Brad Smith On Intonational Prominence

Brad Smith replied to David Rose on asflanet on 9 Sept 2024, at 11:54:

yes: 'good reason' is purpose, or function, which is stratal (in relation to higher strata). 

So far as intonational prominence goes, though, it is at the speaker's discretion whether to assign a marked/non-congruent choice greater prominence (eg whether a marked mood-tone co-selection, as realisation of complex interpersonal discourse semantics and tenor relations, is given textual prominence, eg through tonicity) — 

however, I do observe, as a general rule, that when a marked choice is made in an intonation system (eg marked tonicity), there is found to be a decided excess in the phonetic expression - speakers will make sure the listener hears the marked choice (in the same way they might more carefully articulate a particular lexical choice). But this is probably way too complex a topic for me to be delving into while in the middle of other work :)

 

and David Rose replied at 12:09:

//5 ^ ba / rill iant // 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This re-expresses a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[2] To be clear, looking to the higher stratum to find the reason for a marked choice is what the text analyst does, whereas making the marked choice is what the speaker does.

[3] As previously explained, in SFL Theory, 'marked' and 'non-congruent' are not synonymous. Congruence only applies to the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar on the content plane. Applying it to the relation between lexicogrammar and phonology invents the non-existent resource of "phonological metaphor".

[4] This confuses metafunctions and axes. To be clear, the tonic realises an element of structure as the Focus of New information (textual, syntagmatic), not a "marked mood-tone" co-selection (interpersonal, paradigmatic).

[5] This exemplifies a point made by a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236):

In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’].

[6] See David Rose Positively Judging And Appreciating Brad Smith.

David Rose Solving The Non-Problem Of The Synonymy Of 'Unmarked', 'Default' And 'Neutral'

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 9 Sept, at 10:43:

Yep, the apparent synonymy of unmarked, default and neutral were pedagogic issues for Brad designing his intonation course (and perhaps for us all). A possible solution lies in their differing usage (instantial). 

Marked/unmarked are used as technical labels for features in textual systems, where the marked option realises textual prominence (stratal). 

Default tends to connote skewed frequency, which realises unmarked features (axial). 

Neutral tends to be used for ungraduated features in interpersonal systems (eg key)

and at 11:47:

My friend Giacomo Figueredo pointed out that description generalises (same stratum) but explanation abstracts (higher stratum). So look up for reasons (eg prominence in discourse).

*I meant to say ‘Default tends to connote skewed frequency *of structures*, which realise unmarked features (axial).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'default' and 'neutral' are glosses for 'unmarked' as a description of an option in a system. There is no problem requiring a solution.

[2] To be clear, the marked/unmarked distinction is not restricted to the textual metafunction, but is used for systems realising any metafunction, e.g. TENSE and TONE.

[3] To be clear, both the marked and unmarked option of THEME assign textual prominence to an element of structure (axial, not stratal).

[4] To be clear, 'default' describes the 'unmarked' or 'neutral' choice in a system, so the structure that realises that systemic choice is the 'default' or 'unmarked' or 'neutral' structure (axis). Skewed probabilities are a system property, whereas skewed frequencies are an instance property (instantiation).

[5] To be clear, in the system of KEY, 'neutral' is a feature in the system, not a description of a feature as unmarked or default. 

[6] To be clear, here Rose is presenting part of the post he is reacting to (below) as if it hadn't already been stated in that post. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

Many systems embody the distinction between an unmarked term and a marked one, and the distinction may be reflected in the descriptive names given to the terms, as in “unmarked theme” vs. “marked theme”. An alternative label for the unmarked term is “neutral”, as in the interpersonal of (declarative) KEY (e.g. Halliday & Greaves, 2008: 50), where ‘neutral’ key is unmarked and the other keys are marked (‘challenging’, ‘non-committal’, ‘reserved’, ‘strong’); another alternative label is “default”.

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

Brad Smith On Phonological Congruence And His Problem With Markedness

Brad Smith replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 9:43 :

… in the SFL material I was browsing through yesterday afternoon, the terms unmarked and congruent seemed to be used more or less interchangeably.

I am not seeking to find the canonical definition to follow, but working out my own ideas on this (I believe, as a Doctor, this is not only my right but my responsibility!). The quoted passage from my YouTube lecture script, I think, is probably where I land on this: congruence, at least, relates, as you have said, to an inter-stratal relation, specifically what is being demanded of clause and tone group by the discourse semantics (that's my current take on this aspect). …

There are other, similarly troublesome issues of terminology and symbolism in SFL: for example, the same symbol, with minor, inconsequential adjustment, is used for both structural ordering and for a silent Ictus! …

In terms of intonation, however, unlike much of the rest of his work, this has not, relatively speaking, happened as much as I think Halliday wished or expected - for example, the functions of tonicity are still discussed in terms of (Given-New) structure; when the real game, for me, has always been, what gets chosen as focus against the background of what could have been chosen?...i.e. what is the systemic potential for a textual choice? (which, when you start to consider it, is a question with a lot of implications, including for theoretical accounts). 

