Brad Smith On Intonational Prominence

Brad Smith replied to David Rose on asflanet on 9 Sept 2024, at 11:54:

yes: 'good reason' is purpose, or function, which is stratal (in relation to higher strata). 

So far as intonational prominence goes, though, it is at the speaker's discretion whether to assign a marked/non-congruent choice greater prominence (eg whether a marked mood-tone co-selection, as realisation of complex interpersonal discourse semantics and tenor relations, is given textual prominence, eg through tonicity) — 

however, I do observe, as a general rule, that when a marked choice is made in an intonation system (eg marked tonicity), there is found to be a decided excess in the phonetic expression - speakers will make sure the listener hears the marked choice (in the same way they might more carefully articulate a particular lexical choice). But this is probably way too complex a topic for me to be delving into while in the middle of other work :)

 

and David Rose replied at 12:09:

//5 ^ ba / rill iant // 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This re-expresses a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[2] To be clear, looking to the higher stratum to find the reason for a marked choice is what the text analyst does, whereas making the marked choice is what the speaker does.

[3] As previously explained, in SFL Theory, 'marked' and 'non-congruent' are not synonymous. Congruence only applies to the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar on the content plane. Applying it to the relation between lexicogrammar and phonology invents the non-existent resource of "phonological metaphor".

[4] This confuses metafunctions and axes. To be clear, the tonic realises an element of structure as the Focus of New information (textual, syntagmatic), not a "marked mood-tone" co-selection (interpersonal, paradigmatic).

[5] This exemplifies a point made by a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236):

In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’].

[6] See David Rose Positively Judging And Appreciating Brad Smith.

Brad Smith Confusing Markedness And Incongruence

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 2 September 2024 at 17:09:

With a yes/no question move, the polarity is at issue – that is what a yes/no question is all about! Hence, the unmarked, or congruent co-selection in mood and tone for a yes/no question is polar interrogative with rising pitch tone 2.

So when I say that the tone 1 imperative mood is the unmarked, or congruent choice for a command, I mean that these co-selections in clause and tone group are congruent with what a command is trying to get done with language – the issue of polarity is not at stake, hence we expect a command to have a falling tone 1 pitch contour. The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide (e.g polar interrogative + falling tone 1 for a polite command) are based on our understanding of what the congruent choices are, using such unconscious knowledge to motivate the use of language in non-congruent, or metaphorical ways.

The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide illustrate what happens when more complex contextual aspects are operating that make more demands of the language – and, in fact, such complexity is more common than not in social interactions!

Blogger Comments:

This confuses markedness with incongruence. Markedness is 'intra-system': whether a choice is the default/neutral one (unmarked) or not (marked). Congruence is 'inter-stratal' within content: whether the meaning and wording agree (congruent) or not (metaphorical). Importantly, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction only applies to the realisation relation between strata of the content plane, semantics and lexicogrammar, and is only made possible by the natural relation between them. 

That is, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction does not apply to the realisation relation between lexicogrammar and phonology — there is no "phonological metaphor". For example, in realising declarative mood, the relation between unmarked tone 1 and marked tone 2 is not metaphorical, since 'protesting statement' (tone 2) is not a metaphor for 'statement' (tone 1).

David Rose On Focus As Phonology And Jim Martin's Fastidiousness

David Rose replied to Rob Spence on asflanet on 20 Feb 2024, at 12:31:

I think you’ll find the term ‘focus’ is used in phonology for the name of a system information focus, whose features are realised by relations between the Tonic function and lexicogrammar. (More hill than ditch ;-) Focus isn’t used as a function term.

I think you’ll also find that Jim has always been fastidiously careful about distinguishing terms between strata, which I guess he learnt from Michael (all those years ago), and has been teaching others, as the canon has proliferated (all these years since).

He is also fastidiously careful about acknowledging those whose work he and colleagues are building on. How to show respect for others is nicely modelled in current work on register systems, carefully framed in relation to that of Halliday (53 refs), Hasan (42), Carmel Cloran, Cate Poynton and others...

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, INFORMATION is a system of lexicogrammar, not phonology. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 115):

… the system of INFORMATION. This is a system not of the clause, but of a separate grammatical unit, the information unit (cf. Halliday, 1967a, 1967/8; Halliday & Greaves, 2008: Section 5.1). The information unit is a unit that is parallel to the clause and the other units belonging to the same rank scale as the clause.

The misunderstanding of INFORMATION as phonology can be sourced to Martin (1992: 384, 401).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, 'focus' refers to the lexicogrammatical element of structure that is realised by tonic prominence (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 116). Halliday (1992: 371):

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Martin uses the most of the terms from lexicogrammatical cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976) in rebranding it as his discourse semantics. Evidence here.

