David Rose Explaining 'Mere' By Coupling

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 8 Sept 2024, at 11:15:

Can I suggest we think in terms of coupling? 

...first of lexical items – e.g. attitudinal mere with a target entity such as housemaid, construing a value in a field, such as a person’s occupational status. 

...secondly of lexical choices with grammatical functions. Given that attitude is expressed prosodically through structures such as nom gps – how does the choice of gram function adjust the meaning?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'coupling' is merely Martin's term for grouping any selections.

[2] To be clear, this coupling of lexical items is merely taking a lexical perspective on APPRAISAL:

Under the [APPRECIATION] subcategory of `social value', the object, product or process is evaluated according to various social conventions. This domain is very closely tied to field in that the social valuation of one field will not be applicable or relevant in another.

[3] Trivially, 'entity' is not a type of lexical item, but a semantic category, and attitudes are interpersonal, and so enact (social relations as meaning); it is ideational systems that construe (experience as meaning).

[4] To be clear, the choice of lexical item adds different lexical (more delicate) features to a grammatical function, such as Epithet vs post-Deictic. Meaning is realised by all the lexicogrammatical features, from the most general (grammatical) to the most delicate (lexical).

David Rose Misconstruing 'Mere' As A Judgement Of Capacity

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz Olivares on 7 Sept 2024, at 11:32:

Your questions always demand a bit of SF rigor. Quite right about the word class... I was blinded from above... manner degree so adverb... but mere/merely : adjective/adverb. …

And you’re right about gradability... in this context is it a judgement of capacity? Construing a series... a lowly scullery maid – mere housemaid – capable housekeeper

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the topic sentence ("hyper-Theme"), with 'rigour' being Rose's evaluation of what follows.

[2] To be clear, the meaning of 'mere(ly)' is interpersonal (counter-expectancy: limiting), not experiential (manner: degree). For example, in he merely said it wasn't cooked properly, the Adjunct merely is not circumstantial: it does not qualify the manner in which he said it.

[3] Clearly, 'a mere housemaid' is not a judgement of the capacity of a servant. Mere housemaids may be more capable or less capable. In terms of APPRAISAL, it might be seen as a negative appreciation of the status of 'housemaid' in terms of social value:

But the fact that I’d sort of gone from that status position down to merely a housemaid, you know? 

Brad Smith On Intonational Prominence

Brad Smith replied to David Rose on asflanet on 9 Sept 2024, at 11:54:

yes: 'good reason' is purpose, or function, which is stratal (in relation to higher strata). 

So far as intonational prominence goes, though, it is at the speaker's discretion whether to assign a marked/non-congruent choice greater prominence (eg whether a marked mood-tone co-selection, as realisation of complex interpersonal discourse semantics and tenor relations, is given textual prominence, eg through tonicity) — 

however, I do observe, as a general rule, that when a marked choice is made in an intonation system (eg marked tonicity), there is found to be a decided excess in the phonetic expression - speakers will make sure the listener hears the marked choice (in the same way they might more carefully articulate a particular lexical choice). But this is probably way too complex a topic for me to be delving into while in the middle of other work :)

 

and David Rose replied at 12:09:

//5 ^ ba / rill iant // 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This re-expresses a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[2] To be clear, looking to the higher stratum to find the reason for a marked choice is what the text analyst does, whereas making the marked choice is what the speaker does.

[3] As previously explained, in SFL Theory, 'marked' and 'non-congruent' are not synonymous. Congruence only applies to the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar on the content plane. Applying it to the relation between lexicogrammar and phonology invents the non-existent resource of "phonological metaphor".

[4] This confuses metafunctions and axes. To be clear, the tonic realises an element of structure as the Focus of New information (textual, syntagmatic), not a "marked mood-tone" co-selection (interpersonal, paradigmatic).

[5] This exemplifies a point made by a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236):

In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’].

[6] See David Rose Positively Judging And Appreciating Brad Smith.

David Rose Solving The Non-Problem Of The Synonymy Of 'Unmarked', 'Default' And 'Neutral'

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 9 Sept, at 10:43:

Yep, the apparent synonymy of unmarked, default and neutral were pedagogic issues for Brad designing his intonation course (and perhaps for us all). A possible solution lies in their differing usage (instantial). 

Marked/unmarked are used as technical labels for features in textual systems, where the marked option realises textual prominence (stratal). 

Default tends to connote skewed frequency, which realises unmarked features (axial). 

