David Rose On 'Chains Of Interlocking Relations'

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz on SYSFLING on 30 Dec 2024, at 10:26:

… So it’s OK to define features by their realisations as function structures, and functions by their realisations as classes, then vice versa...given that units at each level are defined in contrast with other units.

Eg (v simplified), 

1. a clause participant is realised by a nominal gp that contrasts with verbal gp realising process. 
2. Nom gps are realised most generally by a Thing function. 
3. Thing is realised by a nominal word class, that realises a discourse semantic entity, in contrast to verbs realising an occurrence. 
4. Nominal sub-classes specify an entity uniquely, or by person, proximity, number, gender, or by class. 
5. These criteria define the class labels proper noun, pronoun and common noun. 
6. They in turn are criteria for different types of nom gp, which in turn have different options for specifying, evaluating and ordering, and different functions in discourse.

Just an example of ‘chains of (interlocking) relations involved (which also includes the labelling of such relations)’ 

PS On such criteria, mine/ours/yours/theirs/hers/his could be defined as (possessive) pronouns, not determiners, since they realise Thing, not Deictic (despite the weight of old authority).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the argument here is:

Premiss: Units at each rank are defined in contrast with other units.
Conclusion #1: Features are defined by their realisations as function structures (and vice versa)
Conclusion #2: Functions are defined by their realisations as classes (and vice versa)

Analysis:

The argument is invalid, because neither conclusion follows from the premiss. The Premiss makes a claim about relations between form, whereas Conclusion #1 makes a claim about the axial relation between functions, features and structures, and Conclusion #2 makes a claim about the realisation relation between function and form.

The premiss is invalid because it is false. In SFL Theory, rank units are distinguished 'from above': in terms of their functions in the structure in the rank above. 'Nominal' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'participant'; 'verbal' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'process'; and 'adverbial' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'circumstance'.

Conclusion #1 is invalid, because it is false. The features of a rank unit (Value) are realised by the function structure of the unit (Token), so in terms of 'definition', this conclusion is the exact opposite of what is true, since a definition is a Value assigned to a Token, not the reverse.

Conclusion #2 is invalid, because it is false. Different functions (Value) are realised by different classes of form (Token), so in terms of 'definition', this conclusion is the exact opposite of what is true, since a definition is a Value assigned to a Token, not the reverse.

[2] To be clear, like the two conclusions above, this again has the realisation relation backwards. It is the Thing function (Value) that is congruently realised by a nominal group (Token), not the other way 'round.

[3] To be clear, 'entity' an 'occurrence' are essentially rebrandings of 'participant' and 'process' in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) by Martin's former student Hao. To reframe this in terms of SFL Theory, a noun (word) realises a Thing (nominal group) which realises a participant (clause) which, in a congruent clause, realises a participant (figure) on the semantic stratum. By the same token, a lexical verb (word) realises an Event (verbal group) which realises a Process (clause) which, in a congruent clause, realises a Process (figure) on the semantic stratum.

[4] To be clear, subclasses of noun are not criteria for different types of nominal group, but different formal realisations (Token) of the function Thing (Value).

[5] As demonstrated above, Rose's self-congratulation here is unwarranted.

[6] This is misleading. To be clear, Rose here is unwittingly giving the very same view as the 'old authority' known as 'traditional grammar', and the 'old authority' known as Halliday (1985, 1994). For example, Halliday (1994: 313): 

The misinterpretation of possessive pronouns as Deictic determiners was introduced into IFG3&4 by Matthiessen. Compare the above table with the following in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 628):

David Kellogg On Non-Defining Relative Clauses

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 8 Apr 2024, at 21:32:

a) She tore up the letter, which upset me (because it was from someone I once loved).

b) She tore up the letter which upset me (because it was from someone who was blackmailing me.)

In b) the clause is indubitably rankshifted: it's a post-modifying qualifier in a nominal group--no different from "of England" in "the King of England's crown".

