David Rose On Intrastratal And Interstratal Realisation

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz on SYSFLING on 31 Dec 2024, at 14:06:

Oh, then we’d have to allow meanings to be made on two lg strata, that may be coupled to realise register!  

Jing Hao opens that meta-window wide for us in Analysing Scientific Discourse. (Essential reading, folks.) 

All I’d add here is that

1. Thing doesn't realise a discourse semantic entity (interstratally). 
2. It realises the grammatical feature [nominal group] (axially). 
3. It’s the nominal word (complex) realising Thing (rankwise) that realises an entity (interstratally). 
4. Thing and entity are distinct meanings. 
5. But as Thing is the core function of a nominal group, the whole nominal group may also realise the entity (along with clause participation). 
6. (Note [entity] is a discourse semantic feature, whereas ‘class’ implies a rank scale.) 
7. And yes, Jing unpicks ideational metaphor brilliantly. 
8. So, while axial relations make meaning within strata and ranks, 
9. it seems function/class relations enable discourse semantic features to be both realised by and coupled with lexicogrammatical features

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, SFL stratifies the content plane into meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar), but wording is interpreted in terms of its function of realising meaning. And register is a language subpotential that realises a contextual configuration of field tenor and mode, not the contextual systems of field tenor and mode. The latter is Martin's (1992) misunderstanding — see, e.g. here — but accepted without question by his students.

[2] To be clear, 'entity' is Hao's rebranding of the type of element known as a 'simple thing' in the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 182). It is congruently realised in lexicogrammar by a participant at clause rank, which is congruently realised by a nominal group, whose structure may include 'Thing' as a functional element.

[3] To be clear, axially, the system of the nominal group is realised by the entire structure, not just the function 'Thing'.

[4] To be clear, it is not the word realising Thing, but the entire nominal group (that realises a participant) that realises a simple thing (entity).

[5] To be clear 'Thing' is one function in nominal group structure in the lexicogrammar, whereas 'entity', as 'simple thing', is a type of participant in the semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[6] To be clear, 'entity' is Halliday & Matthiessen's semantic element 'simple thing' rebranded by Hao as a feature of Martin's discourse semantics.

[7] This is a bare assertion, without supporting evidence.

[8] To be clear, axial relations don't "make meaning". The syntagmatic axis (Token) realises the paradigmatic axis (Value). This is another example of the Martin-derived confusion of semogenesis (making meaning) with realisation, though this time applied axially instead of stratally.

[9] To be clear, on the one hand, this conclusion cannot be validated by the preceding series of misunderstandings. On the other hand, the claim is that an intrastratal relation of realisation in lexicogrammar enables an interstratal relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, both of realisation and coupling. 

With regard to realisation, there is no "enabling" here; it is just the same relation at different locations in the architecture. With regard to "coupling", this is a matter of instantiation, the selection of features during logogenesis, which is a distinct from the realisation relations between axes and strata.

David Rose On 'Chains Of Interlocking Relations'

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz on SYSFLING on 30 Dec 2024, at 10:26:

… So it’s OK to define features by their realisations as function structures, and functions by their realisations as classes, then vice versa...given that units at each level are defined in contrast with other units.

Eg (v simplified), 

1. a clause participant is realised by a nominal gp that contrasts with verbal gp realising process. 
2. Nom gps are realised most generally by a Thing function. 
3. Thing is realised by a nominal word class, that realises a discourse semantic entity, in contrast to verbs realising an occurrence. 
4. Nominal sub-classes specify an entity uniquely, or by person, proximity, number, gender, or by class. 
5. These criteria define the class labels proper noun, pronoun and common noun. 
6. They in turn are criteria for different types of nom gp, which in turn have different options for specifying, evaluating and ordering, and different functions in discourse.

Just an example of ‘chains of (interlocking) relations involved (which also includes the labelling of such relations)’ 

PS On such criteria, mine/ours/yours/theirs/hers/his could be defined as (possessive) pronouns, not determiners, since they realise Thing, not Deictic (despite the weight of old authority).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the argument here is:

Premiss: Units at each rank are defined in contrast with other units.
Conclusion #1: Features are defined by their realisations as function structures (and vice versa)
Conclusion #2: Functions are defined by their realisations as classes (and vice versa)

Analysis:

The argument is invalid, because neither conclusion follows from the premiss. The Premiss makes a claim about relations between form, whereas Conclusion #1 makes a claim about the axial relation between functions, features and structures, and Conclusion #2 makes a claim about the realisation relation between function and form.

The premiss is invalid because it is false. In SFL Theory, rank units are distinguished 'from above': in terms of their functions in the structure in the rank above. 'Nominal' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'participant'; 'verbal' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'process'; and 'adverbial' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'circumstance'.

Conclusion #1 is invalid, because it is false. The features of a rank unit (Value) are realised by the function structure of the unit (Token), so in terms of 'definition', this conclusion is the exact opposite of what is true, since a definition is a Value assigned to a Token, not the reverse.

