Monday, 1 August 2022

David Rose Continuing To Misrepresent Halliday On Semantic Structure

So how do the models compare at this point? Three significant cleavages are apparent. The first is axis. Both models posit realisations in grammar, but MAKH suggested semantic structures were unnecessary for the ‘limited purpose’ of semantic networks...
This [grammatical system/structure] is already fairly abstract, and it may be unnecessary therefore to interpose another layer of structure between the semantic systems and the grammatical systems, given the limited purpose of the semantic systems, which is to account for the meaning potential associated with defined social contexts and settings.
Nevertheless, describing semantic structure is possible...
It is important to emphasise here that structure is defined as the 'configuration of functions', since this is abstract enough to cover semantic structure if such a thing is to be formulated. The shape of a structure may vary; we may express it literally or hierarchically or simultaneously. But all such shapes have in common the property of being configurations of functions... All that the term 'structure' implies is that there will be some configurations of functions at that stratum, and that these will realise the meaning selections, the combinations of options in the meaning potential.
Accordingly, discourse semantic systems are motivated by structural variations, such as the negotiation system. Here from WWD, first with realisation statements, then with examples...


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[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday's semantics features both system and structure. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

Moreover, Rose not only cites Halliday (1972) to claim that the current model does not include semantic structures, but he misrepresents the content of the paper. In this early exploratory paper, Halliday is actually equivocal about the theoretical utility of semantic structures, as the text Rose omitted from his first quote makes plain. Halliday (2003 [1972]: 347):

This is already fairly abstract, and it may be unnecessary therefore to interpose another layer of structure between the semantic systems and the grammatical systems given the limited purpose of the semantic systems, 'which is to account for the meaning potential associated with defined social contexts and settings.
On the other hand, it is possible that one might be able to handle more complex areas of behaviour by means of a concept of semantic structure. It may be, for instance, that the study of institutional communication networks, such as the chain of command or the patterns of consultation and negotiation in an industrial concern, might be extended to a linguistic analysis if the semantic options were first represented in semantic structures — since the options themselves could then be made more abstract. Various complex decision-making strategies in groups of different sizes might become accessible to linguistic observation in the same way. But for the moment this remains a matter of speculation.

[2] This is very misleading indeed, because it falsely implies that Martin alone took up Halliday's idea of semantic structure.

[3] To be clear, the discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION (Martin 1992) is a rebranding of misunderstandings of Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION. Evidence here.

Regarding Figure 7.2 in Martin & Rose (2007), see
Regarding Figure 7.6 in Martin & Rose (2007), see