Neutral tends to be used for ungraduated features in interpersonal systems (eg key)

and at 11:47:

My friend Giacomo Figueredo pointed out that description generalises (same stratum) but explanation abstracts (higher stratum). So look up for reasons (eg prominence in discourse).

*I meant to say ‘Default tends to connote skewed frequency *of structures*, which realise unmarked features (axial).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'default' and 'neutral' are glosses for 'unmarked' as a description of an option in a system. There is no problem requiring a solution.

[2] To be clear, the marked/unmarked distinction is not restricted to the textual metafunction, but is used for systems realising any metafunction, e.g. TENSE and TONE.

[3] To be clear, both the marked and unmarked option of THEME assign textual prominence to an element of structure (axial, not stratal).

[4] To be clear, 'default' describes the 'unmarked' or 'neutral' choice in a system, so the structure that realises that systemic choice is the 'default' or 'unmarked' or 'neutral' structure (axis). Skewed probabilities are a system property, whereas skewed frequencies are an instance property (instantiation).

[5] To be clear, in the system of KEY, 'neutral' is a feature in the system, not a description of a feature as unmarked or default. 

[6] To be clear, here Rose is presenting part of the post he is reacting to (below) as if it hadn't already been stated in that post. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

Many systems embody the distinction between an unmarked term and a marked one, and the distinction may be reflected in the descriptive names given to the terms, as in “unmarked theme” vs. “marked theme”. An alternative label for the unmarked term is “neutral”, as in the interpersonal of (declarative) KEY (e.g. Halliday & Greaves, 2008: 50), where ‘neutral’ key is unmarked and the other keys are marked (‘challenging’, ‘non-committal’, ‘reserved’, ‘strong’); another alternative label is “default”.

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

Ed McDonald On Metafunction, Stratification And Expression Affordances

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 27 Nov 2023, at 10:05:

Just to take up the issue of metafunctions again after some further thinking on this fundamental but slippery concept, I think that if this notion is to be empirically defensible, or rather if the theoretical category of metafunction when translated into descriptive categories as part of a framework for a specific modality is to be empirically defensible, we need first of all to look outside language, <<without assuming that the 3x3 stratification/metafunction model necessarily applies in the case of other semiotic systems>>.

My starting point here would be that every semiotic system depends on its affordances, which shape the kinds of meanings it most easily or typically expresses. … My recent paper for LC&T, The Signifying Voice: Materiality and sociality in language and music, maps out one way of doing this, by taking two systems — language and music — whose default expression plane is the human voice and seeing how they exploit this differently. 

I have been hugely influenced in my thinking on these two systems by a little book now out of print which has almost the same name as Theo's 1999 book on music, i.e. David Burrows' 1990 Sound, Speech, Music, which sets out from a basic phenomenological starting point to characterise the differing affordances and meanings of the two systems. I have also been deeply influenced by my own personal and professional experience as a language learner and language teacher, and likewise by my personal experience as a music learner (piano and voice) and my professional experience as a vocal accompanist/repetiteur. So when I think and particularly when I write about these issues, always in the back of my mind is the nagging thought "How is this going to be useful to performers", by which term I include learners and teachers and users of language and music.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the metafunctions are not slippery; they are very clearly defined. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8):

The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world. … The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language, with the adoption and assignment of speech roles, with the negotiation of attitudes, and so on — it is language in the praxis of intersubjectivity, as a resource for interacting with others. The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared.

For more detailed discussion, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 511-32).

[2] To be clear, this 3x3 model does not apply to semiotic systems other than language because language is unique in having a content plane that is stratified into semantics and grammar (Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: xi). This is demonstrated by the fact that it is not possible to read aloud the texts of such systems. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 600) point out:

… through projection, we construe the experience of 'meaning' — as a layered, or stratified, phenomenon, with 'meanings' projected by sensing and 'wordings' projected by saying …

[3] To be clear, this is the opposite of SFL methodology, in as much as it gives priority to view 'from below', expression, rather than the view 'from above', the meaning that is expressed.

[4] To be clear, the human voice is not the default expression of music. Rather, it is the default expression of song, that is, of language that is organised on the basis of music variables.

[5] To be clear, as supporting argument for McDonald's model, this is another instance of the logical fallacy known as the Appeal to accomplishment – an assertion is deemed true or false based on the accomplishments of the proposer. 

Ed McDonald's Argument For An Obligatory Multi-Semiotic Theoretical Approach

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 19 Nov 2023, at 14:02:

Secondly, a recommendation for an obligatory multi-semiotic theoretical approach whichever semiotic system we're examining.