But why can't I consider the clause in a) to be a Circumstance of "She tore up" or some way of complexing the verbal group in the main clause? Why do I have to consider it a ranking clause in its own right?

and replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on sys-func on 10 Apr 2024, at 08:25:

I don't get why you are changing the subject, though. The question is about rank, The issue is whether the clause is part of a nominal group or part of a verb complex or (the standard interpretation) a clause complex. …

and again on 10 Apr 2024, 16:12:

I do not analyse the instance as a verbal group complex. In truth, I don't see any ambiguity whatsoever: one is a nominal group complex and the other is a hypotactic clause. 

If, however, I were applying Merge (or "subjacency"), I would have to argue that "which" is a merged conjunction and pronoun, and therefore the sentence is agnate to "She tore up the letter and upset me", which is a verbal group complex. One more reason for preferring the SFL account.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (a) is a hypotactic clause complex in which the elaborating dependent clause is a non-defining relative clause:

The fact that the relative clause is ranking, and not a constituent of the primary clause is demonstrated by the fact that, unlike true constituents, it cannot be made Theme of that clause.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (b) is a single clause in which the Qualifier of a nominal group is a defining relative clause, shifted to word rank:

[3] To be clear, the elaborating relative clause cannot serve as a clause circumstance because it is not a clause constituent — it cannot be thematised — and it does not serve as a Role, the only type of elaborating circumstance.

When confronted with the problems facing his 'circumstance' analysis, Kellogg falsely accused CLÉiRIGh of changing the subject (see here), and at the same time, without acknowledging the fact, moved the goalposts (a logical fallacy) so his claim now became that the relative clause is part of a nominal group, The problem here is that it treats a non-defining relative clause the same as a defining relative clause:

Then, perhaps as a correction to his first movement, Kellogg moved the goalposts again so his claim now became that the relative clause is embedded as one unit of a nominal group complex:

The problem here is that complexing is only possible with units of the same rank, and in hypotactic nominal group complexes, this means with adverbial groups or prepositional phrases. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 564):

While the dominant element has to be a nominal group, dependent elements can be adverbial groups or prepositional phrases.

[4] To be clear, after twice proposing a verbal group complex as a possible analysis, Kellogg owns that this is not his analysis. He then goes on to claim that She tore up the letter and upset me features a verbal group complex. However, in SFL Theory, a verbal group complex serves a single Process. In this instance, there are two distinct Processes, one material and one mental, so it is a clause complex, not a verbal group complex:

In Kellogg's analysis, where both verbal groups in the complex serve a single Process, neither the PROCESS TYPE nor any of the participants can be identified:

David Rose On Interstratal Tension And A Structure Not Covered By IFG

David Rose summed up the preceding discussion on asflanet on 11 Feb 2024, at 09:25:

Annabelle’s first question was a great illustration. It distilled a complex explanation of the earth’s origin into a process with a couple of circumstances, which made us question the simple analysis of Actor, Process, Means and Time. This interstratal tension has been a focus of SFL research in recent years, especially Jing Hao’s and Yaegan Doran’s work on science.

Annabelle’s second question then revealed that the Time circumstance had a structure that is not covered in IFG. Personally, that made me look more closely at both the example, and what Halliday had to say about its grammatical domain. Alternative suggestions by Rosemary, Chris and Annabelle made me look even harder.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Annabelle's first question was

I'm keen to hear thoughts on the analysis of this clause:

The earth formed some 4,600 years ago from a vast cloud of gas and dust.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. This is the structure of the clause:

Although this analysis was questioned by David Banks, it was done so on the basis of theoretical misunderstandings, as previously demonstrated here.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. There is no "interstratal tension" here. This is a happening figure realised by a material clause, its congruent realisation.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. On the principles provided in IFG, this structure is simply a nominal group:

[5] To be clear, Rose did not need to look at all, let alone more closely or even harder. Rosemary provided the IFG interpretation of the structure as a nominal group, and ChRIS provided the evidence that the structure could not possibly be an adverbial group, as Rose would maintain, on the principles provided in IFG.

