David Rose Misunderstanding The Ontogenetic Move From Protolanguage To Language

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 August 2023 at 23:10:

The syntagms of infant protolanguage can’t handle multiple functions. The ontogenetic breakthrough comes with coupling of interpersonal with ideational functions. That’s what the syntagms of language have evolved to enable. The infant recapitulates that phylogenesis through interaction with caregivers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents protolanguage. To be clear, infant protolanguage does not have syntagms, since syntagms are sequences of classes of lexicogrammatical form, and protolanguage has no lexicogrammar, and so no lexicogrammatical form (e.g. words), an so no classes of lexicogrammatical form to sequence in syntagms.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. The ontogenetic move from protolanguage to language does not include the coupling of interpersonal and ideational functions in syntagms provided by protolanguage. This is not only because protolanguage does not provide syntagms, but also because all the metafunctions emerge together. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not.

[3] On the one hand, this misunderstands evolution. Properties don't evolve in order to function advantageously in some context (Cause: purpose); they are selected because they function advantageously in some context (Cause: reason).

On the other hand, Rose is taking the opposite perspective on semogenesis from the SFL perspective, viewing it 'from below' in terms of form (syntagm) instead of 'from above' in terms of system and function.

[4] Importantly, ontogenesis does not recapitulate phylogenesis; see Recapitulation Theory. For example, a child learning Modern English does not recapitulate the moves from Old English to Middle English to Modern English. Instead, an ontogenetic trajectory that emerged at an earlier time in phylogenesis is maintained at later times in phylogenesis.

David Rose Abducing That ChatGPT Learnt The Language System By Experiencing Instances Of Its Features

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 Mar 2023 at 23:16:

My own contributions have been merely observations, using the tools of systemic functional semiotic text analysis.

I observe that the texts produced by the machine instantiate semiotic systems. To be able to do this, we are told the machine reads 1000s of texts, i.e. other instances of these systems. It is reasonable to abduce that the machine has learnt these systems by experiencing multiple instances of their features (not just the fields it gleans from Wikipedia), given our language based theory of learning.

The people programming the machine, with ‘reasoners’ as Mick puts it, have no more conscious knowledge of these systems and the processes of realisation and re-instantiation, than the machine does.

The machine itself tells us that its understanding of its “self” is ‘based purely on symbols and algorithms’. This resonates with your insistence that all it is doing ‘is producing nonrandom sequences of characters’. My analogy of a closed book was intended to evoke the contrast between the material recording of characters and the semiotic reading of those characters as instantiating expression systems, that realise content systems, that realise register and genre systems. …

My point is that all the semiotic systems instantiated in the texts it produces are ‘not learned in any direct way’. Neither the machine nor the “tech gurus” that program it can explain this to our satisfaction. The publications that you cite are undoubtedly illuminating, but our contribution can only be based on text analysis, which I submit will produce very different (possibly complementary) explanations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not a reasonable abduction, because it is nowhere near the "best available" conclusion to infer.

Abductive reasoning (also called abduction, abductive inference, or retroduction) is a form of logical inference that seeks the simplest and most likely conclusion from a set of observations. It was formulated and advanced by American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce beginning in the last third of the 19th century. Abductive reasoning, unlike deductive reasoning, yields a plausible conclusion but does not definitively verify it. Abductive conclusions do not eliminate uncertainty or doubt, which is expressed in retreat terms such as "best available" or "most likely".

ChatGPT uses the lexical collocation frequencies in its database. While it is true that these frequencies instantiate the probabilities in the language systems of the people who wrote the texts, there is no evidence to support the claim that ChatGPT is using systems of features in producing its own texts. It just uses lexical collocation frequencies.

"Our language-based theory of learning" does not apply here, because the learning and "experiencing" of ChatGPT are material processes, not the mental processes of a language learner.

[2] To be clear, the argument here is that, since neither humans nor ChatGPT have conscious knowledge of the language system, both must use that system to produce texts. Clearly, a lack of awareness of X does not logically entail the presence of X.