(2) What can they know of [metafunctions] who only [language] know

Given that those of us working in SFL, whatever else we are, are almost inevitably linguists, we can take it that we will always be "aware of" language - but at the same time we need, I believe, to acknowledge that other semiotic systems may not necessarily show the same configuration of stratification and metafunction as we take to be characteristic of language.…

McDonald (Understanding BL dramas / discourse analysis... in draft):

Although I said that a social semiotic perspective is a useful one here, in practice I find much of the actual analysis carried out within social semiotic frameworks inadequate for the purpose [of accounting for the text as a whole, in all its complexity but at the same time coherence], largely because scholars have struggled to free themselves from the theoretical influence of linguistics, and from the analytical practice of continually invoking the meanings of language in order to explain those of other semiotic systems.... 

My general criticism would be that while the social semiotic frameworks currently in use are very good at dealing with the “combination”, of delineating the whats and hows of the multimodal text as a whole, they are less good at accounting for the “contribution”, at capturing the basic duality of each semiotic system, what I like to call interpretation and expression, without constant resource to language as the ground of explanation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for those working in SFL, according to SFL Theory, following Hjelmslev, all semiotic systems are stratified into content and expression planes and, following Halliday, only the content plane of language is stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar. The fact that other semiotic systems do not include a lexicogrammatical stratum is demonstrated by the fact that they cannot be read aloud as language can. (It is the stratum of wording that is projected by the process of saying.)

With regard to the metafunctions, in SFL Theory, these are very general functions that lie behind all meaning making. Although different social semiotic systems can be expected to vary in the systems of each metafunction, the metafunctions themselves can be expected to be recognisable in virtually all adult social semiotic systems. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3) write:

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

[2] To be clear, the use of 'largely because' here presents a bare assertion (the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit) as if it were a reasoned argument. McDonald's unsupported claim is that social semiotic analyses of non-linguistic social semiotic systems are inadequate because they apply models theorised on the basis of linguistic social semiotic systems.

[3] To be clear, this is another bare assertion (ipse dixit). Here the previous bare assertion about the inadequacy of social semiotic analyses of non-linguistic social semiotic systems is elaborated by an unsupported claim of what they are 'less good at'.

David Rose On There Being No Important Differences Between Martin And Halliday & Hasan

David Rose replied to Attia Rasool on SYSFLING on 16 Sept 2023 at 09:32:

There are no important differences between Martin’s, Halliday’s and Hasan’s approaches in SFL. Halliday’s major contribution was developing SFL theory in the process of describing lexicogrammar and intonation through the 1960-70s. He and Hasan used the work on lexicogrammar to describe structures of discourse as ‘cohesion’ in 1976. Hasan was also trained as a sociologist. She and Halliday both used the work on lexicogrammar to interpret aspects of social contexts in their later work.

Martin used Halliday’s and Hasan’s work on lexicogrammar and discourse to describe discourse semantic systems. His foundational English Text (1992) explains carefully how this work builds on their research. It should be read closely by anyone interested in SFL.

Martin also extended SFL theory to social context, describing field, tenor and mode as semiotic systems, realised in language, and genre as a semiotic system realised in field, tenor and mode. This work has been widely applied to research in education and other fields.

Martin and colleagues then built on Kress and van Leeuwen’s work on images to describe other modalities as semiotic systems. Martin and colleagues have also integrated Halliday’s, Hasan’s and others’ research on ‘users’ and ‘uses’ of language, as individuation and instantiation.

Work on individuation helps to understand various alignments within the SFL community in terms of affiliation, or bonding around icons. As the founder of the field, Halliday has been iconised, so that SFL work beyond his was sometimes seen as too different and less legitimate. This is not the view of younger generations.

Measured objectively, by far the most influential figures in SFL have been Halliday with [almost 200,000] citations, and Martin with almost 100,000 citations. Other leaders in SFL have only a fraction of these followers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because there are very many important irreconcilable differences, all deriving from Martin's misunderstandings of Halliday's theory. See some of the evidence at:

Review of Martin (1992)
Review of Bateman (1998)
Review of Martin & Rose (2007)
Review of Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010)
Review of Martin (2013)
Review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019)
Review of Martin & Doran (2023)

[2] This is potentially misleading. Halliday's "major contribution" was to actually formulate SFL theory, developing it, in the 1970s, from his 1960s theory, Scale & Category Grammar. The integration of all the dimensions that the theory assigns to language is Halliday's work. Without Halliday, SFL Theory does not exist; without Martin, it does. 

