David Rose Misconstruing 'Mere' As A Judgement Of Capacity

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz Olivares on 7 Sept 2024, at 11:32:

Your questions always demand a bit of SF rigor. Quite right about the word class... I was blinded from above... manner degree so adverb... but mere/merely : adjective/adverb. …

And you’re right about gradability... in this context is it a judgement of capacity? Construing a series... a lowly scullery maid – mere housemaid – capable housekeeper

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the topic sentence ("hyper-Theme"), with 'rigour' being Rose's evaluation of what follows.

[2] To be clear, the meaning of 'mere(ly)' is interpersonal (counter-expectancy: limiting), not experiential (manner: degree). For example, in he merely said it wasn't cooked properly, the Adjunct merely is not circumstantial: it does not qualify the manner in which he said it.

[3] Clearly, 'a mere housemaid' is not a judgement of the capacity of a servant. Mere housemaids may be more capable or less capable. In terms of APPRAISAL, it might be seen as a negative appreciation of the status of 'housemaid' in terms of social value:

But the fact that I’d sort of gone from that status position down to merely a housemaid, you know? 

David Banks On Effected/Affected

 After Annabelle Lukin wrote asflanet on 5 Feb 2024 at 11:56:

I'm keen to hear thoughts on the analysis of this clause:

The earth formed some 4,600 years ago from a vast cloud of gas and dust.

David Banks replied on asflanet on 5 Feb 2024, at 19:41:

If "formed" is a creative process, and "the earth" is what is created, it can't exist before the process takes place. So it can't be the actor of that process. My memory tells me that somewhere (but I haven't got a refrerence to hand) Halliday talks about an "effected" - the participant created by a process (as opposed to an "affected" - the participant altered by a process). To avoid any confusion, with my (non-anglophone) students I used to use the term "result". I would suggest that "the earth" is effected/result.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the clause analysis here.

[2] To be clear, in terms of ergativity, The Earth is the Medium of the Process formed, which, in an intransitive clause is the Actor.

[3] To be clear, the affectum/effectum distinction applies to transitive clauses, not intransitive clauses. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148):

The subtypes that have been generally recognised in grammar are (1) intransitive/transitive; (2) within intransitive, action/event; and (3) within transitive, effectum/affectum. … The third is the distinction between a Goal that 'exists' prior to the doing of the deed (affectum: Mary threw the ball) and one that is brought into existence by the doing (effectum: Jack built a house). We shall use this distinction, referred to as dispositive/creative, to explain figures of doing in terms of their outcome in other figures.

[4] To be clear, this only creates confusion, since "effected" applies only to transitive clauses, and 'result' is a type of Cause circumstance, not a participant.

On the other hand, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 149) classify subtypes of figures of doing according to outcome:

Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism

Yaegan Doran wrote to Sysfling on 25 August 2023 at 7:09:

… we should be wary of metafunctions being considered a basic theoretical parameter for the description of semiotic resources in general.

A basic argument I put in a paper once was:

‘If we take metafunctionality to be the one of the broadest means by which these traditions [SFL/Social Semiotics] conceptualize the intrinsic functionality of semiotic resources, by simply assuming metafunctions across semiosis, we run the risk of homogenizing descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described (i.e. English). That is, we risk watering down the specific functionality of each resource.’

Rather, following people working in language description at the time, I tried to tease these issues out for mathematical symbolism in the attached paper (and in more detail in my 2018 book Discourse of Physics), by attempting to ‘derive’ metafunctionality from axis (following Martin’s 2013 book on axis). Maths, I figured (with years of excellent help from many), would prove a useful point of contrast to language by virtue of regular common-sense comparisons that considered it to ‘be’ language/a language. But despite its comparability to language, I could find no evidence in the internal systemic/structural organisation of mathematical symbolism for an interpersonal component, and it was really pushing it to interpret an experiential component. But I tried to suggest that there was a major component comparable to the logical in language and a smaller independent one comparable to the textual. Nonetheless, I do think it much closer to language in this regard than most other resources, and so if even it struggles to fill out the full metafunctional complement, we should not assume it across the board (though metafunction is of course still a useful way in for analysis/application that is less concerned with descriptive/theoretical development – which I also tried to emphasise in the attached paper).