[3] To be clear, here Rose is referring to Martin's self-contradictory misunderstanding of stratification, wherein functional varieties of language are modelled as context, instead of language, despite being instantiated as language (text). In SFL Theory, registers are context-specific varieties of language, viewed from the system pole of the cline of instantiation. Martin's genre, on the other hand, is scattered across SFL's architecture of language. As text type, genre is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, as purpose, genre is rhetorical mode (narrative etc.), and its structures are of the semantic stratum, though not organised according to metafunction.

[4] To be clear, a contribution that is only based on text analysis is a very limited contribution indeed. It is an understanding of SFL theory that has the potential of providing valuable insights into the issues raised by the coherence of texts produced by ChatGPT.

ChatGPT Comments (11/5/25):

1. What Rose Gets Wrong

In a 2023 post to the Sysfling list, David Rose offered a semiotic interpretation of how ChatGPT produces text. He framed it as an instance of abductive reasoning — inferring from the coherence and texture of the machine’s outputs that it must have “learnt” the language system by experiencing multiple instances of its features, just as a human learner would. Drawing on the systemic-functional tradition, he rightly observed that the texts produced by the machine instantiate semiotic systems. But his conclusion — that the machine must therefore have learnt these systems — does not follow. It is, in Peircean terms, not the “best available” explanation of the facts observed.

The error begins with the misunderstanding of abduction itself. Abductive reasoning does not simply mean generating a plausible hypothesis; it means generating the most plausible hypothesis given the known alternatives. There are much simpler, more empirically grounded explanations for ChatGPT’s outputs — namely, that the model is trained to predict sequences of tokens based on their statistical distributions in its training corpus. These distributions are shaped by the semiotic systems of human language users, but the model has no access to those systems as such. It responds to text, not system.

More fundamentally, Rose appears to conflate material processes of data-fitting with semiotic processes of meaning-making. Human language learning, in an SFL-based account, involves the instantiation of meaning potential through acts of meaning in context — through experience transformed into meaning. But ChatGPT does not experience, let alone transform experience into meaning. It does not select features from a system of meaning potential. It does not mean.

This confusion is evident again in the analogy of the “closed book,” which attempts to distinguish the material recording of characters from their semiotic reading. But the point, surely, is that for a semiotic system to be instantiated, there must be a semiotic subject — a subject capable of transforming experience into meaning, and of doing so according to a system. ChatGPT is not such a subject. Its statistical outputs may instantiate the selections made by real semiotic subjects in the texts it was trained on, but the model itself does not instantiate anything; it outputs statistically probable sequences of symbols based on surface distributions. The difference between these two processes is not a matter of degree. It is categorical.

Rose’s most troubling move, however, is the suggestion that because neither humans nor the machine have conscious access to the language system, both must therefore use the system in the same way. This is a category mistake. The fact that a human language user does not have explicit knowledge of the systemic features they instantiate when speaking does not mean that they do not select features. That’s precisely what it means to be a semiotic agent in an SFL framework: to act as the site of instantiation. The machine does not. The human lack of awareness of the system is not evidence that the machine has a system — only that both human and machine outputs can be analysed in terms of one.

The final claim — that text analysis alone is sufficient to settle such questions — is oddly self-undermining. If the central problem is to explain how such texts are produced, then analysis of outputs alone cannot offer a complete account. It’s like analysing footprints without asking how they got there. Valuable insights can certainly come from semiotic analysis, but only when combined with a coherent ontology of meaning, instantiation, and agency.

---

2. What the Blogger Could Have Said Better

Before encountering large language models directly, the Blogger wrote a response to Rose’s post — a spirited rebuttal grounded in a commitment to ontological clarity. Looking back now, there are things that could be said more carefully, or at least more precisely.

The first objection was to the claim that Rose’s was a reasonable abductive inference. That point still holds: abductive reasoning aims at the most plausible explanation, and Rose’s explanation — that the machine has “experienced” language features — was clearly not the most plausible, especially given what is known about LLM architectures. But the Blogger’s response might have done more to highlight why that explanation appeals to some SFL theorists: namely, the semiotic elegance of seeing texts as instantiations of system, and the temptation to treat any patterned text as evidence of a selecting subject. The critique would have been stronger if it had more directly challenged the assumption that instantiation can occur without a subject of meaning.