Conclusion #2 is invalid, because it is false. Different functions (Value) are realised by different classes of form (Token), so in terms of 'definition', this conclusion is the exact opposite of what is true, since a definition is a Value assigned to a Token, not the reverse.

[2] To be clear, like the two conclusions above, this again has the realisation relation backwards. It is the Thing function (Value) that is congruently realised by a nominal group (Token), not the other way 'round.

[3] To be clear, 'entity' an 'occurrence' are essentially rebrandings of 'participant' and 'process' in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) by Martin's former student Hao. To reframe this in terms of SFL Theory, a noun (word) realises a Thing (nominal group) which realises a participant (clause) which, in a congruent clause, realises a participant (figure) on the semantic stratum. By the same token, a lexical verb (word) realises an Event (verbal group) which realises a Process (clause) which, in a congruent clause, realises a Process (figure) on the semantic stratum.

[4] To be clear, subclasses of noun are not criteria for different types of nominal group, but different formal realisations (Token) of the function Thing (Value).

[5] As demonstrated above, Rose's self-congratulation here is unwarranted.

[6] This is misleading. To be clear, Rose here is unwittingly giving the very same view as the 'old authority' known as 'traditional grammar', and the 'old authority' known as Halliday (1985, 1994). For example, Halliday (1994: 313): 

The misinterpretation of possessive pronouns as Deictic determiners was introduced into IFG3&4 by Matthiessen. Compare the above table with the following in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 628):

David Kellogg Misunderstanding Halliday On The Relation Between Language And Context

David Kellogg replied on sys-func on 31 Dec 2024, at 12:11:

But there are three problems that occur to me, and at least two of them stem from this very distinction [between the material-semiotic dialectic and the stratal relation between culture and language]. 

First of all, Halliday and Matthiessen note that the logico-semantic categories of elaboration, extension, and enhancement are fuzzy ones, with considerable overlap. This really must be so, not just because all language categories are fuzzy, but because we use "and", "but" and "so" to do all three: they are logico-semantic categories, viz. categories of thinking, and they won't obey the strong classification and framing that we use in lexicogrammar (and most particularly in transitivity). 

Secondly, as Chris has reiterated many times, there is a distinction between theoretical categories and descriptive ones. The categories of elaboration, extension, and enhancement are descriptive ones (and they are really designed around English, which is perhaps why they fit the simile of decorating a room, adding an annex, and enhancing the grounds that Halliday proposes in IFG so well. They are not theoretical categories, much less metaphysical ones, and when Halliday uses them to think about the grammatics, he stresses that this too is a simile.

Thirdly, and most importantly from my point of view, there are always far more things in heaven and earth than can be dreamt of even in the philosophy of language, much less the theory of experience that is encoded in the actual grammar. Birds, those "dinosaurs that learned to fly", don't really know about or obey the names we give them, and if we say that the relation between context and language is not causal, since ("because?") since cause is an enhancing relation, we are attributing to language a power over causality that it does not possess. Marx said that being determines consciousness, he meant that being got here first and consciousness was late to the party. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the indeterminacy here is with regard to which expansion relation is being realised by the forms and, but and so in a given instance, not with regard to the distinctions between the expansion relations themselves.

[2] This is the exact opposite of what is true. To be clear, in SFL Theory, 

• logico-semantic relations are categories of meaning, 
• thinking is a mental process that projects meaning. and 
• meaning is construed by wording, lexicogrammar.

[3] To be clear, Halliday's distinction between theoretical and descriptive categories applies to the distinction between theorising language and using the theory to describe languages. This is the opposite of using a description of English to think about a theory of language. Halliday (2002: 413-4):

But as a final step I will shift to another angle of vision and look at realisation and instantiation from inside the grammar – turning the tables by using the grammar as a way of thinking about the grammatics. …

The identifying relationship, as construed in the grammar of English, involves two particular functions, mutually defining such that one is the outward form, that by which the entity is recognised, while the other is the function the entity serves. This relationship of course takes a variety of more specific guises: form / function, occupant / role, sign / meaning, and so on. I labelled these grammatical functions “Token” and “Value”. This Token / Value relationship in the grammar is exactly one of realisation: the Token realises the Value, the Value is realised by the Token. It is thus analogous to the relationship defined in the grammatics as that holding between different strata. The grammar is modelling one of the prototypical processes of experience as constructing a semiotic relationship – precisely the one that is fundamental to the evolution of the grammar itself. …

Of course, the boot is really on the other foot: the grammatics is parasitic on the grammar, not the other way around. It is because of the existence of clause types such as those exemplified above that we are able to model the linguistic system in the way we do. The grammatics evolves (or rather one should say the grammatics “is evolved”, to suggest that it is a partially designed system) as a metaphoric transformation of the grammar itself. This is a further aspect of the special character of grammatics: while all theories are made of grammar (to the extent that they can be construed in natural language), one which is a grammar about a grammar has the distinctive metaphoric property of being a theory about itself.