Along similar lines, Yu Zhigang followed this up by looking at the range of symbolism used in chemistry and concluded similarly – that the logical dominated, that there was little evidence for an interpersonal, that there was an even smaller textual component than maths, but there was in fact something comparable to an experiential. But he went a little further, and noted that some structuring principles that we often associate with interpersonal meaning in language – i.e. prosodic structure – occurred in various chemical symbolisms, but seemed to have become ‘ideationalised’ in that they were used to realise meaning related to field, not tenor.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not just an argument against the metafunctional dimension of the theory, but against any dimension of the theory, and so against the theory itself, since in this view, using a theory that was devised for English, SFL, runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. The same argument could be made against generalising Newton's theory of gravitation from falling apples to orbiting heavenly bodies, since it runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. 

[2] To be clear, the metafunctions cannot be derived from axis, even if axis is properly understood. This is not least because they are independent dimensions, with different scopes, and organised according to different principles. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):

That is, the local distinction between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders of axis entails nothing about the global distinctions between construing experience as meaning, enacting intersubjective relations as meaning, and creating text from the two.

For some of the theoretical misunderstandings of axis in Martin (2013), see the review here.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, mathematics is a contextual semiotic that is realised in language (e.g. algebraic equations) and a pictorial semiotic (e.g. geometric diagrams). The proof that equations, for example, are language is that, unlike non-language, they can be read aloud. This is because what is projected by saying, locutions, constitutes the lexicogrammatical stratum, and language is the only semiotic system with a stratified content plane. This is why bi-stratal systems, like pictorial semiotics, cannot be read aloud.

[4] To be clear, this is the logical fallacy known as the Argument from ignorance:

Argument from ignorance (from Latin: argumentum ad ignorantiam), also known as appeal to ignorance (in which ignorance represents "a lack of contrary evidence"), is a fallacy in informal logic. It asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false or a proposition is false because it has not yet been proven true. This represents a type of false dichotomy in that it excludes the possibility that there may have been an insufficient investigation to prove that the proposition is either true or false.

Here Doran has misconstrued absence of evidence as evidence of absence. The evidence for the interpersonal metafunction in mathematical symbolism is manifold. For example, mathematical symbolism is language, so it enacts interpersonal meaning. As language, the equation E = mc² is a proposition realised by a declarative clause that can argued as valid or not whether it is expressed this way or as energy equals mass times the speed of light squared. If there were no interpersonal meaning in mathematical symbolism, then mathematicians would not be able to argue for or against their validity.

[5] To be clear, mathematical symbolism is deployed in many sciences precisely because it construes experience as meaning. As language, a mathematical equation is a figure of being realised by an intensive identifying relational clause, and the solving of an equation is the iterated elaboration of the clause until one or more unknown Tokens is decoded by reference to a Value.

[6] To be clear, the logical metafunction is concerned with the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection, so it requires experiential meanings to relate logically to one another. Every equation is an intensive identifying clause that construes an elaborating logical relation between a Token and a Value, and the solving of an equation entails a clause complex in which all clauses are logically related through elaboration. The logical relation of extension, for example, is manifested in processes of addition and subtraction.

[7] To be clear, none of the metafunctions is independent of the others. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

More specifically, the textual metafunction requires the other metafunctions, since its function is to operationalise them. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8, 398):

The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared. … 

The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them…

Every mathematical equation is organised in terms of Theme and information; see [4] above.

[8] To be clear, given the explanatory power of the metafunctions, it would be more prudent to assume that they are a dimension of a semiotic system until it is proved otherwise. As explained above in [4], Doran mistook his inability to identify the metafunctions in mathematical symbolism for evidence that they are not a dimension of its systems. 

[9] To be clear, Yu Zhigang is Doran's collaborator, rather than a scholar working independently of Doran. More importantly, what is said above about mathematical symbolism also applies to chemical symbolism. For example:

∞

See also Yaegan Doran Failing To Recognise The Interpersonal Metafunction In Mathematics.