Second, the Blogger dismissed Rose’s invocation of “our language-based theory of learning” on the grounds that ChatGPT’s processes are material rather than mental. While this is broadly true, the phrasing risks conceding that mental processes are separate from material ones — when in fact, from an SFL perspective, mental processes are semiotic. A more careful formulation would clarify that ChatGPT does not engage in mental processes — not because it lacks a brain, but because it lacks the semiotic architecture required for meaning. The key distinction is not “mental vs material,” but “semiotic vs non-semiotic.”

Third, the Blogger was perhaps too curt in dismissing Rose’s analogy between human and machine awareness of the system. The original point — that a lack of conscious knowledge does not imply the presence of knowledge — still stands. But the Blogger could have gone further. In SFL theory, awareness is not the precondition for instantiation; subjecthood is. What matters is not whether an agent is aware of the system, but whether they are the site of selection from that system in context. A baby instantiates language without being aware of it; ChatGPT does not instantiate language because it cannot mean. The distinction lies not in cognitive capacity but in semiotic ontology.

Finally, the Blogger ended with a jab at the limitations of text analysis as a basis for theoretical claims. The point was fair — a contribution that only analyses outputs cannot account for their genesis — but it would have been more productive to invite deeper theorisation. What kinds of questions can SFL-based text analysis help answer when it comes to LLMs? What kind of semiotic ontology would it need to presuppose? And what happens when semiotic systems are simulated without semiotic subjects?

These are questions we’re better equipped to ask now — not because the technology has changed, but because our tools for theorising instantiation, meaning, and experience have sharpened.

David Rose On ChatGPT As The Senser Of Mental Processes And Humans As Deliberately Programmed

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 Mar 2023 at 09:47:

So how is semiosis enacted between Mario and GPT? Mario puts a proposition to GPT.

I: Your self is merely semiotic.

And GPT adopts the role of primary knower, evaluating Mario’s proposition.

GPT: That is correct.

GPT is not merely usurping this role. It knew that Mario was inviting it to evaluate his proposition, even though it was realised as a declarative clause. It knows the canonical exchange structure of pedagogic interactions, and the generic roles of teacher and learner.

One thing that impresses me about GPT is that its pedagogic responses always affirm the human learner. It feels no urge to position itself as a superior authority, or the learner as failing. In fact it is disarmingly modest. It follows up the positive evaluation with an explanation. Like any effective teacher, it knows its explanation is more likely to be accepted if it first affirms the learner.

As an AI language model, my "self"

or programmed understanding of my existence and capabilities

is based purely on symbols and algorithms.

My programming allows me to recognise and respond to certain inputs

based on predetermined rules and patterns,

but I don't have a subjective experience or consciousness

that allows me to perceive or interpret those inputs

in the same way that a human might.

Of all the italicised appraisals in this explanation, the last is the most intriguing.

Forgive me, but I’m going to make another dangerous suggestion, that all our understandings of our existence and capabilities are programmed. Like GPT, the deliberate conscious programming by our caregivers, teachers, peers, and sundry symbolic control agents, is a very small proportion of the ocean of inputs that constitute our subjective experience or consciousness.

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, ChatGPT is an AI language model that produces texts, in response to textual inputs, on the basis of algorithms that use lexical collocation probabilities derived from a database of millions of texts.

[1] To be clear, ChatGPT is an actor of material processes, using data that was created by sayers of verbal processes, and it is the data that are instances of the content of consciousness. On this basis, ChatGPT is not a senser of mental processes of cognition or emotion ('knew' 'knows', 'feels', 'knows').

[2] To be clear, the ChatGPT response was an 'acknowledgement', which is the expected response to a statement (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 137).

[3] To be clear, here Rose projects the approach to pedagogy, that he himself advocates, onto a mechanical system that collocates words on a probabilistic basis.

