Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism

Yaegan Doran wrote to Sysfling on 25 August 2023 at 7:09:

… we should be wary of metafunctions being considered a basic theoretical parameter for the description of semiotic resources in general.

A basic argument I put in a paper once was:

‘If we take metafunctionality to be the one of the broadest means by which these traditions [SFL/Social Semiotics] conceptualize the intrinsic functionality of semiotic resources, by simply assuming metafunctions across semiosis, we run the risk of homogenizing descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described (i.e. English). That is, we risk watering down the specific functionality of each resource.’

Rather, following people working in language description at the time, I tried to tease these issues out for mathematical symbolism in the attached paper (and in more detail in my 2018 book Discourse of Physics), by attempting to ‘derive’ metafunctionality from axis (following Martin’s 2013 book on axis). Maths, I figured (with years of excellent help from many), would prove a useful point of contrast to language by virtue of regular common-sense comparisons that considered it to ‘be’ language/a language. But despite its comparability to language, I could find no evidence in the internal systemic/structural organisation of mathematical symbolism for an interpersonal component, and it was really pushing it to interpret an experiential component. But I tried to suggest that there was a major component comparable to the logical in language and a smaller independent one comparable to the textual. Nonetheless, I do think it much closer to language in this regard than most other resources, and so if even it struggles to fill out the full metafunctional complement, we should not assume it across the board (though metafunction is of course still a useful way in for analysis/application that is less concerned with descriptive/theoretical development – which I also tried to emphasise in the attached paper).

Along similar lines, Yu Zhigang followed this up by looking at the range of symbolism used in chemistry and concluded similarly – that the logical dominated, that there was little evidence for an interpersonal, that there was an even smaller textual component than maths, but there was in fact something comparable to an experiential. But he went a little further, and noted that some structuring principles that we often associate with interpersonal meaning in language – i.e. prosodic structure – occurred in various chemical symbolisms, but seemed to have become ‘ideationalised’ in that they were used to realise meaning related to field, not tenor.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not just an argument against the metafunctional dimension of the theory, but against any dimension of the theory, and so against the theory itself, since in this view, using a theory that was devised for English, SFL, runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. The same argument could be made against generalising Newton's theory of gravitation from falling apples to orbiting heavenly bodies, since it runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. 

[2] To be clear, the metafunctions cannot be derived from axis, even if axis is properly understood. This is not least because they are independent dimensions, with different scopes, and organised according to different principles. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):

That is, the local distinction between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders of axis entails nothing about the global distinctions between construing experience as meaning, enacting intersubjective relations as meaning, and creating text from the two.

For some of the theoretical misunderstandings of axis in Martin (2013), see the review here.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, mathematics is a contextual semiotic that is realised in language (e.g. algebraic equations) and a pictorial semiotic (e.g. geometric diagrams). The proof that equations, for example, are language is that, unlike non-language, they can be read aloud. This is because what is projected by saying, locutions, constitutes the lexicogrammatical stratum, and language is the only semiotic system with a stratified content plane. This is why bi-stratal systems, like pictorial semiotics, cannot be read aloud.

[4] To be clear, this is the logical fallacy known as the Argument from ignorance:

Argument from ignorance (from Latin: argumentum ad ignorantiam), also known as appeal to ignorance (in which ignorance represents "a lack of contrary evidence"), is a fallacy in informal logic. It asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false or a proposition is false because it has not yet been proven true. This represents a type of false dichotomy in that it excludes the possibility that there may have been an insufficient investigation to prove that the proposition is either true or false.

Here Doran has misconstrued absence of evidence as evidence of absence. The evidence for the interpersonal metafunction in mathematical symbolism is manifold. For example, mathematical symbolism is language, so it enacts interpersonal meaning. As language, the equation E = mc² is a proposition realised by a declarative clause that can argued as valid or not whether it is expressed this way or as energy equals mass times the speed of light squared. If there were no interpersonal meaning in mathematical symbolism, then mathematicians would not be able to argue for or against their validity.

