiated... more so for more general and less so for more delicate features.The other is that the content planes of lg and other modalities have evolved to semioticise social relations, for which semiosis is a necessary condition. So the social and semiotic are two sides of the same coin.The semiotic systems of most species are reproduced genetically. In some species these are augmented by learnt systems, i.e. culturally reproduced.Lg evolved in humans in tandem with the complexity of our social relations. It required on one hand sufficient flexibility to manage variability in our ancestors’ sociality, and on the other a mechanism for replication fidelity to ensure its reproduction across multiple generations (on the model of genetic reproduction).The tension between these selection pressures produced a bifurcation in lg’s content plane, still recapitulated in the transition from protolg to mother tongue in infants.On one hand, LG systems provided the replication fidelity for reproduction over deep time (analogous with the reproductive role of DNA). Their features cement untold millions of re-instantiations, more so at higher ranks. One result is their more general features remain common across lgs (as humans share 85% of our DNA with mice, 60% with insects, and 50% with plants). It is probably also why grammatical systems encode such stable models of experience and exchange.While stability is essential for cultural reproduction, it is insufficient for negotiating unfolding contingencies in human social relations. That is the task for which DS systems evolved (analogous with the role of RNA in managing intracellular functions).Both LG and DS systems are necessary for human semiosis on phylogenetic and logogenetic timescales, but their functions are complementary. The fact that we are still trying to model the semantic stratum on what we known of LG systems is, I think, an accident of history. From 2500 years of grammatics, cryptogrammatics has struggled to emerge in the last 80, and DS systems are another order of covert reactances.
Blogger Comments:
[1] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) identify grammatical metaphor as the primary motivation for a semantic stratum:
If the congruent pattern had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.
[2] To be clear, features in systems are defined by their relations to other features, and each has a probability of being instantiated, varying for register, and actualised as frequencies in texts.
[3] It is undoubtedly true that semiosis is a necessary condition for semiotising social relations.
[4] To be clear, not all semiotic systems are social semiotic systems, as demonstrated by perceptual semiotic systems, which are somatic, not social.
[5] This is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. The difficulty here lies in being able to distinguish, in Halliday's terms, systems that involve the exchange of value (social systems) from systems that involve the exchange of symbolic value (semiotic systems).
[6] To be clear, it is language that enabled the enactment of social relations to complexify beyond those of the other chimpanzees.
[7] To be clear, if it were these factors that produced the stratification of the content plane, then they should have done so for all species' protolanguages, not just human protolanguage.
[8] This is a false analogy, since it correlates generality with proportion (%).
[9] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, it misunderstands evolution: systems do not evolve in order to perform tasks (purpose); they evolve because they successfully perform tasks (reason). On the other hand, it is the grammar (MOOD) that construes the semantics (SPEECH FUNCTION) that makes symbolic negotiation possible.
[10] This a false analogy, since RNA is at the same level of abstraction as intra-cellular functions, whereas semantics is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than lexicogrammar.
[11] To be clear, the sense in which semantics and grammar are complementary is as complementary perspectives on the same phenomenon, the content plane of language, varying in terms of symbolic abstraction. With regard to the ideational metafunction, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) write:
Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning.
[12] This is misleading. On the one hand, it is the grammar that construes the semantics. On the other, the false implication is that Martin's discourse semantic systems are not 'modelled in terms of what we know of lexicogrammatical systems'. To be clear, Martin's discourse semantic systems derive from non-structural textual grammar (cohesion) and from SPEECH FUNCTION, which is construed by the interpersonal grammar of MOOD and KEY. Evidence here.
