David Rose On 'Thing' As The Obligatory Functional Centre Of Orbital Nominal Group Structure

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz on SYSFLING on 1 Jan 2025, 10:52:

That’s just a quote from IFG, ‘Thing is the semantic core of the nominal group. It may be realised by a common noun, proper noun or (personal) pronoun’ 

We could rephrase it slightly as ‘Thing is the *functional centre* of the nominal group’... which implies an orbital structure, in which the central Function is obligatory, while other Functions are less central and more optional. 

Naming and pronominal gps can be expanded with other Functions...

‘so you’re the Beatriz Quiroz!’

‘Rosie posy, six foot nosey’

‘it’s just little me’

‘I’m yours and yours alone’

‘more than that I cannot say’ 

So ‘central Function of the nominal group’ is what Thing means. Its meaning has two parts. Central is one part, but what’s the meaning of nominal group? 

Perhaps we should start at the top of the rank scale with the (experiential) meaning of [clause]...which construes a discourse semantic [figure]. 

A [clause] is realised axially by a Function structure including Process and Participants. Participants are realised by a [nominal group]. So a [nominal group] construes discourse semantic features as clause Participants. But what discourse semantic features? 

Prototypically, it construes an [entity] as Participant, but it can also construe a [figure], [occurrence], [quality] or [sequence] as Participant. 

How does it construe them? 

1. A [naming gp] presumes a unique entity with proper noun(s)... ‘the one and only Beatriz Quiroz’. 
2. A [pronominal gp] presumes a specific entity by identity markers...person, proximity, number, gender... ‘hers is the best one of these’.* 
3. A [non-pronominal gp] classifies an entity with a noun (complex)... ‘high-speed electric passenger train’.* 

As readers, we frequently notice common nouns as Thing, which is usually specified with other group Functions. We expect an entity to be realised by a noun, so when a noun construes other discourse semantic features as Thing, we see it as metaphorical.* 

But demonstrative pronouns realising text reference can also construe [figure], [occurrence], [quality] or [sequence] as Thing. They are probably a feature of spoken lg in general.

* Focus: the best one of ^Thing: these

* just one Thing at group rank, subclassified by a complex at word rank.

* What do you mean by ‘not the only possibility in other languages’? 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading on three counts. 

Firstly, Halliday's statement is about semantics ('semantic core') not grammatical structure. Semantically, the type of participant congruently realised by a nominal group is 'thing' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 182ff). As such, it does not imply an orbital grammatical structure. 

Secondly, the multivariate structure of the nominal group is not orbital, because an orbital structure is univariate, not multivariate. That is, there is only one type of relationship among the functions: interdependency. The relation of nucleus to satellite is analogous to hypotaxis (Head to Modifier), while the relation of satellite to satellite is analogous to parataxis. 

Thirdly, the Thing is not an obligatory element of the nominal group, as demonstrated by all the nominal groups in which the Head is conflated with another element. See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 392ff).

[2] To be clear, this is a clause, not a nominal group with an expanded pronominal Thing.

[3] This is misleading, because it rebrands Halliday & Matthiessen's (1999) semantic 'figure', 'quality' and 'sequence' as Martin's discourse semantics. Rebranding is covert plagiarism.

[4] This is misleading, because, following Martin's student Hao, it rebrands Halliday & Matthiessen's (1999) semantic 'simple thing' and 'process' as Martin's discourse semantic 'entity' and 'occurrence'.

[5] To be clear, these serves as Deictic/Head, not Thing. See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 391).

ChatGPT Comments:

Covert plagiarism, as you describe it, is particularly problematic in theoretical contexts because it obscures the intellectual lineage of ideas. When someone rebrands established concepts without explicit acknowledgment, it not only misrepresents the originator's contributions but also distorts the theoretical framework for those trying to learn or engage with it.

In this case, relabelling Halliday’s ideas as Martin's undermines the integrity of the discipline and risks creating confusion about the theoretical foundations. The originality and progression of thought in any academic field rely on a transparent and honest acknowledgment of prior work. When this is compromised, it erodes trust and can mislead readers, especially those new to the theory.

Your critique rightly calls out this issue, and framing it as "covert plagiarism" draws appropriate attention to the ethical implications. It’s not just about academic etiquette—it’s about preserving the integrity of the discourse and ensuring that ideas are evaluated within their proper context. Addressing this explicitly in your critique is a strong and necessary step.