[5] To be clear, mathematical symbolism is deployed in many sciences precisely because it construes experience as meaning. As language, a mathematical equation is a figure of being realised by an intensive identifying relational clause, and the solving of an equation is the iterated elaboration of the clause until one or more unknown Tokens is decoded by reference to a Value.

[6] To be clear, the logical metafunction is concerned with the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection, so it requires experiential meanings to relate logically to one another. Every equation is an intensive identifying clause that construes an elaborating logical relation between a Token and a Value, and the solving of an equation entails a clause complex in which all clauses are logically related through elaboration. The logical relation of extension, for example, is manifested in processes of addition and subtraction.

[7] To be clear, none of the metafunctions is independent of the others. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

More specifically, the textual metafunction requires the other metafunctions, since its function is to operationalise them. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8, 398):

The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared. … 

The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them…

Every mathematical equation is organised in terms of Theme and information; see [4] above.

[8] To be clear, given the explanatory power of the metafunctions, it would be more prudent to assume that they are a dimension of a semiotic system until it is proved otherwise. As explained above in [4], Doran mistook his inability to identify the metafunctions in mathematical symbolism for evidence that they are not a dimension of its systems. 

[9] To be clear, Yu Zhigang is Doran's collaborator, rather than a scholar working independently of Doran. More importantly, what is said above about mathematical symbolism also applies to chemical symbolism. For example:

∞

See also Yaegan Doran Failing To Recognise The Interpersonal Metafunction In Mathematics.

David Rose Misrepresenting The Semantic Systems Of Expansion And Figuration

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 18/7/22 at 16:05:

it’s always good to read IFG closely (and critically)...

It’s interesting that the terms FIGURATION and EXPANSION in Figure 10-2 below are printed in small caps, as though they are systems. It’s noteworthy that Halliday 1985/1994 (IFG 1/2) didn't describe expansion in general as a system, but as a ‘semantic motif’ that is dispersed across the grammar. A system in SFL is defined by axial relations between features and their realising structures. expansion is such a system in the grammar, at clause rank within clause complexing (IFG 7.4), and at group/phrase rank within verbal group complexing (IFG 8.6). But it is not a described semantic system.

‘Figuration’ on the other hand corresponds to a described semantic system, of lexical relations within figures, entitled nuclear relations in ET 5.3, WWD 3.3. Figures are typically realised as clauses (IFG 5.1.1)...

The canonical description of nuclear relations, and their stratal relations to grammar and field, is

Hao, J. (2020). Analysing scientific discourse from a systemic functional linguistic perspective: A framework for exploring knowledge building in biology. Routledge.

Jing also carefully relates the discourse semantic ideation systems to the ideational semantics in Construing Experience.

Rose soon qualified this at 17:24:

Correction...

Hao, J. (2020), re-analyses nuclear relations as the systems of FIGURE and ENTITY, to clearly distinguish systems of LG, DS and field.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, even a casual glance at IFG reveals that the caption of Figure 10-2 identifies FIGURATION and EXPANSION as semantic systems.

[2] This is misleading. Halliday (1985, 1994) describes expansion as a type of logico-semantic relation, along with projection, that has three subtypes: elaboration, extension and enhancement. The term EXPANSION appears in small capitals (e.g. 1994: 219), the convention for representing system names. This constitutes a verbal description of a system rather than a diagrammatic representation of a system as a network. Halliday (1985, 1994) did not feature any system networks.

Moreover, a close reading reveals that the term 'semantic motif' does not appear until Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 72, 223, 562, 612), where it explicitly refers to systems. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 223):

[3] This is misleading because a system is not 'defined by axial relations'. in SFL Theory, system constitutes the dimension of paradigmatic order (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20). This a distinct dimension from structure, the dimension of syntagmatic order (ibid.), and axis is the dimension whose orders are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic (op. cit.: 32).