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Hasan (1976) theorises the lexicogrammatical systems of cohesion, a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction. Later, Martin (1992) rebranded his misunderstandings of their non-structural systems as his structural systems of discourse semantics. See the evidence at Review of Martin (1992).

[4] This is potentially misleading. In the 1960s, Hasan worked at the Sociolinguistic Research Centre with Basil Bernstein.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Hasan did not interpret context in terms of the lexicogrammar. Halliday used Hjelmslev's notion of a connotative semiotic to stratify context in relation to language, and projected the notion of metafunction onto context as the systems of field, tenor and mode.

[6] For the closest of all readings of Martin (1992), see  Review of Martin (1992).

[7] This is very misleading indeed, because it credits Martin with Halliday's work. It was Halliday who modelled context in terms of field, tenor and mode. Martin's "contribution" was to misunderstand context (the culture as semiotic system) as register (a diatypic variety of language). See the evidence at Review of Martin (1992).

[8] To be clear, Martin's genre is a confusion of text type (register viewed from the instance pole), mode (textual context) and semantics not organised by metafunction. It unwittingly proposes that stages of a narrative ("genre"), for example, are realised by the relative social status of the speaker and addressee (tenor). See the evidence here, here and here.

[9] For some of the misunderstandings in Martin's work on pictorial semiosis, see here (Working With Discourse) and here (Deploying Functional Grammar). For theoretical and ethical problems with "Martin's" work on "paralanguage", see Martin's Model Of Paralanguage.

[10] To be clear, Martin does not understand instantiation; evidence here, here and here. And as previously explained, Martin's model of individuation incongruously maps a meronymic taxonomy (affiliation) onto a hyponymic taxonomy (individuation). See the previous post David Rose On Martin's Context-Bound/Free And Individuation As Allocation/Affiliation.

[11] See The Tactics Of The Disciplinarian Head Of The Martin Faith Community.

[12] To be clear, here Rose implies that Martin's work has been rejected because it is too different or less legitimate, rather than because it is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and itself. See also The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

[13] To be clear, here Rose is talking of Martin's former and current students.

[14] To be clear, this confuses quantity (citations) with quality (theoretical integrity). The most reliable interpreter of Halliday, by far, is Christian Matthiessen. A meticulous review of his 700+ page book, Lexicogrammatical Cartography, warranted only 41 critiques.

[15] See The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

John Bateman On Dimensions Across Semiotic Modes

John Bateman replied to David Rose on Sysfling on 26/8/23 at 20:16:

… But the following [from Rose] is very nice to hear:

Metafunctionality as I tried to suggest, is a property of lg that its syntagmatic structuring has evolved to enable, together with ranks and strata. So it’s basic to lg but not to semiotic modes in general.

I'm wondering how well that statement goes down more generally: consequences should actually follow.

I think the question of what dimensions are common across semiotic modes is very interesting and also central for a semiotics. I'd readily take rank to have to be present, otherwise axis has no domain (s) to operate in. Structural configurations have to be configurations of something. Stratification is also a good bet. Moreover, since semiosis is inherently dynamic, we'll have instantiation and sedimentation relating to reservoires and repositories I'd expect. These would all seem to be necessarily bound up in a single 'definition' of a particular kind of signs for my money. This means there is no 'picking and choosing' to do. …

Metafunction again turns up there as a bit of a swamp... the original idea of "distinctive regions of relatively interdependent systems" gets tricky without sufficiently strongly motivated systems. And I am not yet sure to what extent the different kinds of structure (which I like a lot) actually match well with kinds of functions parallel to linguistically motivated metafunctions in nonverbal semiotic modes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not "very nice to hear" from a theoretical point of view. See David Rose Misunderstanding Metafunctionality And Axis (Inter Alia).

[2] To be clear, rank is one way of modelling formal constituency. In language, rank is a dimension of lexicogrammar and phonology/graphology. Therefore, in modelling semiotic systems without a grammar — that is, those other than language — rank can only be a dimension of the expression plane, not the content plane.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. To be clear, semantics has no rank scale because it has no forms to rank, and yet semantics is modelled with both axes, paradigmatic and syntagmatic; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

Bateman's false claim derives from two theoretical misunderstandings. Firstly, rank is not the domain of axis. Axis and rank are distinct local dimensions. Axis has two orders: the paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Rank has four orders: clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme in lexicogrammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

Secondly, structures are configurations of functions (Senser^Process) not rankscale forms (nominal group ^ verbal group). The sequencing of formal units is a syntagm.