[4] Here again, Kellogg confuses Halliday's notion of semiotic context, culture, with the material environment of language; see the previous post.

David Kellogg Misunderstanding Halliday On The Co-Evolution Of Language And Culture

David Kellogg reacted to a Halliday quote on sys-func on 30 Dec 2024, at 16:42:

Note that "driving" is a very narrow interpretation of causality, and "determine" is not much better. There is an obvious sense in which a virus "causes" Covid and a bacteria [sic] "causes" tuberculosis, but it is rather vacuous to say that viruses or bacteria "drive" or "determine" epidemics. 

Co-evolution involves reciprocation, but not necessarily symmetrical reciprocity. When Halliday says, for example, that every use of a word (even in private speech) will have some effect on the probabilities of a language system, he is not saying that lexical invention is on a par with grammatical regularity. The use of "he or she" instead of "he" does not prevent a single instance of rape much less shake the foundations of patriarchy; these are secured not only by language but also by organised violence (c.f. the work of Annabelle Lukin).

I think that when Halliday says that language will always have an "ideological" role, and that construals of reality will differ as we alter our condition, he is really saying that changes in productive relations do in the long run cause the way we speak, even if they do not in the short run "drive" or "determine".

Blogger Comments:

[1] The quote was Halliday (2003 [1992]: 380):

Language neither drives culture nor is driven by it; the old questions about which determines which can be set aside as irrelevant, because the relation is not one of cause and effect but rather (as Firth saw it, though not in these words) one of realisation: that is, culture and language coevolve in the same relationship as that in which, within language, meaning and expression co-evolve. Thus above and beyond the random, local variation between languages that was the subject matter of earlier typological studies, we may expect to find non-random variation realising different construals of reality across major alterations in the human condition. But given that language and culture evolve together in this kind of relationship, it is inevitable that language will take on an ideological role.

[2] To be clear, here Kellogg is disagreeing with Halliday on the basis of his misunderstanding of Halliday. Halliday is concerned with the relation between the two planes of a connotative semiotic system, where culture is semiotic content, and language is its semiotic expression. For Halliday, the relation between these two semiotic planes is realisation, which is an elaborating relation of identity (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145). So the relation between culture and language is not causal, because 'cause' is an enhancing relation, not an elaborating one.

Kellogg, on the other hand, misconstrues the semiotic content that is realised in language as the material environment of language (organisms, diseases, rape, organised violence, productive practices). That is, the causal relation he proposes is between first-order material experience (phenomena) and second-order semiotic experience (metaphenomena), not between the culture as semiotic system and the language that realises it. In Halliday's terms, Kellogg is concerned with the ongoing material-semiotic dialectic, not the coevolution of culture and language. Halliday (2003: 238, 255):

The history of language, it seems to me, is part — an integral part — of human history; and this "history" is a dialectic interplay of material and semiotic processes, whose impacting engenders the complex ecosocial systems that we know as human cultures (cf. Lemke 1993 for a powerful account). …

Thus, grammar is bound up with all the other aspects of the human condition, as part of the eco-social system constituted by a human community and its environment. It takes its shape from the other strata of language with which it interfaces, from the relation of "languaging" both to other semiotic and to social and material processes, and from the nature of those processes themselves. It is the outcome of the ongoing dialectic between the material and the semiotic in human life.

David Rose Explaining 'Mere' By Coupling

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 8 Sept 2024, at 11:15:

Can I suggest we think in terms of coupling? 

...first of lexical items – e.g. attitudinal mere with a target entity such as housemaid, construing a value in a field, such as a person’s occupational status. 

...secondly of lexical choices with grammatical functions. Given that attitude is expressed prosodically through structures such as nom gps – how does the choice of gram function adjust the meaning?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'coupling' is merely Martin's term for grouping any selections.

[2] To be clear, this coupling of lexical items is merely taking a lexical perspective on APPRAISAL:

Under the [APPRECIATION] subcategory of `social value', the object, product or process is evaluated according to various social conventions. This domain is very closely tied to field in that the social valuation of one field will not be applicable or relevant in another.

[3] Trivially, 'entity' is not a type of lexical item, but a semantic category, and attitudes are interpersonal, and so enact (social relations as meaning); it is ideational systems that construe (experience as meaning).

[4] To be clear, the choice of lexical item adds different lexical (more delicate) features to a grammatical function, such as Epithet vs post-Deictic. Meaning is realised by all the lexicogrammatical features, from the most general (grammatical) to the most delicate (lexical).

David Rose On Homophoric Reference, Contact And Instantiation

David Rose wrote to SYSFLING on 24 Jun 2024, at 19:35:

Homophoric reference is characteristic of contraction, instantiating close contact, discussed in English Text, eg from p531... 