[4] To be clear, Martin (hypocritically) criticises Halliday for 'not distinguishing terms between strata'. Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 232):

… confusion invited by the use of grammatical terminology for semantic description in several SFL publications, particularly those dealing with grammatical metaphor (e.g. Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999).

But, in any case, the objection is based on a misunderstanding. A functional grammar interprets grammatical form in terms of its function, which is to realise meaning. In grammatical metaphor, the meaning of a grammatical form is incongruent with the meaning being realised. It is the use of meaning terminology on both strata that enables the systematic description of grammatical metaphor. And, as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) point out:

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning. If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[5] For the motivation behind this theological term for what in science would be called 'the standard theory', see The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

[6] This misleads through what it omits. It is true that Martin generally acknowledges his sources, though he doesn't always acknowledge that an idea comes from his source rather than himself. Evidence here. But more importantly, having acknowledged his sources, Martin then renames their ideas so that all future references will be to his work and not theirs, thereby giving himself credit for the ideas of others. See for example, here (Martin 1992) and here (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna 2022).

[7] To be clear, Martin named these scholars because they provided the source of his ideas. Martin then rebranded 'register' as his stratum of context, so all references to register by his readership refer to his model rather than Halliday's original model. Moreover, Martin's model of register is full of self-contradictions. For example, his register is context, not language, despite register being a functional variety of language (cf. beef and dairy cattle not being categorised as 'cattle'); and though it is context, not language, it is instantiated as text, which is language, not context. And this is just the tip of the iceberg.

David Rose On Interstratal Tension And A Structure Not Covered By IFG

David Rose summed up the preceding discussion on asflanet on 11 Feb 2024, at 09:25:

Annabelle’s first question was a great illustration. It distilled a complex explanation of the earth’s origin into a process with a couple of circumstances, which made us question the simple analysis of Actor, Process, Means and Time. This interstratal tension has been a focus of SFL research in recent years, especially Jing Hao’s and Yaegan Doran’s work on science.

Annabelle’s second question then revealed that the Time circumstance had a structure that is not covered in IFG. Personally, that made me look more closely at both the example, and what Halliday had to say about its grammatical domain. Alternative suggestions by Rosemary, Chris and Annabelle made me look even harder.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Annabelle's first question was

I'm keen to hear thoughts on the analysis of this clause:

The earth formed some 4,600 years ago from a vast cloud of gas and dust.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. This is the structure of the clause:

Although this analysis was questioned by David Banks, it was done so on the basis of theoretical misunderstandings, as previously demonstrated here.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. There is no "interstratal tension" here. This is a happening figure realised by a material clause, its congruent realisation.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. On the principles provided in IFG, this structure is simply a nominal group:

[5] To be clear, Rose did not need to look at all, let alone more closely or even harder. Rosemary provided the IFG interpretation of the structure as a nominal group, and ChRIS provided the evidence that the structure could not possibly be an adverbial group, as Rose would maintain, on the principles provided in IFG.

Mick O'Donnell On The Appraisal In A Metaphorical Clause

Michael O'Donnell wrote to the lang-eval list on 13 Jan 2023, at 01:32:

'the bright sunlight gave a false impression of warmth'

The sunlight is being metaphorically construed as a conscious communicating being. Within the metaphorical domain, the sunlight could be said to be evaluated negatively for veracity. 

Ignoring the potential animalisation, I would need to say appreciation:quality, with "false" acting as a graduating token lessening the appreciation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The metaphorical clause construes the bright sunlight as the Token of a Value:

If the bright sunlight had been construed as 'a conscious communicating being', it would have been construed as the Sayer of a verbal process. And even unpacking the metaphor yields mental processes, not verbal processes:

when someone saw the bright sunlight, they falsely inferred that the weather was warm.

Here O'Donnell has engaged in the 'notional semantics' that he has previously denounced in others, instead of 'following the grammatical principles that Halliday established' that he has previously insisted upon; see Mick O'Donnell On Following SFL Analytical Principles.

[2] To be clear, in the metaphorical clause, the negative assessment is a feature of the Value a false impression of warmth, not the Token the bright sunlight. The negative judgement of the bright sunlight, in terms of veracity, derives from misconstruing the relational clause as verbal, with the Sayer deemed to be dishonest, for communicating a falsehood.

[3] To be clear, if the metaphor is ignored, then the congruent rendering becomes the focus of the analysis. In this case, the assessment is one of negative judgement, in terms of capacity: falsely inferred. The function of the metaphor, therefore, is to conceal this judgement, since it omits its target: someone.