[4] To be clear, Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar (1985, 1994) is focused on grammar, not semantics, which means modelling grammatical form in terms of its function in realising meaning. A focus on semantics, mainly ideational, is provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[5] This is very misleading indeed. As Figure 10-2, above, makes clear, FIGURATION is the semantic system that is congruently realised by the grammatical system of TRANSITIVITY. Martin's discourse semantic system of IDEATION, which is a rebranding of lexical cohesion, but within which 'nuclear relations' are modelled, does not feature the figure as either a system or structural unit. 

For some of the problems with 'nuclear relations' in Martin (1992), see the close examination here. For some of the problems with 'nuclear relations' in Martin & Rose (1992), see the close examination here.

[6] Clearly, any "canonical" description of 'nuclear relations' lies not in the work of Martin's student, Hao, but in her source: Halliday & Mathiessen (1999). For the source of Hao's system of FIGURE, see Chapter 4 Figures (Halliday & Mathiessen 1999: 128-76), and for the source of Hao's system of ENTITY, see Chapter 5 Elements (Halliday & Mathiessen 1999: 177-226).

Shooshi Dreyfus On Circumstantial Meaning

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote to SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, 16:00:

Right, so here’s where I’d like to push us to think beyond clause constituents and up to circumstantial meaning, which can be realised a cross a range of grammatical structures. For example:

On the table (circumstance location place) there is a book

The book on the table (Qualifier) is mine

The book is on the table (Participant in relational clause – not going to argue about which)

How does one explain how this meaning can move around like this? By thinking of it as more than a clausal constituent. 

H&M and JRM point to this in different places but Jing Hao I have a paper on this if anyone is interested. 

It makes SO much more sense to think like this (sorry if that’s notional Jim) and helps students NOT make the errors of analysing beta enhancing clauses (eg when the book was on the table, I spilt my tea on it) and Qualifiers etc as Circumstances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday does far more than merely "point" to this — it is his model. Circumstantiation constitutes one domain of manifestation of the transphenomenal fractal types of expansion and projection — transphenomenal because they operate across various categories of phenomena, and fractal because they are organising principles across different scales; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 268).

That is, the meanings that are realised as circumstances are also realised across a range of other grammatical domains, as outlined by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 670-3), who exemplify this for 'cause' as follows:

[2] To be clear, this type of variation can be explained by the fact that a prepositional phrase that realises the meaning 'spatial location' can serve as a circumstance or circumstantial participant of a clause, or be rankshifted to serve as the Qualifier of a nominal group.

[3] To be clear, these types of student errors reflect an inability to analyse formal constituency, since:

• mistaking a β clause for a circumstance is mistaking a clause for a prepositional phrase, and
• mistaking a Qualifier for a circumstance is mistaking a rankshifted prepositional phrase for a ranking one.

David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Discourse Semantics Model

David Rose continued his third reply to Erich Steiner on sysfling on 16 May 2018 at 11:47 as follows:

The discourse semantic model attempts to resolve this contradiction, by treating the discourse/grammar relation as stratal abstraction, rather than instantiation. That is, the discourse semantic stratum consists of feature/structure systems that are instantiated in the discourse patterns of texts. These discourse semantic patterns are realised inter-stratally as grammatical patterns, that instantiate grammatical systems.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the previous post for why the said contradiction only arises from Rose's misunderstandings of instantiation and cohesion.  This clause thus begins the logical fallacy known as a straw man argument:

A straw man argument is one that misrepresents a position in order to make it appear weaker than it actually is, refutes this misrepresentation of the position, and then concludes that the real position has been refuted. This, of course, is a fallacy, because the position that has been claimed to be refuted is different to that which has actually been refuted; the real target of the argument is untouched by it.