Markedness is not a systemic description, it is a post hoc account of the valeur of certain choices: we consider, for example, which systemic option in the system of mood is unmarked; but this assignment of markedness, however, is not itself a systemic description - the systemic description of mood is declarative, polar interrogative etc. - We still have to work out what the actual potential for choice is for systems of tonicity, salience etc. (eg within/outside of the mood block can, in some texts, be consequential).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as demonstrated in the previous post, Smith's 'current take' on the interchangeability of 'unmarked' and 'congruent' is a theoretically invalid misunderstanding.

[2] To be clear, the troublesome issue here is using the symbol ^ for ordering (a^b) and the symbol ‸ for silent Ictus (/‸ /).

[3] To be clear, every non-tonic salient syllable realises what could have been selected as the tonic that realises the Focus of New information. The choice of the Given + New structure of an information unit, on the other hand, is a grammatical selection: tonicity is the phonological means of realising it.

[4] This misunderstands 'valeur'. To be clear, 'valeur' (Saussure) is the value of a term in a system in relation to the other terms.

[5] To be clear, descriptive terms like 'declarative', 'polar interrogative' etc. are features that describe language, whereas theoretical terms like 'unmarked' describe the features.

[6] To be clear, a selection of tonic placement realises a selection of a Focus of New information, which gives textual prominence to one or more functional elements of mood (and transitivity and thematic) structure.

David Rose Misleading Through Misunderstanding And Misrepresenting Context Of Culture And Situation

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 18/9/23 at 9:04:

Let’s try to clear up the confusion between situation/culture and register/genre, since it still befuddles sysflingers in my generation...

A ‘context of situation’ is a specific instance of a general ‘context of culture’. These terms were borrowed a century ago by Firth, from the anthropologist Malinowski. They were handy metaphors, long before SFL had a model of tenor, field and mode realised in metafunctions of language, or of semiotic systems instantiated as texts. In contrast, genre and register are terms in SFL theory. 

A genre is a configuration of recurrent selections in tenor, field and mode systems, that is recognised by members of a culture. These are all cultural systems, so ‘context of situation’ is not an appropriate cover term for tenor, field and mode. Instead, the term ‘register’ was appropriated to include tenor, field and mode systems. Genres are realised by selections in register systems. Systems of genre are realised by systems of register, which are realised by systems of language and other modalities.

That’s the perspective of realisation between strata, a synoptic view. Instantiation is more dynamic. As a text unfolds, it instantiates selections in genre systems, register systems and language systems, in each moment.

These are all semiotic systems (systems of meanings), so there is no longer any need for notions of ‘culture’ or ‘situation’ outside of meaning. But metaphors like ‘context of situation and culture’ can be very sticky. How about we prise them loose.

Blogger Comments:

Having previously claimed there are no important differences between the models of Martin and Halliday & Hasan, here Rose proposes replacing Halliday's model of context with Martin's.

[1] To be clear, this confusion began when Martin (1992: 495) incongruously proposed replacing the instantiation relation between culture and situation with a realisation relation between genre and register:

The tension between these two perspectives will be resolved in this chapter by including in the interp[r]etation of context two communication planes, genre (context of culture) and register (context of situation), with register functioning as the expression form of genre, at the same time as language functions as the expression form of register.

[2] To be clear, the only ones befuddled are those who trust Martin to understand SFL Theory for them. See The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

[3] This misleading, because it confuses instantiation with delicacy. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5):

One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation): see Table 4(4).

[4] This is very misleading indeed. The claim here is that 'genre' and 'register' are (genuine) SFL terms, whereas 'context of culture' and 'context of situation' are not, because they are merely "handy metaphors" that precede SFL Theory. The truth is that all four terms are used in SFL Theory. 

Halliday models context as the culture as a semiotic system, with situation as an instance of culture. The term 'register' is used by Halliday for a subpotential of language, varying for context, whereas Martin misunderstands register as a system of context. 

The term 'genre' was introduced by Hasan, at first to refer to a rhetorical mode, but then to refer to a register that realises a rhetorical mode, whereas Martin misunderstands genre as a system of context.

[5] This misunderstands stratification. Martin's model posits his genre as a higher level of symbolic abstraction than his register, so his genre can not be a configuration of selections from his lower stratum, anymore than lexicogrammar can be a configuration of phonological selections. 

Moreover, the process of selection is the process of instantiation, so selections refer to instances, and recurrent selections refer to instance types, not to systems of potential. So the theoretical point that Rose misunderstands here is that a situation type — i.e. "recurrent" selections of tenor, field and mode — is realised by a text type.

[6] This is a very serious misunderstanding of stratification and instantiation. To be clear, 'context of situation' is an appropriate term because it refers to an instance of the context of culture, the systems of tenor, field and mode.

