David Rose On 'Chains Of Interlocking Relations'

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz on SYSFLING on 30 Dec 2024, at 10:26:

… So it’s OK to define features by their realisations as function structures, and functions by their realisations as classes, then vice versa...given that units at each level are defined in contrast with other units.

Eg (v simplified), 

1. a clause participant is realised by a nominal gp that contrasts with verbal gp realising process. 
2. Nom gps are realised most generally by a Thing function. 
3. Thing is realised by a nominal word class, that realises a discourse semantic entity, in contrast to verbs realising an occurrence. 
4. Nominal sub-classes specify an entity uniquely, or by person, proximity, number, gender, or by class. 
5. These criteria define the class labels proper noun, pronoun and common noun. 
6. They in turn are criteria for different types of nom gp, which in turn have different options for specifying, evaluating and ordering, and different functions in discourse.

Just an example of ‘chains of (interlocking) relations involved (which also includes the labelling of such relations)’ 

PS On such criteria, mine/ours/yours/theirs/hers/his could be defined as (possessive) pronouns, not determiners, since they realise Thing, not Deictic (despite the weight of old authority).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the argument here is:

Premiss: Units at each rank are defined in contrast with other units.
Conclusion #1: Features are defined by their realisations as function structures (and vice versa)
Conclusion #2: Functions are defined by their realisations as classes (and vice versa)

Analysis:

The argument is invalid, because neither conclusion follows from the premiss. The Premiss makes a claim about relations between form, whereas Conclusion #1 makes a claim about the axial relation between functions, features and structures, and Conclusion #2 makes a claim about the realisation relation between function and form.

The premiss is invalid because it is false. In SFL Theory, rank units are distinguished 'from above': in terms of their functions in the structure in the rank above. 'Nominal' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'participant'; 'verbal' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'process'; and 'adverbial' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'circumstance'.

Conclusion #1 is invalid, because it is false. The features of a rank unit (Value) are realised by the function structure of the unit (Token), so in terms of 'definition', this conclusion is the exact opposite of what is true, since a definition is a Value assigned to a Token, not the reverse.

Conclusion #2 is invalid, because it is false. Different functions (Value) are realised by different classes of form (Token), so in terms of 'definition', this conclusion is the exact opposite of what is true, since a definition is a Value assigned to a Token, not the reverse.

[2] To be clear, like the two conclusions above, this again has the realisation relation backwards. It is the Thing function (Value) that is congruently realised by a nominal group (Token), not the other way 'round.

[3] To be clear, 'entity' an 'occurrence' are essentially rebrandings of 'participant' and 'process' in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) by Martin's former student Hao. To reframe this in terms of SFL Theory, a noun (word) realises a Thing (nominal group) which realises a participant (clause) which, in a congruent clause, realises a participant (figure) on the semantic stratum. By the same token, a lexical verb (word) realises an Event (verbal group) which realises a Process (clause) which, in a congruent clause, realises a Process (figure) on the semantic stratum.

[4] To be clear, subclasses of noun are not criteria for different types of nominal group, but different formal realisations (Token) of the function Thing (Value).

[5] As demonstrated above, Rose's self-congratulation here is unwarranted.

[6] This is misleading. To be clear, Rose here is unwittingly giving the very same view as the 'old authority' known as 'traditional grammar', and the 'old authority' known as Halliday (1985, 1994). For example, Halliday (1994: 313): 

The misinterpretation of possessive pronouns as Deictic determiners was introduced into IFG3&4 by Matthiessen. Compare the above table with the following in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 628):

Ed McDonald On What SFL Should Be Working Towards

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 27 Nov 2023, at 10:05:

So if I think we always need to look outside language in order to understand language … equally I think we need to look outside SFL in order to understand what we are doing within SFL. 

The days of the grand all-encompassing theory, the Theory of Everything which I note the physicists are still struggling towards, for me are well over, even if you put aside the historical accident that it was a man deeply UNinterested in language as she languages, i.e. Old Noam, who was responsible for the best known of such theories in our current academic ecology. 

How can one theory be social, cognitive, pure, applied, etc etc all at the same time? It seems to me that it would be far more helpful — not to mention more feasible — for (at least) two complementary theories that start out from completely different premises to somehow manage to meet in the middle, and that this is what those of us working within SFL should be working towards creating a space for, a space that needs to be both practical and intellectual, both ideational and interpersonal. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the assumption of 'immanence', which informs SFL, there can be no final theory, because there is no meaning beyond semiotic systems that theories can finally equal. Instead, theories are evolving semiotic systems, and the open-ended process of evolution entails that there is no final state of such a system.

[2] To be clear, a theory of everything in physics would unify the General Theory of Relativity (modelling gravity) with Quantum Theory (modelling the other three forces). See Quantum Gravity Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics.

[3] To be clear, these are not components of an 'all-encompassing' theory. 'Social' and 'cognitive' are different priorities in theorising, though not mutually exclusive, whereas 'pure' and 'applied' is the distinction between theorising and applying a theory to practical purposes.

[4] To be clear, after dismissing the pursuit of a theory of everything, as exemplified by physicists, here McDonald advocates that SFL should do precisely the sort of thing that physicists are trying to do: make two complementary theories, General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, meet in the middle in a theory of quantum gravity.

Ed McDonald On Metafunction, Stratification And Expression Affordances

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 27 Nov 2023, at 10:05:

Just to take up the issue of metafunctions again after some further thinking on this fundamental but slippery concept, I think that if this notion is to be empirically defensible, or rather if the theoretical category of metafunction when translated into descriptive categories as part of a framework for a specific modality is to be empirically defensible, we need first of all to look outside language, <<without assuming that the 3x3 stratification/metafunction model necessarily applies in the case of other semiotic systems>>.

