Brad Smith On Intonational Prominence

Brad Smith replied to David Rose on asflanet on 9 Sept 2024, at 11:54:

yes: 'good reason' is purpose, or function, which is stratal (in relation to higher strata). 

So far as intonational prominence goes, though, it is at the speaker's discretion whether to assign a marked/non-congruent choice greater prominence (eg whether a marked mood-tone co-selection, as realisation of complex interpersonal discourse semantics and tenor relations, is given textual prominence, eg through tonicity) — 

however, I do observe, as a general rule, that when a marked choice is made in an intonation system (eg marked tonicity), there is found to be a decided excess in the phonetic expression - speakers will make sure the listener hears the marked choice (in the same way they might more carefully articulate a particular lexical choice). But this is probably way too complex a topic for me to be delving into while in the middle of other work :)

 

and David Rose replied at 12:09:

//5 ^ ba / rill iant // 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This re-expresses a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[2] To be clear, looking to the higher stratum to find the reason for a marked choice is what the text analyst does, whereas making the marked choice is what the speaker does.

[3] As previously explained, in SFL Theory, 'marked' and 'non-congruent' are not synonymous. Congruence only applies to the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar on the content plane. Applying it to the relation between lexicogrammar and phonology invents the non-existent resource of "phonological metaphor".

[4] This confuses metafunctions and axes. To be clear, the tonic realises an element of structure as the Focus of New information (textual, syntagmatic), not a "marked mood-tone" co-selection (interpersonal, paradigmatic).

[5] This exemplifies a point made by a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236):

In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’].

[6] See David Rose Positively Judging And Appreciating Brad Smith.

David Rose Mistaking Realisation Rules For Function Structures And Paradigmatic Features For Syntagmatic Units

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 30/8/23 at 22:41:

Just some parameters...

In a rank scale, the initial entry condition for systems is a syntagmatic unit eg clause. Their features e.g. [indicative] are realised by function structures at that rank ↘︎S^F, and each function within that structure e.g. Subject is realised by a syntagm at the next rank ↘︎nom gp.

Phonemes are syntagmatic units at the base of a rank scale. Features at syllable rank are realised by function structures eg ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme, and each function is realised by a phoneme (complex). Phonemes are produced by tongue and lip postures with voicing, but these lie outside language in the biology of the vocal tract... Jim’s materiality (the ‘etics’ materialising ‘emics’)

So yes, it seems adult social semiosis minimally requires two syntagmatic ranks

Im interested in how that emerges from unranked protolg

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The entry conditions to paradigmatic systems are paradigmatic features, not syntagmatic units. The rank scale construes formal constituents as a system of features, with the selection of a feature satisfying the entry condition to the systems of that rank.

[2] This is very misleading because it is a serious misunderstanding. Features are not realised by function structures. Importantly, in Rose's first example, ↘︎S^F is not a function structure, but a realisation statement that specifies 'Subject before Finite'. Moreover, it is activated by the selection of the feature 'declarative', not 'indicative'. The feature 'indicative' activates the insertion of a Mood element (Subject and Finite). See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162).

In Rose's second example, ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme is not a function structure, but a realisation statement of an unidentified feature that specifies 'optional Onset before Rhyme'.

[3] To be clear, the systems that specify phonemes are those that 'label tongue and lip postures with voicing' (and more), so this is not the distinction between phonology and phonetics. The difference is stratal: phonology is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than phonetics. Moreover, the materiality of phonetics is hardly Martin's discovery.

[4] Clearly, SFL Theory maintains that four ranks are required to model formal constituency in lexicogrammar and phonology. But rank only applies to the expression plane of semiotic systems without a lexicogrammar.