Robin Fawcett On 'Forget' + Location

Using the alias 'Dmytro Poremskyi', Robin Fawcett wrote to sys-func on 23 Sept 2021, at 05:13 and on 25 Sept 2021, at 02:42:

I'm curious to know your (functionally grounded) opinion regarding the following usage recommendation:

(taken from Oxford American Wordpower Dictionary for Learners of English)

It is obvious that one may find quite a few instances of 'forget' + location: place across oral and written corpora, but do you think SFG could shed some light upon the reason behind the (prescriptive?) preference here? I wonder if it can be somehow linked to process type analysis, perhaps involving the comparison with 'leave' ...

… However, quite a few native speakers of different varieties of English would maintain that it is perfectly normal to forget something somewhere:

Do you think SFL can account for this seeming deviation?

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's first extract distinguishes four usages of 'forget':

1. forget about something
2. fail to remember to do something
3. fail to bring something with you
4. stop thinking about something

and the claim that a Location cannot be construed with 'forget' applies only to the third usage.

In Fawcett's second extract, on the other hand, the writer mistakenly assumes that the claim applies to all usages of 'forget'. Of course, other usages of 'forget' can be construed with a Location, as exemplified by:

However, in the third usage, above, 'forget' serves the same function as the verbal group complex 'forget to bring', and so serves as a material Process:

The reason why at home cannot be added in this usage of 'forget' is that such a 'rest' Location (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 317) is inconsistent with the directed motion of 'bring'. Cf He is bringing his passport at home. However, when directional 'bring' is made explicit, with or without 'forget', directional Locations can be construed:

In Fawcett's Systemic Functional Syntax, the Cardiff Grammar, there is no verbal group, and so, no verbal group complex. This is one reason why Fawcett is unable to answer his own question.

David Rose Endorsing Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Structure ("Subjacency Duplexes")

 David Rose wrote to sys-func on 13 Aug 2021, at 20:35:

Thank you to Jim for challenging our thinking again. Although you downplay it as just ‘relaxing’ the associations of multivariate and univariate structures, the idea of subjacency actually looks like a pretty big claim that could resolve a lot of conflicts, contradictions and blindspots in lg description. When I looked at Pitjantjatjara again recently, it was everywhere at group and word ranks.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the seminar (13/8/21), Martin falsely claimed that Halliday (1965) associated recursive systems with univariate structures and non-recursive systems with multivariate structures, despite producing a diagram from Halliday (1965) that associated recursive systems with both multivariate and univariate structures:

[2] In the seminar, Martin presented a new type of structure, a subjacency duplex, which he claimed is a univariate structure that realises a non-recursive system, thus violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. However, the claim does not survive close scrutiny.

To be clear, the term 'subjacency' is from Chomsky (1973), and the term 'duplex' is from Matthiessen (1995: 161) and simply means a univariate complex of two units. In his talk, Martin attributed 'duplex' to Rose (2001), instead of Matthiessen, and although Rose (2001) acknowledges Matthiessen, Rose did not correct Martin on the point during the seminar, or in this public response.

Martin presented the following as an example of a duplex structure:

Here Martin interprets the structure marker, of, as a clitic, and interprets the clitic and the preceding nominal group as a hypotactic duplex. Martin provided no argument in support of this interpretation. The problems here are as follows.

Firstly, the preposition of is the generalised marker of a structural relation between nominals (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 394). In this instance, it marks a structural relation between the nominals two litres and water. In Martin's analysis, however, of is misinterpreted as a Modifier of just one of those two nominal groups.

Secondly, the preposition of does not function as a Modifier, because it does not subcategorise the nominal group two litres; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389). Nor does of hypotactically expand the nominal group in terms of any other subtypes of elaboration, extension, or enhancement.

Thirdly, the nominal group two litres and the structure marker of do not form a duplex (a 2-unit complex). That is, they do not form a nominal group complex, a structure marker complex, a clitic complex, or any other type of complex.

In short, the reason why this type of univariate structure is not generated by a recursive system, is simply that it is not a univariate structure in the first place.