... 

Leaving homophoric ‘the’ unsaid instantiates even closer contact.

and again at 21:27:

This little quote from Working with Discourse Ch 9 encapsulates it...

Contraction refers to the amount of work it takes to exchange meanings, and the idea that the better you know someone the less explicitness it takes... Technically speaking, the less information a homophoric reference contains, the tighter the community it constructs and the more people it excludes.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the instance under discussion is:

in the scene where the couple realise they are being stalked by the iconic masked killers, they get into the car trying to escape and the guy says:

[1] To be clear, if the speaker had said the car won't start, the reference would be exophoric to the car they are sitting in, not homophoric (self-specifying). But he could also have used other Deictics, such as our or my, which do not serve as reference items.

[2] To be clear, the proposed relation here would be realisation, not instantiation, since this is concerned with the relation between context and language. Instantiation is the relation between potential and instance.

[3] Rose's claim here is that the reason why the Deictic could be omitted in this instance is because of the amount of contact between the interlocutors, husband and wife. This suggests that if the speaker's addressee, sitting beside him in the car, had been a hitchhiker he had just met, and he had said simply car won't start, the addressee would need to have the referent clarified, with something like which car?

David Rose On Halliday's Instantiation/Stratification Matrix

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 21 Mar 2024, 15:00:

This matrix from a talk MAKH gave to computer scientists in 95 may help to flesh out the SFL timeline a little.

It is based on ideas he first proposed in 1961. Subsequent research was overwhelmingly in the bottom row – on LG systems. Cells above that are proposals for research. He comments “Semantic representations of the instance — the instance as meaning — are still quite unsatisfactory, and there is much work to be done in this respect. Likewise for the instantial situation: we tend to work with informal word-pictures, like the stage directions in the printed edition of a play; but the basic concept of situation as instance has advanced very little in recent decades” (2005:255).

The upper and middle left-hand cells were the focus of Jim Martin and colleagues’ research through the 80s, culminating in English Text in 92. Metafunctional semantic systems were described as discourse semantics. Systems were also described for ‘potential clusterings of values of field, tenor, mode’, that were named genre systems. Appliability was one motivation for prioritising genre systems. Systems were proposed for field, tenor, mode, but it took another two decades for this research to be taken up in earnest, starting with Jing Hao on field, followed by a series of studies, culminating in Doran, Martin, Herrington 2023 (and Yaegan’s recent course at Usyd).

A crucial advance in this research is description of field, tenor, mode systems as semiotic systems that are instantiated, not by ‘informal word-pictures’, but by ‘selection expressions’, as the matrix specifies for LG and semantic systems.

Another major step forward is the reconstrual of what MAKH calls ‘values’ in the top row as ‘principles’ of instantiation, and ‘domains’ of individuation. This potentially integrates research using different SFL models into a commensurate whole.

It also helps resolve an anomaly in the upper right-hand cell, in which instances of socio-semiotic systems are named ‘particular social semiotic situation events’, whereas instances of LG and semantic systems are simply named ‘particular texts’. A social semiotic event is of course a (multimodal) text.

"The left-hand upper cell is taken up with contextual networks: it contains a theory of the possible semiotic situations that collectively constitute a culture – taxonomies of institutions and of doings and happenings, manifested as possible clusterings of values of field, tenor and mode.” Halliday 2005: 255

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) did not include a cline of instantiation, nor Malinowski's notions of context, nor a semantic stratum:

[2] To be clear, it is important to recognise that Halliday himself never proposed system networks to represent the systems of context.

[3] This is misleading. Martin (1992) rebranded the lexicogrammatical systems of the textual metafunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976) as his discourse semantic systems and distributed them across the different metafunctions. To these systems he added Halliday's semantic system of speech function and rebranded it as his discourse semantic system of negotiation.

[4] To be clear, Martin (1992) mistook registers for the contextual systems (field, tenor, mode) that are realised by registers, thereby proposing that a functional variety of language was not language, but context. Martin (1992) then confused two meanings of 'genre', genre as mode and genre as text type, and located the confusion stratally above register in context. This had the effect of proposing that text types were realised by field, tenor, and mode, instead of the reverse, thereby upending the realisation relation.

[5] To be clear, Hao and Doran were Martin's students and use Martin's model that proposes that functional varieties of language are not language, but context.

[6] This is cleverly misleading. First, Halliday did not describe field, tenor and mode as instantiated by 'informal word pictures'. Halliday used 'informal word pictures' to describe instances of field, tenor and mode, because he didn't have formal systems of field, tenor and mode to model the potential. Second, in Martin's model, context is realised by an instance of language, text, whereas this advance by Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024) rejects Martin's model, so that context systems are now instantiated by context, not by language (text).