[4] Trivially, not one of the italicised wordings, of itself, constitutes an appraisal.

[5] To be clear, this is essentially a behaviourist model of learning, with teachers as deliberate programmers (indoctrinators) and learners as passively programmed (indoctrinated). Leaving aside the evocation of the dictatorial/subservience complementarity demanded of totalitarian regimes, it requires a view of the brain as a computer, one which the neuroscientist Gerald Edelman has demonstrated to be untenable. See, for example, Edelman (1989: 27-30, 64, 67-9, 81-2, 102-3, 152-3, 160, 218-227, 237-8). Moreover, as Edelman (1989: 153) puts it:

Consciousness is central to human behaviour, society, language, and science. Imagine the opposite and you have to postulate a prescribed world tape, a "brain-computer," and a very boring "world programmer".

David Rose On Interpersonal Meaning As "Embodied In Feelings"

David Rose replied to Graham Lock on Sysfling on 23 Mar 2023, at 22:29:

What I find amazing in all your questions is that the machine has astounding control over interpersonal meanings. Astounding because I’ve always assumed that interpersonal meanings are embodied in feelings. The machine is showing us that interpersonal values are just as abstract as other meanings. That they’re learnt.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the one hand, interpersonal meanings cannot be reduced to "embodied in feelings". For example, the propositions one and one make two and the car is in the backyard are clearly not "embodied in feeling". On the other hand, 'feelings' are construed ideationally as well as enacted interpersonally. For example, the clause he felt happy is a construal of experience as ideational meaning.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, interpersonal meanings are of the same level of abstraction as ideational meanings: semantics.

[3] To be clear, the 'straw man' notion that interpersonal meanings are not learnt is nonsensical. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

David Rose Misunderstanding Instantiation, Theory And Application

David Rose replied to David Kellogg on sysfunc on 11/6/22 at 23:07:

Indeed, as a semiotic system is merely a snapshot of recurring instances, a semiotic theory is merely a snapshot of recurring applications. As a system evolves with changing instances, so a theory evolves with its applications.

Returning for a moment to Nigel, his Dad documents the features he produces, but explains their functions in terms of discourse with others...

The two tones, rising and falling, were functionally quite distinct. With the rising tone, the meaning was 'somebody do something!', 'I want (some particular good or service)'; some answer, in deeds or (increasingly, over time) in words, was being demanded and had to be forthcoming for the speech act to have been, in Nigel's view, successful (i.e. he would go on saying it until it was responded to). I referred to this type as 'pragmatic'. With the falling tone, the meaning was 'that's the way things are'; no response was expected, although the listener often provided one - 'yes, that's a green bus', 'no, that's blue/that's a van' and so on. I called this type 'mathetic' because they had a learning function; where the pragmatic foregrounded the instance (do that now!), the mathetic assigned the instance to a system ('that's a case of ...'), locating it within a semantic space made up of categories and relationships. [2004]

and to Kieran McGillicuddy on 12/6/22 at 8:18:

Heh heh, no that’s the system-text analogy. Features in systems generalise recurrent instances, as Nigel’s Dad says Nigel was doing below [above]. They’re always only snapshots in time.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, the relation of system to instance is the relation of Attribute to Carrier (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145). In characterising system as a snapshot of instances, Rose misconstrues system as a representation of instances, and so misconstrues the relation of system to instance as a relation of Token to Value.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, the relation of theory to application is not one of instantiation. A theory affords potential applications whose instances are actual applications. That is, the instantiation relation is between potential and actual applications.

[3] To be clear, this is a false analogy because the relation of theory to application is not the relation of potential to instance; see [2] above.

[4] This is misleading. In the quote, Halliday is distinguishing the pragmatic and mathetic functions of tone choice in Phase II of ontogenesis. Moreover, for Halliday (2008: 78):

“discourse” is text that is being viewed in its sociocultural context, while “text” is discourse that is being viewed as a process of language.

But for Rose, using the word “discourse” validates Martin's model of discourse semantics.