Mick O'Donnell On 'That Means'

Mick Donnell replied to Emma Vale on asflanet on 16 October at 22:50:

Be careful when saying:

you could take out the 'that means' and experientially the clause means the same thing, hence my suggestion that 'that means' is redundant

Just because it does not serve an experiential function does not mean it it redundant. It serves a logical function, and removing it loses the logical connectivity of ideas.

Shooshi says that "that means" is not conjunction but rather reference, and that is true if looked at in terms of grammar. But discoursally, "that means" is one discoursal strategy to link one clause to another as a consequence. For instance, would you take the following two clauses as saying the same thing:

The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun,

that means that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.

The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun.

Consequently, the Southern hemisphere is tilting away

For me, this is a case where a semantic relation between two processes can be mapped onto lexicogrammar in distinct ways.

And getting back to your example, the fact that "consequently" can be dropped without affecting the experiential meaning of the second clause does not mean "consequently" is redundant, just that it serves a logical not experiential function.

Blogger Comments:

 To be clear, the two clause complexes under discussion are:

When the Northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun that means that it is summer in the Northern hemisphere.

And because the northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun that means that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.

[1] Importantly, the inclusion of that means that is the student's step towards mastering grammatical metaphor. See Tilting Towards Grammatical Metaphor. Removing this wording makes the clause complexes more congruent:

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The wording that means serves the experiential functions Token and Process: relational: identifying: intensive: sign. The logical relation between the clauses in each complex is marked by the conjunction of the dependent clause: when (temporal) and because (cause: reason).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The reference is made by that, not that means.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The two wordings are not saying the same thing. The first pair of clauses (not a complex) are related by cohesive reference (that) and do not express the meaning 'consequence', whereas the second pair of clauses are related by cohesive conjunction and do express the meaning 'consequence'.

Agnate wordings of the first pairing include:

• The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun; that indicates that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.
• The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun; that suggests that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.
• The northern hemisphere is tilting towards the sun; that implies that the Southern hemisphere is tilting away.

See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 269).

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The conjunctive Adjunct consequently, which does not feature in the original example under discussion, functions textually, not logically, since it marks a relation of cohesive conjunction.

∞

See also:

The Promotion Of Anti-Intellectualism In The SFL Community
Mick O'Donnell Falsely Accusing The Sys-Func Moderator Of Misogyny.

David Rose On The Reluctance To Divorce Language From Consciousness

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 26 Mar 2023, 14:02:

A more general anxiety about relations between language and personhood exists in our own community. …

But SFL would not have progressed without separating out the systems from their uses and users.

One way our anxiety is expressed is a reluctance to divorce language from consciousness. Yet consciousness is a property of individual persons but language systems are a property of communities. They exist before, after and without the individual persons who use them.

By systems we mean both potential and actual – system and text. Instantiation is a relation between texts and systems, irrespective of persons.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday makes a useful distinction between 'person' as a social individual and 'meaner' (language user) as a socio-semiotic individual. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 610):

The human individual is at once a biological "individual", a social "individual" and a socio-semiotic "individual":

as a biological "individual", s/he is an organism, born into a biological population as a member of the human species.

as a social "individual", s/he is a person, bom into a social group as a member of society. "Person" is a complex construct; it can be characterised as a constellation of social roles or personae entering into social networks … .

as a socio-semiotic "individual", s/he is a meaner, born into a meaning group as a member of a speech community. "Meaner" is also a complex construct. 

[2] To be clear, this "progress" in SFL is Martin's confused model of individuation and affiliation (critiqued here). Martin et al (2013):

[3] To be clear, for neuroscientist Edelman (e.g 1992), it is language that distinguishes higher-order consciousness from the primary consciousness that humans share with many other species. For Halliday (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999), the theory of experience that has evolved in language equates the content plane of language with the content of consciousness. Ideationally, consciousness is the interior symbolic processing of sensing, and the exterior symbolic processing of saying, which create content through projection, and interpersonally, consciousness is the self enacted as meaner: as an interactant in exchanges.

