It may be possible that SFL itself is a metaphysical theory that facilitates empirical research. That might explain why it accommodates competing incommensurate models of stratification, if each is justifiable but not falsifiable??
I think sorting out the nature of our theory must be part of it, particularly our competing models of stratification. I’m interested in how a purportedly empirical theory can produce and sustain such incommensurate models. My suggestion was influenced by Popper’s that "Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program—a possible framework for testable scientific theories.”
Blogger Comments:
[1] This is misleading because it presents a view that Popper recanted as if it were Popper's final view on the matter. To be clear, Popper (1978: 344-6) admitted his error in characterising Darwin's theory of Natural Selection as metaphysical:
The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some people, anti-Darwinists and even some great Darwinists, to claim that it is a tautology. . . . I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as "almost tautological," and I have tried to explain how the theory of natural selection could be untestable (as is a tautology) and yet of great scientific interest. My solution was that the doctrine of natural selection is a most successful metaphysical research programme. …
I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation. …
The theory of natural selection may be so formulated that it is far from tautological. In this case it is not only testable, but it turns out to be not strictly universally true. There seem to be exceptions, as with so many biological theories; and considering the random character of the variations on which natural selection operates, the occurrence of exceptions is not surprising.
Popper, K. R. 1978. "Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind." Dialectica, 32:339-355.
To be clear, SFL is a scientific theory, in the sense that its architecture is systematic, consistent and explicit. It is this that makes misunderstandings of the theory easy to identify.
[2] To be clear, the "two incommensurate models of stratification" in Rose's competition are the two different models of context: Halliday's versus Martin's. However, "sorting out the nature of our theory" won't explain why these two models are both "accommodated" — simply because it is not the theory that accommodates both of them, but the SFL community.
[3] This is misleading because it is demonstrably untrue. Both models are falsifiable, at least in terms of self-consistency, and moreover, at least one of them, Martin's, is falsified by this criterion, and so: not justifiable.
Put most simply, Martin models varieties of language, genres and registers, not as language, but as more abstract than language. This is analogous to claiming that varieties of bird, such as penguins and emus, are not birds at all, but something more abstract than birds.
More technically, Martin's model misinterprets the instantiation relation between language and register/genre as a realisation relation (symbolic abstraction) in which genre (text type) is more abstract than register, and both more abstract than language.
The number of inconsistencies escalates when Martin's stratification hierarchy is cross-classified with the cline of instantiation — the most obvious consequence being that instances of genres and registers are, by definition, instances of context, not language.
For more detailed arguments that identify some the theoretical misunderstandings on which Martin's model is based, and explain why the model is invalidated by its own internal inconsistencies, see here (stratification), here (context), here (register), and here (genre).
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