[7] To be clear, it was Martin who rebranded Halliday's context as register. This "appropriation" was not appropriate, because it models a functional variety of language as not being language. This is tantamount to claiming that dairy cattle and beef cattle are not cattle. More technically, in Hjelmslev's terms, it mistakes a variety of a denotative semiotic for (the content plane of) a connotative semiotic.

[8] This confuses stratification with instantiation. To be clear, the claim here is that genres (systems) are realised by instances of registers, since selecting in register systems is the instantiation of register systems.

[9] To be clear, this contradicts the previous statement, since here genre and register are both described at the system pole of the cline of instantiation. However, the claim is that systems like story genres are realised by systems like status and contact relations between the speakers producing the story.

[10] To be clear, here the claim is that genres like narratives, anecdotes etc. are not language.

[11] To be clear, Rose's 'synoptic view' of realisation between strata is confused with the 'dynamic view' of instantiation. See [5], [6] and [8] above.

[12] This misunderstands both instantiation and stratification. Firstly, a text does not instantiate selections in systems; a text is the instantiation of systems, and selection is the process of instantiation. Secondly, a text cannot be the instantiation of Martin's genre and register systems, since text is an instance of language potential, whereas genre and register systems are not language potential, but context potential.

[13] This is very misleading because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, context of culture is not "outside of meaning". Context is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, a system of meaning, and a situation is an instance of that system.

[14] To be clear, since context of situation and culture, when understood, are consistent with SFL Theory, and Martin's misconstrual of language varieties as not language is not, the intelligent response would be try to understand what the terms context of situation and culture mean, and "prise loose" Martin's self-contradictory model.

[15] To be clear, on the one hand, this diagram of Martin's model misrepresents text, an instance of language, as also being an instance of context, which Martin opposes to language. On the other hand, this diagram strategically omits the term that would make its other inconsistencies more obvious: 'register' is omitted from the stratum of field, tenor and mode, and from each cline of instantiation. If the term 'register' is given its place in Martin's model, then it yields:

• a system of genre,
• a register/text type of genre,
• an instance of genre,
• a system of register,
• a register/text type of register,
• an instance of register,
• a system of language,
• a register/text type of language,
• an instance of language (text). 

Moreover, if Martin's stratification is cross-classified with Martin's instantiation:

then it yields such anomalies as:

• a genre/register of genre,
• a text type of genre,
• a genre/register of register,
• a text type of register.

∞

See also

• The Practice Of Public Bluffing In The SFL Community
• David Rose Negatively Appreciating The Deployment Of Logic
• David Rose Positively Judging 'Being Wrong'

David Rose Misrepresenting How Martin's Approach to SFL Differs From Halliday's and Hasan's

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 17/9/23 at 8:53:

Returning briefly to Attia’s question...

How does Martin Approach to SFL is Different from Halliday and Hasan?

To understand its [Halliday and Hasan’s Cohesion in English] relation to Martin’s work in SFL, the place to start is his English Text. ... ET extends the descriptions in CiE...CiE describes structures of discourse, which ET extends to systems and structures

CiE focuses on textual structuring, termed ‘cohesion’, which ET extends to structures across all metafunctions 

CiE describes roles of grammar features in discourse structures, which ET extends as features in discourse semantic systems realised as features in grammar systems 

CiE’s relates textual structuring of discourse to the contextual variables of mode and field as ‘coherence’, which ET extends by describing systems of mode, field and tenor that are realised by discourse semantic structures in each metafunction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the question was about the different approaches to SFL, but Rose has reduced it to a question about the differences between cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976) and discourse semantics (Martin 1992).

[2] To be clear, Martin (1992) takes the original, groundbreaking work of Halliday & Hasan (1976) as his source material and rebrands their lexicogrammatical systems of cohesion as his own systems of discourse semantics.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Hasan (1976) is concerned with non-structural lexicogrammatical resources of cohesion. 

[4] This is very misleading. Of Martin's 49 discourse semantic system networks, across four metafunctions, only 4 specify structural realisations, and all of these are confined to the interpersonal metafunction.

[5] To be clear, this is true, and in doing so, Martin creates theoretical inconsistencies by rebranding the textual lexicogrammatical systems of cohesive conjunction and lexical cohesion as ideational discourse semantic systems of ideation (experiential) and conjunction/connexion (logical).

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Hasan (1976) is concerned with non-structural lexicogrammatical resources of cohesion, not with discourse structures.

[7] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Not one of Martin's 49 discourse semantic system networks, across four metafunctions, specifies how discourse semantic features are realised as features in grammar systems.

[8] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Hasan (1976) has no discussion of coherence. The notion of coherence first appeared in Hasan (1984), and it does not involve relating text structure to field and/or mode. See, for example, Hasan (1989/1985: 93-4) for the linguistic correlates of variation in coherence.