[4] To be clear, the target of the negative appreciation is the impression of warmth in the metaphorical clause. However, false enacts the attitude itself, not a graduation of it. That is, false does not "lessen" the negative appreciation. From the Appraisal Theory website:

Graduation

Values by which (1) speakers graduate (raise or lower) the interpersonal impact, force or volume of their utterances, and (2) by which they graduate (blur or sharpen) the focus of their semantic categorisations.

1. (FORCE ) slightly, somewhat, very, completely
2. (FOCUS) I was feeling kind'v woozy, they effectively signed his death warrant; a true friend, pure folly

David Rose Continuing To Misrepresent The Semantic System Of Modality

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 27/7/22 at 8:07:

Rather than a ‘semantic system of modality’, Martin & Matthiessen 1991 explain such motifs as topologies, or ‘fractal principles’ that recur across ranks and strata. They are generalisations of types of meanings that complement the typological generalisations of systems. Crucially they are not more abstract than the systems they generalise across. So does postulating a ‘semantic system of modality’ above the grammatical systems of modality, confuse abstraction with generalisation?

In any case these ‘semantic systems’ were not proposed in IFG1/2 but have been added to IFG3/4.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Martin & Matthiessen (1991) are concerned with the semantic system of modality and the diverse ways it is realised in lexicogrammar. Martin & Matthiessen (1991: 376):

With MODALISATION, POLARITY in propositions is used to bound the semantic space under consideration, with degree of usuality and probabilily defining parameters between 'it is' (yes) and 'it isn't' (no). Similarly, obligation and inclination are used as parameters grading the semantic space in proposals between 'do' and 'don't'.

[2] This is misleading. Martin & Matthiessen (1991) don't explain 'such motifs' as topologies. The paper contrasts two perspectives in modelling: the typological and topological.

[3] This is misleading. The one instance of the word 'fractal' (p376) refers only to the system of EXPANSION.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. With regard to expansion, Martin & Matthiessen (1991: 375) write:

All we can do at present is posit a generalised system that we 'abstract' from the specific grammatical environments in which it is manifested.

To be clear, logically, for there to be congruent and metaphorical grammatical realisations of MODALITY, MODALITY must be a more abstract system at the level of semantics that is realised in lexicogrammar, since congruent vs metaphorical relations obtain between strata.

[5] No. The confusion here is entirely Rose's. See [4].

[6] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. Halliday (1994: 356):

The reason this area of the semantic system is so highly elaborated metaphorically is to be found in the nature of modality itself … Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no – the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.

David Rose On The Need For (Discourse) Semantics As A Separate Stratum

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 12/7/22 at 21:36:

Re your earlier comment about ‘the need for Semantics as a separate stratum’... I think that takes us back to two first principles...

One is that features in systems are no more substantial than the probabilities of their realising structures being re-instantiated... more so for more general and less so for more delicate features.

The other is that the content planes of lg and other modalities have evolved to semioticise social relations, for which semiosis is a necessary condition. So the social and semiotic are two sides of the same coin.

The semiotic systems of most species are reproduced genetically. In some species these are augmented by learnt systems, i.e. culturally reproduced.

Lg evolved in humans in tandem with the complexity of our social relations. It required on one hand sufficient flexibility to manage variability in our ancestors’ sociality, and on the other a mechanism for replication fidelity to ensure its reproduction across multiple generations (on the model of genetic reproduction).

The tension between these selection pressures produced a bifurcation in lg’s content plane, still recapitulated in the transition from protolg to mother tongue in infants.

On one hand, LG systems provided the replication fidelity for reproduction over deep time (analogous with the reproductive role of DNA). Their features cement untold millions of re-instantiations, more so at higher ranks. One result is their more general features remain common across lgs (as humans share 85% of our DNA with mice, 60% with insects, and 50% with plants). It is probably also why grammatical systems encode such stable models of experience and exchange.

While stability is essential for cultural reproduction, it is insufficient for negotiating unfolding contingencies in human social relations. That is the task for which DS systems evolved (analogous with the role of RNA in managing intracellular functions).

Both LG and DS systems are necessary for human semiosis on phylogenetic and logogenetic timescales, but their functions are complementary. The fact that we are still trying to model the semantic stratum on what we known of LG systems is, I think, an accident of history. From 2500 years of grammatics, cryptogrammatics has struggled to emerge in the last 80, and DS systems are another order of covert reactances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) identify grammatical metaphor as the primary motivation for a semantic stratum:

If the congruent pattern had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[2] To be clear, features in systems are defined by their relations to other features, and each has a probability of being instantiated, varying for register, and actualised as frequencies in texts.

[3] It is undoubtedly true that semiosis is a necessary condition for semiotising social relations.