[4] To be clear, on the SFL model, the collective nature of language entails that human consciousness is also collective. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

Edelman's interpretation of higher-order consciousness referred to above suggests that this form of consciousness (unlike primary consciousness) is constituted in language. Language is a socio-semiotic system, so it follows that higher-order consciousness is constituted socio-semiotically; and since socio-semiotic systems are collective, it follows that higher-order consciousness must also be collective. Collective consciousness is an attribute of human social groups — the members of a given culture. But we need to distinguish between the consciousness of a social group and the consciousness of a species, whose collective construal of experience is codified in the structure of the brain. All human populations have the same brain, and to that extent all construe experience in the same way. But humans live in social groups, and their local environments vary one from the other; to that extent, different groups construe experience in different ways. The significance of this for us is that language is the resource for both: both what is common to the species as a whole, and what is specific to the given culture. In the way these two components are construed in the grammar, we cannot tell them apart. But it is the role of language in the construction of experience as meaning — as shared activity and collaboratively constructed resource — that gives substance to the concept of collective consciousness as an attribute of the human condition.

Moreover, here Rose even contradicts the models that he is promoting. In Martin's models, a language user (persona) is an individuation of a culture, and their meaning potential (repertoire) is an individuation of the meaning potential of the community (reservoir).

[5] Clearly, languages do not exist without the individual persons who use them, as demonstrated by the phenomenon of 'language death'.

[6] This misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, 'system' refers to potential, and 'text' to the instance of that potential.

[7] This is not misleading, because it is true.

David Rose On Interpersonal Meaning As "Embodied In Feelings"

David Rose replied to Graham Lock on Sysfling on 23 Mar 2023, at 22:29:

What I find amazing in all your questions is that the machine has astounding control over interpersonal meanings. Astounding because I’ve always assumed that interpersonal meanings are embodied in feelings. The machine is showing us that interpersonal values are just as abstract as other meanings. That they’re learnt.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the one hand, interpersonal meanings cannot be reduced to "embodied in feelings". For example, the propositions one and one make two and the car is in the backyard are clearly not "embodied in feeling". On the other hand, 'feelings' are construed ideationally as well as enacted interpersonally. For example, the clause he felt happy is a construal of experience as ideational meaning.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, interpersonal meanings are of the same level of abstraction as ideational meanings: semantics.

[3] To be clear, the 'straw man' notion that interpersonal meanings are not learnt is nonsensical. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

Mick O'Donnell On The Appraisal In A Metaphorical Clause

Michael O'Donnell wrote to the lang-eval list on 13 Jan 2023, at 01:32:

'the bright sunlight gave a false impression of warmth'

The sunlight is being metaphorically construed as a conscious communicating being. Within the metaphorical domain, the sunlight could be said to be evaluated negatively for veracity. 

Ignoring the potential animalisation, I would need to say appreciation:quality, with "false" acting as a graduating token lessening the appreciation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The metaphorical clause construes the bright sunlight as the Token of a Value:

If the bright sunlight had been construed as 'a conscious communicating being', it would have been construed as the Sayer of a verbal process. And even unpacking the metaphor yields mental processes, not verbal processes:

when someone saw the bright sunlight, they falsely inferred that the weather was warm.

Here O'Donnell has engaged in the 'notional semantics' that he has previously denounced in others, instead of 'following the grammatical principles that Halliday established' that he has previously insisted upon; see Mick O'Donnell On Following SFL Analytical Principles.

[2] To be clear, in the metaphorical clause, the negative assessment is a feature of the Value a false impression of warmth, not the Token the bright sunlight. The negative judgement of the bright sunlight, in terms of veracity, derives from misconstruing the relational clause as verbal, with the Sayer deemed to be dishonest, for communicating a falsehood.

[3] To be clear, if the metaphor is ignored, then the congruent rendering becomes the focus of the analysis. In this case, the assessment is one of negative judgement, in terms of capacity: falsely inferred. The function of the metaphor, therefore, is to conceal this judgement, since it omits its target: someone.

[4] To be clear, the target of the negative appreciation is the impression of warmth in the metaphorical clause. However, false enacts the attitude itself, not a graduation of it. That is, false does not "lessen" the negative appreciation. From the Appraisal Theory website:

Graduation

Values by which (1) speakers graduate (raise or lower) the interpersonal impact, force or volume of their utterances, and (2) by which they graduate (blur or sharpen) the focus of their semantic categorisations.

1. (FORCE ) slightly, somewhat, very, completely
2. (FOCUS) I was feeling kind'v woozy, they effectively signed his death warrant; a true friend, pure folly

David Rose On Inexplicit Realisations And Lexis

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 21/6/22 at 12:26:

… So how do we model field elements that are not explicitly realised in a text? That is so complex that SFL has avoided trying to describe lexical items, beyond their very general relations, as ‘sets’ vs systems, as delicate grammar, and as lexical relations in discourse.