[9] This is seriously misleading in several ways. First, since Halliday & Hasan (1976) has no discussion of coherence, and coherence does not involve relating text structure to field and/or mode, Martin (1992) did not extend that model. Second, mode, field and tenor (style) were first formulated by Halliday in Halliday et al (1964), not Martin (1992). Third, Martin (1992) does not specify how mode, field and tenor are realised by discourse semantic systems, let alone structures.

∞

See also

The Practice Of Public Bluffing In The SFL Community.

David Rose Negatively Appreciating The Deployment Of Logic

David Rose Positively Judging 'Being Wrong'

David Rose Mistaking Realisation Rules For Function Structures And Paradigmatic Features For Syntagmatic Units

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 30/8/23 at 22:41:

Just some parameters...

In a rank scale, the initial entry condition for systems is a syntagmatic unit eg clause. Their features e.g. [indicative] are realised by function structures at that rank ↘︎S^F, and each function within that structure e.g. Subject is realised by a syntagm at the next rank ↘︎nom gp.

Phonemes are syntagmatic units at the base of a rank scale. Features at syllable rank are realised by function structures eg ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme, and each function is realised by a phoneme (complex). Phonemes are produced by tongue and lip postures with voicing, but these lie outside language in the biology of the vocal tract... Jim’s materiality (the ‘etics’ materialising ‘emics’)

So yes, it seems adult social semiosis minimally requires two syntagmatic ranks

Im interested in how that emerges from unranked protolg

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The entry conditions to paradigmatic systems are paradigmatic features, not syntagmatic units. The rank scale construes formal constituents as a system of features, with the selection of a feature satisfying the entry condition to the systems of that rank.

[2] This is very misleading because it is a serious misunderstanding. Features are not realised by function structures. Importantly, in Rose's first example, ↘︎S^F is not a function structure, but a realisation statement that specifies 'Subject before Finite'. Moreover, it is activated by the selection of the feature 'declarative', not 'indicative'. The feature 'indicative' activates the insertion of a Mood element (Subject and Finite). See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162).

In Rose's second example, ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme is not a function structure, but a realisation statement of an unidentified feature that specifies 'optional Onset before Rhyme'.

[3] To be clear, the systems that specify phonemes are those that 'label tongue and lip postures with voicing' (and more), so this is not the distinction between phonology and phonetics. The difference is stratal: phonology is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than phonetics. Moreover, the materiality of phonetics is hardly Martin's discovery.

[4] Clearly, SFL Theory maintains that four ranks are required to model formal constituency in lexicogrammar and phonology. But rank only applies to the expression plane of semiotic systems without a lexicogrammar.

John Bateman On Dimensions Across Semiotic Modes

John Bateman replied to David Rose on Sysfling on 26/8/23 at 20:16:

… But the following [from Rose] is very nice to hear:

Metafunctionality as I tried to suggest, is a property of lg that its syntagmatic structuring has evolved to enable, together with ranks and strata. So it’s basic to lg but not to semiotic modes in general.

I'm wondering how well that statement goes down more generally: consequences should actually follow.

I think the question of what dimensions are common across semiotic modes is very interesting and also central for a semiotics. I'd readily take rank to have to be present, otherwise axis has no domain (s) to operate in. Structural configurations have to be configurations of something. Stratification is also a good bet. Moreover, since semiosis is inherently dynamic, we'll have instantiation and sedimentation relating to reservoires and repositories I'd expect. These would all seem to be necessarily bound up in a single 'definition' of a particular kind of signs for my money. This means there is no 'picking and choosing' to do. …

Metafunction again turns up there as a bit of a swamp... the original idea of "distinctive regions of relatively interdependent systems" gets tricky without sufficiently strongly motivated systems. And I am not yet sure to what extent the different kinds of structure (which I like a lot) actually match well with kinds of functions parallel to linguistically motivated metafunctions in nonverbal semiotic modes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not "very nice to hear" from a theoretical point of view. See David Rose Misunderstanding Metafunctionality And Axis (Inter Alia).

[2] To be clear, rank is one way of modelling formal constituency. In language, rank is a dimension of lexicogrammar and phonology/graphology. Therefore, in modelling semiotic systems without a grammar — that is, those other than language — rank can only be a dimension of the expression plane, not the content plane.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. To be clear, semantics has no rank scale because it has no forms to rank, and yet semantics is modelled with both axes, paradigmatic and syntagmatic; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

Bateman's false claim derives from two theoretical misunderstandings. Firstly, rank is not the domain of axis. Axis and rank are distinct local dimensions. Axis has two orders: the paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Rank has four orders: clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme in lexicogrammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

Secondly, structures are configurations of functions (Senser^Process) not rankscale forms (nominal group ^ verbal group). The sequencing of formal units is a syntagm.