[4] To be clear, not all semiotic systems are social semiotic systems, as demonstrated by perceptual semiotic systems, which are somatic, not social. 

[5] This is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. The difficulty here lies in being able to distinguish, in Halliday's terms, systems that involve the exchange of value (social systems) from systems that involve the exchange of symbolic value (semiotic systems).

[6] To be clear, it is language that enabled the enactment of social relations to complexify beyond those of the other chimpanzees.

[7] To be clear, if it were these factors that produced the stratification of the content plane, then they should have done so for all species' protolanguages, not just human protolanguage.

[8] This is a false analogy, since it correlates generality with proportion (%).

[9] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, it misunderstands evolution: systems do not evolve in order to perform tasks (purpose); they evolve because they successfully perform tasks (reason). On the other hand, it is the grammar (MOOD) that construes the semantics (SPEECH FUNCTION) that makes symbolic negotiation possible.

[10] This a false analogy, since RNA is at the same level of abstraction as intra-cellular functions, whereas semantics is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than lexicogrammar.

[11] To be clear, the sense in which semantics and grammar are complementary is as complementary perspectives on the same phenomenon, the content plane of language, varying in terms of symbolic abstraction. With regard to the ideational metafunction, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) write:

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning.

[12] This is misleading. On the one hand, it is the grammar that construes the semantics. On the other, the false implication is that Martin's discourse semantic systems are not 'modelled in terms of what we know of lexicogrammatical systems'. To be clear, Martin's discourse semantic systems derive from non-structural textual grammar (cohesion) and from SPEECH FUNCTION, which is construed by the interpersonal grammar of MOOD and KEY. Evidence here.

David Rose On Incongruent Grammatical Realisations And 'Wording'

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 11/7/22 at 20:10: 

I’m happy to be mistaken but my understanding is that incongruent grammatical realisations of speech functions are treated as delicate features in message semantic systems. That is, each feature in the semantic systems has a particular grammatical realisation. … 

One issue with your synopsis below, is a suggested correlation of form and meaning with grammar and semantics. This is also suggested by the oft-used terms ‘wording’ vs ‘meaning’, as though grammar was not meaningful in itself. What makes grammar meaningful is axis... features realised as structures. The features are the meanings of the structures. Or rather the features and structures are two faces of the meanings, that MAKH showed us are made by the grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is clearly true, as 140+ posts on this blog demonstrate.

[2] This is a serious misunderstanding. Incongruent realisations are relations between strata, whereas delicacy is the ordering principle of the system of a stratum. Delicacy is the ordering of systemic features that may be realised congruently or incongruently on the stratum below.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, the "oft-used" distinction 'wording vs meaning' (Halliday 1970) does not correspond to the distinction between form and meaning. The term 'wording' is used in SFL Theory as the folk equivalent of 'lexicogrammar', and it refers to the interpretation of form in terms of its function of realising meaning, as when a formal constituent of a clause, a verbal group, is interpreted as serving the function of Process of a clause.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true that axis makes grammar meaningful. This is demonstrated by the fact that axis is a dimension of every stratum, including phonology. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32) explain, on each stratum, the dimension of axis has two orders: the paradigmatic (the dimension of system) and the syntagmatic (the dimension of structure).

[5] This is misleading. In SFL theory, grammatical systems (e.g. PROCESS TYPE) and the structures that realise them (e.g. Senser ^ Process) are both interpreted in terms of the meanings they realise.

[6] Rose is here drawing on Martin's misunderstanding of stratification as 'all strata make meaning', which is a statement of semogenesis, not stratification. This confusion leads Martin (1992) to misconstrue even phonology as a level of meaning. Evidence here.

Mick O'Donnell On Semantics And Grammar

Mick O'Donnell replied to David Rose on Sys-func on 11/7/22 at 17:57:

I would not think any Hallidayan would ever posit a 1-to-1 mapping between Semantics and Grammar. That would invalidate the need for Semantics as a separate stratum. …

So, the mapping between Semantics and Grammar always needs to be seen as a many-to-many mapping.

- language provides multiple forms for realising a particular meaning.

- a particular form can express alternative meanings

(but yes, "Construing Experience" can be read (misread?) to suggest a one to one mapping between semantic process type selection and Transitivity selection in the grammar. Something I and other have argued against in the past. And not something that I think was intended by the authors, Christian and MAKH).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is metaphor that motivates semantics as a stratum of content. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237):

If the congruent pattern had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[2] Here O'Donnell misconstrues the distinction between semantics and grammar as a distinction between meaning and form. To be clear, the distinction in SFL Theory is between meaning and wording, where wording is form (the rank scale) interpreted in terms of its function of realising meaning; e.g. verbal group (form) as Process (function).