David Rose Misunderstanding Axial Relations

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 August at 13:07:

Expanding our terms a little, the axial relation is abbreviated as system/structure, but is actually features/structures in systems. Systemic contrasts are simultaneously between features and the structures that realise them. Structures are more precisely function structures. Their functions are either interpersonal, ideational or textual (at least at higher ranks). They are realised by syntagms (or syntagmatic structures). In a metafunctional semiotic, syntagms must be able to realise multiple functions at once (eg nom gps realising Theme/Subject/Actor). This seems basic to semiotic organisation??

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The axial relation — the relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders of axis — is realisation. System is the dimension of the paradigmatic order, and structure is the dimension of the syntagmatic order. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. On the one hand, there are no structures in systems, since these are each different dimensions of different orders of axis. On the other hand, the axial relation, realisation, does not obtain between features and structures; for example, the clause feature [existential] entails the realisation statement 'insert Existent' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 355), which is the specification of a participant, not of the structure in which the participant figures.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. For example, a systemic contrast between features, such as [positive] vs [negative] POLARITY is not realised by a systemic contrast in (agnate) structures, since both are realised by the same structure, e.g. Subject^Finite^Predicator.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. A syntagm is a sequence of classes, whereas a structure is a configuration of functions. (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 60):

Such a sequence of classes is called a syntagm (e.g. Halliday, 1966a). However, this tells us very little about how it is organised or what it means. The significance of such a syntagm is that here it is the realisation of a structure: an organic configuration of elements, which we can analyse in functional terms.

David Rose Misunderstanding Axial Relations And Connotative Semiotics

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 August 2023 at 00:01:

Axis is the systemic in systemic functional. In this theory, the coupling of generalisation with abstraction in the axial relation is the basis of semiosis. It is not merely a formalism of the theory, rather the formalism mirrors the semiotic relation. There can be no structures outside of systems, and no systems without structures. This includes systems at each rank, stratum and metafunction, of denotative semiotics like language and image, and connotative semiotics like register and genre.

There are plenty of other theories out there, but axis is what sets this one apart. SFS has been influenced by many theories in lx and other disciplines. It proceeds by examining the objects of these theories through the lens of axis, with procedures designed by Halliday in the 1960s for phonology and grammar, and applied since to these and other strata and modalities.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Axis is a dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. The 'systemic' in 'systemic functional' is the paradigmatic order of axis only.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The axial relation is the (realisation) relation between the paradigmatic axis and the syntagmatic axis. It is not a "coupling of generalisation with abstraction".

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Structures are, by definition, "outside of systems" since the two are of different orders: structures are syntagmatic (chains), whereas systems are paradigmatic (choices).

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Hjelmslev's connotative semiotic is a semiotic that has a denotative semiotic as its expression plane. What Rose refers to as a connotative semiotic is only the content plane of the connotative semiotic. However, register and genre (text type) are varieties of a denotative semiotic: language. In terms of a connotative semiotic, register and genre are on its expression plane (language) not its content plane (context).

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. There was no Systemic Functional theory in the 1960s. Halliday's theory at that time was Scale-&-Category Grammar, which had no system networks and no metafunctions.

David Rose Confusing Axis With System

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 23 August 2023 at 13:55:

Can I suggest when reading the various philosophers of language cited in this thread, to remember the one missing puzzle piece that lies at the heart of systemic functional semiotics... axis.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Rose confuses axis with system. Axis is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

System, on the other hand, is the dimension of the paradigmatic order of axis only. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20):

David Rose Misrepresenting His Posts On 'Axis'

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on sysfling on 9/8/22 at 9:07:

Rather than an argument, I’d call the macro-genre of this thread a jointly constructed factorial explanation, more informing for anyone interested, than arguing a position. Its factorial structure was given by the points you raised in your 3 August sysfunc post, and each Factor drew on others’ explanations. So explicitly heteroglossic (trying not to mansplain, pace Lexi). Factors were...