[4] To be clear, without the stratification of content and expression, there can be no semiotic system. Semiosis requires that a Token means a Value. However, the stratification of the content plane is restricted to language, as demonstrated by the fact that only language can be read aloud, since the locutions that a Sayer projects are the wordings of the lexicogrammatical stratum.

[5] This is possibly a garbled reference to 'reservoir' and 'repertoire' in Martin's Bernstein-derived model of individuation.

[6] To be clear, this misrepresents the metafunctions. The metafunctions are "strongly motivated" as the basic types of meaning: construing experience as meaning, enacting intersubjective relations as meaning, and weaving these together as text. Each of these understandings of the metafunctions can be applied to semiotic systems. Indeed, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3) are sceptical of there being full semiotic systems without metafunctions:

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. … There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain.

David Rose Misunderstanding Axial Relations

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 August at 13:07:

Expanding our terms a little, the axial relation is abbreviated as system/structure, but is actually features/structures in systems. Systemic contrasts are simultaneously between features and the structures that realise them. Structures are more precisely function structures. Their functions are either interpersonal, ideational or textual (at least at higher ranks). They are realised by syntagms (or syntagmatic structures). In a metafunctional semiotic, syntagms must be able to realise multiple functions at once (eg nom gps realising Theme/Subject/Actor). This seems basic to semiotic organisation??

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The axial relation — the relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders of axis — is realisation. System is the dimension of the paradigmatic order, and structure is the dimension of the syntagmatic order. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. On the one hand, there are no structures in systems, since these are each different dimensions of different orders of axis. On the other hand, the axial relation, realisation, does not obtain between features and structures; for example, the clause feature [existential] entails the realisation statement 'insert Existent' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 355), which is the specification of a participant, not of the structure in which the participant figures.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. For example, a systemic contrast between features, such as [positive] vs [negative] POLARITY is not realised by a systemic contrast in (agnate) structures, since both are realised by the same structure, e.g. Subject^Finite^Predicator.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. A syntagm is a sequence of classes, whereas a structure is a configuration of functions. (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 60):

Such a sequence of classes is called a syntagm (e.g. Halliday, 1966a). However, this tells us very little about how it is organised or what it means. The significance of such a syntagm is that here it is the realisation of a structure: an organic configuration of elements, which we can analyse in functional terms.

David Rose On There Being No Such Things As Systems Or Structures

David Rose replied to Kieran McGillicuddy on Sysfling on 24 August 2023 at 4:36:

You’re quite right... there are actually no such things as systems or structures — they are merely generalisations from accumulated instances in the flow of discourse.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in this context, systems and structures are abstract things that serve as participants in clauses in the field of linguistic theory.

[2] To be clear, systems and structures are abstractions in the metalanguages that theorise languages.

∞

Postscript: McGillicuddy promptly denied that he held the view ascribed to him by Rose.

David Rose Misunderstanding Axial Relations And Connotative Semiotics

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 August 2023 at 00:01:

Axis is the systemic in systemic functional. In this theory, the coupling of generalisation with abstraction in the axial relation is the basis of semiosis. It is not merely a formalism of the theory, rather the formalism mirrors the semiotic relation. There can be no structures outside of systems, and no systems without structures. This includes systems at each rank, stratum and metafunction, of denotative semiotics like language and image, and connotative semiotics like register and genre.

There are plenty of other theories out there, but axis is what sets this one apart. SFS has been influenced by many theories in lx and other disciplines. It proceeds by examining the objects of these theories through the lens of axis, with procedures designed by Halliday in the 1960s for phonology and grammar, and applied since to these and other strata and modalities.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Axis is a dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. The 'systemic' in 'systemic functional' is the paradigmatic order of axis only.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The axial relation is the (realisation) relation between the paradigmatic axis and the syntagmatic axis. It is not a "coupling of generalisation with abstraction".

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Structures are, by definition, "outside of systems" since the two are of different orders: structures are syntagmatic (chains), whereas systems are paradigmatic (choices).

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Hjelmslev's connotative semiotic is a semiotic that has a denotative semiotic as its expression plane. What Rose refers to as a connotative semiotic is only the content plane of the connotative semiotic. However, register and genre (text type) are varieties of a denotative semiotic: language. In terms of a connotative semiotic, register and genre are on its expression plane (language) not its content plane (context).

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. There was no Systemic Functional theory in the 1960s. Halliday's theory at that time was Scale-&-Category Grammar, which had no system networks and no metafunctions.

David Rose Misunderstanding Axis And Realisation (Inter Alia)

David Rose replied to Brad Smith on Sysfling on 23 August 2023 at 15:47 and 16:26:

I used realisation below as the interstratal relation. Axis is the feature/structure relation in systems (which is also confusingly called realisation). Both are abstraction (token/value) relations. Axis is a one-to-one relation between a feature (value) and a structure (token). It also implies the generalisation of a system, because it is a contrast between structures that realises a contrast between features (not individual structures).

