Showing posts with label Instance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Instance. Show all posts

Saturday, 23 March 2024

David Rose On The "Slippage" Between The 1961 And 1992 Models Of Language And Context

The slippage is between 1961 and 92 models of lg and context 
61...
Lg described as semiotic systems instantiated as text (after Saussure, Firth)
Context modelled as culture instantiated as situation (after Malinowski)
Situation modelled as instantial categories of field, tenor, mode (not described as semiotic systems) 
92...
Context modelled as semiotic systems instantiated as text (after Hjelmslev)
Text instantiates systems at all strata (no ‘situation’ outside of semiosis)
Doran, Martin, Herrington describe field, tenor, mode systems as ‘resources’
Earlier classification model incorporated as ‘principles’ of instantiation


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Scale and Category Grammar differed from SFL Theory in that it had no system networks, no metafunctions, no cline of instantiation, and the level between grammar and situation was called context, not semantics. The architecture of language proposed by Scale and Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) was as follows:

1.png

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. Scale and Category Grammar ("the 1961 model") did not include a cline of instantiation.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. In Scale and Category Grammar ("the 1961 model"), 'context' referred to the equivalent of semantics in SFL Theory, and 'situation' referred to the equivalent of context in SFL Theory.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. In Scale and Category Grammar ("the 1961 model"), there were no metafunctions, and so, no metafunctional categories of situation.

[5] This is misleading because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, context is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, and field, tenor and mode constitute the projection of the metafunctions, modes of meaning, onto the culture as semiotic system.

[6] To be clear, this is the model of Martin (1992) in which Halliday's culture as semiotic system is mistakenly stratified into two perspectives on language variation: genre and register. In SFL Theory, genre, in the sense of text type, and register are at the midway point of the cline of instantiation: text type is register viewed from the instance pole, and register is text type viewed from the system pole of the cline.

[7] On the one hand, this is misleading because it falsely implies that Martin (1992) was the first to model context as semiotic. On the other hand, this is a self-contradiction, because text is an instance of language, whereas context is distinguished from language in Martin's stratification hierarchy.

[8] This is misleading because it is untrue. Hjelmslev did not model context as semiotic systems instantiated as text. Like Halliday before him, Martin used Hjelmslev's notion of a connotative semiotic as a semiotic that has a denotative semiotic, such as language, as its expression plane. Martin, however, misunderstood Hjelmslev on two counts. First, he mistook the content plane of the connotative semiotic, context, for the entire connotative semiotic. Then he mistook varieties of a denotative semiotic, genres and registers, for connotative semiotics.

[9] This repeats the self-contradiction of language (text) as an instance of non-language (context).

[10] This is misleading because it falsely claims that situation, as an instance of culture, is not modelled as semiotic, in Halliday's model.

[11] To be clear, in their model of field, tenor and mode as resources, Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024: 1) confuse context with semantics: 
In this paper, we review recent work in SFL which focuses on modelling register as a resource — reconceiving field as a resource for construing phenomena, tenor as a resource for negotiating social relations, and mode as a resource for composing texture. 
That is, having first misconstrued language (register) as context, Martin is now, with his colleagues, misconstruing context (field, tenor, mode) as language.
See also
[12] To be clear, the proposal of Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024: 12) is to remove Poynton's CONTACT and STATUS from tenor systems to make way for their misinterpretation of tenor as interpersonal semantics:
Accordingly, we will propose below that these dimensions [of contact and status] be interpreted as principles of instantiation, rather than as tenor options within the realisation hierarchy.

Friday, 22 March 2024

David Rose Confusing Misunderstood Stratification With Instantiation

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 20 Mar 2024, at 10:28:
Not easy to describe realisation and instantiation together in a gotcha friendly soundbite...

Genre configures recurrent dynamic couplings of selections in field, tenor, mode systems. Cultures assign names to these recurrent configurations ...story, conversation, argument, ceremony... SFL names them as features in system networks. Named features generalise recurrent instances. Features in field, tenor, mode systems are of a different order...item, activity, property; tender, render..