[2] To be clear, treating discourse and grammar as two strata of symbolic abstraction is reinterpreting the word 'discourse' to mean 'semantics'.  A complicating factor here is that the stratum of discourse semantics (Martin 1992) was not theorised with an understanding of strata as different levels of symbolic abstraction.  Instead, Martin misinterpreted all strata as interacting modules of meaning. Martin (1992: 390, 392, 488):

Each of the presentations of linguistic text forming resources considered above adopted a modular perspective. As far as English Text is concerned this has two main dimensions: stratification and, within strata, metafunction. …

The modularity imposed by stratification is also an important issue. Discourse systems generate structures which in principle cut across grammatical and phonological ones. …

In this chapter a brief sketch of some of the ways in which discourse semantics interacts with lexicogrammar and phonology has been presented. The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface? What is the nature of the conversation among components? 

[3] There is a sense in which the relation between grammar and discourse is one of instantiation, though not the sense understood by Rose.  The relation between grammatical systems and the grammar of a text is instantiation, and for Halliday (2008: 78), text and discourse are two views on the same phenomenon:

I do make a difference between these two; but it is a difference in point of view, between different angles of vision on the phenomena, not in the phenomena themselves. So we can use either to define the other:

• 'discourse' is text that is being viewed in its sociocultural context, while
• 'text' is discourse that is being viewed as a process of language.

[4] A most serious shortcoming of the discourse semantic model (Martin 1992), in this regard, is that its system networks do not specify how choices in discourse semantic systems are realised as discourse semantic structures.  Moreover, attempts to do so would expose deficiencies in the theorising of structure.  For example, on the one hand, discourse* semantic units are not structures, since they have no internal organisation; and on the other hand, the relations between Martin's discourse* semantic units are not structural, since they are rebrandings of Halliday's (non-structural) cohesive relations.  Moreover, the type of structure Martin interprets them to be, co-variate, was later acknowledged by its source, Lemke (1988: 159), as not being a type of structure after all.  For more detailed critiques of discourse semantic structure, see here.

[5] A most serious shortcoming of the discourse* semantic model (Martin 1992), in this regard, is that its system networks do not specify how choices in discourse semantic systems are realised as choices in grammatical systems.  Moreover, attempts to do so would expose deficiencies in the theorising.  Two examples will illustrate this fact.  On the one hand, the logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION does not recognise the three most general types of expansion: elaboration, extension and enhancement; because of this, most, if not all, realisation relations between discourse semantics an grammar are incongruent, whether metaphorical or not.  On the other hand, the logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION does not include the major logical semantic system of projection, and so cannot account for projection relations anywhere at the level grammar.

* Martin's interpersonal discourse semantics is a general exception, because it is largely a rebranding of genuinely semantic systems and structures, devised by others, not Martin.

David Rose On Coordination And Proposition

David Rose replied to Tom Bartlett on sysfling on 11 May 2018 at 16:15:

Coordination is a grammatical term, for relations between grammatical units. Proposition is a discourse semantic term, for messages exchanging information.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, the traditional category of 'coordination' is interpreted as the logico-semantic relation of paratactic extension.  Logico-semantic relations obtain at the level of semantics (meaning) and are realised at the level of lexicogrammar (wording).

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'proposition' is 'the semantic function of a clause in the exchange of information' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 139).  The intrusion of the word 'discourse' reflects the fact that Martin (1992) rebranded Halliday's interpersonal semantic system as a 'discourse semantic' system.  ('Message' is a semantic unit of the textual metafunction.)

David Rose On "Lexical Meanings And Lexical Relations In Grammatical Analysis"

David Rose replied to Robert Spence's analysis of two lexically dense relational clauses on the sys-func and sysfling lists on 4 April 2017 at 13:09:

… I am also intrigued by the roles of interpreting lexical items in the grammatical analysis. For example, the first clause is interpreted as receptive circumstantial identifying, subclassified as Cause:purpose, from synonymy of ‘purpose’ with the lexical item ‘aim’ and the embedded clause ‘to (do)’ …

The primary clauses are attributive, in which each 'experimental method’ is classified as 'an isothermal process’ or 'an isochoric process’. That seems to be the function of the non-specific Deictic “an”, to indicate a class of items. …

What’s particularly intriguing to me is the extent of assumptions of lexical meanings and lexical relations in grammatical analysis. This is most apparent in Halliday’s discussion of relational processes in IFG, which I found baffling until I started recognising the lexical assumptions implicit in his categories.  Has anyone else experienced this?