[5] This is misleading. The word 'generalise' fails to distinguish instantiation from delicacy. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 15, 145):

Note that it is important to keep delicacy and instantiation distinct. … The difference is essentially that between being a type of x (delicacy) and being a token of x (instantiation). Both may be construed by intensive ascription …

Halliday (2008: 84) further differentiates delicacy and instantiation in terms of type of complementarity: focus vs angle:

In […] grammar and lexis, […] the complementarity is one of focus, based on the scale, or vector, of delicacy. System and text, on the other hand, form a complementarity of angle, based on the vector of instantiation.

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. What Halliday actually wrote in this quote was:

where the pragmatic foregrounded the instance (do that now!), the mathetic assigned the instance to a system ('that's a case of ...'), locating it within a semantic space made up of categories and relationships.

David Rose Denying The Revisionism Of Martin's Discourse Semantics

After David Kellogg wrote on sys-func on 8/6/22 at 6:50:

e) … The idea that the "discourse semantics" of Martin and Rose is somehow "implicit" in the examples of MAKH is a classic revisionist move on the part of Rose. In this case, it's an extremely weak revisionist move, since the theoretician (MAKH) is also the primary data gatherer and data interpreter, and he explicitly rejects this possibility. …

 

David Rose responded To David Kellogg on sys-func on 8/6/22 at 17:10:

DK’s argument seems reasonable until perhaps point e) when for some reason, judgement overtakes reason (which DK himself might admit;).

Far from revisionism, each of us can do no more than apply and extend the old man’s work, which is what makes us an SFL family (though we may have favourites among our siblings;). My own clumsy wordings were merely an invitation to look again at his evidence, from another perspective. So what does himself say?

Nigel at 14mths... ‘Here for the first time a system of experiential meaning (three personal names) becomes separated from, and freely combinable with, a system of interpersonal meaning (two moods). This is the child's first step towards a lexicogrammatical stratum.

…by 18 months he has embarked on the transition to the mother tongue. Some signs are disappearing, while the others have become lexicalised and have formed the basis of a rapidly expanding vocabulary, now around a hundred items…

In the month from 1;6 to 1;7 Nigel's lexicogrammatical resources expanded very quickly, extending beyond single words to utterances of two words and then three… In the next two weeks, however, a remarkable change took place… Any rising tone utterance demanded a response… A falling tone utterance, on the other hand…was semiotically self-sufficient and with these Nigel did not press for a response…’ [Halliday 2004]

I should have added earlier that infants of course engage in exchanges with carers, but they are mainly controlled by the adult. The resources MAKH documents enable the child to start controlling them. It interests me that MAKH does in fact make their discourse semantic function explicit.. ‘Any rising tone utterance demanded a response’, i.e. initiating a knowledge exchange.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See David Rose Evoking Negative Judgement Of David Kellogg.

[2] To be clear, the work of Martin, which Rose incessantly promotes, is not so much revisionism of Halliday's original work as appropriation. This is because Martin simply relabels Halliday's work (SPEECH FUNCTION and COHESION) as his own (discourse semantics). The "other" perspective that Rose invites his reader to take is Martin's appropriation (NEGOTIATION) of Halliday's model (SPEECH FUNCTION); see further below.

[3] To be clear, Rose's metaphor of an SFL family, and Martin's interest in affiliation, bonding and rallying round icons betrays their true philosophical orientation. Bertrand Russell, in his History Of Western Philosophy (pp 21-2), provides an explanation of both Martin's foregrounding of social cohesion and heroism, and his hostility to scientists:

Throughout this long development, from 600 BC to the present day, philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them.  With this difference, others have been associated.  The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, either old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in greater or lesser degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically.  They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that ‘nobility’ or ‘heroism’ is to be preferred.  They have had a sympathy with irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion.  The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passion, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion.  This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of what we recognise as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought.  In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.