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the "soundbites" are 'situation' for an instance of context, and 'text' for an instance of the content plane of language.

[2] This confuses stratification with instantiation. On the one hand, in Martin's model of stratified context, where functional varieties of language are misunderstood as the full potential of the culture as a semiotic system, the relation between the strata of genre and register, like any other strata, is simply realisation: the stratum of genre (e.g. narrative) is construed as realised by the stratum of register (e.g. the tenor relations between speakers and addressees).

On the other hand, "recurrent dynamic couplings of selections" describes the vector of instantiation ('dynamic couplings of selections') at the level of instance type ('recurrent'). 

Friday, 22 September 2023

David Rose Misleading Through Misunderstanding And Misrepresenting Context Of Culture And Situation

Let’s try to clear up the confusion between situation/culture and register/genre, since it still befuddles sysflingers in my generation...

A ‘context of situation’ is a specific instance of a general ‘context of culture’. These terms were borrowed a century ago by Firth, from the anthropologist Malinowski. They were handy metaphors, long before SFL had a model of tenor, field and mode realised in metafunctions of language, or of semiotic systems instantiated as texts. In contrast, genre and register are terms in SFL theory. 
A genre is a configuration of recurrent selections in tenor, field and mode systems, that is recognised by members of a culture. These are all cultural systems, so ‘context of situation’ is not an appropriate cover term for tenor, field and mode. Instead, the term ‘register’ was appropriated to include tenor, field and mode systems. Genres are realised by selections in register systems. Systems of genre are realised by systems of register, which are realised by systems of language and other modalities.

That’s the perspective of realisation between strata, a synoptic view. Instantiation is more dynamic. As a text unfolds, it instantiates selections in genre systems, register systems and language systems, in each moment.

These are all semiotic systems (systems of meanings), so there is no longer any need for notions of ‘culture’ or ‘situation’ outside of meaning. But metaphors like ‘context of situation and culture’ can be very sticky. How about we prise them loose.


Blogger Comments:

Having previously claimed there are no important differences between the models of Martin and Halliday & Hasan, here Rose proposes replacing Halliday's model of context with Martin's.

[1] To be clear, this confusion began when Martin (1992: 495) incongruously proposed replacing the instantiation relation between culture and situation with a realisation relation between genre and register:

The tension between these two perspectives will be resolved in this chapter by including in the interp[r]etation of context two communication planes, genre (context of culture) and register (context of situation), with register functioning as the expression form of genre, at the same time as language functions as the expression form of register.

[2] To be clear, the only ones befuddled are those who trust Martin to understand SFL Theory for them. See The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

[3] This misleading, because it confuses instantiation with delicacy. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5):

One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation): see Table 4(4).

[4] This is very misleading indeed. The claim here is that 'genre' and 'register' are (genuine) SFL terms, whereas 'context of culture' and 'context of situation' are not, because they are merely "handy metaphors" that precede SFL Theory. The truth is that all four terms are used in SFL Theory. 

Halliday models context as the culture as a semiotic system, with situation as an instance of culture. The term 'register' is used by Halliday for a subpotential of language, varying for context, whereas Martin misunderstands register as a system of context. 

The term 'genre' was introduced by Hasan, at first to refer to a rhetorical mode, but then to refer to a register that realises a rhetorical mode, whereas Martin misunderstands genre as a system of context.

[5] This misunderstands stratification. Martin's model posits his genre as a higher level of symbolic abstraction than his register, so his genre can not be a configuration of selections from his lower stratum, anymore than lexicogrammar can be a configuration of phonological selections. 

Moreover, the process of selection is the process of instantiation, so selections refer to instances, and recurrent selections refer to instance types, not to systems of potential. So the theoretical point that Rose misunderstands here is that a situation type — i.e. "recurrent" selections of tenor, field and mode — is realised by a text type.

[6] This is a very serious misunderstanding of stratification and instantiation. To be clear, 'context of situation' is an appropriate term because it refers to an instance of the context of culture, the systems of tenor, field and mode.

