Ed McDonald On Musical Meanings As Concrete And General

Edward McDonald wrote to: sys-func on 20 Nov 2023, at 09:59:

… This reflects my understanding of the nature of musical meaning as concrete but general. Musical meanings are concrete, again in my opinion but informed by a wide range of research across a number of disciplines, because they express our human embodiment: music represents a kind of semiotic transformation of our experience of our own and other people’s bodies moving through space and time. 

At the same time, musical meanings are general, because, to borrow the insight of one philosopher of music, music is like body language: when we observe someone’s body language, including their gait, posture, facial expression, and gaze, we can “read off” its meaning, but only in general terms. We can tell that someone is sad, but not why; we can pick up that someone is highly agitated, but we don’t know the circumstances that gave rise to that agitation – unless we use language to ask them about it. 

So language, in contrast to music, is more abstract, more detached from our embodied experience, but at the same time because it supplies us with a system of categories we can apply to that experience, linguistic meanings are more specific. 

So from this point of view, we can see that soundtrack / expression music – “songs with words” – and score / mood music – “songs without words” – take on, as you might expect, the general semiotic characteristics of the systems of language and music with which they are mostly closely identified in each case.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this reason for musical meanings being 'concrete' is based on a misunderstanding, since it has the (Token–Value) relation backwards. It is the movement of bodies — in playing instruments — that expresses music, not the other way around. That is, McDonald claims that musical meanings are concrete because he misconstrues them as the more concrete Token instead of the more abstract Value.

[2] To be clear, this is another instance of the logical fallacy known as Appeal to accomplishment – an assertion is deemed true or false based on the accomplishments of the proposer.

[3] To be clear, one way to understand the difference between music and body language is through the theory of experience that has naturally evolved in English. Music is the Scope of the material Process of playing, whereas body language is a behavioural Process that 'manifests states of consciousness' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 302).

[4] To be clear, this reason for musical meanings being 'general' is based on a misunderstanding, since it confuses elaboration (generality) with enhancement (cause: reason).

[5] To be clear, this is another instance of the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit, a bare assertion, since no supporting argument has been made, and the claim that the meanings of music are concrete is based on a misunderstanding; see [1].

[6] To be clear, this point has not been demonstrated; see [1] to [5] above.

Shooshi Dreyfus On The Transitivity Of 'Live'

In response to the following query on the Systemic Functional Linguistics Interest Group:

What kind of process is 'live' in the following sentence - We live in the same city. Is it relational??? Identifying circumstantial?

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote on 22 June 2016:

Not relational and there's conjecture whether it's material or behavioural. If you are a strict Hallidayan, it might be behavioural as only sensate beings can do behavioural processes whereas anything, sensate or non-sensate can do material processes. However, as a Martinian, behavioural clauses are those that seem like verbal and mental but can't project. Definitely NOT relational as relational relates one participant to another.

and on 23 June 2016:

[In the] example 'he is in the kitchen', 'in the kitchen' is not functioning as a circumstance in this instance, it's functioning as an Attribute. Circumstantial meanings are incredibly versatile and can move around the clause mapping onto all kinds of constituents … . And from above, living is NOT being. Though we could probably argue about that till the cows come home, … And I recall Fran Christie telling me that Michael Halliday told her that living and dying are material.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The clause we live in the same city is an intensive attributive relational clause — as opposed to material — on several grounds.

Viewed from above, it means 'we are in the same city' rather than 'we do in the same city'.  That is, in terms of the complementary perspectives of being-&-having and doing-&-happening, the construal is one of being.

Viewed from roundabout, the unmarked present tense is simple not the present-in-present, so relational not material.  If it were material, the simple present tense would be marked because it would carry the added feature 'habitual'.

A 'behavioural' interpretation is ruled out by the definition of behavioural processes as physiological and psychological processes as behaviours.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 171):

On the borderline between ‘material’ and ‘mental’ are the behavioural processes: those that represent the outer manifestations of inner workings, the acting out of processes of consciousness and physiological states.

[2] To be 'a strict Hallidayan' is merely to understand and apply the theory that is the brainchild of Halliday;  Cf 'a strict Einsteinian'.

synonyms: precise, exact, faithful, true, accurate, unerring, scrupulous, careful, meticulous, rigorous
antonyms: imprecise, loose

[3] This is not a criterion for distinguishing behavioural processes from material and relational processes.  Conscious beings can participate in all process types.