[3] This is misleading. On the one hand, PROCESS TYPE is a grammatical system within the larger system of TRANSITIVITY (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 219, 354-5), so, in this sense, the notion of a 'one to one mapping' of 'process type selection' to 'transitivity selection' is nonsensical.

On the other hand, in the absence of grammatical metaphor, the process type served by a verbal group is congruent with its semantic value. Moreover, in the case of grammatical metaphor, the incongruence is not between one process type and another, but between a process and some other element, as when a Process is realised grammatically by a Range participant, as he had a bath.

[4] To be clear, O'Donnell misunderstands the system of PROCESS TYPE, largely because he fails to recognise verbal group complexes. See, for example:

Mick O'Donnell On Process Types [1]

Mick O'Donnell On Process Types [2]

Mick O'Donnell On The Number Of Process Types

Mick O'Donnell On Process Types

Mick O'Donnell On The Difference Between 'Should Not Fail To See' And 'Should See'

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday On Stratification

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 11/7/22 at 11:53:

To clarify, the grammatico-semantic model assumes a bijective or one-to-one relation between LG features and semantic features, while the discourse semantic model allows for multivalued or one-to-many relations between DS features and LG features. The latter is consistent with MAKH’s model of congruent/incongruent relations between semantic features and LG features. This was described in Ch10 of IFG1/2 but was replaced in IFG3/4 by ‘‘transgrammatical semantic domains’, which relocates multivalued realisation from an interstratal to an intrastratal relation within semantics.

Blogger Comments: 

[1] To be clear, by the 'grammatico-semantic' model, Rose means the 'standard model' of SFL Theory: the stratification of the content plane into lexicogrammar and semantics.

[2] This is very misleading, because it is very untrue. On the 'standard model', one semantic system may be realised across many lexicogrammatical systems. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 667) term this 'dispersed realisation':

[3] To be clear, the discourse semantic systems of IDENTIFICATION, IDEATION and CONJUNCTION are Martin's rebrandings of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) textual lexicogrammatical systems of REFERENCE, LEXICAL COHESION and COHESIVE CONJUNCTION. Unsurprisingly, the grammatical realisations of these discourse semantic systems are not specified in either Martin (1992) or in Martin & Rose (2007); see here and here.

[4] On the one hand, one-to-many relations between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar is a different matter from congruent/incongruent relations, since the latter, but not the former, is the contrast between non-metaphorical and metaphorical realisations.

On the other hand, this is misleading, because it is untrue. Martin's model is not consistent with Halliday's model of congruent/incongruent relations, because it does not identify what constitutes congruent versus incongruent grammatical realisations of its discourse semantic systems. (NEGOTIATION is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's semantic system SPEECH FUNCTION.)

[5] This is very misleading, because it is very untrue. 'Transgrammatical semantic domains' did not replace 'congruent/incongruent relations' in IFG3/4. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 665):

Table 10-1 shows how semantic units are mapped onto grammatical ones. The principle is that of rank-based constituency – semantic unit a ↘ grammatical unit m; the key grammatical unit is the clause, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 10-1. But while this is the foundation on which the relationship between semantics and lexicogrammar is based, there are two other principles affecting this relationship, making it more complicated but also extending the meaning potential of language: 

(i) transgrammatical semantic domains – domains of meaning extending across different grammatical units, and 

(ii) metaphor – incongruent realisational relations between semantics and lexicogrammar.

[6] This is very misleading, because it is very untrue. As the term 'transgrammatical semantic domains' suggests, it describes interstratal relations: 'semantic domains that range over more than a single grammatical unit' (ibid.)

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday On Grammatical Metaphor

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 11/7/22 at 10:26:

This diagram is a good illustration of the grammatico-semantic model, with a semantic ‘figure’ realised by a grammatical clause and a semantic ‘participant’ by a grammatical nominal group. It must then explain grammatical metaphor by stratifying the semantic stratum into two ‘domains’, with the diagram showing a more abstract ‘Value’ realised by a less abstract ‘Token’.

In the discourse semantic model, stratification is between the strata of DS and LG. So a semantic figure may be realised ‘congruently’ by a clause, or metaphorically by a nominal group. This paper proposes the term ‘symbolising’ for the latter metaphorical type of relation between DS and LG.

Martin, J. R. (2020). Metaphors we feel by: stratal tension. Journal of World Languages, 6(1-2), 8-26.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the diagram is Figure 6-16 from Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 289):

[2] To be clear, the 'grammatico-semantic' model is Halliday's original stratification of the content plane.

[3] To be clear, here Rose misunderstands Figure 6-16. The diagram simply represents the semantics of the metaphorical wording engine failure as a congruent meaning (figure) realised by a metaphorical meaning (participant).