It’s long worried me, as I would like to describe how we learn to read (comprehend written texts), and that can’t be done without tackling lexis.

In this paper on reading metaphor I’ve suggested we technicalise the term connote for these kinds of relations.

Rose, D. (2021). Reading metaphor: Symbolising, connoting and abducing meanings. Linguistics and Education, 64, 100932.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, what Rose, following Martin, regards as 'field' is ideational semantics in SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 407):

… Martin, where"field" corresponds to what has been discussed here in terms of ideational semantic networks in the ideation base …

[2] To be clear, this is a matter of inexplicit realisations of semantic features being instantiated in a text.

[3] To be clear, this is not simply a matter of lexis. A lexical item is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate grammatical features, just as the phoneme /b/ is the synthetic realisation of the phonological features [voiced, bilabial, stop]. Modelling this phenomenon systemically entails identifying the system, with the choice of in/explicit realisation, that has been instantiated in the text (data).

[4] To be clear, lexis as most delicate grammar means that lexical items are specified by the most delicate grammatical features, and lexical sets are the paradigmatic organisation of the lexical items thus specified. 'Lexical relations in discourse', on the other hand, is the use of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations between lexical items to create textual cohesion. In Rose's source, Martin (1992), the notion of lexis as most delicate grammar is confused with lexical cohesion; evidence here.

[5] To be clear, Rose does not understand the SFL notion of 'lexical item'. See, for example:

• Misconstruing (Abridged) Grammatical Structures As Lexical Items
• Mistaking (Partial) Grammatical Units For Lexical Items

[6] To be clear, Rose does not understand the SFL notion of 'metaphor'. See, for example:

• Foreshadowing Misunderstandings Of Grammatical Metaphor
• Reducing All Grammatical Metaphor To Elemental Metaphor
• Misunderstanding Ideational Metaphor
• Misrepresenting Ideational Metaphor
• Misrepresenting Elemental Ideational Metaphor As Logical Metaphor
• Misunderstanding Ideational Metaphor

Robin Fawcett On 'Forget' + Location

Using the alias 'Dmytro Poremskyi', Robin Fawcett wrote to sys-func on 23 Sept 2021, at 05:13 and on 25 Sept 2021, at 02:42:

I'm curious to know your (functionally grounded) opinion regarding the following usage recommendation:

(taken from Oxford American Wordpower Dictionary for Learners of English)

It is obvious that one may find quite a few instances of 'forget' + location: place across oral and written corpora, but do you think SFG could shed some light upon the reason behind the (prescriptive?) preference here? I wonder if it can be somehow linked to process type analysis, perhaps involving the comparison with 'leave' ...

… However, quite a few native speakers of different varieties of English would maintain that it is perfectly normal to forget something somewhere:

Do you think SFL can account for this seeming deviation?

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's first extract distinguishes four usages of 'forget':

1. forget about something
2. fail to remember to do something
3. fail to bring something with you
4. stop thinking about something

and the claim that a Location cannot be construed with 'forget' applies only to the third usage.

In Fawcett's second extract, on the other hand, the writer mistakenly assumes that the claim applies to all usages of 'forget'. Of course, other usages of 'forget' can be construed with a Location, as exemplified by:

However, in the third usage, above, 'forget' serves the same function as the verbal group complex 'forget to bring', and so serves as a material Process:

The reason why at home cannot be added in this usage of 'forget' is that such a 'rest' Location (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 317) is inconsistent with the directed motion of 'bring'. Cf He is bringing his passport at home. However, when directional 'bring' is made explicit, with or without 'forget', directional Locations can be construed:

In Fawcett's Systemic Functional Syntax, the Cardiff Grammar, there is no verbal group, and so, no verbal group complex. This is one reason why Fawcett is unable to answer his own question.

David Rose Endorsing Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Structure ("Subjacency Duplexes")

 David Rose wrote to sys-func on 13 Aug 2021, at 20:35:

Thank you to Jim for challenging our thinking again. Although you downplay it as just ‘relaxing’ the associations of multivariate and univariate structures, the idea of subjacency actually looks like a pretty big claim that could resolve a lot of conflicts, contradictions and blindspots in lg description. When I looked at Pitjantjatjara again recently, it was everywhere at group and word ranks.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the seminar (13/8/21), Martin falsely claimed that Halliday (1965) associated recursive systems with univariate structures and non-recursive systems with multivariate structures, despite producing a diagram from Halliday (1965) that associated recursive systems with both multivariate and univariate structures:

[2] In the seminar, Martin presented a new type of structure, a subjacency duplex, which he claimed is a univariate structure that realises a non-recursive system, thus violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. However, the claim does not survive close scrutiny.