It is that coupling of generalisation with abstraction that lies at the heart of semiosis, and hence of SFS theory.

Interstratal relations are not one-to-one. Hence tone choices can be coupled with various mood choices to realise variations in appraisal, //4 don’t you know//. …

Oh sorry Brad, how rude of me.

I meant to say, //5 don't you/know//

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here again Rose misunderstands axis. Axis is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic, whereas system is the dimension of the paradigmatic order of axis. Systems include realisation statements attached to features which specify structural realisations, but that is not 'axis'.

[2] To be clear, realisation is the relation between different levels of symbolic abstraction, and so it applies wherever that relation obtains: between system and structure, between strata, between function and form. It does not obtain between a feature and a structure, since a feature is not realised by a structure. Instead, a system (of a clause) is realised by a structure (of a clause). Importantly, a structure is not a functional element, but the relationships between such elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451): 

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

[3] To be clear this argument rests on an invalid premiss:

Premiss: Axis is a contrast between structures that realises a contrast between features

Conclusion: Axis implies a generalisation of a system

The premiss is invalid because this is not what axis is (see [1]). Moreover, a contrast in features is not realised by a contrast in structure. For example, the contrast between the POLARITY features positive and negative is not realised by a contrast in structure, since both are realised by the element Finite in the same structural configuration, e.g. Subject^Finite^Predicator.

[4] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 618) write:

The developmental dynamic of "generalisation — abstractness — metaphor" provides the semiotic energy for the grammar, enabling it to serve as the powerhouse for construing experience in the form of scientific knowledge.

But this bears no relation to Rose's use of the terms generalisation and abstraction. For example (op. cit.: 615):

This principle of generalisation — that is, naming general classes rather than specific individuals — is what makes it possible to construct an ideation base. …

General terms are not necessarily abstract; a bird is no more abstract than a pigeon. But some words have referents that are purely abstract — words like cost and clue and habit and tend and strange; they are construing some aspect of our experience, but there is no concrete thing or process with which they can be identified.

[5] This is misleading. To be clear, in the absence of grammatical metaphor, semantics and lexicogrammar are in agreement (congruent):

• a statement (semantics) is realised by a declarative clause (lexicogrammar);
• a question (semantics) is realised by an interrogative clause (lexicogrammar);
• a command (semantics) is realised by an imperative clause (lexicogrammar);
• an elaborating sequence (semantics) is realised by an elaborating clause complex (lexicogrammar);
• a relational figure (semantics) is realised by a relational clause (lexicogrammar);
• an element (semantics) is realised by a group or phrase (lexicogrammar).

[6] This is potentially misleading. The phonological system of TONE realises the grammatical system of KEY.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 168):

The tones are not, however, simply additional markers attached to the realisation of mood. They realise distinct grammatical systems of their own, which are associated with the mood categories. The general name for systems that are realised by tone is KEY. The term KEY covers a number of systems …

(1) declarative clauses

unmarked statement: tone 1

reserved statement: tone 4

insistent statement: tone 5

tentative statement: tone 3

protesting statement: tone 2

(2) WH- interrogative clauses

unmarked WH- question: tone 1

tentative question: tone 2

echo question: tone 2 with tonic on WH- element

(3) yes/no interrogative clauses

unmarked yes/no question: tone 2

peremptory question: tone 1

(4) imperative clauses

command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)

invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)

request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t

plea: tone 4

[7] Note that tones 4 and 5 are not used with yes/no interrogative clauses. Since Rose's question is peremptory, it would be realised by tone 1 if spoken. 

David Rose Confusing Axis With System

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 23 August 2023 at 13:55:

Can I suggest when reading the various philosophers of language cited in this thread, to remember the one missing puzzle piece that lies at the heart of systemic functional semiotics... axis.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Rose confuses axis with system. Axis is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

System, on the other hand, is the dimension of the paradigmatic order of axis only. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20):

David Rose On What Makes Us Human And Fooled

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 31 Mar 2023 at 9:23:

I was thinking of Shooshi’s what makes us human... dirty jokes ;-))

Re pickiness of humans... I have a sneaking suspicion GPT’s telling us something important about us, not just itself. How much are we fooled by our synoptic view of systems and texts? We can see emergent patterning when we stare at enough printed text, and then represent it as weighted options in systems. But how much do we actually know about how we process text above the lower ranks of expression? What actually is the relation between structural probabilities in text production and ‘meaning’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Halliday, it is the stratified content plane of language that "makes us human". Halliday (2002 [1996]: 388):

The more complex type of semiotic system is that which evolves in the form of Edelman’s “higher order consciousness”. This higher order semiotic is what we call language. It has a grammar; and it appears to be unique to mature (i.e. post-infancy) human beings. In other words, it evolved as the “sapiens” in homo sapiens.