Martin then went on to compound the error by interpreting both the multivariate structure of prepositional phrases and paratactic nominal group complexes in terms of his subjacency duplexes:

∞

In the same seminar, Martin claimed that a nominal group with multiple Epithets is a multivariate structure realising a recursive system, thus also violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. His supporting argument was that each Epithet is independently related to the Thing:

The major theoretical problem here is that, in SFL Theory, recursive systems specify an iterative relation between formal units (e.g words), not functional elements (e.g. Epithets). The logical structure of the nominal group construes it as a group of words, rather than as an organic configuration, such that α is modified by β, which is modified by γ, which is ... , where the α word serves as the Head of the nominal group, and the series of subcategorisations of the Head serves as its Modifier. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389):

However, there are also problems in using Martin's model of structure to make the argument:

The problem here is that Martin's structural distinction between experiential and logical meaning actually construes the distinction between unequal status (of nucleus vs satellite) and equal status (of multiple nuclei). That is, Martin's structure typology misconstrues the metafunctional distinction between experiential (multivariate) and logical (univariate) as the interdependency distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis.

So, in interpreting the nominal group as an orbital structure, Martin is not actually interpreting it as a multivariate structure, but as a univariate structure, with each Epithet hypotactically related to the Thing.

A final internal inconsistency is that, in applying his model of orbital structure, Martin reverses the direction of the relation from nucleus to satellites to satellites to nucleus (Epithets to Thing), because it suits his argument to do so.

Shooshi Dreyfus Mistaking Non-Defining For Defining Relative Clauses

Shooshi Dreyfus replied to Sarah on sys-func on 11 Nov 2018, 11:33:

Here’s my version of your analysis – but it’s only one version and you could analyse the last bit as a second clause but I think this works too:

Third, the crisis [[(that is) in the European and the global economy]] [ACTOR – with downranked spatial meaning ie NOT a circumstance but a Qualifier realising circumstantial meaning] has entered [PRO: MATERIAL] a second phase, [[(that is) characterized by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //and (which) is uneven [ATTRIBUTE] across countries]]

Basically, this way, you’ve got one clause with lots of embedding, which is typical of highly written text. And you’ve got circumstantial meaning being realised across numerous lexicogrammatical structures – see my attached paper (and have another one forthcoming on circumstantial meanings)

Blogger Comments:

[1] The proposed analysis can represented as follows:

Third	the crisis [[in the European and the global economy]]	has entered	a second phase [[characterised by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //  and is	uneven	across countries]]
	Actor	Process: material	?	Attribute	?

[2] To be clear, the instance in question is a complex of four clauses:

Third, the crisis in the European and the global economy has entered a second phase	characterised by a recovery	that is proceeding at a faltering pace	and is uneven across countries
α	= β
	α	= β
		1	+ 2

Suggested transitivity analyses of the four clauses can be viewed here.

[3] Trivially, this is an embedded phrase ([ ]), not an embedded clause ([[ ]]).

[4] Trivially, // marks a tone group boundary, not a clause boundary (||).

[5] The primary source of Dreyfus' confusion — analysing a complex of four clauses as a single clause — is her mistaking non-defining relative clauses (hypotactic elaboration) for defining relative clauses (embedded clauses serving as nominal group Qualifier).

[6] To be clear, the circumstantial meanings in this instance are realised grammatically as

• locational Qualifier (nominal group): in the European and the global economy;
• circumstance of Manner (clause): at a faltering pace;
• circumstance of Location (clause): across countries.

David Rose On "The Attributive Nucleus"

David Rose reacted to David Banks on sysfling on 25 September 2018 at 08:19:

The answer lies in their orbital (nucleus/margin/periphery) structuring. David Banks semantically re-interpeted the attributive nucleus (us + into this/ us + out) as a ‘result’ of the attributing agency (I got/gonna get), which is marginal (IFG pp350, 211, Martin 1996, Working with Discourse §3.3). 

Agency in English grammar is potentially recursive…

they made me get us into this

But 'us + into this’ remains the attributive nucleus (Medium/Carrier + Range/Attribute) … 

It's intriguing to see the intricacies of meaning made by the grammar itself.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the answer to a transitivity question depends on the ability to understand and apply transitivity theory.  The 'orbital structuring' Rose refers to is Martin's misunderstanding of Halliday's clause nuclearity, rebranded and relocated to Martin's ill-conceived discourse semantic stratum.