Lise Fontaine On The Distinction Between Complement And Adjunct

Lise Fontaine wrote to Sysfling on 16 August 2023 at 10:59:

Ed is making a very important point here and one that is often overlooked. I think linguistics generally has seen a lot of damage from imposed boundaries around ideas. Even a distinction between Complement and Adjunct is not always clear, especially as concerns spatial reference. There is great benefit in being open-minded about accounts and not being afraid to be wrong sometimes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. The distinction between Complement and Adjunct is clear on theoretical criteria. Difficulty only arises when the theory is not understood.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 153, 154, 155):

A Complement is an element within the Residue that has the potential of being Subject but is not; … Any nominal group not functioning as Subject will be a Complement (with the exception of certain circumstantial Adjuncts of Extent realised by nominal groups without the preposition for, e.g. 180 miles in he sailed 180 miles north on the Company’s armed schooner); and this includes nominal groups of one type which could not function as Subject as they stand, namely those with adjective as Head …

An Adjunct is an element that has not got the potential of being Subject; … (As noted above, certain circumstantial Adjuncts of Extent may be realised by nominal groups without the preposition for; contrast he had walked for miles with he had walked four miles.)

Fontaine's difficulty arises from taking the Formalist view 'from below' (forms: nominal group vs prepositional phrase) instead of the Functionalist view 'from above' (functions: Complement vs Adjunct). That is, the view 'from below' decodes forms by reference to functions, whereas the view 'from above' encodes functions by reference to forms. In other words, the view 'from below' begins with expressions and asks what they mean, whereas the view 'from above' begins with meanings and asks how they are expressed.

[2] To be clear, here Fontaine again engages in her promotion of the culture of anti-intellectualism (see here), reframing it as open-mindedness. Being afraid of being wrong is vitally important for producing high quality work, whether in academic publications or school exams. Ethically, not being afraid of being wrong is a licence to tell lies.

Mick O'Donnell On The Appraisal In A Metaphorical Clause

Michael O'Donnell wrote to the lang-eval list on 13 Jan 2023, at 01:32:

'the bright sunlight gave a false impression of warmth'

The sunlight is being metaphorically construed as a conscious communicating being. Within the metaphorical domain, the sunlight could be said to be evaluated negatively for veracity. 

Ignoring the potential animalisation, I would need to say appreciation:quality, with "false" acting as a graduating token lessening the appreciation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The metaphorical clause construes the bright sunlight as the Token of a Value:

If the bright sunlight had been construed as 'a conscious communicating being', it would have been construed as the Sayer of a verbal process. And even unpacking the metaphor yields mental processes, not verbal processes:

when someone saw the bright sunlight, they falsely inferred that the weather was warm.

Here O'Donnell has engaged in the 'notional semantics' that he has previously denounced in others, instead of 'following the grammatical principles that Halliday established' that he has previously insisted upon; see Mick O'Donnell On Following SFL Analytical Principles.

[2] To be clear, in the metaphorical clause, the negative assessment is a feature of the Value a false impression of warmth, not the Token the bright sunlight. The negative judgement of the bright sunlight, in terms of veracity, derives from misconstruing the relational clause as verbal, with the Sayer deemed to be dishonest, for communicating a falsehood.

[3] To be clear, if the metaphor is ignored, then the congruent rendering becomes the focus of the analysis. In this case, the assessment is one of negative judgement, in terms of capacity: falsely inferred. The function of the metaphor, therefore, is to conceal this judgement, since it omits its target: someone.

[4] To be clear, the target of the negative appreciation is the impression of warmth in the metaphorical clause. However, false enacts the attitude itself, not a graduation of it. That is, false does not "lessen" the negative appreciation. From the Appraisal Theory website:

Graduation

Values by which (1) speakers graduate (raise or lower) the interpersonal impact, force or volume of their utterances, and (2) by which they graduate (blur or sharpen) the focus of their semantic categorisations.