1. MAKH’s view of axis (following Firth and Saussure)

2. Relations between features and structures in systems

3. Differences between stratal and axial realisation

4. Stratal relations between phonology/lexicogrammar and semantics in the ‘meaning/wording/sounding’ formula

5. Axis and strata in other modalities

6. Hjelmslev’s influence on MAKH’s stratal model

7. Axis and strata in protolanguage

So yes, very much theory internal (strong verticality in Jo Muller’s terms), but also highly appliable (strong grammaticality). That’s how axis is usually presented in SFL, as a theoretical tool for describing language and other modalities, and for theory building. But I think it is not simply a linguistic innovation by MAKH, but a discovery of how semiosis works. That was the inspiration for my diagram in Factor 2, centred on the claim ‘Structures are perceivable tokens of the abstract values of features’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue on several counts. 

• Firstly, the email thread in question was not jointly constructed. No other list members contributed to the points that Rose tried to make. 
• Secondly, it was not a 'factorial explanation'. According to Martin & Rose (2007: 345), a factorial explanation is a genre ('text type' in SFL) whose purpose ('rhetorical mode' in SFL) is explaining multiple causes, and whose stages ('semantic structure' in SFL) are Phenomenon^Explanation. The previous 20+ posts demonstrate that Rose was not concerned with multiple causes, but with multiple examples of theoretical uses of 'axis', inter alia.
• Thirdly, the posts in the thread were not informing, but misinforming, as demonstrated by the previous 20+ posts on this blog.
• Fourthly, the posts in the thread were indeed arguing a position, Martin's, which Rose explicitly stated as 'axis is key', axis is sufficient' etc.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The previous 20+ blog posts demonstrate that Rose's emails do not have the 'factorial' structure of Phenomenon^Explanation. Rose and his citations have been strong on assertion, but weak on explanation.

[3] This misunderstands heteroglossia. Heteroglossia involves the expressions of different points of view. In his posts, Rose has cited different authors that he believes support the same point of view.

[4] Mansplain verb. (of a man) explain (something) to someone, typically a woman, in a manner regarded as condescending or patronising.

[5] See, for example:

• David Rose Misrepresenting Axis As Key To Semantics-Grammar Relations
• David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday's Development Of SFL Theory
• David Rose Misrepresenting Axis
• David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday On Axis
• David Rose Misunderstanding Halliday's "Axial Breakthrough"
• David Rose Endorsing Martin's Misunderstanding Of Stratal Relations As Axial
• David Rose Endorsing Martin's Misunderstandings Of Protolanguage

[6] This is potentially misleading. On the one hand, the innovation, the distinction between paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, was made in Course in General Linguistics (Saussure 1916), nine years before Halliday's birth. 

On the other hand, on the epistemological assumptions of SFL Theory, theories do not "discover truth" ('how semiosis works'). Instead, they reconstrue data validly, or otherwise, on the basis of the assumptions of the theory, valid or otherwise, and vary in their explanatory potential in different contexts of use. Rose here expresses a transcendent view of meaning — meanings are 'out there' to be discovered — whereas SFL assumes an immanent perspective, wherein meanings are construed in semiotic systems. See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 415-8).

[7] For the self-contradictions in Rose's diagram, see

• David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction

David Rose Misunderstanding Halliday's "Axial Breakthrough"

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald to sys-func and sysfling on 5/8/22 at 8:34:

2.

Thanks to Ed, for the challenge presented by your reading of my diagram below as ‘(paradigmatic) "features" and (syntagmatic) "structures"’.

The diagram is meant to show that structures are part of systems, not opposed to them as the system/structure and paradigmatic/syntagmatic terms might suggest. Structures don’t realise systems, but features in systems. Structures are perceivable tokens of the abstract values of features. Each instance of structure is recognisable by its similarity to other instances of the same structure, and its difference from other types of structure. Similarity is represented in the diagram by hexagons, and difference by the system. The entry condition to a system is a more general similarity that is shared by its structures, e.g. the structure +Subject;+Finite is shared by the structures Subject^Finite and Finite^Subject. These similarities and differences in structure realise similarities and differences in features, such as indicative: declarative/ interrogative. Hence the system of features is a mirror of the system of structures. They are two faces of a system. This is my understanding of MAKH’s axial breakthrough.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[2] This is a very serious misunderstanding. Systems and structures are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction (elaboration + identity), whereas the relation that obtains between a whole and its parts is composition (extension). A part of a system is a subsystem, whereas a structure (e.g. of a group) is part of a larger structure (e.g. of a clause).