[7] This is misleading, because this major step forward is major step backward. Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024) have reinterpreted the features of field, tenor and mode systems as 'principles of instantiation' in order to make room for semantic systems which they misconstrue as contextual.  That is, having first misconstrued language (register) as context, Martin is now, with his colleagues, misconstruing context (field, tenor, mode) as language. See also

• Negotiating Tenor: Enacting Affiliation In Dialogue And Monologue (Yaegan Doran)
• A Close Examination Of Yaegan Doran's 2023 ASFLA Plenary Abstract

[8] For some of the inconsistencies that invalidate Martin's model of individuation, see

• David Rose Endorsing Martin's Misunderstandings Of Individuation
• David Rose On Martin's Context-Bound/Free And Individuation As Allocation/Affiliation

[9] For some of the inconsistencies that invalidate Martin's integrated model, see

• David Rose On Jim Martin's Individuation
• David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Realisation, Instantiation And Individuation

[10] This is misleading, because there is no anomaly in the upper right-hand cell, though the false claim betrays a serious misunderstanding of the distinction between context and language. 'Particular social semiotic situation events' describes instances of context: the culture as semiotic potential. A text, on the other hand, is an instance of the content plane of language: semantics and lexicogrammar. A multimodal text includes instances of the content plane of semiotic systems other than language.

David Rose On The 1961, 1992 And 2024 Models Of Context And Instantiation

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 20 Mar 2024, 20:48:

In both 1961 and 92 models, context is realised by language (and other modalities), and language systems are  instantiated as text. In the 92 model, context is described as semiotic systems that are also instantiated as text (rather than as ‘settings’ in situations). Doran, Martin, Herrington supply the 2024 update.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. Scale-&-Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) does not construe levels as related by realisation, and neither does it construe a cline of instantiation as part of the theory.

[2] To be clear, Martin's notion that non-language (context) is instantiated as language (text) contradicts, inter alia, Martin's acknowledgement that the process of instantiation does not cross strata.

[3] This is misleading because it misrepresents settings and situations. In SFL Theory, a situation is an instance of context, the culture as a semiotic system. This contrasts with what Hasan calls the 'material situational setting' which is the first-order material environment from which is projected the second-order instance of language (text) and the semiotic context (situation) that it realises.

[4] To be clear, according to Doran, the update supplied by Doran, Martin & Herrington (2024) retracts the claim in Martin (1992) that context is instantiated as text.

David Rose Confusing Misunderstood Stratification With Instantiation

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 20 Mar 2024, at 10:28:

Not easy to describe realisation and instantiation together in a gotcha friendly soundbite...

Genre configures recurrent dynamic couplings of selections in field, tenor, mode systems. Cultures assign names to these recurrent configurations ...story, conversation, argument, ceremony... SFL names them as features in system networks. Named features generalise recurrent instances. Features in field, tenor, mode systems are of a different order...item, activity, property; tender, render..

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the "soundbites" are 'situation' for an instance of context, and 'text' for an instance of the content plane of language.

[2] This confuses stratification with instantiation. On the one hand, in Martin's model of stratified context, where functional varieties of language are misunderstood as the full potential of the culture as a semiotic system, the relation between the strata of genre and register, like any other strata, is simply realisation: the stratum of genre (e.g. narrative) is construed as realised by the stratum of register (e.g. the tenor relations between speakers and addressees).

On the other hand, "recurrent dynamic couplings of selections" describes the vector of instantiation ('dynamic couplings of selections') at the level of instance type ('recurrent'). 

David Rose Misconstruing Nominal Groups, A Subjacency Duplex, And 'Instantiate'

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 11 Feb 2024, at 15:08:

Subjacency duplexes are dependency structures that are not recursive (not hypotactic series)

 

Proportionality first...

some days ago : some of those days long ago ::

adv gp : nom gp 

Also...

a little while ago : an example of those days a little while ago ::

adv gp : nom gp

 

Adverbial group structure is Modifier^Head 

long	ago
b	a

This is a subjacency duplex with adverb as Head. (Ago can only instantiate the Head.)

 

The Modifier can be an embedded nom gp 

[a little while]	ago
b	a
nom gp

Here [a little while] specifies how long ago.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are nominal groups and cannot be adverbial groups (see [4]).

[2] To be clear, even if subjacency duplex were a valid type of structure, this does not satisfy its condition of not being expandable beyond a single modifier, e.g. not so very long ago. In SFL terms, this is simply an adverbial group 'with adverb as Head'. 

[3] This seriously misunderstands 'instantiate'. Instantiation is the relation between potential and instance. The relation here is between a word and its function as Head at group rank, which is realisation.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the Premodifier of an adverbial group cannot be an embedded nominal group because it is inconsistent with the characterisation of an adverbial group having no lexical premodification. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 419-20):

The adverbial group has an adverb as Head, which may or may not be accompanied by modifying elements. … Premodifiers are grammatical items like not and rather and so; there is no lexical premodification in the adverbial group. … The items serving as Premodifiers are adverbs belonging to one of three types – polarity (not), comparison (more, less; as, so) and intensification.