• For the misunderstandings of clause nuclearity in Martin (1992), see the relevant posts in the critique of Chapter 5 here.
• For the misunderstandings of clause nuclearity in Martin & Rose (2007), see the relevant posts in the critique of Chapter 3 here.
• For some of the reasons why Martin's discourse semantic stratum is ill-conceived, see Why The Argument For A 'Discourse' Semantic Stratum Is Invalid.

[2] See the previous post for the theoretical misunderstanding that invalidates Banks' analysis.

[3] To be clear, Banks' clause analysis was presented as grammatical, not semantic.

[4] On the one hand, this is deeply misleading, since it falsely implies that Rose's statement is consistent with Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014), and thereby endorsed by them.  On the other hand, it is a poor bluff, since neither of the cited pages — in any edition — says anything at all about clause nuclearity.

[5] To be clear, the discussion of nuclear relations in Working With Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007) is §3.4.  The concern of §3.3 is taxonomic relations, which is Halliday & Hasan's lexical cohesion misunderstood, rebranded and relocated by Martin from textual lexicogrammar to experiential discourse semantics.

[6] To be clear, according to Martin (1992: 319) and Martin & Rose (2007: 95), it is Range: entity that is said to be within the nucleus.  The prepositional phrase into this, interpreted as a circumstantial Attribute, does not function as Range: entity.  Circumstances, on the other hand, are said (ibid.) to be located at the periphery.

For the original, theoretically consistent model of clause nuclearity, see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 348):

[7] To be clear, making meaning is semogenesis, and it involves all strata.   In SFL theory, grammar (wording) realises meaning (semantics).  This confusion between semogenesis and stratification derives from Martin (1992); see for example:

• Confusing Semogenesis And Stratification
• Confusing Semogenesis With Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction
• Confusing Semogenesis With Stratification

On the other hand, in SFL theory, the grammar not only realises meaning, it construes (intellectually constructs) it.  That is, it is the grammar that makes possible the sorts of meanings that language can make.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 603-4):

The central meaning-making resource in language — its "content plane" — is stratified into two systems: that of lexicogrammar, and that of semantics. The semantic system is the 'outer' layer, the interface where experience is transformed into meaning. The 'inner' layer is the grammar, which masterminds the way this transformation takes place.

David Rose "In A Nutshell" [Part 1]

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 2 December 2017 at 08:39:

a different but hopefully complementary perspective. I’m interested in social context as a semiotic plane that is organised systemically and realised by language, including grammar and discourse systems. Grammar and discourse construe register (field/tenor/mode) in different ways, partly by configuring lexical items. Eg IDEATION configures items in taxonomies, figures and sequences, TRANSITIVITY in processes, participants and circumstances. Each of these contribute general types of patterns to unfolding construals of a field. Lexical items contribute more specific features of register. …

in a nutshell
David

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'context' means the culture construed as a semiotic system.  This is distinct from the material setting in which interlocutors create texts.  The context is realised by what the interlocutors say (and think).

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, taking metaredundancy into account, context is realised by the realisation of semantics (meaning) in lexicogrammar (wording).

[3] To be clear, in SFL theory, language construes context — where construes means intellectually constructs — and field tenor and mode are the metafunctional systems of context.

[4]  To be clear, in SFL theory, register means a functional variety of language, and it is modelled as a  language sub-potential of the content plane (semantics and lexicogrammar).  As sub-potentials of language, different registers realise different sub-potentials of context.  Thus, context and register differ in terms of stratification (context vs language) and instantiation (potential vs sub-potential).

Rose, on the other hand, confuses register with context (field, tenor and mode), and in doing so, misconstrues language as non-language (his "social context"). 

[5] To be clear, in SFL theory, lexical items are not configured.  What are configured are functions in structures, whereas lexical items are the synthetic realisation of the most delicate lexical systems.  

[6] The experiential discourse semantic system of IDEATION is from Martin (1992).  As demonstrated in great detail here, and summarised here, it is a confusion of lexical cohesion (textual metafunction), lexis as most delicate grammar, and misapplied logical relations.