Blogger Comments:

[1] These false claims proceed from a misunderstanding of the theoretical dimension of delicacy (but see also point [2] below).  The subtypes of process are located intermediate between the most general systems and the most delicate systems that specify individual lexical items.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9):

… we can differentiate both processes and participants into finer and finer subcategories, until we reach a degree of differentiation that is associated with the choice of words (lexical items). Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations. 

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 65) provide an example of how the combination of more delicate process type features can specify lexical items:

[2] This misunderstands the reasoning behind the grammatical analysis of the clause (shown here).  The clause construes a relation of identity between an embedded clause complex of cause: purpose (to investigate the properties of air…) and a nominal group of cause: purpose (the aim of this experiment); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 500ff) on 'nouns of expansion'.

[3] The two 'primary' clauses are embedded and identifying, not attributive (as detailed here).  Each identifies (encodes) one experimental method.  The nominal groups with the non-specific Deictic an function as Identifier Token, not Attribute.

David Rose Analysing A Text "We Don't Understand"

Responding to a post by Jim Donohue, David Rose wrote to sysfling on 2 July 2016 at 09:47:

Fantastic effort to combine grammar and discourse, to analyse genre and field. Critical focus is on lexical, conjunction and reference items, for which answer 1 is great text to analyse. You could go a little further and simplify. Here with lexical items in yellow and conjunction, reference, appraisal items in blue.

S1. A system call is a request made by a process to the operating system in order to perform tasks only the operating system can complete. 

Retrieving a file from a disk, or retrieving/displaying inputs/outputs, are examples of this

nuclear relations, activity sequence and conjunction - what’s going on
line 1 defines system call as type of request from process to operating system
line 2 explains what operating system does then (in order to, only)
line 3 exemplifies types of tasks requested by system call (examples of this)

(nuclear relations are lexical relations within clauses, configured by grammar)

taxonomic relations - why it makes sense
line 1 system call is a type of call, call and request are synonyms, process is technical part of computing field,
lines 1-2 operating and perform tasks are synonymous, operating system is repeated, complete is part of task
lines 2-3 retrieving/displaying are types of task, file/disk/inputs/outputs are parts of operating system

Blogger Comments:

[1] The "fantastic effort" that Rose applauds misconstrues these two clauses of a student's exam answer as attributive rather than identifying.  See clause analysis here.

As the clause analysis shows — but which Rose's discourse semantic analysis doesn't — in the first clause, the student decodes a system call and, in the second clause, the student then encodes examples of this.

[2] To be clear, in Martin's discourse semantics:

• 'nuclear relations' are expansion relations — mostly misapplied — between experiential elements of clause and group structure;
• 'activity sequence' is misconstrued as an aspect of field, not discourse semantics;
• 'conjunction' is the logical system of discourse semantics — which confuses structural (logical) deployments of expansion with cohesive (textual) deployments;
• 'what's going on' could be either field ('activity sequence') or genre ('social process').

[3] This is only part of the definition, as the grammatical analysis makes clear.  Rose's analysis makes no use of any of the discourse semantic resources: nuclear relations, activity sequence or conjunction.

[4] This part of the definition construes purpose, not time.  Here Rose has applied the discourse semantic resource of conjunction to an embedded clause complex, but misidentified the expansion relation.

[5] As the clause analysis shows, this clause encodes examples of a system call.  In the absence of a clause analysis, Rose misconstrues the meaning realised by the clause, as evinced by his "tasks requested by a system call"; cf. 'a system call is a request made by a process…'.  Again, Rose's analysis makes no use of any of the discourse semantic resources: nuclear relations, activity sequence or conjunction.