1. (FORCE ) slightly, somewhat, very, completely
2. (FOCUS) I was feeling kind'v woozy, they effectively signed his death warrant; a true friend, pure folly

David Rose On Voice And Notional Reasoning

David Rose replied to David Banks on SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, 22:20:

… ‘reversible’ means operative/receptive:

[identifying] ‘a happy mother is made by a happy baby’

[attributive] ‘a mother is happy’/*’happy is a mother’ (except poetically)

‘Notional reasoning’ here means deriving grammatical categories from lexical notions. …

and to Tom Bartlett on SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, at 22:43:

… Features like [identifying] and [attributive] are defined in relation to each other (eg by your examples), not by dictionary-like glosses. Notional reasoning imagines such glosses.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the agnation here is in terms of thematicity, not voice. What Rose presents as the poetic 'receptive voice' agnate is actually a 'marked thematicity' agnate:

Even in assigned attributive clauses, which do admit a voice contrast, Attribute can never conflate with Subject:

[2] This misunderstands the meaning of 'notional reasoning'. In grammatical analysis, 'notional reasoning' means arguing for a analysis solely on the basis of the meanings being construed, without grounding the analysis in the lexicogrammatical systems of the wording, as exemplified by the previous two posts by David Banks. As Halliday (1985: xx) explains:

If we simply took account of differences in meaning, then any set of clauses or phrases could be analysed in all kinds of different ways; there would be no way of preferring one scheme over another. The fact that it is a 'functional' grammar means that it is based on meaning; but the fact that it is a 'grammar' means that it is an interpretation of linguistic forms. Every distinction that is recognised in the grammar — every set of options, or 'system' in systemic terms — makes some contribution to the form of the wording.

Shooshi Dreyfus On Circumstantial Meaning

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote to SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, 16:00:

Right, so here’s where I’d like to push us to think beyond clause constituents and up to circumstantial meaning, which can be realised a cross a range of grammatical structures. For example:

On the table (circumstance location place) there is a book

The book on the table (Qualifier) is mine

The book is on the table (Participant in relational clause – not going to argue about which)

How does one explain how this meaning can move around like this? By thinking of it as more than a clausal constituent. 

H&M and JRM point to this in different places but Jing Hao I have a paper on this if anyone is interested. 

It makes SO much more sense to think like this (sorry if that’s notional Jim) and helps students NOT make the errors of analysing beta enhancing clauses (eg when the book was on the table, I spilt my tea on it) and Qualifiers etc as Circumstances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday does far more than merely "point" to this — it is his model. Circumstantiation constitutes one domain of manifestation of the transphenomenal fractal types of expansion and projection — transphenomenal because they operate across various categories of phenomena, and fractal because they are organising principles across different scales; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 268).

That is, the meanings that are realised as circumstances are also realised across a range of other grammatical domains, as outlined by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 670-3), who exemplify this for 'cause' as follows:

[2] To be clear, this type of variation can be explained by the fact that a prepositional phrase that realises the meaning 'spatial location' can serve as a circumstance or circumstantial participant of a clause, or be rankshifted to serve as the Qualifier of a nominal group.

[3] To be clear, these types of student errors reflect an inability to analyse formal constituency, since:

• mistaking a β clause for a circumstance is mistaking a clause for a prepositional phrase, and
• mistaking a Qualifier for a circumstance is mistaking a rankshifted prepositional phrase for a ranking one.

Robin Fawcett On 'Forget' + Location

Using the alias 'Dmytro Poremskyi', Robin Fawcett wrote to sys-func on 23 Sept 2021, at 05:13 and on 25 Sept 2021, at 02:42:

I'm curious to know your (functionally grounded) opinion regarding the following usage recommendation:

(taken from Oxford American Wordpower Dictionary for Learners of English)

It is obvious that one may find quite a few instances of 'forget' + location: place across oral and written corpora, but do you think SFG could shed some light upon the reason behind the (prescriptive?) preference here? I wonder if it can be somehow linked to process type analysis, perhaps involving the comparison with 'leave' ...

… However, quite a few native speakers of different varieties of English would maintain that it is perfectly normal to forget something somewhere:

Do you think SFL can account for this seeming deviation?

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's first extract distinguishes four usages of 'forget':

1. forget about something
2. fail to remember to do something
3. fail to bring something with you
4. stop thinking about something

and the claim that a Location cannot be construed with 'forget' applies only to the third usage.