[4] In matters of grammar, Martin purports to be following Halliday — e.g. Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010: i) — and so, any differences are misunderstandings, rather than competing interpretations. The treatment of behavioural processes in this work, Deploying Functional Grammar, is particularly confused, as demonstrated here.  Moreover, contrary to Dreyfus' claim, Martin et al. (2010: 124) analyse some projecting clauses as behavioural.

[5] This is misleading in two ways.  On the one hand, there are relational clauses with only one participant (Carrier).  This occurs when a quality is construed as a qualitative Process (it matters) rather than as a qualitative Attribute (it is important); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 222).

On the other hand, the prepositional phrases in the same city and in the kitchen serve as circumstantial Attributes; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 240-1).

With regard to the participanthood of Attribute, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 123) write:

… the Attribute cannot be mapped onto the interpersonal rôle of Subject.  This is because only participants in the clause can take modal responsibility, and the Attribute is only marginally, if at all, a participant.

[6] Hearsay is not argument, and in this case, it demonstrably misrepresents Halliday's view.  The function of a verb (verbal group) depends on the clause in which it figures.  The verb 'live' can serve as a material Process (he lives life to the max), as a relational Process (he lives in Japan), and as an existential Process (Elvis lives).

David Banks On The "Non-Existence" Of Behavioural Processes

David Banks wrote at 18:27 on October 30 2014 to sysfling:

The simple (but brutal, and with all due respect to all the other contributors) is that there are no distinguishing criteria because behavourial process does not exist. What is usually discussed under this heading is a rag-bag of unrelated phenomena that do not form a coherent category. The phenomena in question are better dealt with at a more delicate level than that of process types. My article on this question is forthcoming in a book edited by Donna Miller and Paul Bayley.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6) provide some grammatical reactances which distinguish behavioural from other process types and which thus identify what they have in common:

• Like material clauses (but unlike mental clauses) the unmarked present tense in behavioural clauses is present-in-present (he is watching) rather than the simple present (he watches).

• Behavioural clauses include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching listening, pondering, meditating) rather than just passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing).

• Like the Senser in a mental clause, the ‘Behaver’ in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones.

• Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing? — I’m meditating but not I’m believing.

• Behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon;

• Behavioural clauses can not accept a ‘fact’ serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left).

Criteria for distinguishing process types are listed in Table 5(45) in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 301).

[2] The existence, or not, of metalinguistic distinctions depends on whether or not they are projected into semiotic existence as ideas and locutions by linguists.  This depends, in the short-term, on whether or not they prove useful, and in the long term, on whether they are consistent with the other distinctions on which they depend.

[3] As Halliday & Matthiessen make clear:

• '‘behavioural’ process clauses are not so much a distinct type of process, but rather a cluster of small subtypes blending the material and the mental into a continuum' (2004: 255), and
• 'these can be interpreted as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental' (1999: 136).

Jim Martin On Phrasal Verbs As Behavioural

Jim Martin wrote on 30 October 2014 to sysfling:

My rule of thumb, when worrying if a phrasal verb is behavioural or mental/verbal, is that it is behavioural.

Blogger Comment:

As a caveat to this rule of thumb, it's worth noting some of the phrasal verbs that commonly serve as mental (or verbal) processes:

• figure out
• find out
• get over
• give away
• hold onto
• look forward to
• look into
• look up
• look up to
• make up
• mix up
• put up with
• sort out

Sample clauses featuring these verbs can be viewed here.
An alphabetical list of more than 1,000 phrasal verbs can be found here.

Jim Martin On Behavioural & Verbal Processes

Jim Martin wrote 30 October 2014 to sys-func & sysfling:

It is hard to get beyond notional reasoning here. 

One possibility is to try to restrict the behavioural category to 'embodied physical' manifestations of mental or verbal processing, giving minimal pairs such as look/see, listen/hear, smile/like, shudder/fear, ponder/think… etc. This would seem to fit with what Mick reports from Thompson below, and with a suggestion in the Deploying Functional Grammar workbook. 

As a reactance, although in general behaviourals don't project (better to say 'don't report'), and this helps distinguish them from mentals and verbals, many can quote, in 'narrative' discourse, especially when following a quoted locution or idea… to describe the manner in which something is said or thought.

'I better get out of her', he shuddered.
'I think so', she smiled.
'You're wrong', they accused. 

But not:

*'They've arrived', he listened.
*'She's responsible', they gossiped. 

The 'accused' example above raises the classification of clauses of judgement as verbals in IFG (with a Target function) even though they take present in present tense and can't report.