David Rose On Interstratal Tension And A Structure Not Covered By IFG

David Rose summed up the preceding discussion on asflanet on 11 Feb 2024, at 09:25:

Annabelle’s first question was a great illustration. It distilled a complex explanation of the earth’s origin into a process with a couple of circumstances, which made us question the simple analysis of Actor, Process, Means and Time. This interstratal tension has been a focus of SFL research in recent years, especially Jing Hao’s and Yaegan Doran’s work on science.

Annabelle’s second question then revealed that the Time circumstance had a structure that is not covered in IFG. Personally, that made me look more closely at both the example, and what Halliday had to say about its grammatical domain. Alternative suggestions by Rosemary, Chris and Annabelle made me look even harder.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Annabelle's first question was

I'm keen to hear thoughts on the analysis of this clause:

The earth formed some 4,600 years ago from a vast cloud of gas and dust.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. This is the structure of the clause:

Although this analysis was questioned by David Banks, it was done so on the basis of theoretical misunderstandings, as previously demonstrated here.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. There is no "interstratal tension" here. This is a happening figure realised by a material clause, its congruent realisation.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. On the principles provided in IFG, this structure is simply a nominal group:

[5] To be clear, Rose did not need to look at all, let alone more closely or even harder. Rosemary provided the IFG interpretation of the structure as a nominal group, and ChRIS provided the evidence that the structure could not possibly be an adverbial group, as Rose would maintain, on the principles provided in IFG.

David Kellogg On "Bottom-Up" Realisation

After ChRIS CLÉiRIGh wrote to sys-func on 21 December 2023 at 10:56:

The reason why Halliday would not even have meant

'wording-realized-as-meanings' or

'sounding-realized-as-wording'

is that both are self-contradictions. These are agnate with:

meaning realises wording

wording realises sounding

which are identifying clauses: Token^Process^Value.

In the first clause, the higher level of symbolic abstraction (meaning) is misconstrued as the lower level of symbolic abstraction (Token), and the lower level of symbolic abstraction (wording) is misconstrued as the higher level of symbolic abstraction (Value).

Likewise, in the second clause, the higher level of symbolic abstraction (wording) is misconstrued as the lower level of symbolic abstraction (Token), and the lower level of symbolic abstraction (sounding) is misconstrued as the higher level of symbolic abstraction (Value).

This is 'theory turned back on itself'.

 

David Kellogg replied on sys-func on 22 December 2023 at 8:55:

Chris--yes, theory turned back on itself indeed! But theory turned back on itself often produces category errors, like when you drive by a field and instead of seeing two cows you say that there are a bull, a cow, and a bovine couple.

When you say that "wording-realises-meaning" is agnate with the clause "meaning realizes wording", you can ignore the hyphen and make the clause irreversible, so that wording realizes meaning but meaning does not realize wording.

That makes it impossible for me to pursue my argument on verbal art, because my argument does depend on the relationship being reversible, and the 'bottom up" realization being dominant in and typical of literature.

But ignoring the hyphen and introducing "Token-Relational Process-Value" also means that your model is no longer neutral between speaking and hearing, as Halliday's is (Halliday remarks on the difficulty and necessity of making it so in the intro to the IFG).

Worse, you seem to be confusing two dimensions of SFL (stratification and metafunction) which are typically (and rightly) distinct--at least as distinct as the dimensions of instantiation and stratification confused in the Martin model.

As I said, I was writing about the theory--not about the way it was worded. That's why I used my own words and said "Halliday pointed out that" instead of "Halliday said". And Halliday does indeed say, in many places, that realization works both ways. I think, actually, that he chose the word "realization" for precisely this reason--it can mean both "to make real" and "to become aware" in English, although of course neither of these folk meanings captures the distinction that Halliday is really making.

This is one of many places where Halliday's terminology differs from that of Hasan--Hasan prefers "actualization" [activation] to talk about bottom up realization. For me, "realization" will do nicely.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Kellogg presents no evidence that 'theory turned back on itself often produces category errors' or that there is a category error in this case. The example of a category error he presents is not a case of theory turned back on itself and does not relate to this post.

To explain, just as linguistic theory is 'language turned back on itself' is using language to model language, 'theory turned back on itself' is using linguistic theory to model linguistic theory. In this case, it was using identifying clauses to model interstratal realisation.

[2] This misunderstands Cléirigh's post. What Cléirigh said was that Kellogg's 'wordings-realised-as-meanings' is agnate with 'meaning realises wording'. Kellogg's 'wordings-realised-as-meanings' is also agnate with 'Gielgud-played-by-Prospero'. The difference here is only in the subtype of identifying: 'realise' is 'symbol', whereas 'play' is 'role' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 269).

[3] This misunderstands identifying clauses. All identifying clauses are reversible. The reverse of wording realises meaning is meaning is realised by wording. In the first, the Token is Subject; in the second, Value is Subject. Moreover it is true that meaning does not realise wording, because this misconstrues Value (meaning) as Token and Token as Value (wording).