[4] To be clear, without the stratification of content and expression, there can be no semiotic system. Semiosis requires that a Token means a Value. However, the stratification of the content plane is restricted to language, as demonstrated by the fact that only language can be read aloud, since the locutions that a Sayer projects are the wordings of the lexicogrammatical stratum.

[5] This is possibly a garbled reference to 'reservoir' and 'repertoire' in Martin's Bernstein-derived model of individuation.

[6] To be clear, this misrepresents the metafunctions. The metafunctions are "strongly motivated" as the basic types of meaning: construing experience as meaning, enacting intersubjective relations as meaning, and weaving these together as text. Each of these understandings of the metafunctions can be applied to semiotic systems. Indeed, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3) are sceptical of there being full semiotic systems without metafunctions:

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. … There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain.

Bradley Smith On Music And Metafunction

Bradley Smith replied to Ed McDonald on Sysfling on 25/8/23 at 10:08:

in thinking about the semiosis/semiotics of music, it has always seemed to me that the same problem occurs as in intonation study: our scope for what we consider to be 'meaning'. In intonation study, much that I consider 'meaning' has been dismissed as emotional reflexes or some such, as though those reflexes aren't grounded in some communication of meaning! So, the same with music: what meanings are there in music, beyond those found in other semiotic modes? From there, in terms of metafunction, the next question I would ask is, can we see prosodies or periodicities in music, and how are they realised? I happen to have a fundamental faith in the theory of metafunction, distinguished via prosodic and periodic expression, I have found it essential to understanding how tone group and clause interact, together and with body language, for example, as in the recent Paralanguage book.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, to date, no-one has been able to devise system networks for the content plane of music, together with realisation statements specifying how the systems are realised structurally; nor has anyone been able to identify how content plane systems are realised by expression plane systems and their structures.

For the view that music is not a socio-semiotic system, but a social system expanded by socio-semiotic systems such as theory, notation and lyrics, see Making Sense Of Music.

[2] To be clear, prosodies and periodicities are the types of structure favoured by the interpersonal and textual metafunctions, so Smith's question is 'how are structures realised?'. In SFL Theory, function structures (e.g. Senser ^ Process) are realised by syntagms of classes of units at the lower rank (e.g. nominal group ^ verbal group). That is, the question presumes that music has not only a grammar, but a grammar with a rank scale of grammatical forms. For Halliday, on the other hand, language is the only semiotic system that has a stratified content plane with a grammar; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 602ff).

[3] To be clear, here Smith gives priority to the view 'from below', structure, and suggests that structure types distinguish the metafunctions. SFL Theory, on the other hand, gives priority to view 'from above', so that it is the metafunctions that engender different types of structure.

[4] See 

• Modelling Paralanguage Using Systemic Functional Semiotics (Ngo et al. 2022)
• Buyer Beware!
• Martin's Model Of Paralanguage

David Rose Misunderstanding Metafunctionality And Axis (Inter Alia)

David Rose replied to Yaegan Doran and John Bateman on Sysfling on 25 August 2023 at 8:40:

This makes excellent sense. Metafunctionality as I tried to suggest, is a property of lg that its syntagmatic structuring has evolved to enable, together with ranks and strata. So it’s basic to lg but not to semiotic modes in general.

My original point was that axis is the basis of semiosis and that these are all dimensions in which axis proliferates in lg. John singled out metafunction as less basic than the others (for his own ends we now see).

What about ranks and strata? Lg has a stratified content plane and elaborate rank systems in grammar and phonology. Again metafunctionality is enabled by the evolved syntagmatic structuring of texts, clauses, groups, words and morphemes, together with tone groups, feet and syllables.

How much of these are basic to other modalities?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Rose is endorsing Doran's misunderstanding of the metafunctions in mathematical and chemical symbolism. For detailed reasons as to why it does not make excellent sense, see the previous post Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism.

[2] To be clear, here Rose gives priority to the view 'from below', structure, and suggests that structure evolved to enable metafunctional meanings. This would mean, for example, that Theme^Rheme structure evolved to enable the textual metafunction. 

In SFL Theory, on the other hand, it is the other way round: priority is given to the view 'from above', system and meaning, and it is the different systems of metafunctional meaning that are realised as different types of structure. 