[7] To be clear, it was Martin who rebranded Halliday's context as register. This "appropriation" was not appropriate, because it models a functional variety of language as not being language. This is tantamount to claiming that dairy cattle and beef cattle are not cattle. More technically, in Hjelmslev's terms, it mistakes a variety of a denotative semiotic for (the content plane of) a connotative semiotic.

[8] This confuses stratification with instantiation. To be clear, the claim here is that genres (systems) are realised by instances of registers, since selecting in register systems is the instantiation of register systems.

[9] To be clear, this contradicts the previous statement, since here genre and register are both described at the system pole of the cline of instantiation. However, the claim is that systems like story genres are realised by systems like status and contact relations between the speakers producing the story.

[10] To be clear, here the claim is that genres like narratives, anecdotes etc. are not language.

[11] To be clear, Rose's 'synoptic view' of realisation between strata is confused with the 'dynamic view' of instantiation. See [5], [6] and [8] above.

[12] This misunderstands both instantiation and stratification. Firstly, a text does not instantiate selections in systems; a text is the instantiation of systems, and selection is the process of instantiation. Secondly, a text cannot be the instantiation of Martin's genre and register systems, since text is an instance of language potential, whereas genre and register systems are not language potential, but context potential.

[13] This is very misleading because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, context of culture is not "outside of meaning". Context is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, a system of meaning, and a situation is an instance of that system.

[14] To be clear, since context of situation and culture, when understood, are consistent with SFL Theory, and Martin's misconstrual of language varieties as not language is not, the intelligent response would be try to understand what the terms context of situation and culture mean, and "prise loose" Martin's self-contradictory model.

[15] To be clear, on the one hand, this diagram of Martin's model misrepresents text, an instance of language, as also being an instance of context, which Martin opposes to language. On the other hand, this diagram strategically omits the term that would make its other inconsistencies more obvious: 'register' is omitted from the stratum of field, tenor and mode, and from each cline of instantiation. If the term 'register' is given its place in Martin's model, then it yields:

  • a system of genre,
  • a register/text type of genre,
  • an instance of genre,
  • a system of register,
  • a register/text type of register,
  • an instance of register,
  • a system of language,
  • a register/text type of language,
  • an instance of language (text). 
Moreover, if Martin's stratification is cross-classified with Martin's instantiation:

then it yields such anomalies as:

  • a genre/register of genre,
  • a text type of genre,
  • a genre/register of register,
  • a text type of register.

∞

See also

Monday, 8 August 2022

David Rose Misunderstanding Halliday's "Axial Breakthrough"

2.

Thanks to Ed, for the challenge presented by your reading of my diagram below as ‘(paradigmatic) "features" and (syntagmatic) "structures"’.

The diagram is meant to show that structures are part of systems, not opposed to them as the system/structure and paradigmatic/syntagmatic terms might suggest. Structures don’t realise systems, but features in systems. Structures are perceivable tokens of the abstract values of features. Each instance of structure is recognisable by its similarity to other instances of the same structure, and its difference from other types of structure. Similarity is represented in the diagram by hexagons, and difference by the system. The entry condition to a system is a more general similarity that is shared by its structures, e.g. the structure +Subject;+Finite is shared by the structures Subject^Finite and Finite^Subject. These similarities and differences in structure realise similarities and differences in features, such as indicative: declarative/ interrogative. Hence the system of features is a mirror of the system of structures. They are two faces of a system. This is my understanding of MAKH’s axial breakthrough.


 Blogger Comments:

[1] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[2] This is a very serious misunderstanding. Systems and structures are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction (elaboration + identity), whereas the relation that obtains between a whole and its parts is composition (extension). A part of a system is a subsystem, whereas a structure (e.g. of a group) is part of a larger structure (e.g. of a clause).

[3] This is a very serious misunderstanding. It is the entire system of a rank unit that specifies how its entire structure is realised, and this is achieved through realisation statements, not features.

[4] This confuses lower abstraction with perceivability. The structure of a nominal group cannot be perceived, unless, like its system, it is represented theoretically.

[5] This confuses the realisation (token-value) relation between structure and system with the instantiation (token-type) relation between instances and instance type.