[4] This is misleading, because what Rose describes is actually Halliday's ('grammatico-semantic') model of grammatical metaphor. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 280):

The notion of a semantic figure originates in Halliday's model of ideational semantics (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999), and did not feature in Martin's model of discourse semantics (Martin 1992). The terms 'figure' and 'element' — from Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) — are assumed at times in Martin & Rose (2007), without either explanation or attribution, though neither term is identified as a unit in their model of ideational discourse semantics.

[5] To be clear, 'symbolising' is a poor choice of term for a subtype of realisation, if only because, in SFL Theory (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 269), realisation is a subtype of 'symbol'.

[6] To be clear, in order for 'stratal tension' to be a valid model of grammatical metaphor, the model must provide a systematic contrast between stratal tension and its absence. This is not provided by Martin's (1992) model of ideational discourse semantics, since it is a rebranding of lexical cohesion (textual lexicogrammar) and does not feature discourse semantic analogues of clause complex, clause and group — its only unit being the 'message part' (Martin 1992: 385).

David Rose On Inexplicit Realisations And Lexis

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 21/6/22 at 12:26:

… So how do we model field elements that are not explicitly realised in a text? That is so complex that SFL has avoided trying to describe lexical items, beyond their very general relations, as ‘sets’ vs systems, as delicate grammar, and as lexical relations in discourse.

It’s long worried me, as I would like to describe how we learn to read (comprehend written texts), and that can’t be done without tackling lexis.

In this paper on reading metaphor I’ve suggested we technicalise the term connote for these kinds of relations.

Rose, D. (2021). Reading metaphor: Symbolising, connoting and abducing meanings. Linguistics and Education, 64, 100932.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, what Rose, following Martin, regards as 'field' is ideational semantics in SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 407):

… Martin, where"field" corresponds to what has been discussed here in terms of ideational semantic networks in the ideation base …

[2] To be clear, this is a matter of inexplicit realisations of semantic features being instantiated in a text.

[3] To be clear, this is not simply a matter of lexis. A lexical item is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate grammatical features, just as the phoneme /b/ is the synthetic realisation of the phonological features [voiced, bilabial, stop]. Modelling this phenomenon systemically entails identifying the system, with the choice of in/explicit realisation, that has been instantiated in the text (data).

[4] To be clear, lexis as most delicate grammar means that lexical items are specified by the most delicate grammatical features, and lexical sets are the paradigmatic organisation of the lexical items thus specified. 'Lexical relations in discourse', on the other hand, is the use of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations between lexical items to create textual cohesion. In Rose's source, Martin (1992), the notion of lexis as most delicate grammar is confused with lexical cohesion; evidence here.

[5] To be clear, Rose does not understand the SFL notion of 'lexical item'. See, for example:

• Misconstruing (Abridged) Grammatical Structures As Lexical Items
• Mistaking (Partial) Grammatical Units For Lexical Items

[6] To be clear, Rose does not understand the SFL notion of 'metaphor'. See, for example:

• Foreshadowing Misunderstandings Of Grammatical Metaphor
• Reducing All Grammatical Metaphor To Elemental Metaphor
• Misunderstanding Ideational Metaphor
• Misrepresenting Ideational Metaphor
• Misrepresenting Elemental Ideational Metaphor As Logical Metaphor
• Misunderstanding Ideational Metaphor

David Rose On Grammatical Metaphor As Stratal Tension

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 6/6/22 at 13:04:

Some recent work on grammatical metaphor and stratal tension

Martin, J. R. (2020). Metaphors we feel by: Stratal tension. Journal of World Languages, 6(1-2), 8-26.

Rose, D. (2021). Reading metaphor: Symbolising, connoting and abducing meanings. Linguistics and Education, 64, 100932.

Blogger Comments:

[1] For evidence that Martin and Rose do not understand grammatical metaphor, see here (English Text), here (Working With Discourse), here (this blog), and below.

[2] To be clear, Martin characterises grammatical metaphor as a "tension" between his discourse semantic stratum and the lexicogrammatical stratum (Martin & Rose 2007: 229). On the one hand, this conception largely does not work for Martin's model, and on the other hand, it misunderstands the notion of metaphor.

On the first point, in Martin (1992), the only discourse system that allows for grammatical metaphor is the interpersonal system of NEGOTIATION, and this is because NEGOTIATION is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION. Halliday's original system allows for metaphors of mood, such a command being realised by an interrogative, as in Will you get your feet off the table?.