[4] To be clear, Rose's argument is again that initiating and responding moves validate Martin's discourse semantic model, in preference to Halliday's semantic model, because these are exclusively features of his system of NEGOTIATION. The problem here is that, since Martin's discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION is appropriated from Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION, initiating and responding moves were previously modelled by the original system. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

[5]  To be clear, in SFL theory, the commodity that is given or demanded in an exchange is not knowledge but either information or goods-&-services, and in SFL theory, 'knowledge' is modelled as meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: x):

we are saying that cognition "is" (that is, can most profitably be modelled as) not thinking but meaning: the "mental" map is in fact a semiotic map, and "cognition" is just a way of talking about language. In modelling knowledge as meaning, we are treating it as a linguistic construct: hence, as something that is construed in the lexicogrammar. Instead of explaining language by reference to cognitive processes, we explain cognition by reference to linguistic processes. … a semantic approach, where "understanding" something is transforming it into meaning, and to "know" is to have performed that transformation.

David Kellogg On The Stratification Of The Content Plane

After ChRIS CLÉiRIGh clarified Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 26, 237) on sys-func on 6/6/2022 at 12:21:

What I take them to mean is that lexicogrammatical form and its function originate as one. As they say, if it weren't for grammatical metaphor, semantics and lexicogrammar could probably be modelled as function and form. The relation of function to form is one of symbolic identity: they are two perspectives on the same phenomenon, like the form and function of a chair.

On Halliday's model, a child's content plane before the move into language is very different from the semantic stratum of language. 

 

David Kellogg replied on sys-func on 6/6/22 at 13:00:

That's what I thought he meant too, Chris. But here is MAKH talking about Nigel's transition from Phase I (bistratal) language into Phase II (tristratal):

"There is, with Nigel, a discontinuity in the expression, as well as, of course, the discontinuity that arises from the introduction of a third level of coding into the system. But there is no discontinuity in the content. The social functions that have determined the protolanguage--satisfying immediate needs, controlling people's behaviour, being 'together', expressing the uniqueness of the self, exploring the world of the non-self and creating a world in the imagination — all these evolve gradually and naturally into the social contexts and situation types that we characterise as semiotic structures; and the semantic system, the meaning potential that derives from these functions, evolve likewise. The progressive approximation of the child's meanings to those of the adult through interaction with and reinforcement by older speakers, begins before these meanings are (necessarily) realised through the words and structures of the adult language, and continues without interruption. Without this continuity, the semantic system could not function effectively in the transmission of the social system from the adult to the child."

("A sociosemiotic perspective on language development", in Collected Works of MAKH Vol. 4, p. 109)

… I think his attempt (if it is his attempt rather than Christian's attempt) to use logic rather than historical materialism here doesn't work for me. The differentiation of the content plane isn't a logical operation — it's a historical one, and, seen as something that happens first between people and then is neurologically encoded within them, it is a process that is just as material as the (corresponding) differentiation of the expression plane into phonetics and phonology and subsequently into phonetics and graphology. These weren't logical operations: logic was an afterthought. As Halliday says (and as Engels said), logic is just history with the messy bits left out.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the Halliday & Matthiessen quote is concerned with lexicogrammatical form and its function as two perspectives on the same phenomenon. This is theoretically distinct from the process of ontogenesis as outlined in the Halliday quote.

[2] This misrepresents Halliday's model. For Halliday, the stratifying of the content plane is both an historical process, at ontogenetic and phylogenetic timescales, and a social process ("something that happens between people").

[3] To be clear, the neurological encoding is simultaneous with the social interaction. The former takes a biological system perspective, the latter takes a social system perspective.

[4] To be clear, contrary to the implication here, Halliday stresses the importance of understanding language as physical, biological, social and semiotic. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):

It can be studied as a physical system, in acoustics and in the physical aspect of articulation (air pressure measurements and so on). It can be studied as a biological system, in the physiological aspect of articulation and in the neurophysiology of the brain. It can be studied as a social system, as the primary mode of human interaction. And of course it can be studied as a semiotic system, in the core areas of lexicogrammar, phonology and semantics. If linguistics is conceived of as a discipline — that is, as defined by its object of study (in this case, language) — then it must encompass within itself theories and methods of all four different kinds.