[3] This is a very serious misunderstanding. It is the entire system of a rank unit that specifies how its entire structure is realised, and this is achieved through realisation statements, not features.

[4] This confuses lower abstraction with perceivability. The structure of a nominal group cannot be perceived, unless, like its system, it is represented theoretically.

[5] This confuses the realisation (token-value) relation between structure and system with the instantiation (token-type) relation between instances and instance type.

[6] This confuses instance type (similarity) with paradigmatic order (difference).

[7] This confuses instance type (similarity) with the entry condition of a system. In the grammar, the first entry condition of a system is a formal unit on the rank scale.

[8] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Difference in system is difference between paradigmatic features, such as declarative vs interrogative, whereas difference in structure is difference in elements, such as Subject vs Complement.

[9] To be clear, the claim that "Halliday's axial breakthrough" is that system and structure are "two faces of a system" derives from the multiple misunderstandings identified above.

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday On Axis

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on sys-func on 4/8/22 at 8:45:

These are really important points Ed, that everyone engaging with SFL needs to grapple with (as we are).

That is why I posted MAKH’s own account of his engagement with axis, in the foreword to Martin, Wang & Zhu (reposted below).

1.

His starting point here is not with the paradigmatic or syntagmatic axis, but with the relation between them, as recognised by Saussure. His second point is that most linguists since have ignored this relation. His third point is that his teacher Firth foregrounded it. The fourth is his own effort to describe language ‘biaxially’, and coming to see it as sets of choices (systems). His fifth point is Firth’s very specific conception of the axial relation ‘as the paradigm of options that were available at a given location in the structure’. He then devotes more detail to this point, because it is central to systemic theory. Every system in SFL starts from ‘a given location in the structure’, such as syllable or nom gp. Every feature in a system is realised by a distinct structure, such as Onset+Rhyme or Deictic+Thing. His last point here is that this representation enables us to see the interdependence of diverse system/structure options, which is what ‘opened up metafunctions and rank scale system/structure cycles’ (as you quote me below) as well as strata.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday begins by explaining the difference between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic axes, not the relation between them. In SFL Theory, the relation between the axes is realisation (symbolic identity).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday claims that most linguists in the 20th Century focused on the syntagmatic axis rather than the paradigmatic axis, not that they ignored the realisation relation between the axes.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday claims that Firth was one linguist who did not focus on the syntagmatic axis at the expense of the paradigmatic, not that Firth foregrounded the realisation relation between the axes.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday is here describing Firth's approach to systems, not the SFL approach that Halliday instigated. For Firth, each element of function structure (e.g. Deictic) is an entry point to a network of choices. For Halliday, it is the formal rank unit (e.g. nominal group) that is the entry condition for the network of choices that specify how the unit is structured in a given instance. Rose fails to notice this important distinction between Firthian linguistics and SFL Theory.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. No single feature specifies the structure of a unit. Instead, a realisation statement associated with a feature specifies the insertion, conflation etc. of elements. Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) identifies seven types of realisation statement:

(a) 'Insert' an element (e.g., insert subject);

(b) 'Conflate' one element with another (e.g., conflate subject with theme);

(c) Order' an element with respect to another, or to some defined location (e.g., order finite auxiliary before subject);

(d) 'Classify' an element (e.g., classify process as mental: cognition);

(e) "Split' an element into a further configuration (e.g., split mood into subject + finite);

(f) 'Preselect' some feature at a lower rank (e.g., preselect nominal group);

(g) 'Lexify' an element (e.g., lexify subject : it).