In Fawcett's second extract, on the other hand, the writer mistakenly assumes that the claim applies to all usages of 'forget'. Of course, other usages of 'forget' can be construed with a Location, as exemplified by:

However, in the third usage, above, 'forget' serves the same function as the verbal group complex 'forget to bring', and so serves as a material Process:

The reason why at home cannot be added in this usage of 'forget' is that such a 'rest' Location (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 317) is inconsistent with the directed motion of 'bring'. Cf He is bringing his passport at home. However, when directional 'bring' is made explicit, with or without 'forget', directional Locations can be construed:

In Fawcett's Systemic Functional Syntax, the Cardiff Grammar, there is no verbal group, and so, no verbal group complex. This is one reason why Fawcett is unable to answer his own question.

Margaret Berry On Theme

Margaret Berry wrote to sysfling on 17 Jun 2019 at 00:32:

I agree with Mick and Nick that what is the best approach to Theme and Rheme depends on what you want to do with it. Like them I’m particularly interested in patterns across texts. 

It could be said that in English the main function of Theme is to show whether the perspective of the text changes or whether it remains the same, in particular whether the main topic entity changes or stays the same and whether the setting changes or stays the same. 

In Mick’s example, the ‘He’s show that the writer is staying with the same main topic entity. But at intervals the temporal setting changes, as shown by the initial Adjuncts. As Mick has shown, for me both the continuity of main topic entity and the changes of setting are relevant to the ongoing perspective of the text. So I want the Subjects to count as Themes as well as the Adjuncts. (Which Halliday wouldn’t allow when a Subject is preceded by an Adjunct.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, if a theoretical term like 'Theme' is not used in the original formulation, the use of the term is no longer valid, since the theoretical valeur of the term has changed. Moreover, this can have unintended consequences for systemic relationships, the basis of explanation in SFL.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness (agnation…).

[2] To be clear, thematic patterns across texts can be examined using the original formulation of Theme.  That is, this does not constitute an argument in support of varying the theoretical valeur of 'Theme'.

[3] To be clear, this characterisation of Theme confuses Theme, a functional element of the clause, with the logogenetic pattern known as the method of development.  As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 89, 126) explain:

The Theme is the element that serves as the point of departure of the message; it is that which locates and orients the clause within its context. The speaker chooses the Theme as his or her point of departure to guide the addressee in developing an interpretation of the message; by making part of the message prominent as Theme, the speaker enables the addressee to process the message. The remainder of the message, the part in which the Theme is developed, is called in Prague school terminology the Rheme. …

The choice of clause Themes plays a fundamental part in the way discourse is organised; it is this, in fact, that constitutes what has been called the ‘method of development’ of the text…

[4] To be clear, this argues for a reformulation of a clause function (Theme), not on the basis of its function in the clause, but on the basis of logogenetic patterns, and in doing so, confuses two distinct logogenetic patterns: choice of Theme and choice of Subject.

Mick O'Donnell On Theme

Michael O'Donnell wrote to sysfling on 16 Jun 2019 at 18:24:

In Halliday's approach (for English), Theme stops with the first topical (experiential) element, which in this case is the circumstance of time, "in 1925". "Halliday" is thus Rheme. 

I myself am a proponent of the Berry approach (which I believe is similar to the Fawcett approach), whereby one has Subject-theme, and elements in front of that are also "Additional Theme", e.g. 

Additional-Theme	Subject Theme	Rheme
In May 1476,	he	He took part in an armed convoy sent by Genoa to carry a valuable cargo to northern Europe.
	He	docked in Bristol, Galway, in Ireland and was possibly in Iceland in 1477.
In 1479	Columbus	reached his brother Bartolomeo in Lisbon, keeping on trading for the Centurione family.
	He	married Filipa Moniz Perestrello, daughter of the Porto Santo governor, the Portuguese nobleman of Genoese origin Bartolomeu Perestrello.
In 1479 or 1480,	his son Diego	was born.

This approach better captures the continuity or discontinuity of the Subject selections, and allows for the presence of marked elements in front of the Subject.

Blogger Comments:

Applying this model yields:

Additional-Theme	Rheme	Subject Theme
blessed	are	the meek
on your left	is	the main bedroom
a little further on	is	the Rijksmuseum

Additional-Theme	Additional-Theme		Rheme	Subject Theme
where	precisely	in that case	are	they?