Martin's other systems, IDENTIFICATION, IDEATION and CONJUNCTION are grammatical systems of the textual metafunction, COHESIVE REFERENCE, LEXICAL COHESION and COHESIVE CONJUNCTION, rebranded as discourse semantic systems. This rules out grammatical metaphor on two criteria. Firstly they are grammatical systems, so the only tension is between the original systems and Martin's misunderstandings of them. Secondly, they are textual systems, and metaphor is restricted to the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 731n):

While some scholars have explored the possibility of grammatical metaphor within the textual metafunction, we do not see any evidence that the textual metafunction engenders metaphor. It is certainly a factor in the metaphorical mode of realisation – particularly, in ideational metaphor, as we have illustrated above; but the origins of metaphor lie in the need to re-construe experience (ideational) and to re-enact roles and relations (interpersonal). The role of the textual metafunction is of a different nature (cf. Matthiessen, 1992).

On the second point, metaphor is more than just a "tension" (incongruence) between semantics and lexicogrammar. Metaphorical grammatical realisations express two levels of meaning on the semantic stratum at once. For example, the nominal group perception realises both a thing and a process, with the thing realising the process. See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243, 244, 272, 278, 283, 289) on grammatical metaphor as semantic junction in which a metaphorical Token realises a congruent Value.

David Rose On Ideational Metaphor

David Rose wrote to Johanna Salomonsson on SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, at 09:52:

My apologies, I missed this example, "A happy baby makes a happy mother" 

This can only be identifying, as it is simple present (so not material) and reversible (so not attributive). 

It seems odd because of the ‘cause-in-the-clause’ logical metaphor (‘if a baby is happy, then a mother is happy’). The identifying grammatical meaning is in tension with a consequential discourse semantic meaning. 

A fuller account would ask the function of the metaphor in the discourse sequence. The consequential meaning is a link in a chain of reasoning. The identifying meaning is non-negotiable. It reads like a wise old proverb. 

The sequence as a whole realises the ‘grounds’ for a proposal at register level...

Grounds...

Your child will thrive on Glaxo

when all else fails

because it is a natural substitute for breast milk

(now we all know) A happy baby makes a happy mother

(so) Your happy Glaxo baby will make you a happy mother

Conclusion...

(You should buy Glaxo)

(Another point for your readers – realisation between strata)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, Rose didn't "miss" the example, he misanalysed it as an assigned attributive clause, as his own words make plain:

your second examples are caused attributive relations, in which Attributor is additional Agent from ergative perspective

[2] This misunderstands the grammatical metaphor. This instance is not a contrast between 'identifying grammatical meaning' and 'consequential semantic meaning', not least because both the identifying relation and the cause-conditional relation feature on both strata. 

Grammatically the cause-conditional relation is construed metaphorically as a Process of an identifying clause, instead of congruently as a relator of clauses in a clause complex.

Semantically, the clause both congruently realises an identifying figure of being and incongruently realises a sequence of figures in a cause-conditional relation. See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243, 244, 272, 278, 283) on ideational metaphor as a 'junctional' construct.

[3] To be clear, Rose has here invented an imaginary text. The original query (here) presented three separate instances, with no suggestion that they formed a continuous text:

Your child will thrive on Glaxo when all else fails because it is a natural substitute for breast milk

A happy baby makes a happy mother

Your happy Glaxo baby will make you a happy mother

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. The presence of a Mood element in this declarative clause opens it up for negotiation:

A happy baby makes a happy mother

— Yes, it does.

— No, it doesn't.

[5] To be clear, as explained elsewhere, Rose follows Martin in misunderstanding register as a stratum of context rather than a sub-potential of language. In Martin's model, functional varieties of language are not considered language, which is analogous to functional varieties of dog — cattle dog, sheep dog — not being regarded as dogs.

David Rose Misrepresenting Michæl Halliday On The Relation Between Semantics And Grammar

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on SYSFLING on 27 Aug 2020 at 10:01:

You may have missed my comment that the 'natural/conventional' debate is out of date... by 6 decades, since MAKH showed how the phono/grammar relation is not ‘arbitrary’ at the ranks of intonation and rhythm, and often not at syllable rank. The IFG intro briefly acknowledges that old debate but proceeds to ignore it, preferring the terms ‘congruent/incongruent’ for grammar/semantics relations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, this misunderstands Halliday on the conventional (arbitrary) relation between lexicogrammar and phonology. The relation obtains between grammatical forms and their phonological realisations. Clearly, although participants and processes are naturally distinguished grammatically as nominal and verbal groups, nominal and verbal groups are not naturally distinguished phonologically by their realisations in intonation, rhythm and articulation. According to Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 11), the natural relation of prosodic phonology is to semantics, not grammar.