[6] This confuses instance type (similarity) with paradigmatic order (difference).

[7] This confuses instance type (similarity) with the entry condition of a system. In the grammar, the first entry condition of a system is a formal unit on the rank scale.

[8] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Difference in system is difference between paradigmatic features, such as declarative vs interrogative, whereas difference in structure is difference in elements, such as Subject vs Complement.

[9] To be clear, the claim that "Halliday's axial breakthrough" is that system and structure are "two faces of a system" derives from the multiple misunderstandings identified above.

Saturday, 23 July 2022

David Rose Misrepresenting Axis As Key To Semantics-Grammar Relations

Axis is key...

Michael Halliday is the only linguist who has given priority to the paradigmatic axis and organised the theory and description of language around this axis... but at the same time, he maintains the connection with the syntagmatic, by means of realisation statements specifying fragments of structure, and the account of structure he developed is a sophisticated unification of different metafunctional strands of organisation.

Matthiessen, C. M., Wang, B., Ma, Y., & Mwinlaaru, I. N. (2022). Systemic Functional Insights on Language and Linguistics. Springer

...two very basic theoretical concepts in SFL, metafunction and rank, are in fact based on the even more fundamental dimension of axis... stratification, alongside metafunction and rank, is based on way in which systems bundle together with one another - axis in other words is key.

Martin, J. R., Wang, P., & Zhu, Y. (2013). Systemic functional grammar: a next step into the theory–axial relations. Beijing: Higher Education.
In broad terms, a system is a set of relations of abstraction and generality. Its features are generalisations based on recurrent similarity of function at higher strata. From this instantial perspective, a system is an accumulation of instances over time scales of phylogenesis and ontogenesis.

Rose, D. in press. Designing pedagogic registers: Reading to Learn. In J.R. Martin, D. Caldwell & J. Knox (eds.) Developing Theory: A Handbook in Appliable Linguistics and Semiotics. London: Bloomsbury, 103-125

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this quote from Matthiessen et al. (2022) is a statement on how SFL gives priority to the paradigmatic axis, with metafunctional structures of the syntagmatic axis specified by realisation statements associated with features in systems.

[2] To be clear, this quote from Martin et al. (2013) makes the false claims that stratification is based on the way systems bundle together, and that axis is fundamental to stratification, metafunction and rank.

On the first claim, stratification is based on the principle of realisation. Different strata constitute different levels of symbolic abstraction.

On the second claim, axis, stratification, metafunction and rank are distinct dimensions, each with distinct ordering principles, independent of those of the other dimensions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20,32):
[3] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[4] To be clear, this quote from Rose (in press) presents several misunderstandings. Regarding the first sentence, it is delicacy that is the ordering principle of system, whereas (symbolic) abstraction is the relation between systems of different strata.

The second sentence confuses instantiation ('recurrent') with stratification ('higher strata'). To be clear, the features of a system represent the potential choices of instantiation for a specified entry condition.

Regarding the third sentence, a system is built up at all three timeframes, including that of logogenesis, 'the creation of meaning in instantiation, maintained as a changing instantial system'. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384-5):
If we look at logogenesis from the point of view of the system (rather than from the point of view of each instance), we can see that logogenesis builds up a version of the system that is particular to the text being generated: the speaker/ writer uses this changing system as a resource in creating the text; and the listener/ reader has to reconstruct something like that system in the process of interpreting the text — with the changing system as a resource for the process of interpretation. We can call this an instantial system. … the instantial system is built up successively by the generation process; but as it is developed, it in turn becomes a resource for further instantiation.

Wednesday, 1 June 2022

David Rose Misunderstanding Halliday's Distinction Between Value And Meaning

I too have wondered about this for 30 odd years since MAKH proposed this thumbnail phylogenesis of complexity.

But chatting with a colleague recently about MAKH’s Marxism it hit me that his social value/semiotic meaning contrast is just good traditional Marxist theory, contrasting material base and superstructure. It also helps to explain why ‘situation’ is contrasted with ‘text’ in his model from 1961 onwards.