Halliday (2003 [1995]: 390, 430n):

In this paper I have tried to identify, and to illustrate, certain aspects of language which seem to me critical to a consideration of language and the human brain. In doing so I have assumed that language is what defines the brain of homo sapiens: what constitutes it as specifically human.

The emergence of grammar … is the critical factor in the development of higher-order consciousness; homo sapiens = homo grammaticus. See Halliday (1978a, 1979b); Painter (1984, 1989); Oldenburg (1986).

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 25):

This stratification of the content plane had immense significance in the evolution of the human species – it is not an exaggeration to say that it turned homo ... into homo sapiens (cf. Halliday, 1995b; Matthiessen, 2004a). It opened up the power of language and in so doing created the modern human brain. 

[2] To be clear, in the case of ChatGPT, "we" are not fooled by "our synoptic view of systems and texts", but by ascribing systems to an AI model of language that generates texts from (the lexical collocation probabilities of) instances, not systems.

[3] To be clear, this relation is given by the architecture of language proposed by SFL Theory: structures are specified systemically in the realisation statements attached to features whose probability of instantiation varies according to register. 'Meaning', in the narrower sense, is the stratum of semantics: its systems that are realised as structures, and instantiated as texts.

But importantly, ChatGPT does not use systems that specify structural probabilities to generate texts. Instead, it uses the lexical collocation probabilities garnered from a 'reservoir' of texts, each of which is the instance of the system of the meaner who produced it. (In lexicogrammar, collocation is the syntagmatic dimension of lexis, whereas structure is the syntagmatic dimension of grammar.)

Ed McDonald On There Being 'No Such Things As Words, Sounds Or Meanings'

Edward McDonald replied to David Kellogg on sys-func on 13 Dec 2022 at 10:50:

I would go even further than either you or Chris and say simply this: there are NO such things as "words" - or "sounds" or "meanings" for that matter. We're misled by the lexicogrammar of our metalanguage into seeing such things are "entities", whereas, as Chris in effect pointed out, they're really "intersections" of a whole array of overlapping features. This is how I've framed the issue for my editing clients:

There are no such things as “meanings”, only *contrasts* in meaning; there are no such things as “words”, only alternative *choices* of wording. This is the hard truth about using a language that fluent users know "instinctively” but many learners - and teachers! - seem to try and avoid: you can’t know what a word means unless you know the other possible alternative choices in that context. And because each contrast in meaning, through the appropriate choice in wording, derives from and leads on to further choices, the process of writing, like that of reading, is one of negotiating future choices in the light of past ones, the key at every point being to anticipate what your reader will be expecting.

Such a relational point of view is very hard to keep in mind - so much of modern linguistics and philosophy of language rejects it outright - but if we look at how language actually functions - text in context - then for me it's the only perspective that makes sense.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, 'things' are construals of experience as meaning. 'Sounds' are construals as first-order (material) things, whereas 'words' and 'meanings' are construals as second-order (semiotic) things; that is: as meta-things. Semiotic things have no material existence.

[2] To be clear, the distinction here between "misled" (words, sounds and meanings) and "really" (intersections of overlapping features) is a theoretical distinction between a Token and a Value:

McDonald's view is that the higher level of abstraction (Value) of the identity is real, whereas the lower level abstraction (Token) is not real. Logically, McDonald's argument is:

P = Q 

∴ ~ P

[3] To be clear, 'contrasts in meaning' presupposes that there are meanings that can be contrasted.

[4] To be clear, 'choices in wording' presupposes that there are words that can be chosen.

[5] To be clear, 'what a word means' presupposes that there are words that mean.

[6] To be clear, the relational point of view that McDonald meant to express is Saussure's view that 

concepts... are defined not positively, in terms of their content, but negatively by contrast with other items in the same system. What characterises each most exactly is being whatever the others are not (Saussure 1983, 115; Saussure 1974, 117).

In other words:

But, as above, it can be seen that the nub of McDonald's misinterpretation of Saussure is to treat the Value (contrast) as 'real' and to dismiss the Token (meaning) as 'no such thing'.

See also The Thoughts Of Spinoza In Systemic Functional Linguistics.

David Rose Misrepresenting The Basis Of Systems

David Rose replied to David Kellogg on asflanet on 23/8/22 at 12:28:

Beyond Korean... good chance to sort out axis and strata

Re axis: Distinctions in mood options (features) must be realised by regular structural distinctions, that are dependent on other mood choices... e.g. modality options within the English mood system. Systems can only be drawn from structural proportionalities that are consistent across all instances.

Re strata: 

a) indicative-interrogative etc are features in grammatical mood systems. Speech functions are features in (discourse) semantic systems, that are realised by variations in mood.

b) Face-to-face meeting or newspaper reading is a choice at the stratum of tenor and mode (register), which is realised in interpersonal and textual language patterns. ...