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday is concerned with explaining how systems can be elaborated in delicacy and combined into networks. He does not claim that this is what 'opened up metafunctions and rank scale system/structure cycles as well as strata'.

Importantly, this last bare assertion is the crucial point Rose wants to make, and all the misrepresentations that precede it are falsely presented as evidence for what is, logically, a non-sequitur.

David Rose Misrepresenting Axis

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on 1/8/22 at 20:42:

Axis pairs perceivable forms with conceivable meanings, which makes semiosis possible. Turning your question around, what the others all have is axis. It’s also what makes SFL systemic.

and on 2/8/22 at 12:41:

I liked my bon mot ‘Axis pairs perceivable forms with conceivable meanings, which makes semiosis possible.’

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, axis is the local dimension whose orders are paradigmatic and syntagmatic, with system as the dimension of paradigmatic order and structure as the dimension of syntagmatic order (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20, 32).

Importantly, axis does not "pair forms with meanings". Form and meaning are located on both axes in the lexicogrammar. (There is meaning, but not form, on the semantic stratum, and form, but not meaning, on the expression plane.) Lexicogrammatical form is modelled as a rank scale, and rank units are interpreted in terms of their function in realising meaning. Paradigmatically, each formal rank unit is the entry condition to systems of such functions, and syntagmatically, each element of function structure is realised by a formal unit of the rank below.

With regard to "perceivabilty", lexicogrammar is 'a purely abstract level of representation "in between" the two faces of the sign' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 613).

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, the 'others' here are those identified by Ed McDonald:

I noted the reference to axis, and I'm a bit puzzled as to how and why this seems to have become the theoretical fons et origo. Do we really to trace everything back to that single distinction? And if so, why paradigmatic/syntagmatic (and not and / or system/text, content/form, synchronic/diachronic...)? Does it have a privileged relation to realisation and / or instantiation?

As McDonald implies, axis is but one dimension of language in the SFL model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

[3] This is misleading. What makes SFL systemic is the priority it gives to system over structure, just as what makes SFL functional is the priority it gives to function over form.

David Rose Misrepresenting The Semantic Systems Of Expansion And Figuration

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 18/7/22 at 16:05:

it’s always good to read IFG closely (and critically)...

It’s interesting that the terms FIGURATION and EXPANSION in Figure 10-2 below are printed in small caps, as though they are systems. It’s noteworthy that Halliday 1985/1994 (IFG 1/2) didn't describe expansion in general as a system, but as a ‘semantic motif’ that is dispersed across the grammar. A system in SFL is defined by axial relations between features and their realising structures. expansion is such a system in the grammar, at clause rank within clause complexing (IFG 7.4), and at group/phrase rank within verbal group complexing (IFG 8.6). But it is not a described semantic system.

‘Figuration’ on the other hand corresponds to a described semantic system, of lexical relations within figures, entitled nuclear relations in ET 5.3, WWD 3.3. Figures are typically realised as clauses (IFG 5.1.1)...

The canonical description of nuclear relations, and their stratal relations to grammar and field, is

Hao, J. (2020). Analysing scientific discourse from a systemic functional linguistic perspective: A framework for exploring knowledge building in biology. Routledge.

Jing also carefully relates the discourse semantic ideation systems to the ideational semantics in Construing Experience.

Rose soon qualified this at 17:24:

Correction...

Hao, J. (2020), re-analyses nuclear relations as the systems of FIGURE and ENTITY, to clearly distinguish systems of LG, DS and field.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, even a casual glance at IFG reveals that the caption of Figure 10-2 identifies FIGURATION and EXPANSION as semantic systems.

[2] This is misleading. Halliday (1985, 1994) describes expansion as a type of logico-semantic relation, along with projection, that has three subtypes: elaboration, extension and enhancement. The term EXPANSION appears in small capitals (e.g. 1994: 219), the convention for representing system names. This constitutes a verbal description of a system rather than a diagrammatic representation of a system as a network. Halliday (1985, 1994) did not feature any system networks.

Moreover, a close reading reveals that the term 'semantic motif' does not appear until Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 72, 223, 562, 612), where it explicitly refers to systems. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 223):

[3] This is misleading because a system is not 'defined by axial relations'. in SFL Theory, system constitutes the dimension of paradigmatic order (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20). This a distinct dimension from structure, the dimension of syntagmatic order (ibid.), and axis is the dimension whose orders are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic (op. cit.: 32).

[4] To be clear, Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar (1985, 1994) is focused on grammar, not semantics, which means modelling grammatical form in terms of its function in realising meaning. A focus on semantics, mainly ideational, is provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[5] This is very misleading indeed. As Figure 10-2, above, makes clear, FIGURATION is the semantic system that is congruently realised by the grammatical system of TRANSITIVITY. Martin's discourse semantic system of IDEATION, which is a rebranding of lexical cohesion, but within which 'nuclear relations' are modelled, does not feature the figure as either a system or structural unit. 

For some of the problems with 'nuclear relations' in Martin (1992), see the close examination here. For some of the problems with 'nuclear relations' in Martin & Rose (1992), see the close examination here.

[6] Clearly, any "canonical" description of 'nuclear relations' lies not in the work of Martin's student, Hao, but in her source: Halliday & Mathiessen (1999). For the source of Hao's system of FIGURE, see Chapter 4 Figures (Halliday & Mathiessen 1999: 128-76), and for the source of Hao's system of ENTITY, see Chapter 5 Elements (Halliday & Mathiessen 1999: 177-226).

David Rose On Incongruent Grammatical Realisations And 'Wording'

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 11/7/22 at 20:10: 

I’m happy to be mistaken but my understanding is that incongruent grammatical realisations of speech functions are treated as delicate features in message semantic systems. That is, each feature in the semantic systems has a particular grammatical realisation. … 

One issue with your synopsis below, is a suggested correlation of form and meaning with grammar and semantics. This is also suggested by the oft-used terms ‘wording’ vs ‘meaning’, as though grammar was not meaningful in itself. What makes grammar meaningful is axis... features realised as structures. The features are the meanings of the structures. Or rather the features and structures are two faces of the meanings, that MAKH showed us are made by the grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is clearly true, as 140+ posts on this blog demonstrate.

[2] This is a serious misunderstanding. Incongruent realisations are relations between strata, whereas delicacy is the ordering principle of the system of a stratum. Delicacy is the ordering of systemic features that may be realised congruently or incongruently on the stratum below.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, the "oft-used" distinction 'wording vs meaning' (Halliday 1970) does not correspond to the distinction between form and meaning. The term 'wording' is used in SFL Theory as the folk equivalent of 'lexicogrammar', and it refers to the interpretation of form in terms of its function of realising meaning, as when a formal constituent of a clause, a verbal group, is interpreted as serving the function of Process of a clause.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true that axis makes grammar meaningful. This is demonstrated by the fact that axis is a dimension of every stratum, including phonology. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32) explain, on each stratum, the dimension of axis has two orders: the paradigmatic (the dimension of system) and the syntagmatic (the dimension of structure).

[5] This is misleading. In SFL theory, grammatical systems (e.g. PROCESS TYPE) and the structures that realise them (e.g. Senser ^ Process) are both interpreted in terms of the meanings they realise.

[6] Rose is here drawing on Martin's misunderstanding of stratification as 'all strata make meaning', which is a statement of semogenesis, not stratification. This confusion leads Martin (1992) to misconstrue even phonology as a level of meaning. Evidence here.

David Rose On Jim Martin's Coupling/Co-instantiation

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on SYSFLING on 24 Aug 2020 at 13:36:

Ed McDonald:

2. The idea of co-instantiaton is also an interesting one:

My gloss for coupling, defined by Martin et al. (2013, p. 469) as ‘the co-selection of linguistic resources across ranks, metafunctions, strata, and modalities which are not specified by system/structure cycles’.