[7] This is seriously misleading.  Figures and sequences are types of phenomenon in the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 48ff).  They do not appear in Martin (1992), where 'activity sequences' —misunderstood from Barthes (1977) — are modelled as field (ideational context), which Martin misconstrues as register.

[8] To be clear, the system of TRANSITIVITY does not configure lexical items "in processes, participants and circumstances".  The system of TRANSITIVITY provides the potential for construing experience as a configuration of process, participants and circumstances.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 212, 213):

…experientially, the clause construes a quantum of change as a figure, or configuration of a process, participants involved in it and any attendant circumstances. …

The system of transitivity provides the lexicogrammatical resources for construing a quantum of change in the flow of events as a figure – as a configuration of elements centred on a process.

[9] Here Rose follows Martin (1992) in misconstruing ideational semantics (the meaning construed) during logogenesis as ideational context (the field of culture construed) — which Martin further misconstrues as a dimension of register.  For Martin's misunderstandings of context see here; for Martin's misunderstandings of register, see here.

[10] There is a sense in which the wording of this is consistent with SFL theory, even if it is not the meaning that Rose has in mind (see [Part 2]).  It is consistent in the sense that registers, in the SFL use of the term, differ in terms of the probabilities of systemic features being instantiated, and given that lexical items realise bundles of the most delicate features, the probabilities of these most delicate features being instantiated are the most delicate means of specifying different registers.

In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04In a nutshell.

Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

David Banks' Reasons For Not Identifying 'Accompaniment'

 David Banks replied regarding Annabelle Lukin's query on sysfling on 2 November 2017 at 22:09:

It seems to me that if you say "between Iraqi and British forces" is a circumstance, that means that it is functioning at the level of the clause, and it is a circumstance of the predicator "have been". But I don't feel that holds water. If "between Iraqi and British forces" is related to a process, then that process is "clashes", which is a nominalized process, and the relationship is not circumstantial but agentive, so in the unpacked variant "Iraqi and British forces clashed", "Iraqi and British forces" functions as actor. This is not unusual; it is common in cases of grammatical metaphor, for the putative actor of a nominalized process to be encoded in a prepositional phrase functioning as qualifier of the nominalized process. It is the reciprocal nature of the process in this case that gives us the process "between" rather than "by".

and on 3 November 2017 at 05:36:

If we simply ask: what is "between Iraqi and British forces" doing, surely the answer is: telling us about the nature of "clashes", that is, it is describing "clashes". Since "clashes" is a noun, an element which describes it is a modifier or qualifier. 

The only complication arises because "clashes" is a nominalized process. Who is doing the "clashing": answer: "Iraqi and British forces". So the qualifier encodes the putative actor of the nominalized process.

and on 3 November 2017 at 19:22:

Among the numerous variants we have:

"Iraqi forces clashed with British forces"
"British forces clashed with iraqi forces"
"Iraqi and British forces clashed"

So, I feel, you can't get away from the fact that "Iraqi forces" and "British forces" are the participants in the process of "clashing", and the grammatical metaphor (used for reasons we do not know since it's out of context) means that the participants are encoded as a qualifier of the nominalized process.

to which John Bateman replied on 3 November 2017 at 23:56:

I agree with almost everything David wrote, with the possible exception of needing to agree to disagree! :-)

Blogger Comments:

Reminder: the clause under discussion is

there have been more clashes between Iraqi and British forces.

[1] Trivially, a circumstance is attendant on a Process (experiential), not a Predicator (interpersonal), and have is Finite and been is Predicator.

[2] This is incorrect.  The Process of this clause is have been, not clashes; clashes functions as the Thing/Head of the nominal group more clashes which functions as the participant Existent.

[3] This is true; clashes is a nominalised process, which is why it doesn't function as the Process of this metaphorical clause.  It is in the more congruent agnates, which Banks cites, that it functions as Process.

[4] The agency of both the metaphorical clause and its congruent agnates is 'middle', not 'effective';  that is, there is no Agent.

[5] This part is true, but irrelevant, because the query is about the metaphorical clause, not its more congruent agnates.