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, systemic distinctions between features are not realised by structural distinctions between elements. For example, in the system of MODALITY, the systemic distinction between probability and obligation is not realised by the structural distinction between Finite and mood Adjunct, and either systemic feature may be realised by either structural element.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, it misunderstands systemic proportionalities as structural. As Halliday (2008: 121) explains:

Proportionality means that the terms in the system stand in a constant relationship to one another; their significance will vary according to the context, but (for example) hats is to hat as hairs is to hair as silk is to silks, even though hats are more than hat, hairs are less than hair, and silks are kinds of silk.

On the other hand, contrary to Rose's formulation, it is the system that “gives value to” the elements of syntagmatic structure, as Halliday (2008: 5,6):

This is the “system” in the sense in which it was formulated and defined by JR Firth (Firth 1957a,b); the system is the paradigmatic relation that “gives value to” the elements of syntagmatic structure. […] It is the system that defines the set of options from which any feature derives its value. […] What characterises the system is the regular proportionality between its terms. The system is closed, so that its terms are mutually defining […]

[3] This is misleading, because it repeats Martin's confusion of context with register. To be clear, in SFL Theory, field, tenor and mode are systems of context, the culture as semiotic system, whereas register is a sub-potential of language. Halliday (2005 [1995]: 254):

David Rose Misrepresenting His Posts On 'Axis'

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on sysfling on 9/8/22 at 9:07:

Rather than an argument, I’d call the macro-genre of this thread a jointly constructed factorial explanation, more informing for anyone interested, than arguing a position. Its factorial structure was given by the points you raised in your 3 August sysfunc post, and each Factor drew on others’ explanations. So explicitly heteroglossic (trying not to mansplain, pace Lexi). Factors were...

1. MAKH’s view of axis (following Firth and Saussure)

2. Relations between features and structures in systems

3. Differences between stratal and axial realisation

4. Stratal relations between phonology/lexicogrammar and semantics in the ‘meaning/wording/sounding’ formula

5. Axis and strata in other modalities

6. Hjelmslev’s influence on MAKH’s stratal model

7. Axis and strata in protolanguage

So yes, very much theory internal (strong verticality in Jo Muller’s terms), but also highly appliable (strong grammaticality). That’s how axis is usually presented in SFL, as a theoretical tool for describing language and other modalities, and for theory building. But I think it is not simply a linguistic innovation by MAKH, but a discovery of how semiosis works. That was the inspiration for my diagram in Factor 2, centred on the claim ‘Structures are perceivable tokens of the abstract values of features’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue on several counts. 

• Firstly, the email thread in question was not jointly constructed. No other list members contributed to the points that Rose tried to make. 
• Secondly, it was not a 'factorial explanation'. According to Martin & Rose (2007: 345), a factorial explanation is a genre ('text type' in SFL) whose purpose ('rhetorical mode' in SFL) is explaining multiple causes, and whose stages ('semantic structure' in SFL) are Phenomenon^Explanation. The previous 20+ posts demonstrate that Rose was not concerned with multiple causes, but with multiple examples of theoretical uses of 'axis', inter alia.
• Thirdly, the posts in the thread were not informing, but misinforming, as demonstrated by the previous 20+ posts on this blog.
• Fourthly, the posts in the thread were indeed arguing a position, Martin's, which Rose explicitly stated as 'axis is key', axis is sufficient' etc.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The previous 20+ blog posts demonstrate that Rose's emails do not have the 'factorial' structure of Phenomenon^Explanation. Rose and his citations have been strong on assertion, but weak on explanation.

[3] This misunderstands heteroglossia. Heteroglossia involves the expressions of different points of view. In his posts, Rose has cited different authors that he believes support the same point of view.

[4] Mansplain verb. (of a man) explain (something) to someone, typically a woman, in a manner regarded as condescending or patronising.

[5] See, for example:

• David Rose Misrepresenting Axis As Key To Semantics-Grammar Relations
• David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday's Development Of SFL Theory
• David Rose Misrepresenting Axis
• David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday On Axis
• David Rose Misunderstanding Halliday's "Axial Breakthrough"
• David Rose Endorsing Martin's Misunderstanding Of Stratal Relations As Axial
• David Rose Endorsing Martin's Misunderstandings Of Protolanguage

[6] This is potentially misleading. On the one hand, the innovation, the distinction between paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, was made in Course in General Linguistics (Saussure 1916), nine years before Halliday's birth. 

On the other hand, on the epistemological assumptions of SFL Theory, theories do not "discover truth" ('how semiosis works'). Instead, they reconstrue data validly, or otherwise, on the basis of the assumptions of the theory, valid or otherwise, and vary in their explanatory potential in different contexts of use. Rose here expresses a transcendent view of meaning — meanings are 'out there' to be discovered — whereas SFL assumes an immanent perspective, wherein meanings are construed in semiotic systems. See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 415-8).

[7] For the self-contradictions in Rose's diagram, see

• David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction