Showing posts with label TNGS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TNGS. Show all posts

Wednesday, 6 December 2023

David Kellogg On Viewers Of Cave Paintings Not Requiring Language

Implicit in Halliday's last two sentences is either:
a) Prelinguistic infants are not engaged in human semiosis, or.
b) Language exists from birth.
It seems to me that both of these are clearly false.

Instead of Mondrian, consider the attached cave painting. Imagine that the floor of the cave preserves the footprints of the artists who made this mural.
1. The involuntary meaning of the footprints of the artists who made the mural. This seems no different from the meaning that deer tracks convey to a non-human predator. 
2. The intentional meaning of the picture of the herdsmen (hunters?) recording their labor. This seems very different, as it invites (because its intention is to allow) the viewer to "reverse engineer" the story, for amusement or profit. 
3. The strategically placed hand print done in red ochre. This too seems different again: although it resembles 1) in form and 2) in intension, it probably signals authorship and in that sense has a textual as well as an interpersonal function.

None of these seem to me to require the Hallidayan assumption that the viewer possesses language. All of them merely require the Vygotskyan assumption that the object (or "objective") can be inferred from the remains of the object-oriented action.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the last two sentences in the quote (Halliday 2003: 4) were:

All that needs to be said in the present context is that other human semiotics are dependent on the premise that their users also have language. Language is a prerequisite; but there is no need to insist that language can mean it all.

[2] To be clear, neither of these propositions are implicit in the quote, since Halliday's 'present context' is a discussion of human 'post-infancy' semiotic systems.

[3] This is true, as demonstrated by Halliday's extensive work on human protolanguage.

[4] To be clear, the observation of deer tracks by a non-human predator is, according to Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, simply perceptual categorisation on value. No linguistic meaning is involved. The observation of footprints by humans is the construal of experience as the first-order meaning of language.

[5] To be clear, according to comparative mythologist Joseph Campbell, cave paintings are expressions of mythic symbolism, and mythic symbolism is the use of (lexical) metaphor to adapt consciousness to its physical and social environments, which requires that the participants had language — as does the fact that the painting is, at most, only about 13,000 years old.

[6] To be clear, the cave painting is to be found in The Cave Of Hands, in Argentina, and since, according to comparative mythologist Joseph Campbell, such sites were used for male initiation rites in hunter-gatherer societies, the great number of hand images in this cave might be taken to suggest that they identify the initiates in those rituals. Again, this demonstrates that the participants had language.

[7] As the above demonstrates, this is the exact opposite of what is true. All three require that the human participants had language, and the dating of the cave art provides corroborating evidence.

Friday, 29 July 2022

David Rose On Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection

David replied to Kieran McGillicuddy on sys-func on 28/7/22 at 17:27:

Re circularity, generalising seems to be a basic capacity of any organism: ‘food/not-food’, and later ‘food/mate’

Edelman explains how it happens neurologically in animals, as perception, and in larger brained animals as perception of perception.

and at 21:22:

To mansplain what [Edelman] means by perception of perception I’d have to drag up his whole theory of neuronal group selection.
Aside from his books there’s a bunch of papers that summarise it. You could start here which is free to download...
Edelman, G. M. (2003). Naturalizing consciousness: a theoretical framework. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100(9), 5520-5524.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, ‘food/not-food’ and ‘food/mate’ are (linguistic) discriminations, not generalisations. 

[2] On Edelman's model, a perceptual category is established through instances being determined as alike in terms of both value-weighted perceptual features and adaptive motor response. This is achieved neurally through repeated value-guided firings of neuronal groups in global mappings for each instance. Each firing strengthens the synaptic connections within the group, making the group more likely — selecting it — to fire again under similar conditions in the future.

[3] To be clear, Edelman (2003) makes no mention of "perception of perception", but in Edelman's model, the brain further categorises its own categorising performances. For example, in categorising perceptual categorising, the brain creates what Edelman terms 'concepts', but what SFL Theory would interpret as perceptual systems (perceptions organised into systems).

[4] For interpretations of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection in terms of SFL Theory, see the 72 posts here.