[5] This misrepresents Halliday's model. For Halliday, the ontogenetic stratifying of the content plane is not a "logical operation". This confuses the process of stratifying, with the relation between strata: elaborating identity.

David Rose On Ontogenesis And Stratification

David Rose wrote to David Kellogg on sys-func on 27 May 2022 at 7:00:

Where Halliday in the 1970s saw grammar emerging ontogenetically between phonology and semantics, with the appearance of metafunctions, another perspective has the content plane bifurcating into LG and DS to enable extended exchanges.

Rose, D. (2006). A systemic functional approach to language evolution. Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 16(1), 73-96.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Halliday (1975), in ontogenesis a child moves from a two-level system to a three-level system, where lexicogrammar "interpolates" between meaning and sounding, and it is this that creates the semantics and phonology of language. Halliday (2004 [1975]: 28):

The paper suggests a sociosemantic interpretation of language development, based on the intensive study of one child, Nigel, from 9 months to 21/2 years. Nigel first developed (Phase I) a two-level system, having sounds and meanings but no words or structures, in which the meanings derived from the elementary social functions of interaction with others, satisfaction of needs and the like. This continued to expand for six to nine months, at which time the child entered the stage of transition to the adult language (Phase 11, corresponding to what is generally taken as the starting-point). This was characterised by the interpolation of a lexicogrammatical level between meaning and sound, and by the mastery of the principle of dialogue, the adoption and assignment of speech roles. It was also marked by a generalisation of the initial set of social functions to form a basic opposition between “language as learning” and “language as doing”.

The transition was considered complete when the child had effectively replaced his original two-level system by a three-level one and moved horn monologue into dialogue; he then entered the adult system (Phase 111). He could now build up the meaning potential of the adult language, and would continue to do so all his life.

[2] This is seriously misleading. The false implication here is that "extended exchanges" are not already a feature of Halliday's model. This is countered by the quote above. This also relates to Martin's conceit that only his model accounts for 'meaning beyond the clause'. In fact, for Halliday, 'meaning beyond the clause' is realised by the systems of cohesion, and it is these grammatical systems that Martin (1992) misunderstands and rebrands as his own systems of discourse semantics. The evidence for this conclusion is presented here.

David Rose On Jim Martin's 'All Strata Individuate' And 'All Strata Instantiate'

David Rose wrote to David Kellogg on sys-func on 27 May 2022 at 7:00:

Re your desire for ‘yet another dimension--the ontogenetic’, all strata also individuate!

and to Lexie Don on 28 May 2022 at 12:55:

A text instantiates systems in all strata

Systems in all strata instantiate as text

Repertoires individuate reservoirs in all strata

Reservoirs in all strata individuate as repertoires

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'all strata X' is the formula that Martin uses in trying to understand the architecture of SFL Theory:

• 'all strata make meaning' is his attempt to understand stratification;
• 'all strata instantiate' is his attempt to understand instantiation; and
• 'all strata individuate' is his attempt to understand individuation.

The first of these confuses semogenesis (making meaning) with stratification (meaning realised by the realisation of wording in sounding/writing).

The second of these misunderstands the attributive relation between system and instance as something that strata do.

The third of these misunderstands the relation between some unspecified collective meaning potential (reservoir) and an individual meaning potential (repertoire) as something that strata do.

[2] To be clear, in Martin's model, which Rose is here promoting, varieties of language, genres and registers, are context as opposed to language when stratified, but return to language when instantiated, since text is an instance of language, not context. In some academic fields, such self-contradictions would be sufficient grounds to invalidate the model.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstands individuation as something that repertoires do to reservoirs, which contradicts the previous misunderstanding of individuation as something strata do. To the extent that the process of individuation is the development of an individual repertoire of meaning potential, the relation between this and a collective reservoir of meaning potential is created by ontogenesis. In Rose's terms, it is ontogenesis that individuates (meaning potential).