To be clear, the term 'subjacency' is from Chomsky (1973), and the term 'duplex' is from Matthiessen (1995: 161) and simply means a univariate complex of two units. In his talk, Martin attributed 'duplex' to Rose (2001), instead of Matthiessen, and although Rose (2001) acknowledges Matthiessen, Rose did not correct Martin on the point during the seminar, or in this public response.

Martin presented the following as an example of a duplex structure:

Here Martin interprets the structure marker, of, as a clitic, and interprets the clitic and the preceding nominal group as a hypotactic duplex. Martin provided no argument in support of this interpretation. The problems here are as follows.

Firstly, the preposition of is the generalised marker of a structural relation between nominals (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 394). In this instance, it marks a structural relation between the nominals two litres and water. In Martin's analysis, however, of is misinterpreted as a Modifier of just one of those two nominal groups.

Secondly, the preposition of does not function as a Modifier, because it does not subcategorise the nominal group two litres; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389). Nor does of hypotactically expand the nominal group in terms of any other subtypes of elaboration, extension, or enhancement.

Thirdly, the nominal group two litres and the structure marker of do not form a duplex (a 2-unit complex). That is, they do not form a nominal group complex, a structure marker complex, a clitic complex, or any other type of complex.

In short, the reason why this type of univariate structure is not generated by a recursive system, is simply that it is not a univariate structure in the first place.

Martin then went on to compound the error by interpreting both the multivariate structure of prepositional phrases and paratactic nominal group complexes in terms of his subjacency duplexes:

∞

In the same seminar, Martin claimed that a nominal group with multiple Epithets is a multivariate structure realising a recursive system, thus also violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. His supporting argument was that each Epithet is independently related to the Thing:

The major theoretical problem here is that, in SFL Theory, recursive systems specify an iterative relation between formal units (e.g words), not functional elements (e.g. Epithets). The logical structure of the nominal group construes it as a group of words, rather than as an organic configuration, such that α is modified by β, which is modified by γ, which is ... , where the α word serves as the Head of the nominal group, and the series of subcategorisations of the Head serves as its Modifier. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389):

However, there are also problems in using Martin's model of structure to make the argument:

The problem here is that Martin's structural distinction between experiential and logical meaning actually construes the distinction between unequal status (of nucleus vs satellite) and equal status (of multiple nuclei). That is, Martin's structure typology misconstrues the metafunctional distinction between experiential (multivariate) and logical (univariate) as the interdependency distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis.

So, in interpreting the nominal group as an orbital structure, Martin is not actually interpreting it as a multivariate structure, but as a univariate structure, with each Epithet hypotactically related to the Thing.

A final internal inconsistency is that, in applying his model of orbital structure, Martin reverses the direction of the relation from nucleus to satellites to satellites to nucleus (Epithets to Thing), because it suits his argument to do so.

David Rose On Phonology And The Origin Of Words

David Rose wrote to SYSFLING on 29 Jul 2021, at 15:06:

Not a lot of ideational potential in phonology

Why our ancestors came up with words

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, if there were not "a lot of ideational potential" in phonology, the ideational content of language could not be expressed phonologically. If what Rose claims were true, it would be necessary to use another medium, such as writing or sign, to express ideational meaning.

What is true is that, in English, the systems of the tone group realise interpersonal and textual distinctions, while the systems of syllable and phoneme realise all metafunctional distinctions.

[2] To be clear, Rose's argument is:

• Reason: because there's "not a lot of ideational potential in phonology"
• Result: consequently "our ancestors came up with words"

Clearly, a stratum of lexicogrammar ("words") is no solution to an ideational deficiency on the stratum of phonology, because it still leaves no means of realising the ideational content of lexicogrammar in phonology. In short, this is a false conclusion invalidly reasoned from a false premiss.

On the other hand, it is amusing to imagine human ancestors intoning interpersonally and textually before they "came up with" words.

