Mick O'Donnell On Perception Verbs

On 3/12/13, Mick O'Donnell wrote on the Sys-func and Sysfling lists:

IFG3 lists the following perception verbs:

perceive, sense, see, notice, glimse, hear, overhear, feel, taste, smell

And note these can all project (with reservations on the last two):

I perceived that he was uneasy.
I sensed that he was uneasy.
I saw that he was uneasy.
I noticed that he was uneasy.
I glim[p]sed that he had the Joker.
I heard that you won.
I overheard that you like cheese.
I felt that I should leave.
? I smelt that she had been here
? I tasted that she had used garlic

Blogger Comments:

There are two problems here.  

[1] The first problem is O'Donnell's continual mistaking of embedded clauses for projected ones, as demonstrated in previous critiques.  As a general guide, whenever that can be replaced by the fact that, we know we are dealing with a 'fact' clause, and so with a clause that is embedded as a constituent within another clause.

[2] The second problem is the analytical mistake of using the verb itself as the point of departure for determining the process type of a particular clause.  A specific verb can serve as various types of Process, as when see functions as a mental process of cognition, rather than perception.

Mick O'Donnell On Mental Processes

On 3/12/13 Mick O'Donnell wrote on the Sys-func and Sysfling lists:

As for your "get a bird's eye view" being mental, if it can't clausally project, it can't be mental, if we take Halliday's criteria seriously:

* I got a bird's eye view that it was beautiful

Note however:

I got the idea that you were here.

...that potentially projects, so could be mental.  An alternative analysis would place the "that" clause as a postmodifier to "idea", which would dismiss the mental analysis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] If we do indeed "take Halliday's criteria seriously", then the ability to project is not a necessary criterion for mental processes.  Only the 'higher' mental processes of cognition and desideration have the potential to project; the 'lower' mental processes of perception and emotion cannot project, though they can range over (embedded) pre-projected facts, as in He heard (the fact) that you were ill.

he	heard	(the fact) [[ that you were ill ]]
Senser	Process: mental	Phenomenon: metaphenomenon

[2] Again, this is not a projection nexus — but it is a mental clause.  The embedded Postmodifier does not "dismiss the mental analysis":

I	got	the idea [[ that you were here ]]
Senser	Process: mental	Phenomenon: metaphenomenon

As demonstrated elsewhere here, O'Donnell does not understand the distinction between projection nexuses and simple clauses with embedded projections.

Mick O'Donnell On Projection And Clause Complexing

On 17/10/13, Mick O'Donnell wrote to the sys-func and sysfling lists:

Truing [sic] to get my head around Halliday's treatment of projection as clause complexing:

a) Many believe that John is right.

b) That John is right is believed by many.

If (a) Is a clause complex, how do I analyse (b) which seems to be the passive form of the same?

Blogger Comment:

(a) is not a clause complex.  It is a clause simplex with an embedded projection (i.e. a 'pre-projected fact') serving as Phenomenon, and (b) is its receptive agnate.

Reasoning:

From 'roundabout': (a) is agnate with Many believe the fact that John is right

From 'above': the projection was not created by the process of believing.  It was projected by a previous figure of a senser sensing or sayer saying (i.e. 'pre-projected'), and the process of believing ranges over it as a metaphenomenon.

See a transitivity analysis here.

See why (ranking) projections are not clause constituents here.