[1] This is the opposite of what is true. Unsurprisingly, the "continuity or discontinuity" of the Subject selections is shown by the selection of Subjects.  The question of the "continuity or discontinuity" of Subject selections as Theme is nullified by this approach, since all Subjects are claimed to be Themes.

[2] To be clear, this approach adds nothing with regard to "the presence of marked elements in front of the Subject", since 'Additional Theme' is just a rebranding of 'marked Theme', without acknowledging its markedness.  Moreover, it is the distinction between Theme and Subject that provides the criterion for the distinction between marked and unmarked Theme in declarative clauses.

∞

To be clear, this approach merely confuses the interpersonal selection of Subject, the carrier of modal responsibility in a clause as exchange, with the textual selection of Theme, the point of departure for a clause as message.  Subject is reprised in a Mood Tag; Theme is realised by everything up to and including the first experiential element.

Jim Martin On 'In Particular'

After Annabelle Lukin wrote to sys-func and sysfling on 16 Nov 2018 at 09:06:

Can anyone help me out? …

8(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.

… What kind of Adjunct is "in particular"??

Jim Martin responded on sysfling on 16 Nov 2018 at 19:19:

How about appraisal:graduation:focus:sharpen... as part of a paradigm:

in particular when
particularly when
just when
only when
when

• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes particularly when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.

The linking conjunction when would then need to be expanded as a hypotactic complex... beta (in particular) alpha (when)

Blogger Comment:

[1] The reason why the conjunctive Adjunct in particular does not realise 'appraisal: graduation: focus: sharpen' is that, in this instance, there is no appraisal to 'graduate: focus: sharpen'.  For many more of Martin's misunderstandings of Appraisal Theory, see here.

(On the other hand, Martin (1992: 211) rebrands the conjunctive function of in particular as comparative: similarity: reformulation: rework: generality: local: particularise.)

[2] The reason why in particular does not modify when is that in particular — like a conjunctive Adjunct (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 158), but unlike a modifier in a conjunction group (not a hypotactic complex) — can be postponed to the end of the clause as an Afterthought:

The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes — when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, in particular.

See also analysis here. 

Shooshi Dreyfus Mistaking Non-Defining For Defining Relative Clauses

Shooshi Dreyfus replied to Sarah on sys-func on 11 Nov 2018, 11:33:

Here’s my version of your analysis – but it’s only one version and you could analyse the last bit as a second clause but I think this works too:

Third, the crisis [[(that is) in the European and the global economy]] [ACTOR – with downranked spatial meaning ie NOT a circumstance but a Qualifier realising circumstantial meaning] has entered [PRO: MATERIAL] a second phase, [[(that is) characterized by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //and (which) is uneven [ATTRIBUTE] across countries]]

Basically, this way, you’ve got one clause with lots of embedding, which is typical of highly written text. And you’ve got circumstantial meaning being realised across numerous lexicogrammatical structures – see my attached paper (and have another one forthcoming on circumstantial meanings)

Blogger Comments:

[1] The proposed analysis can represented as follows:

Third	the crisis [[in the European and the global economy]]	has entered	a second phase [[characterised by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //  and is	uneven	across countries]]
	Actor	Process: material	?	Attribute	?

[2] To be clear, the instance in question is a complex of four clauses:

Third, the crisis in the European and the global economy has entered a second phase	characterised by a recovery	that is proceeding at a faltering pace	and is uneven across countries
α	= β
	α	= β
		1	+ 2

Suggested transitivity analyses of the four clauses can be viewed here.

[3] Trivially, this is an embedded phrase ([ ]), not an embedded clause ([[ ]]).

[4] Trivially, // marks a tone group boundary, not a clause boundary (||).

[5] The primary source of Dreyfus' confusion — analysing a complex of four clauses as a single clause — is her mistaking non-defining relative clauses (hypotactic elaboration) for defining relative clauses (embedded clauses serving as nominal group Qualifier).

[6] To be clear, the circumstantial meanings in this instance are realised grammatically as

• locational Qualifier (nominal group): in the European and the global economy;
• circumstance of Manner (clause): at a faltering pace;
• circumstance of Location (clause): across countries.