My starting point here would be that every semiotic system depends on its affordances, which shape the kinds of meanings it most easily or typically expresses. … My recent paper for LC&T, The Signifying Voice: Materiality and sociality in language and music, maps out one way of doing this, by taking two systems — language and music — whose default expression plane is the human voice and seeing how they exploit this differently. 

I have been hugely influenced in my thinking on these two systems by a little book now out of print which has almost the same name as Theo's 1999 book on music, i.e. David Burrows' 1990 Sound, Speech, Music, which sets out from a basic phenomenological starting point to characterise the differing affordances and meanings of the two systems. I have also been deeply influenced by my own personal and professional experience as a language learner and language teacher, and likewise by my personal experience as a music learner (piano and voice) and my professional experience as a vocal accompanist/repetiteur. So when I think and particularly when I write about these issues, always in the back of my mind is the nagging thought "How is this going to be useful to performers", by which term I include learners and teachers and users of language and music.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the metafunctions are not slippery; they are very clearly defined. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8):

The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world. … The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language, with the adoption and assignment of speech roles, with the negotiation of attitudes, and so on — it is language in the praxis of intersubjectivity, as a resource for interacting with others. The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared.

For more detailed discussion, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 511-32).

[2] To be clear, this 3x3 model does not apply to semiotic systems other than language because language is unique in having a content plane that is stratified into semantics and grammar (Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: xi). This is demonstrated by the fact that it is not possible to read aloud the texts of such systems. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 600) point out:

… through projection, we construe the experience of 'meaning' — as a layered, or stratified, phenomenon, with 'meanings' projected by sensing and 'wordings' projected by saying …

[3] To be clear, this is the opposite of SFL methodology, in as much as it gives priority to view 'from below', expression, rather than the view 'from above', the meaning that is expressed.

[4] To be clear, the human voice is not the default expression of music. Rather, it is the default expression of song, that is, of language that is organised on the basis of music variables.

[5] To be clear, as supporting argument for McDonald's model, this is another instance of the logical fallacy known as the Appeal to accomplishment – an assertion is deemed true or false based on the accomplishments of the proposer. 

Ed McDonald On The Need For A Triangulation Of Textual, Social And Theoretical

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 19 Nov 2023, at 14:02:

Firstly, a recommendation for a different kind of "trinocular" analysis of "texts" of all kinds from my paper in the Semiotic Margins collection: (1) The need for triangulation: textual, social, theoretical. McDonald (2011):

[I]t seems to me that what is needed for a social-semiotic treatment of any particular modality is a kind of triangulation between the analysis of its texts, the theoretical frameworks that have been applied to it, and the social meanings it has for its communities of users. It is not enough to have just one or two of these: 

the theoretical and social without the textual leaves the analysis ungrounded, with no way of understanding in detail how analysts have come up with their interpretations; 

the social and the textual without the theoretical traps analysts in the (unexamined) presuppositions of their commonsense (or ‘intuitive’) viewpoints; 

the textual and theoretical without the social makes analyses ultimately only personal ones – insightful, perhaps, but in the end only one individual interpretation.

Blogger Comments:

To clear, this is a non-issue in SFL Theory. A text is an instance of meaning, and the meaning of a social semiotic system is social in the sense that it is interpersonally exchanged in a community of users. Clearly, how a text is analysed depends fundamentally on the theory used to do so. Importantly, in the immanent view of meaning that SFL Theory takes, there is no ultimate theory of phenomena that can be reached by cherry-picking from different theories. Instead, there are applications of each theory that are either valid or invalid in terms of that theory.

Jim Martin Misunderstanding SFL Methodology

Jim Martin responded on SYSFLING on 10 Sep 2020 at 12:13 to Ed McDonalds post on modelling music as a semiotic system:

What would music look like if instead of looking ‘notionally’ for kinds of meaning we looked for types of structure (particulate, prosodic and periodic) and worked out the systems behind each type of structure and then asked what their complementary functions were and only then compared music to language or image?

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Martin unwittingly advocates a theoretical approach that is the opposite of the methodology of SFL Theory: giving priority to the view 'from below' (structure and expression) instead of the 'view from above' (system and content). That is, what Martin dismisses as 'notionally' is actually SFL methodology. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49) explain:

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features (for an early statement, see Halliday, 1966a). Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness (agnation, a term introduced into linguistics by Gleason (1965: 199)…

More specific to the methodology itself, Halliday (1985: xiv) outlines the SFL approach, as part of his explanation that SFL does not take a syntactic approach to modelling language:

However, not even the SFL approach will succeed in modelling music as a semiotic system because music is not a semiotic system: the sounds of music do not realise meanings. Of course, music theory and notation are semiotic systems, as are the lyrics that accompany music, but the sounds themselves are not expressions of content. Instead, music activates what the neuroscientist Edelman calls 'value' systems in the brain, which, in turn, with other systems, underlie feelings and emotions. In terms of Halliday's (2002: 388) evolutionary typology of systems, music can be seen as social (value, but not symbolic value), like the pheromonal systems of eusocial insects. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):

A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" …. A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning". Meaning can be thought of (and was thought of by Saussure) as just a kind of social value; but it is value in a significantly different sense — value that is construed symbolically. … Semiotic systems are social systems where value has been further transformed into meaning.