Systems at each stratum make distinct contributions…eg variations in tone and mood couple to instantiate variations in speech function

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's definition of 'coupling' is invalid, because system/structure cycles do not specify any co-selection of paradigmatic features ("linguistic resources"). To explain:-

The process of instantiation is the selection of paradigmatic features and the activation of realisation statements which specify how systemic options are realised along the syntagmatic axis, whether structural or cohesive. System/structure cycles are the iteration of this realisation relation between axes during logogenesis, the unfolding of text. On this basis, system/structure cycles do not specify which features are (co-)selected; feature (co-)selection is the paradigmatic dimension of system/structure cycles.

[2] To be clear, this confuses instantiation with realisation. Instantiations of "variations in speech function" are the speech function features that are selected during logogenesis. The relation between speech function and mood, and between mood and tone, is realisation, since these three systems are located on three different strata: semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology.

However, strictly speaking, the system of TONE does not realise the system of MOOD, but the system of KEY, which is associated with the system of MOOD (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 168). It is the combination of KEY and MOOD that realises SPEECH FUNCTION.

David Rose On Major Theoretical Differences Between 3 SFL Models: Structure And Function

David Rose wrote to sys-func and Sysfling on 23 March 2015 at 08:35:

This pointed to some major theoretical differences between 3 SFL models (that "make different and often opposing assumptions”)

In model a) structure and function are treated stratally, structure as grammar and function as semantics 

In b) structure and function are treated by rank - grammatical structures realise functions at higher ranks, and semantics is the meanings realised by grammar 

In c) grammatical structures realise higher rank functions, but structure and function are properties of both grammatical and semantic strata

Blogger Comments:

[1] The 3 SFL models that Rose has in mind are Halliday's original model (b), and two variations derived from it: Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar (a), and Martin's Discourse Semantics (c).

[2] 'Structure' and 'function' are each one half of two separate dichotomies, each involving the relation of 'realisation'.  On the one hand, 'structure' contrasts with 'system' — this is the relation between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axes.

On the other hand, 'function' contrasts with 'form' — this is the relation of symbolic abstraction that obtains between strata, and, in the rank scale, between elements of function structure, such as Senser^Process, and syntagm that realises them, such as nominal group^verbal group.

[3] In Fawcett's derived model, content system and structure are distinguished stratally.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

In Fawcett’s model, there is only one system–structure cycle within the content plane: systems are interpreted as the semantics, linked through a “realisational component” to form, which includes items and syntax, the latter being modelled structurally but not systemically…

[4] In Halliday's original model, system and structure are modelled at both strata of the content plane.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

…in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones.

[5] Grammatical 'structures' do not "realise higher rank structures".  Syntagms (forms) of a lower rank realise function structures of a higher rank.

[6] Rose's claim that only Martin's derived model posits "structure and function" on both content strata is demonstrably false.  For structure on both strata in the original model, see [4]; for function on both strata, consider, inter alia, the metafunctional organisation of both semantics and grammatics.

Halliday & Matthiessen On Fawcett's System–Structure Cycle

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429): 

In Fawcett’s model, there is only one system–structure cycle within the content plane: systems are interpreted as the semantics, linked through a “realisational component” to [content] form, which includes items and syntax, the latter being modelled structurally but not systemically; […] in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones.

… grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures. Since we [unlike Fawcett] allow for a stratification of content systems into semantics and lexicogrammar, we are in a stronger position to construe knowledge in terms of meaning. That is, the semantics can become more powerful and extensive if the lexicogrammar includes systems.

—∞—

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 25):

The stratification of the content plane had immense significance in the evolution of the human species — it is not an exaggeration to say that it turned Homo … into Homo sapiens. It opened up the power of language and in so doing created the modern human brain.