Importantly, it is the natural relation between semantics and grammatical form that makes it possible to interpret grammatical form in terms of the meanings they realise. If there were a natural relation between grammatical form and phonology, it would be possible to interpret phonology in terms of the grammatical form it realises.

[2] This is misleading, because the IFG introduction (Halliday 1985 & 1994: xvii-xix) does not acknowledge any "debate"; it merely sets out what Halliday means by a natural relation between semantics and grammar.

[3] This is very misleading indeed. Halliday (1985 & 1994: xvii-xix) does not "proceed to ignore" the natural/conventional distinction and does not "prefer" the terms 'congruent/incongruent' for grammar/semantic relations. As can be seen by reading what Halliday actually wrote here, Halliday begins by explaining what he means by a 'natural' relation between semantics and grammar, and then explains how grammatical metaphor exploits this natural relation.

Importantly, the relation between semantics and grammar is realisation, the 'symbol' sub-type of intensive (elaborating) identification, with semantics as Value and grammar as Token. This is the relation between all adjacent strata, whether the relation is natural or conventional, or congruent or incongruent.

Mick O'Donnell On Phrasal Complexity

Michael O'Donnell wrote to sys-func on 1 May 2019 at 20:22:

Phrasal complexity is more than just examining nominal group structure. It quantifies nominal group complexity in some way (e.g., the depth of structure (either in terms of constituency or dependency relations), the total number of connections, etc. 

For me, the hardest part is coming up with a complexity metric that actually makes sense. This is actually an area where psycho linguistics has lots to say, in terms of the readability of a given nominal structure, using eye tracking, etc. 

I haven't seen any work within SFL on this, mostly by post-chomskyans and cognitive linguists.

Blogger Comments:

In terms of SFL theory, this relates to the type of complexity that is typical of written mode: lexical density, and, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 726-9) point out, the nominal group is the primary resource for increasing lexical density.  

Lexical density is quantified at clause rank — rather than group rank — by dividing the number of lexical items by the number of ranking clauses.

Moreover, in terms of semantic complexity, lexical density involves grammatical metaphor, a junctional construct (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 46, 272), embodying the meanings of both the metaphorical and congruent grammatical realisations.

David Rose On Metaphor And Levels Of Comprehension

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 15 Nov 10:41:19:

A common definition that teachers use is in relation to similes, that compare one thing with another with ‘like’, while metaphors say one thing is the same as another. My strategy is to show them that metaphors have ‘two meanings’, the ‘literal' meaning of the wording and an ‘inferred' meaning that is different. And comparison is only one type of metaphor. They can be recognised because the literal meaning doesn't make sense in the co-text. The relation to SFL theory that teachers recognise is three levels of comprehension, literal, inferential and interpretive, where literal is defined simply as recognising meaning with a sentence, inferential as recognising connections from sentence to sentence and page to page, and interpretive as recognising connections to one’s knowledge and values. In technical SFL terms these are explained stratally as lexicogrammar, discourse semantics and register. This and much much more can be found in… Rose, D. (2017). Reading to Learn: Accelerating learning and closing the gap. Teacher training books and DVDs. Sydney: Reading to Learn

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misconstrues (literary) metaphors as similes — the comparison ('same') of phenomena — despite having already identified similes as concerned with comparison ('like').  The general frame of literary metaphor X is a Y, not X is the same as a Y.

A similar misunderstanding of metaphor can be found in Working With Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007: 45), as demonstrated here.

[2] Here Rose misrepresents levels of symbolic abstraction in the modelling of language as levels of comprehension of readers.

[3] In SFL theory, the "meaning in a sentence" is not lexicogrammar; it is the semantics (sequence) realised by the lexicogrammar (clause complex).  'Sentence', on the other hand, is a graphological unit.

Moreover, the (lexicogrammatical) wording may be congruent with the meaning ('literal') or incongruent (grammatical metaphor).

[4] In SFL theory, the "connections from sentence to sentence" are those of lexicogrammatical cohesion, the non-structural resource of the textual metafunction.  Martin (1992) misinterprets these non-structural textual systems of the lexicogrammar as structural experiential, logical and textual systems of his 'discourse' semantics, as demonstrated here.

[5] In SFL theory, 'register' is a functional variety of language, and as such, is modelled as a sub-potential of language, midway on the cline of instantiation between system and instance.  Martin (1992) confuses registers of language with the cultural contexts they realise and misconstrues register as context potential — i.e. neither language nor sub-potential — as demonstrated here.

[6] The use of the term 'accelerating' is interesting here, given that Reading To Learn is largely Rose's rebranding of Brian Gray's Accelerated Literacy.  Rose's doctoral research was concerned with providing an SFL description of an indigenous language; he worked with Brian Gray after its completion.