I'm accusing you of forgetting.

Not

*I accuse you that you forgot.

Another issue.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6) provide some useful grammatical reactances of behavioural processes which can be viewed here.

[2] "To restrict the behavioural category to 'embodied physical' manifestations of mental or verbal processing" would ignore the fact that the processes of physiological behaviours pattern grammatically like the processes of psychological behaviours; eg the Medium is endowed with consciousness, as in mental clauses, but the unmarked present tense is 'present-in-present', as in material clauses, and the Range is restricted to behaviours, unlike the Range in material clauses.

[3] The treatment of behavioural processes in Deploying Functional Grammar is problematic, as argued here.

[4] In such cases of quoting, the effect is to attach a behavioural feature to a verbal or mental process.  That such cases are verbal or mental, and not behavioural, is shown by the unmarked present tense, the simple present — the same as verbal and mental — in contradistinction to behavioural and material processes; eg

'I don't understand' he frowns.

not

'I don't understand' he is frowning. 

[5] 'She's responsible', they gossiped seems fine enough, especially with the tonic on she's (or with the more obviously judgemental irresponsible as Attribute).

[6] If we consider a less unlikely clause, we see that the unmarked present tense for these targeting verbal processes is indeed the simple present, like other verbal processes:

you flatter/insult me

not the present-in-present of behavioural processes:

you are flattering/insulting me

[7] Projection is not a prerequisite for verbal clauses, any more than it is for mental clauses (emotion, perception).  The verbal clauses that take a Target are those in which the order of saying is activity, rather than semiosis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 302), which locates them topologically nearer the behavioural (and material) processes.

Shooshi Dreyfus On Behavioural Processes

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote on 30 October 2014 to sysfling:

I think this is the sensate Subject that I recall Carmel Cloran talking about. So to summarise (and add):

• Is the Doer a sensate being?

• Does it seem like a mental (or verbal) process but can't project eg speak and listen

• Is it a process of physiological or psychological behaviour (both conscious and unconscious) eg cough, sneeze etc (but not think Mick – isn't think mental, cos can project)

Blogger Comment:

This exemplifies the widespread and persistent error of classifying verbs in terms of process types.  The same verb can serve as different process types, because the Process is a function of the clause.  For example, the verb breathe can serve as  Process in a behavioural clause, as in she breathed a sigh of relief, where the Range of the clause, a sigh of relief, is a Behaviour, and it can serve as Process in a material clause, as in they breathe oxygen, where the Range of the clause, oxygen, is not a Behaviour, but the Scope of the breathing process.  See related analyses here.

Sysfling Discussion Of Behavioural Processes

The following links might be helpful:

Behavioural Processes: Grammatical Reactances

Behavioural Processes

Some Phrasal Verbs Serving As Mental (Or Verbal) Process

Behavioural Processes

Behavioural & Material Processes

Behavioural Processes

David Banks On Behavioural Processes

David Banks wrote at 19:52 8/12/12 on the Sysfling list:

I've been following this string with interest. Earlier this year, at the Bertinoro conference, I gave a paper on Behavioural Process, in which I argued that if one tries to synthesize what is said about Behavioural Process in various introductions, the result is contradictory and incoherent. At the risk of being called a heretic (again!), I suggest that it is preferable to uses a system with 5 process types, eliminating Behavioural Process. I treat Verbal Process as being processes of communication, within which it is possible to distinguish two sub-groups: those that project, and those that don't.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Indeed, the treatment of behavioural processes in Deploying Functional Grammar (Martin, Matthiessen & Painter 2010) is clearly inconsistent with Halliday & Matthiessen (2004).  For example, the former analyses the clause the tyres went 'screech!' as behavioural, whereas the latter characterises behavioural processes as processes of psychological and physiological behaviour.  See 'Deploying Functional Grammar' On "Behavioural" Processes.

[2] Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 248-50, 255) already acknowledge that:

They are the least distinct of all the six process types because they have no clearly defined characteristics of their own; rather they are partly like the material and partly like the mental. … ‘behavioural’ process clauses are not so much a distinct type of process, but rather a cluster of small subtypes blending the material and the mental into a continuum …

and suggest (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 136):

These can be interpreted as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental.

 [3] Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 256) already specify verbal processes that don't — or rarely — project reported locutions:

Verbs that accept a Target do not easily project reported speech; this type of clause is closer to the Actor + Goal structure of a ‘material’ clause …