Perhaps ironically, Marx’s whole theory of value is (I reckon) a semiotic theory of social relations, that demolishes the exploiters’ biological one.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Rose is referring to Halliday's linear taxonomy of systems. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 507):

We are treating language as a semiotic system, and it may be helpful to locate this concept within the context of the history of ideas, albeit in a very sketchy fashion. As we conceive of it, the term "semiotic" is framed within a linear taxonomy of "physical — biological — social — semiotic"; and the term "system" is a shortened form of "system-&-process"…

[2] To be clear, Halliday's "social value/semiotic meaning contrast" is not the Marxian contrast between material base and superstructure. Halliday's distinction is between value (social systems) and symbolic value (semiotic systems). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):

… a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value"… . A [social] semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning". Meaning can be thought of (and was thought of by Saussure) as just a kind of social value; but it is value in a significantly different sense — value that is construed symbolically. Meaning can only be construed symbolically, because it is intrinsically paradigmatic, as Saussure understood and built in to his own definition of valeur. Semiotic systems are social systems where value has been further transformed into meaning.

Halliday's example of a social system organised by the exchange of value, but not symbolic value, is a eusocial insect colony.

In stark contrast, in Marxian theory, material base refers to the production forces, or the materials and resources, that generate the goods (human) society needs, and superstructure describes all other aspects of (human) society.

[4] To be clear, in Halliday (1961), 'text' means observed language events, whereas 'situation' means the nonlinguistic context in which language operates. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 38-9):

The data to be accounted for are observed language events, observed as spoken or as codified in writing, any corpus of which, when used as material for linguistic description, is a “text”.
…non-linguistic features of the situations in which language operates…

Importantly, Halliday's distinction between text and situation is not explained by the Marxian distinction between material base and superstructure. It is merely the distinction between the linguistic and the non-linguistic: between an instance of language (text) and an instance of culture (situation).

[5] To be clear, semiotic and biological explanations of (human) social relations are complementary perspectives, neither of which, therefore, can "demolish" the other. On the other hand, the unique identification of a biological approach with "exploiters" requires clarification, evidence and supporting argument.

Wednesday, 25 May 2022

David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Instantiation And Stratification


All strata instantiate!
Martin, J. R. (2009). Realisation, instantiation and individuation: some thoughts on identity in youth justice conferencing. DELTA: Documentação de Estudos em Lingüística Teórica e Aplicada, 25, 549-583.

Martin, J. R. (2010). Semantic variation: Modelling realisation, instantiation and individuation in social semiosis. New discourse on language: Functional perspectives on multimodality, identity, and affiliation, 1, 34.




Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, instantiation is the relation of system to instance. The process of instantiation is the selection of features, and the activation of realisation statements, in logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

[2] To be clear, Martin's Figure 3 misunderstands the cline of instantiation in three ways. Firstly, in misrepresenting the cline as a hierarchy of generality, it blurs the distinction between delicacy (type of x) and instantiation (token of x). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 15):
Note that it is important to keep delicacy and instantiation distinct. … The difference is essentially that between being a type of x (delicacy) and being a token of x (instantiation). Both may be construed by intensive ascription.
Secondly, it misrepresents different perspectives on the same scale of diatypic variation, genre/register and text type, as different points on the cline. To be clear, register is diatypic variation viewed from the system pole of the cline, whereas text type, and genre in this sense, is diatypic variation viewed from the instance pole of the cline.

Thirdly, it misconstrues reading variation as instantial of text variation. Importantly, a reading is not an instance of a text, because, viewed from the system pole, a reading is not a subpotential of a text, and viewed from the instance pole, a text is not a 'reading type'.

[3] To be clear, Figure 4 presents Martin's misunderstanding of stratification. Put most succinctly, Martin mistakes the content plane of Hjelmslev's connotative semiotic for the entire connotative semiotic, and fills his connotative with varieties of a denotative semiotic: register and genre. 

That is, Martin misconstrues functional varieties of language as the context of language, and thereby distinguishes varieties of language from language. (This is analogous to distinguishing functional varieties of cattle — dairy, beef — from cattle.)