[3] It is not clear here, if Rose is suggesting that ranks and strata evolved to enable the metafunctions, or that ranks and strata were enabled by syntagmatic structuring. In any case, neither suggestion is tenable. Rank is a local dimension and the ordering principle of structure, and stratification is a global dimension whose organising principle is realisation. Metafunction is a distinct global dimension with a distinct ordering principle. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):

[4] To be clear, the insights of SFL Theory suggest the opposite point of view: that no all-purpose semiotic system could evolve without the metafunctions. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, axis is a local dimension whose orders are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Since there are semiotic systems without syntagmatic chaining, such as protolanguage, axis cannot be the basis of semiosis. A more fundamental dimension is Saussure's distinction between the two components of the sign, signified and signifier, which SFL Theory models as the dimension of stratification: content and expression.

[6] To be clear, here Rose gives priority to the view 'from below', phonological form, and suggests that phonological form evolved to enable metafunctional meanings. This would mean, for example, that the foot evolved to enable the textual metafunction.

In SFL Theory, on the other hand, it is the other way round: priority is given to the view 'from above', content, and it is metafunctional content that is realised by phonological forms.

Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism

Yaegan Doran wrote to Sysfling on 25 August 2023 at 7:09:

… we should be wary of metafunctions being considered a basic theoretical parameter for the description of semiotic resources in general.

A basic argument I put in a paper once was:

‘If we take metafunctionality to be the one of the broadest means by which these traditions [SFL/Social Semiotics] conceptualize the intrinsic functionality of semiotic resources, by simply assuming metafunctions across semiosis, we run the risk of homogenizing descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described (i.e. English). That is, we risk watering down the specific functionality of each resource.’

Rather, following people working in language description at the time, I tried to tease these issues out for mathematical symbolism in the attached paper (and in more detail in my 2018 book Discourse of Physics), by attempting to ‘derive’ metafunctionality from axis (following Martin’s 2013 book on axis). Maths, I figured (with years of excellent help from many), would prove a useful point of contrast to language by virtue of regular common-sense comparisons that considered it to ‘be’ language/a language. But despite its comparability to language, I could find no evidence in the internal systemic/structural organisation of mathematical symbolism for an interpersonal component, and it was really pushing it to interpret an experiential component. But I tried to suggest that there was a major component comparable to the logical in language and a smaller independent one comparable to the textual. Nonetheless, I do think it much closer to language in this regard than most other resources, and so if even it struggles to fill out the full metafunctional complement, we should not assume it across the board (though metafunction is of course still a useful way in for analysis/application that is less concerned with descriptive/theoretical development – which I also tried to emphasise in the attached paper).

Along similar lines, Yu Zhigang followed this up by looking at the range of symbolism used in chemistry and concluded similarly – that the logical dominated, that there was little evidence for an interpersonal, that there was an even smaller textual component than maths, but there was in fact something comparable to an experiential. But he went a little further, and noted that some structuring principles that we often associate with interpersonal meaning in language – i.e. prosodic structure – occurred in various chemical symbolisms, but seemed to have become ‘ideationalised’ in that they were used to realise meaning related to field, not tenor.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not just an argument against the metafunctional dimension of the theory, but against any dimension of the theory, and so against the theory itself, since in this view, using a theory that was devised for English, SFL, runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. The same argument could be made against generalising Newton's theory of gravitation from falling apples to orbiting heavenly bodies, since it runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. 

[2] To be clear, the metafunctions cannot be derived from axis, even if axis is properly understood. This is not least because they are independent dimensions, with different scopes, and organised according to different principles. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):

That is, the local distinction between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders of axis entails nothing about the global distinctions between construing experience as meaning, enacting intersubjective relations as meaning, and creating text from the two.

For some of the theoretical misunderstandings of axis in Martin (2013), see the review here.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, mathematics is a contextual semiotic that is realised in language (e.g. algebraic equations) and a pictorial semiotic (e.g. geometric diagrams). The proof that equations, for example, are language is that, unlike non-language, they can be read aloud. This is because what is projected by saying, locutions, constitutes the lexicogrammatical stratum, and language is the only semiotic system with a stratified content plane. This is why bi-stratal systems, like pictorial semiotics, cannot be read aloud.

[4] To be clear, this is the logical fallacy known as the Argument from ignorance:

Argument from ignorance (from Latin: argumentum ad ignorantiam), also known as appeal to ignorance (in which ignorance represents "a lack of contrary evidence"), is a fallacy in informal logic. It asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false or a proposition is false because it has not yet been proven true. This represents a type of false dichotomy in that it excludes the possibility that there may have been an insufficient investigation to prove that the proposition is either true or false.