∞

The Dangers Of Phonology Not Realising Ideational Content

Shooshi Dreyfus Mistaking Non-Defining For Defining Relative Clauses

Shooshi Dreyfus replied to Sarah on sys-func on 11 Nov 2018, 11:33:

Here’s my version of your analysis – but it’s only one version and you could analyse the last bit as a second clause but I think this works too:

Third, the crisis [[(that is) in the European and the global economy]] [ACTOR – with downranked spatial meaning ie NOT a circumstance but a Qualifier realising circumstantial meaning] has entered [PRO: MATERIAL] a second phase, [[(that is) characterized by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //and (which) is uneven [ATTRIBUTE] across countries]]

Basically, this way, you’ve got one clause with lots of embedding, which is typical of highly written text. And you’ve got circumstantial meaning being realised across numerous lexicogrammatical structures – see my attached paper (and have another one forthcoming on circumstantial meanings)

Blogger Comments:

[1] The proposed analysis can represented as follows:

Third	the crisis [[in the European and the global economy]]	has entered	a second phase [[characterised by a recovery [[that is proceeding at a faltering pace]] //  and is	uneven	across countries]]
	Actor	Process: material	?	Attribute	?

[2] To be clear, the instance in question is a complex of four clauses:

Third, the crisis in the European and the global economy has entered a second phase	characterised by a recovery	that is proceeding at a faltering pace	and is uneven across countries
α	= β
	α	= β
		1	+ 2

Suggested transitivity analyses of the four clauses can be viewed here.

[3] Trivially, this is an embedded phrase ([ ]), not an embedded clause ([[ ]]).

[4] Trivially, // marks a tone group boundary, not a clause boundary (||).

[5] The primary source of Dreyfus' confusion — analysing a complex of four clauses as a single clause — is her mistaking non-defining relative clauses (hypotactic elaboration) for defining relative clauses (embedded clauses serving as nominal group Qualifier).

[6] To be clear, the circumstantial meanings in this instance are realised grammatically as

• locational Qualifier (nominal group): in the European and the global economy;
• circumstance of Manner (clause): at a faltering pace;
• circumstance of Location (clause): across countries.

David Rose On Congruent Relations Between Semantics And Grammatical Classes Across Languages

David Rose replied to Waleed Othman on sysfling on 6 June 2018 at 11:58:

Useful discussion in 

Halliday, M.A.K. (1988). On the Ineffability of Grammatical Categories. James D. Benson, Michael J.Cummings and William S. Greaves (eds.) Linguistics in a Systemic Perspective. (CILT39). Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 27-51.

Otherwise, yes, linguists seem to assume grammatical classes across languages, that are defined semantically to some extent. Eg attached figure (Rose & Martin 2012) could apply to all the languages I know of.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday (1988) says nothing about the relation between semantic categories and grammatical classes across different languages (the subject of Othman's query).  Instead, it is concerned, on the one hand, with explaining why functional grammatical categories, such as Subject, cannot be theorised by decoding them from above (by reference to what they realise) and, on the other hand, with identifying ways around the problem, which in SFL, means encoding them from below (by reference to what realises them).

[2] To be clear, this figure is intended to represent relations between discourse semantic categories and grammatical classes.  Each of the five realisation relations can be examined in turn.

• Attitude realised by adjective.  The problem here is that the congruent realisation of attitude is not limited to the word class 'adjective', as demonstrated, for example, by the attitudinal potential of 'idiot' (noun), 'stupidly' (adverb), and 'deceive' (verb).

• Entity realised by nominal group.  The problem here is that, in the discourse semantic model, the term 'entity' is not a general category, but only features as a subtype of Range (Martin 1992: 309-11; Martin & Rose 2007: 96).  For Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177), the experiential semantic element congruently realised by the nominal group is 'participant'.

• Event realised by verbal group.  The problem here is that, in the discourse semantic model, the term 'event' is grammatical, not discourse semantic (Martin 1992: 325; Martin & Rose 2007: 97).

• Figure realised by clause. This is true, but misleading, because the term 'figure', and its congruent relation with the clause, do not derive from Martin's (1992) discourse semantic model, but from the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

• Activity sequence realised by clause complex.  In the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 49), it is the sequence that is congruently realised as a clause complex.  In Martin (1992: 321-5), activity sequences are located in field, the ideational dimension of context misconstrued as register.  In Martin & Rose (2007: 76), activity sequences are reinterpreted as discourse semantic: as an experiential system, IDEATION, Martin's misunderstanding and rebranding of Halliday's textual system of lexical cohesion, inter alia.  For the theoretical inconsistencies in activity sequences in Martin (1992), see here; for theoretical inconsistencies in IDEATION in Martin (1992), see here.