However, this distinction is contradicted in Figure 4, where the two systems of context, genre and register, are nevertheless both instantiated as text, an instance of language. (Figure 4 conceals this self-contradiction by not labelling genre and register as context.)

Martin's model becomes more explicitly nonsensical when the instantiation clines of genre and register in Figure 4 are filled out in the detail provided in Figure 3, yielding:
  • genre system >> genre/register of genre >> text type of genre …
  • register system >> genre/register of register >> text type of register …

In sharp contrast, Halliday (2005 [1995]: 254) provides the original coherent model:

Sunday, 10 June 2018

David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Discourse Semantics Model

The discourse semantic model attempts to resolve this contradiction, by treating the discourse/grammar relation as stratal abstraction, rather than instantiation. That is, the discourse semantic stratum consists of feature/structure systems that are instantiated in the discourse patterns of texts. These discourse semantic patterns are realised inter-stratally as grammatical patterns, that instantiate grammatical systems.


Blogger Comments:

[1] See the previous post for why the said contradiction only arises from Rose's misunderstandings of instantiation and cohesion.  This clause thus begins the logical fallacy known as a straw man argument:
A straw man argument is one that misrepresents a position in order to make it appear weaker than it actually is, refutes this misrepresentation of the position, and then concludes that the real position has been refuted. This, of course, is a fallacy, because the position that has been claimed to be refuted is different to that which has actually been refuted; the real target of the argument is untouched by it.

[2] To be clear, treating discourse and grammar as two strata of symbolic abstraction is reinterpreting the word 'discourse' to mean 'semantics'.  A complicating factor here is that the stratum of discourse semantics (Martin 1992) was not theorised with an understanding of strata as different levels of symbolic abstraction.  Instead, Martin misinterpreted all strata as interacting modules of meaning. Martin (1992: 390, 392, 488):
Each of the presentations of linguistic text forming resources considered above adopted a modular perspective. As far as English Text is concerned this has two main dimensions: stratification and, within strata, metafunction. …
The modularity imposed by stratification is also an important issue. Discourse systems generate structures which in principle cut across grammatical and phonological ones. …
In this chapter a brief sketch of some of the ways in which discourse semantics interacts with lexicogrammar and phonology has been presented. The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface? What is the nature of the conversation among components? 
[3] There is a sense in which the relation between grammar and discourse is one of instantiation, though not the sense understood by Rose.  The relation between grammatical systems and the grammar of a text is instantiation, and for Halliday (2008: 78), text and discourse are two views on the same phenomenon:
I do make a difference between these two; but it is a difference in point of view, between different angles of vision on the phenomena, not in the phenomena themselves. So we can use either to define the other:
  • 'discourse' is text that is being viewed in its sociocultural context, while
  • 'text' is discourse that is being viewed as a process of language.
[4] A most serious shortcoming of the discourse semantic model (Martin 1992), in this regard, is that its system networks do not specify how choices in discourse semantic systems are realised as discourse semantic structures.  Moreover, attempts to do so would expose deficiencies in the theorising of structure.  For example, on the one hand, discourse* semantic units are not structures, since they have no internal organisation; and on the other hand, the relations between Martin's discourse* semantic units are not structural, since they are rebrandings of Halliday's (non-structural) cohesive relations.  Moreover, the type of structure Martin interprets them to be, co-variate, was later acknowledged by its source, Lemke (1988: 159), as not being a type of structure after all.  For more detailed critiques of discourse semantic structure, see here.

[5] A most serious shortcoming of the discourse* semantic model (Martin 1992), in this regard, is that its system networks do not specify how choices in discourse semantic systems are realised as choices in grammatical systems.  Moreover, attempts to do so would expose deficiencies in the theorising.  Two examples will illustrate this fact.  On the one hand, the logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION does not recognise the three most general types of expansion: elaboration, extension and enhancement; because of this, most, if not all, realisation relations between discourse semantics an grammar are incongruent, whether metaphorical or not.  On the other hand, the logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION does not include the major logical semantic system of projection, and so cannot account for projection relations anywhere at the level grammar.

* Martin's interpersonal discourse semantics is a general exception, because it is largely a rebranding of genuinely semantic systems and structures, devised by others, not Martin.

Thursday, 7 December 2017

David Rose "In A Nutshell" [Part 2]

We can often categorise lexical items according to grammar or discourse patterns they tend to instantiate (as Michael and Christian like to do in IFG). But these categories are only one dimension of their meaning. Their more specific meanings can only be described in terms of register systems (the function of dictionary and thesaurus). So my instinct is to locate them at the level of register. This is hard to conceptualise because they only manifest as wordings, so we usually talk about them as if they are words. But the items themselves are meanings (at register level), that are realised in language as wordings. In text, they co-instantiate with grammar and discourse features to construe patterns of register. These probabilistic co-instantantions may be the basis of much linguistic description. 
in a nutshell
David

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that lexical items are categorised according to grammar or discourse patterns.  This is inconsistent with Halliday & Matthiessen (2004, 2014).  In SFL theory, lexical items are specified by bundles of the most delicate features of the systems of lexicogrammar.  The relation between a bundle of such features and a lexical item is symbolic identity: the more abstract Value (feature bundle) is realised by the less abstract Token (lexical item).

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, lexical items realise meaning.  That is, wording (lexicogrammar) is construed as a lower level of symbolic abstraction than meaning (semantics).

[3] Rose's argument can be characterised as follows:
Premiss: (reason) the more specific meanings of lexical items — as provided by dictionary and thesaurus — can only be described in terms of register systems.
Conclusion: (result) lexical items are located at the level of register.
Ignoring the theoretical misunderstandings for the moment, the argument itself is an instance of circular reasoning, in this case: the logical fallacy known as begging the question (petitio principii): providing what is essentially the conclusion of the argument as a premiss.  Moreover, the premiss itself is a bare assertion, unsupported by reasoned argument.

Turning to the theoretical misunderstandings, both the premiss and conclusion are inconsistent with the SFL architecture.  In the premiss, Rose does not recognise the stratal differentiation of a lexical item (lexicogrammar) and the meaning (semantics) that it realises.  In both the premiss and the conclusion, Rose misrepresents the SFL notion of register in terms of stratification (context vs language) and instantiation (system vs sub-system).

Stepping back a little, this is what Rose's previous three posts — in which he disingenuously described himself as "perhaps obtuse", "puzzled" and "generally puzzled" — have been leading to: his "instinct" to locate lexical items at the level of register.  Keeping in mind that, for Rose, register means "social context", which he distinguishes from language, his proposal is to locate lexical items outside language.

[4] As mentioned in a previous post, in SFL theory, 'lexical item' is one of two abstractions on the word, the other being a rank unit in the grammar.

[5] This is another bare assertion, made on the assumption that the previous circular reasoning, involving a bare assertion, has established it as true.  It contains the same theoretical confusions about lexical items and register that were identified in [3] above, with the addition of locating linguistic meaning at the level of context (characterised by Rose as 'social context', and misconstrued, following Martin (1992) as 'register').

[6] The claim here is that lexical items, at the level of social context, are realised in language as wordings.  This adds further to the previously identified theoretical inconsistencies by proposing a realisation relation between context and lexicogrammar, thereby skipping the intervening level of symbolic abstraction, semantics.

[7] The claim here is that lexical items are instantiated in text.  On Rose's model, lexical items are located in context, and as such, are not instances of language (text), but of social context, which Rose distinguishes from language.

[8] To be clear, in SFL theory, the relation between features co-selected across different strata is realisation.  On the model proposed by Rose, this means that lexical items (at the level of context) are realised by the realisation of discourse semantic features in lexicogrammatical features.  Here the notion of 'co-instantiation' helps to mask the fact that Rose has not accounted for the discourse semantic features that realise lexical items.

[9] To be clear, in SFL theory, the different probabilities of features being co-selected provide the quantitative means of differentiating registers — where registers are coherently construed: as sub-potentials of language.