[6] Martin's nuclear relations (1992: 309-21) are not lexical relations, but (misapplied) expansion relations between elements of the experiential function structure of clauses (Process, Medium, Range, circumstance), nominal groups (Thing, Classifier, Epithet, Qualifier) and verbal groups (Event, Particle, Quality).  Rose has used none of these relations in his analysis.

[7] As demonstrated here, Martin's experiential discourse semantic system, termed ideation, is a confusion of lexical cohesion (textual metafunction), lexis as most delicate grammar and expansion relations between elements of function structures (logical metafuction).  The taxonomic relations Rose refers to here is the 'lexical cohesion' component.  That is, these relations help to make the text cohesive.

[8] This is not a taxonomic relation in the text — despite the use of 'part' to suggest meronymy.

[9] The suggestion here is that there is a meronymic relation between 'complete' (part) and 'task' (whole).  This can be examined through the lens of expansion relations.  If 'complete' is regarded as a phase of a process, then the type of expansion is elaboration (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 569ff), whereas a meronymic relation is one of extension (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 89).  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 91) provide a different argument:

We can certainly recognise that processes have phases — 'begin to do, keep doing, stop doing'; but it is not immediately clear that these form a process meronymy analogous to the parts of a participant. Although we might reconstrue he began to dance metaphorically as the beginning of his dance on the model of 'the beginning of the book', this is a metaphorical reification of the process 'dance' and we have to be cautious in interpreting the implications for the congruent process 'dance'. If we probe a little further, we can see that process phase is concerned with the occurrence of a process in time — its temporal unfolding: 'begin to do' means 'begin to be actualised (to occur) as doing in time'. In contrast, participant meronymy is not tied to the existence of a participant in referential space.

Conclusion:

Despite claiming to provide a discourse semantic analysis of these clauses, Rose makes no use of the system of nuclear relations (discourse semantic ideation) or activity sequences (Martin's register: field), and the one use he makes of discourse semantic conjunction, he gets wrong.  Further, in his use of Martin's lexical relations (discourse semantic ideation) — a relabelling of Halliday's lexical cohesion — he misrepresents meronymic relations.  Moreover, there was no analysis of appraisal, genre or field.

Most importantly, the fact that the student provided two identifying clauses, with the first decoding a technical term, and the second encoding examples, was not recognised.

Given all of the above, it is fair to say that the aim of the exercise was not pedagogy.

FYI:

In computing, a system call is the programmatic way in which a computer program requests a service from the kernel of the operating system it is executed on.

David Rose Misrepresenting Lexicogrammar As Discourse Semantics: Logical Metafunction

At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents.

[see grammatical analysis here.]

David Rose wrote to sys-func and Sysfling on 18 March 2015 at 09:15, analysing the above clause complex from Barack Obama's Inauguration Speech:

Now from discourse semantics… 

1. logically 

‘because’ as preposition or conjunction are alternative realisations of reason (so 2 equal factors) 

‘not simply…but’ realises counterexpectancy (not just 1 factor) 

Blogger Comments:

[1] The prepositional phrase realising the circumstance of Cause: reason because of the skill or vision of those in high office and the dependent clause of cause: reason because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents are two grammatical means of construing cause: reason.  The insights come from the grammatics, not from a 'discourse semantics'.

[2] In terms of the metafunctions, 'counterexpectancy' is interpersonal, not logical.  That is, 'counterexpectancy' is not a feature of logico-semantic relations, expansion or projection, nor of interdependency (taxis).  In the grammar, it is a feature in the system of mood Adjuncts (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 128).

Mick O'Donnell Misconstruing Non-Finite Dependent Clauses As Circumstances [Revised]

On 17 September 2013, Claudia Stoian asked on the sys-func and sysfling email lists:

What do you think about the following clauses, are they adverbial or non-defining relative clauses?

Every night, at exactly 21:53, the Chief Yeoman Warder of the Tower emerges from the Byward Tower wearing his long red coat and Tudor bonnet and carrying a candle lantern and the Queen's Keys.

