David Rose Misrepresenting IFG On Modality

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 25/7/22 at 17:44:

Thanks Chris, for another opportunity to compare the models.

Again, MODALITY is a described grammatical system, at clause rank in English, but the same term is used below for a semantic ‘domain’. And again, the account in IFG 1/2 differed from the account in IFG 3/4. In IFG1/2, MAKH described the implicit/explicit: subjective/objective orientations topologically, as interpersonal metaphors of modality. But in IFG 3/4 they are presented instead as features in the MODALITY system, within the MOOD system (Fig 4-13, Fig 4-23). The entry condition for this system is [clause], but the metaphorical realisations of subjective and objective orientations are projections and embedding (I think.../it is likely that...), blurring the line between grammar and semantics.

The described discourse semantic system is APPRAISAL: ENGAGEMENT: heterogloss, for which MODALITY is one resource to introduce additional voices into a discourse, alongside PROJECTION and CONCESSION.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading. Halliday (± Matthiessen) explicitly describes MODALITY as a semantic system. Halliday (1994: 356) and Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 691):

The reason this area of the semantic system is so highly elaborated metaphorically is to be found in the nature of modality itself … Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no – the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.

The fact that it is construed as a semantic system is also demonstrated by it having both congruent and metaphorical grammatical realisations. 

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Less importantly, it is only the explicit ORIENTATION that is metaphorical (Halliday 1994: 362). More importantly, the topological representation in IFG1/2 (and IFG3/4) does not describe MODALITY systems, but the relation of modality to polarity and mood. Halliday (1994: 367):

[3] This is misleading, because MODALITY is presented as a system network in IFG1/2 as well as IFG3/4. Halliday (1994: 358, 360):

Cf. Figure 4-23 in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 182):

[4] This is misleading. By including the system of MODALITY in his grammatical network of MOOD — Figure 4-15 in IFG3, Figure 4-13 in IFG4 — Matthiessen is interpreting grammatical form (modelled as a rank scale) in terms of its function in realising meaning, consistent with the modus operandi of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Contrary to Rose's claim, the rank of clause is the appropriate entry condition for clause rank complexing (projection) and  clause rank elements realised by embedded clauses.

[5] For some of the misunderstandings in Working with Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007) in this regard, see:

• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality, Obligation, Inclination And Ability
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Obligation
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Projections", "Polarity" And "Modality"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive But"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concession"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive Conjunctions"

Importantly, projection is not included as a logical system in discourse semantics (Martin 1992, Martin & Rose 2007). This is because the original intellectual source of Martin's CONJUNCTION is the system of cohesive conjunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976), and projection does not function cohesively. So, not only does discourse semantics fail to account for the semantics of projection, it also disables any attempt to account for grammatical metaphor in which projection is featured.

David Rose Endorsing Tom Bartlett's Misunderstandings

David Rose responded to Tom Bartlett on Sysfling at 10 May 2018 at 19:23:

So your description derived from observed proportionalities. It resonates with the topological description of logico-semantic relations across ranks and strata in IFG.

As a typological description it conflicts with long-standing descriptions of complexing co-selected with systems at each rank. That is, rank is the entry condition for all grammatical systems, and units at each rank may be complexed.

That description involves a very large set of empirically tested proportionalities. They are all inherently falsifiable, but would take a lot of labour to do so. So Ockham’s Razor suggests your proportionalities may be of another kind. 

very fruitful example, thanks Tom

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As demonstrated in the previous post, Bartlett's analysis did not derive from "observed" proportionalities, but from theoretical confusion, and from taking a formal, rather than functional, perspective on the grammar.

[2] Trivially, this is doubly misleading, since, on the one hand, there are no topological descriptions of logico-semantic relations (expansion and projection) in any of the four editions of IFG, and on the other hand, logico-semantic relations are only applied there to the one stratum, lexicogrammar.

[3] Here Rose misunderstands and misapplies the meaning of Occam's Razor:

Occam's razor (also Ockham's razor or Ocham's razor; Latin: lex parsimoniae "law of parsimony") is the problem-solving principle that, when presented with competing hypothetical answers to a problem, one should select the answer that makes the fewest assumptions.