[10] From Fawlty Towers (The Hotel Inspectors):
Mr Hutchinson: In a nutshell.
Basil Fawlty: Case, more like.
In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04
In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04
In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04In a nutshell.
Case, more like.

Read more: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=fawlty-towers&episode=s01e04

Saturday, 25 November 2017

John Bateman On "The 'Space' Between A Grammatically-Induced Semantics And Any Contextualised Use Of Involved Grammatical Constructions"

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 2 November 2017 at 19:10:
I guess I should say something since the word 'space' came up.... for variety, spice and funny symbols, see:
  • Bateman, J. A. Language and Space: a two-level semantic approach based on principles of ontological engineering. International Journal of Speech Technology, Springer, 2010, 13, 29-48.
and for this as a further refinement of Michael and Christian's Construing Experience:
  • Bateman, J. A.; Hois, J.; Ross, R. J. & Tenbrink, T. A linguistic ontology of space for natural language processing Artificial Intelligence, 2010, 174, 1027-1071
One of the main points of these papers (derived from our 12 year collaborative research center on space ...) is to open up the 'space' (ha ha) between a grammatically-induced semantics and any contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions so that the enormous flexibility of ranges of interpretation is both made visible and constrained sufficiently so that it can be worked with productively. In the simple cases, one *might*, along that path, get to descriptions of locations-in-space (measurable, movable-in, etc.); in most cases, however, the constructed context is more interesting. One is in any case dealing at least with places rather than locations (i.e., social constructions and not geometry).

Blogger Comments:

[1] See John Bateman Positively Judging Himself.

[2] For a grammatical analysis of this clause nexus, see The Transitivity Of Bamboozlement.

[3] To be clear, "a grammatically-induced semantics" is the SFL model in which semantic potential is construed by lexicogrammatical potential; and "contextualised use of involved grammatical constructions" refers to the grammatical structures that realise grammatical systems instantiated in texts that realise situations.  The 'space' between the two is not a theoretical space; the two are related along three theoretical dimensions simultaneously:
  • stratification (semantics realised by lexicogrammar),
  • axis (system realised by structure),
  • instantiation (text as instance of system).

[4] Here Bateman follows Martin (1992) in misconstruing ideational semantics (the meaning construed) as ideational context (the field of culture construed).  For Martin's misunderstandings of context see here; for Martin's misunderstandings of stratification, see here.  For Bateman's endorsements of Martin's theoretical misunderstandings, in general, see here.

[5] To be clear, on the SFL model, socially constructed "places" and geometrical "locations" are construals of experience as meanings of socio-semiotic systems. For more on Bateman's epistemological assumptions, see John Bateman Denying The Existence Of Text.

Sunday, 2 March 2014

David Rose On Beyond the Clause (Complex)

David Rose wrote at 11:07 on 2/3/14 to sysfling:
Beyond the clause (complex) is the text. Here is a relevant quote from Ch 1 of Working with Discourse: meaning beyond the clause…







Blogger Comments:

[1] Beyond the clause (complex) is the cotext at the level of wording (lexicogrammar).

In terms of stratification, the clause is the uppermost rank unit in stratum of wording (lexicogrammar) — and the clause complex is an expansion of that unit — whereas text is the uppermost 'unit' in the stratum of meaning (semantics).   In terms of instantiation, text is an instance of the system, and so can be viewed at the level of meaning (semantics), wording (lexicogrammar) and sounding (phonology).

[2] Meaning 'beyond the clause' is the meaning (semantic stratum) that is realised on the grammatical stratum as the textual systems of cohesion: CONJUNCTION, REFERENCE, SUBSTITUTION & ELLIPSIS and LEXICAL COHESION.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 524-85).

Saturday, 11 February 2012

Why an instance is 'a token of a type'

The organising principle of the cline of instantiation is attribution (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 14-5, 145).

Attribution is concerned with class membership.
Attribution + elaboration includes type–subtype relations.

But, the most delicate subtype has just a single member.
The relation between a category and its single member is identification.
The category and the member uniquely identify each other.
The member is the Token that realises the category Value.
An instance is the Token that realises the most delicate category Value.

This is the distinction between instance and subtype.