And Mick O'Donnell replied:

The clauses in yellow (wearing... and carrying...) are not relative clauses, but rather present participle clauses (one of the three infinitive clause types)

I have never liked the label "adverbial" used in traditional grammar: clauses are not adverbs. "Adverbial" (or adverb-like) is a holdover from grammars which only had one label for each item, (its class), while good grammars label items by both function (what it does in larger units) and structural class (what shape of unit it is). Because we have two kinds of label, rather than talk of adverbial clauses, we can talk of clauses functioning as Adjunct (or as Circumstance, pick your layer).

I would say these clauses are Circumstances, my best guess would be Manner (how did he emerge?) but I am not sure of that.

Blogger Comment:

[1] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. On the SFL model, these clauses are non-finite clauses related to the primary clause by hypotactic elaboration, which makes them non-defining relative clauses. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 464):

The combination of elaboration with hypotaxis gives the category of non-defining relative clause (also called ‘non-restrictive’, ‘descriptive’). This functions as a kind of descriptive gloss to the primary clause…

See the clause complex analysis here.

[2] To be clear, labelling a clause 'adverbial' is not a claim that the clause is an adverb. However, in spite of his misgiving, O'Donnell nevertheless misconstrues these dependent clauses as circumstances, a function served by adverbs in adverbial groups.

In SFL, the traditional notion of an adverbial clause corresponds to a dependent clause in a relation of hypotactic enhancement.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 481):

The combination of enhancement with hypotaxis gives what are known in traditional formal grammar as ‘adverbial clauses’.

Mick O'Donnell On Non-Defining Relative Clauses

Mick O'Donnell wrote on 7 Sep 2013 on the sysfling list:

Myself, I would have treated the two 'which' clauses as nondefining relative clauses, and thus as part of the nominal group structure, and not as part of the clause complex structure.

and then again on 15 September 2013:

And yes, I did mention that I disagreed with the treatment in the example of nondefining relatives being related as part of a clause complex.

My reasoning is that they only ever occur immediately after the noun (with possible interceding Qualifier) with which the relative pronoun is grounded.

And semantically: They do not extend on a clause, but on a participant.
I don note the possible counter example of postponed nominal relatives,
e.g.,

• The man is here who you were waiting for.

But note that this case is only possible where the postponed relative is in a defining relationship. The above sentence corresponds to:

• The man who you were waiting for is here.

NOT TO:

• The man, who you were waiting for, is here.

Blogger Comment:

[1] O'Donnell's stated reason for treating non-defining relative clauses as 'part of nominal group structure' is  'that they only ever occur immediately after a noun (with a possible interceding Qualifier) with which the relative pronoun is grounded'.

The domain that non-defining relative clauses elaborate is not restricted to the nominal group; they can elaborate the whole of the primary clause or some part of it that is more than the nominal group' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 400).  For example:

He often accuses others of his own shortcomings, which is hypocritical. 

Here the non-defining relative clause which is hypocritical elaborates the whole primary clause he often accuses others of his own shortcomings.  Clearly, it is not a constituent of the preceding nominal group, as any attempt to analyse it as such will demonstrate.  Therefore, O'Donnell's position is based on a false premise.

For some reasoning about the difference between non-defining and defining clauses, see:

http://thethoughtoccurs.blogspot.com.au/2013/09/defining-vs-non-defining-relative.html

[2] Relative clauses generally elaborate the primary clause rather than extend it, though there is one group that strictly belong with extension.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 402-3) for the reasoning.

Mick O'Donnell Mistaking A Dependent Clause For A Circumstance

Michael O'Donnell wrote on sysfling on 3/7/12:

"we have been raised to love and care" 

Actor: -

Process: material (have been raised)

Goal: We

Circumstance: "to love and care" (which is maybe Result, as Reason/Purpose don't fit).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, O'Donnell's analysis here is:

However, systemically, the instance is agnate to 

The systemic difference here is just the finiteness of the dependent clause.

On this basis, the instance can be analysed as