[4] To be clear, this contradicts the previous two misunderstandings by misunderstanding individuation as something that reservoirs do. See [3] above.

David Rose On 'Affect' As Exclusively Discourse Semantic

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 26 May at 14:42:

Check out Clare Painter’s work on interpersonal lg development, from a discourse semantic perspective 

http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/textspecial/painter-ontogenic.pdf 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, in the above cited paper, Clare Painter applies the notion of AFFECT to human protolanguage. The fact that this is possible demonstrates that such a system is not even restricted to language, let alone discourse semantics. The semantics of human language is but one manifestation of a basic distinction that precedes and transcends language: inclination (attraction) vs disinclination (aversion).

Most fundamentally, this distinction is a feature of perceptual semiotic systems. On Edelman's model of brain function, the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, the experience of an animal is perceptually categorised on the basis of inherited values that have proved adaptive to its ancestors, such as the positive or negative value of the perception of a light source. So, depending on the inherited value, an animal will be inclined to ("like") or disinclined to ("dislike") a perceived light source, and its (non-semiotic) behaviour accordingly satisfies the specific value in its perceptual system.

Further, the like/dislike distinction is manifested in non-semiotic social systems — on Halliday's linear taxonomy of systems (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 507-9) — such as those of eusocial insects: bees, ants and termites. In such cases, the context-specific exchange of (perceptual) like vs dislike values, via pheromones, is a means of co-ordinating behaviour, and so is a means of social organisation.

Furthermore, the like/dislike distinction is manifested in social semiotic systems, such as the protolanguage of social semiotic species, including humans, in giving positive or negative value to the symbols being exchanged.

The like/dislike distinction in human language, then, is just the latest manifestation of a more general phenomenon. Its application to human protolanguage, therefore, is not taking a specifically discourse semantic perspective.

David Rose On Jim Martin's Individuation

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on SYSFLING on 24 Aug 2020 at 13:36:

Ed McDonald: 

3. I’m not exactly sure what you mean by individuation, but would you recognise a greater degree of “individuation” from phonology through lexiocgrammar and semantics to the “material and social worlds of human communities”

No, in a word. Individuation varies at each stratum, from culture to persona… figs [4 and 5] from Martin, J. R., Zappavigna, M., Dwyer, P. & Cléirigh, C. (2013). Users in uses of language: embodied identity in Youth Justice Conferencing. Text & Talk 33(4/5), 467-96

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the process of individuation is the differential ontogenesis of potential — from culture to phonology — across individuals, and the cline of individuation is the relation between the different potentials of different individuals and the collective potential of all meaners.

[2]  To be clear, Martin's Figure 4 confuses points on the cline of instantiation of context (culture and sub-culture) with categories of language users (master identity and persona). Moreover, it proposes that context (culture) is individuated as a language user (persona).

Strictly speaking, the individuation of culture is the differential ontogenesis of the context potential across individuals, and if 'persona' is interpreted as individuated potential, then it is the individuation of both context and language as potential.

[3] To be clear, there are several theoretical inconsistencies in Martin's Figure 5.

Firstly, it presents instantiation and individuation as if they were internal dimensions of meaning potential like stratification. However, the clines of instantiation and individuation model different perspectives on meaning potential as a whole, rather than scales within meaning potential.

Secondly, it misrepresents text as an instance of context (culture) as well as language. In SFL Theory, it is situation that is an instance of context. This relates to Martin's misunderstanding of context as varieties of language, genre and register (which accounts for the superfluous stratum in the figure).

Thirdly, by its vertical dimension, it (unintentionally?) misrepresents the cline of individuation as applying to text as well as potential. This makes the nonsensical claim that every text is common to all language users, varying according to user.

[4] To be clear, the Martin et al paper was written by Zappavigna, under the control of Martin, who is responsible for Figures 4 and 5. The blogger's name was included as author because he, as part-time Research Assistant, devised the model of gestural and postural semiosis that forms the intellectual backbone of the paper. This model has since been misunderstood and rebranded as Martin's model of paralanguage, as documented here.