[4] To be clear, if an argument depends on 'bottom up' realisation, then the argument is invalidated by the self-contradiction that it construes. The notion of a higher stratum realising a lower stratum misconstrues the higher level of symbolic abstraction, meaning, as the lower level (Token), and the lower level of symbolic abstraction, wording, as the higher level (Value).

What is reversible is not the direction of realisation (swapping Token and Value) but the direction of coding (swapping Identified and Identifier). That is, the direction is encoding in the case of Token/Identifier and Value/Identified, and decoding in the case of Token/Identified and Value/Identifier. That is, 'wording realises meaning' can either encode meaning (Identified) by reference to wording (Identifier), or decode wording (Identified) by reference to meaning (Identifier).

[5] To be clear, this bare assertion — the logical fallacy ipse dixit — is misleading because it is untrue. Token-Process-Value simply analyses the interstatal relation 'wording realises meaning'. What could be said to differ for speaker and hearer is not the direction of realisation, but the direction of coding. For a speaker, meaning (Value) is encoded by reference to wording (Token), whereas for a hearer, wording (Token) is decoded by reference to meaning (Value). In both cases, wording is Token and meaning is Value.

[6] This is misleading because it is untrue. Cléirigh's post turned theory (identifying relations) back on itself (stratification). The former is a reconstrual of the latter. There is no confusion, because each construal is at a different level of abstraction.

[7] This is misleading. Cléirigh's post was not about Halliday's wording, but about his meaning:

The reason why Halliday would not even have meant…

Moreover, the advantage of quoting a source, instead of reporting it, is that the reader can judge whether or not the writer has understood the source.

[8] This is misleading because it misrepresents Halliday. For Halliday, realisation "works both ways" in the sense that the identifying process "works both ways". Wording realises meaning, and meaning is realised by wording; and in terms of coding, wording can serve to identify meaning, and meaning can serve to identify wording.

[9] To be clear, Halliday chose the word 'realisation' because 'realise' is an intensive identifying process of the type 'symbol' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 269), which is the relation between levels of symbolic abstraction, which is the relation between strata.

[10] This misleading because it is untrue. Hasan uses 'activation' for "top-down" realisation. Hasan (1995: 164):

But at the same time, the notion of realisation must include the relation of activation especially where the higher strata are concerned. Choices at the stratum of context activate choices at the stratum of semantics, which in their turn activate choices from the systems at the stratum of lexicogrammar.

Postscript: 

Unsurprisingly, Martin is one source of the self-contradiction of upside-down realisation. Martin (1992: 505):

The common ground between the two models lies in the correlation proposed between schematic structure and field, mode and tenor options; for both Martin and Hasan staging redounds with social context. Keeping in mind that realisation is not theoretically directional in systemic models, there is nothing substantive in the fact that whereas for Hasan, choices in field, mode and tenor are realised by schematic structure, for Martin schematic structure is realised through these same components of register.

ChRIS CLÉiRIGh On The Expression Plane Of Languaging Bonobos

ChRIS CLÉiRIGh replied to David Kellog on sysfunc at 9:07 on 12/11/23:

It is unlikely that Bill Greaves went on about Bonobo phonology, since the bonobos that were on the project express linguistic meaning by pointing to lexigrams, not by controlling the vocal tract.

Blogger Comments:

My false assumption when I wrote the above was that, although it is possible to study the phonetics of the languaging bonobos, they did not have a phonological system because they cannot realise the lexicogrammar phonologically.

The truth is almost the opposite. The languaging bonobos obviously do have a phonological system, since it is this that enables them to identify the words spoken by humans; and phonetic analysis provides an understanding of the physical limitations on realising their phonological system phonetically.

David Rose Misleading Through Misunderstanding And Misrepresenting Context Of Culture And Situation

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 18/9/23 at 9:04:

Let’s try to clear up the confusion between situation/culture and register/genre, since it still befuddles sysflingers in my generation...

A ‘context of situation’ is a specific instance of a general ‘context of culture’. These terms were borrowed a century ago by Firth, from the anthropologist Malinowski. They were handy metaphors, long before SFL had a model of tenor, field and mode realised in metafunctions of language, or of semiotic systems instantiated as texts. In contrast, genre and register are terms in SFL theory. 

A genre is a configuration of recurrent selections in tenor, field and mode systems, that is recognised by members of a culture. These are all cultural systems, so ‘context of situation’ is not an appropriate cover term for tenor, field and mode. Instead, the term ‘register’ was appropriated to include tenor, field and mode systems. Genres are realised by selections in register systems. Systems of genre are realised by systems of register, which are realised by systems of language and other modalities.

That’s the perspective of realisation between strata, a synoptic view. Instantiation is more dynamic. As a text unfolds, it instantiates selections in genre systems, register systems and language systems, in each moment.