Here Doran has misconstrued absence of evidence as evidence of absence. The evidence for the interpersonal metafunction in mathematical symbolism is manifold. For example, mathematical symbolism is language, so it enacts interpersonal meaning. As language, the equation E = mc² is a proposition realised by a declarative clause that can argued as valid or not whether it is expressed this way or as energy equals mass times the speed of light squared. If there were no interpersonal meaning in mathematical symbolism, then mathematicians would not be able to argue for or against their validity.

[5] To be clear, mathematical symbolism is deployed in many sciences precisely because it construes experience as meaning. As language, a mathematical equation is a figure of being realised by an intensive identifying relational clause, and the solving of an equation is the iterated elaboration of the clause until one or more unknown Tokens is decoded by reference to a Value.

[6] To be clear, the logical metafunction is concerned with the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection, so it requires experiential meanings to relate logically to one another. Every equation is an intensive identifying clause that construes an elaborating logical relation between a Token and a Value, and the solving of an equation entails a clause complex in which all clauses are logically related through elaboration. The logical relation of extension, for example, is manifested in processes of addition and subtraction.

[7] To be clear, none of the metafunctions is independent of the others. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

More specifically, the textual metafunction requires the other metafunctions, since its function is to operationalise them. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8, 398):

The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared. … 

The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them…

Every mathematical equation is organised in terms of Theme and information; see [4] above.

[8] To be clear, given the explanatory power of the metafunctions, it would be more prudent to assume that they are a dimension of a semiotic system until it is proved otherwise. As explained above in [4], Doran mistook his inability to identify the metafunctions in mathematical symbolism for evidence that they are not a dimension of its systems. 

[9] To be clear, Yu Zhigang is Doran's collaborator, rather than a scholar working independently of Doran. More importantly, what is said above about mathematical symbolism also applies to chemical symbolism. For example:

∞

See also Yaegan Doran Failing To Recognise The Interpersonal Metafunction In Mathematics.

David Rose Misunderstanding The Ontogenetic Move From Protolanguage To Language

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 August 2023 at 23:10:

The syntagms of infant protolanguage can’t handle multiple functions. The ontogenetic breakthrough comes with coupling of interpersonal with ideational functions. That’s what the syntagms of language have evolved to enable. The infant recapitulates that phylogenesis through interaction with caregivers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents protolanguage. To be clear, infant protolanguage does not have syntagms, since syntagms are sequences of classes of lexicogrammatical form, and protolanguage has no lexicogrammar, and so no lexicogrammatical form (e.g. words), an so no classes of lexicogrammatical form to sequence in syntagms.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. The ontogenetic move from protolanguage to language does not include the coupling of interpersonal and ideational functions in syntagms provided by protolanguage. This is not only because protolanguage does not provide syntagms, but also because all the metafunctions emerge together. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not.

[3] On the one hand, this misunderstands evolution. Properties don't evolve in order to function advantageously in some context (Cause: purpose); they are selected because they function advantageously in some context (Cause: reason).

On the other hand, Rose is taking the opposite perspective on semogenesis from the SFL perspective, viewing it 'from below' in terms of form (syntagm) instead of 'from above' in terms of system and function.

[4] Importantly, ontogenesis does not recapitulate phylogenesis; see Recapitulation Theory. For example, a child learning Modern English does not recapitulate the moves from Old English to Middle English to Modern English. Instead, an ontogenetic trajectory that emerged at an earlier time in phylogenesis is maintained at later times in phylogenesis.

David Rose Misunderstanding The Dimensions Of SFL Theory Through Biological Analogies

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 23 August 2023 at 21:02:

It’s a missing piece of other theories John, but central to SFS. 

It originates and is reproduced in interaction, the original replicating nucleus of semiosis, analogous with the original proteins of life... always replicating in/as a community. 

As those proteins make life possible, axis makes culture possible. 

Its ideational and textual functions are much later developments, like the eukaryotic cell... ranks the first multicellular organisms, strata the first complex ones (the proteins of which we still share with all other organisms).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is nucleic acids, not proteins, that replicate in biological systems. But even with this correction, the analogy is invalid, since if anything replicates in semiosis, it is in the semiotic system, not the interactions of meaners.

[2] To be clear, proteins make life possible in the sense that they are the expressions (Tokens) of genes (Values). Axis, on the other hand, in SFL Theory, is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Culture, by contrast, is the contextual semiotic realised by language and other social semiotic systems. Thus, it is not axis that makes culture possible but social semiosis.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstands the metafunctions as independent of one another. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not.

[4] To be clear, the eukaryotic cell was a phenotypic innovation in biological evolution, whereas the metafunctions were in language from the start as types of meaning that might be said to have "phenotypic effects".