[6] An instance of this type would be there have been more attacks by British and Iraqi forces.  In this type, the prepositional phrase is indeed functioning as Qualifier, since, unlike the clause under discussion, it can't be thematised without more attacks; see previous post on determining constituency.

[7] Here Banks repeats Bartlett's misinterpretation of 'joint participation in the process' as 'reciprocality'; see previous post.  Since the process is not 'reciprocal' — the British and Iraqi forces didn't "clash each other" — this is not the reason for the minor Process being between rather than by.  The function of between is to construe the joint participants as a circumstance; see [8].

[8] The prepositional phrase metaphorically construes the joint participants in what is congruently a material Process, 'clash', as circumstantial to the existential Process have been.  The type of circumstance that construes joint participation is 'Accompaniment' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 174; Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 324).

[9] This correctly identifies agnates of the metaphorical clause, demonstrating both Accompaniment (with British forces, with Iraqi forces) and its relation to 'joint participation' (Iraqi and British forces), but still fails to make the theoretical connection.

[10] What we can say is that the grammatical metaphor reconstrues a very material process as one of merely existing, and reconstrues the participants of that Process, both Agent and Medium, as merely circumstantial.  Given that it was Britain that illegally invaded Iraq, and not the contrary, we can take a wild stab in the dark and suggest that one reason the metaphor was used was to hide the agency of British humans in the "clash", along with the fact that their actions impacted on Iraqi humans.

[11] See [1] to [10] above.  See also Thoughts That Didn't Occur…

David Rose On Process Type Features

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 12 Oct 2017 at 21:08:16:

… Fourth, as Mick points out there are consistent (but also fuzzy) relations between the grammatical categories and domains of experience denoted by certain verbs (for example). I don’t think labels like behavioural, mental and so on are semantic. Rather they denote general fields of experience, beyond language. The grammar organises these fields, while lexical items are far more variable. 

A question I’m interested in is where do these relations come from? I mean our experience is so complex, fluid and variable. It seems a miracle that the grammar organises it as neatly as it does, despite the fuzz.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the theory.  In SFL, the process type features are theorised as both semantic and lexicogrammatical.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 503):

… we treat transitivity both within semantics (the paradigmatic and syntagmatic organisation of figures) and within lexicogrammar (the grammar of transitivity): it is a system construed within the content plane of language — both in the ideational component in the lexicogrammar and in the ideation base. This two-stratal approach to transitivity makes it possible to model the resource of grammatical metaphor and is fundamental to work on multilingual systems for generating text.

[2] On the one hand, this can be read as consistent with SFL theory, and so, as contradictory of Rose's previous statement.  On this reading, process type features, as ideational semantics do realise (Rose's 'denote') field, in the sense of 'field' as ideational context (the culture as semiotic system).  But this is not Rose's meaning here — as suggested by the contradiction — since Rose follows Martin's error in treating 'field' as a dimension of register.

On the other hand, this can be read as inconsistent with the epistemological assumptions on which SFL theory was developed.  On this reading, 'fields of experience beyond language' refers to the experience that is construed as ideational meaning.  On the SFL model, meaning is located within semiotic systems ("immanent"), rather than being transcendent of them.

In claiming that process type features denote (realise) 'fields of experience beyond language', Rose is (a) ascribing meaning to the domain outside semiotic systems, and (b) construing this domain as more abstract meaning than the meaning of language.  See also Philosophical Realism.

[3] On the one hand, this can be read as consistent with SFL theory if 'fields' is understood as the experience that is transformed into meaning, and if 'organises' is understood as 'construes as meaning'.  But this is not Rose's meaning here.  For Rose, 'fields' refers to (transcendent) meanings outside language, and it is the rôle of the grammar to organise them.

[4] This misunderstands the relation between grammar and lexis.  In SFL, lexical items are the synthesis of features of the most delicate systems of the lexicogrammar (just as phonemes are the synthesis of phonological features).

[5] This puzzlement arises from the epistemological inconsistencies identified above in [2] and [3].  The 'relations' arise as ideational meaning, construed of experience, in the logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis of meaning potential.