These are all semiotic systems (systems of meanings), so there is no longer any need for notions of ‘culture’ or ‘situation’ outside of meaning. But metaphors like ‘context of situation and culture’ can be very sticky. How about we prise them loose.

Blogger Comments:

Having previously claimed there are no important differences between the models of Martin and Halliday & Hasan, here Rose proposes replacing Halliday's model of context with Martin's.

[1] To be clear, this confusion began when Martin (1992: 495) incongruously proposed replacing the instantiation relation between culture and situation with a realisation relation between genre and register:

The tension between these two perspectives will be resolved in this chapter by including in the interp[r]etation of context two communication planes, genre (context of culture) and register (context of situation), with register functioning as the expression form of genre, at the same time as language functions as the expression form of register.

[2] To be clear, the only ones befuddled are those who trust Martin to understand SFL Theory for them. See The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

[3] This misleading, because it confuses instantiation with delicacy. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5):

One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation): see Table 4(4).

[4] This is very misleading indeed. The claim here is that 'genre' and 'register' are (genuine) SFL terms, whereas 'context of culture' and 'context of situation' are not, because they are merely "handy metaphors" that precede SFL Theory. The truth is that all four terms are used in SFL Theory. 

Halliday models context as the culture as a semiotic system, with situation as an instance of culture. The term 'register' is used by Halliday for a subpotential of language, varying for context, whereas Martin misunderstands register as a system of context. 

The term 'genre' was introduced by Hasan, at first to refer to a rhetorical mode, but then to refer to a register that realises a rhetorical mode, whereas Martin misunderstands genre as a system of context.

[5] This misunderstands stratification. Martin's model posits his genre as a higher level of symbolic abstraction than his register, so his genre can not be a configuration of selections from his lower stratum, anymore than lexicogrammar can be a configuration of phonological selections. 

Moreover, the process of selection is the process of instantiation, so selections refer to instances, and recurrent selections refer to instance types, not to systems of potential. So the theoretical point that Rose misunderstands here is that a situation type — i.e. "recurrent" selections of tenor, field and mode — is realised by a text type.

[6] This is a very serious misunderstanding of stratification and instantiation. To be clear, 'context of situation' is an appropriate term because it refers to an instance of the context of culture, the systems of tenor, field and mode.

[7] To be clear, it was Martin who rebranded Halliday's context as register. This "appropriation" was not appropriate, because it models a functional variety of language as not being language. This is tantamount to claiming that dairy cattle and beef cattle are not cattle. More technically, in Hjelmslev's terms, it mistakes a variety of a denotative semiotic for (the content plane of) a connotative semiotic.

[8] This confuses stratification with instantiation. To be clear, the claim here is that genres (systems) are realised by instances of registers, since selecting in register systems is the instantiation of register systems.

[9] To be clear, this contradicts the previous statement, since here genre and register are both described at the system pole of the cline of instantiation. However, the claim is that systems like story genres are realised by systems like status and contact relations between the speakers producing the story.

[10] To be clear, here the claim is that genres like narratives, anecdotes etc. are not language.

[11] To be clear, Rose's 'synoptic view' of realisation between strata is confused with the 'dynamic view' of instantiation. See [5], [6] and [8] above.

[12] This misunderstands both instantiation and stratification. Firstly, a text does not instantiate selections in systems; a text is the instantiation of systems, and selection is the process of instantiation. Secondly, a text cannot be the instantiation of Martin's genre and register systems, since text is an instance of language potential, whereas genre and register systems are not language potential, but context potential.

[13] This is very misleading because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, context of culture is not "outside of meaning". Context is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, a system of meaning, and a situation is an instance of that system.

[14] To be clear, since context of situation and culture, when understood, are consistent with SFL Theory, and Martin's misconstrual of language varieties as not language is not, the intelligent response would be try to understand what the terms context of situation and culture mean, and "prise loose" Martin's self-contradictory model.

[15] To be clear, on the one hand, this diagram of Martin's model misrepresents text, an instance of language, as also being an instance of context, which Martin opposes to language. On the other hand, this diagram strategically omits the term that would make its other inconsistencies more obvious: 'register' is omitted from the stratum of field, tenor and mode, and from each cline of instantiation. If the term 'register' is given its place in Martin's model, then it yields:

• a system of genre,
• a register/text type of genre,
• an instance of genre,
• a system of register,
• a register/text type of register,
• an instance of register,
• a system of language,
• a register/text type of language,
• an instance of language (text). 

Moreover, if Martin's stratification is cross-classified with Martin's instantiation:

then it yields such anomalies as:

• a genre/register of genre,
• a text type of genre,
• a genre/register of register,
• a text type of register.

∞

See also

• The Practice Of Public Bluffing In The SFL Community
• David Rose Negatively Appreciating The Deployment Of Logic
• David Rose Positively Judging 'Being Wrong'