[5] To be clear, multicellular organisms arose from the aggregation of eukaryotic cells, but ranks did not arise from the aggregation of the ideational and textual metafunctions. Rank is one way of modelling formal constituency.

[6] To be clear, complex multicellular organisms evolved from simpler multicellular organisms, but strata did not evolve from rank. Strata are different levels of symbolic abstraction, different perspectives on the one phenomenon, and are a dimension of all semiotic systems from the start, though only language has a stratified content plane.

David Rose On Interpersonal Meaning As "Embodied In Feelings"

David Rose replied to Graham Lock on Sysfling on 23 Mar 2023, at 22:29:

What I find amazing in all your questions is that the machine has astounding control over interpersonal meanings. Astounding because I’ve always assumed that interpersonal meanings are embodied in feelings. The machine is showing us that interpersonal values are just as abstract as other meanings. That they’re learnt.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the one hand, interpersonal meanings cannot be reduced to "embodied in feelings". For example, the propositions one and one make two and the car is in the backyard are clearly not "embodied in feeling". On the other hand, 'feelings' are construed ideationally as well as enacted interpersonally. For example, the clause he felt happy is a construal of experience as ideational meaning.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, interpersonal meanings are of the same level of abstraction as ideational meanings: semantics.

[3] To be clear, the 'straw man' notion that interpersonal meanings are not learnt is nonsensical. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday's Development Of SFL Theory

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 29/7/22 at 13:21:

As quoted earlier, axis was the breakthrough that opened up metafunctions and rank scale system/structure cycles, which I’ve tried to symbolise with this diagram (hexagons borrowed from Giacomo Figueredo)...

But there was a tension with the earlier model predating axis, that assumed the abstraction relation lay between grammar as form and semantics as substance, and kept being repeated alongside axis...

The term «meaning» has traditionally been restricted to the input end of the language system: the «content plane», in Hjelmslev's terms, and more specifically to the relations of the semantic interface, Hjelmslev's «content substance». We will therefore use «meaning potential» just to refer to the semantic options (although we would regard it as an adequate designation for language as a whole).

This historically nuanced conditional formulation then gets reduced to a catchphrase...

Grammar is what the speaker CAN SAY, and is the realisation of what he means. Semantics is what he CAN MEAN

...which is later cemented as the commonsensical triad ‘meaning, wording, sounding’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. Halliday (2002: 12) summarises the development of his theorising as follows:

The steps that have seemed to me perhaps most critical in this endeavour might be summarised as: the unity of lexicogrammar; the priority of the view ‘from above’, from meaning and function; the move into systemics (system networks), freeing the grammar from the restrictions imposed by structure; the metafunctional foundation, disentangling the strands of meaning that are woven together in the syntax; the construction of language by children, from protolanguage to mother tongue; the decoupling and recoupling of lexicogrammar and semantics – the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor; the conceptualising of the relation between system and text (instantiation) and the probabilistic nature of linguistic systems.

That is, according to Halliday, it was not axis, but giving priority to the view 'from' above (meaning and function over form), and to system over structure, that opened up the development of Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[3] To be clear, the notion of axis, system vs structure, has appeared in Halliday's work since his first paper Some Aspects of Systematic Description and Comparison in Grammatical Analysis (Halliday 1957), though the term 'axis' was not used until Class in Relation to the Axes of Chain and Choice in Language (1963). 

That is, there is no Hallidayan model that predates the notion of axis, and the model that predates the term 'axis' is not Systemic Functional Grammar, but a different theory: Scale & Category Grammar, expounded in Categories of the Theory of Grammar (Halliday 1961). Any supposed tension then, is between a discarded theory and its replacement.

[4] This bare assertion bears no relation to the quote from Halliday (1972) that follows it as its support. The quote makes no mention of axis, and merely specifies how the term 'meaning potential' will be used, relative to traditional usages of 'meaning' (interpreted in terms of Hjelmslev's model).

[5] To be clear, the quote from Halliday (1972) that follows this misrepresentation of the previous quote as a 'historically nuanced conditional formulation' is not a reduced "catchphrase" of it. Where the previous quote is concerned with the term 'meaning potential', the quote that follows is concerned with the distinction between lexicogrammar and semantics, explaining that lexicogrammar is what can be verbally projected (say), semantics is what we can mentally project (mean), and the former realises the latter.

[6] To be clear, there is no "cementing" here, and these folk terms also cover phonology (sounding), which is not mentioned in the quotes that precede.