Brad Smith On Intonational Prominence

Brad Smith replied to David Rose on asflanet on 9 Sept 2024, at 11:54:

yes: 'good reason' is purpose, or function, which is stratal (in relation to higher strata). 

So far as intonational prominence goes, though, it is at the speaker's discretion whether to assign a marked/non-congruent choice greater prominence (eg whether a marked mood-tone co-selection, as realisation of complex interpersonal discourse semantics and tenor relations, is given textual prominence, eg through tonicity) — 

however, I do observe, as a general rule, that when a marked choice is made in an intonation system (eg marked tonicity), there is found to be a decided excess in the phonetic expression - speakers will make sure the listener hears the marked choice (in the same way they might more carefully articulate a particular lexical choice). But this is probably way too complex a topic for me to be delving into while in the middle of other work :)

 

and David Rose replied at 12:09:

//5 ^ ba / rill iant // 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This re-expresses a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[2] To be clear, looking to the higher stratum to find the reason for a marked choice is what the text analyst does, whereas making the marked choice is what the speaker does.

[3] As previously explained, in SFL Theory, 'marked' and 'non-congruent' are not synonymous. Congruence only applies to the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar on the content plane. Applying it to the relation between lexicogrammar and phonology invents the non-existent resource of "phonological metaphor".

[4] This confuses metafunctions and axes. To be clear, the tonic realises an element of structure as the Focus of New information (textual, syntagmatic), not a "marked mood-tone" co-selection (interpersonal, paradigmatic).

[5] This exemplifies a point made by a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236):

In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’].

[6] See David Rose Positively Judging And Appreciating Brad Smith.

David Rose Misunderstanding Markedness

David Rose replied to Brad Smith on asflanet on 2 Sept 2024, at 21:21:

As you say, it’s related to instantiation, specifically the probability of instantiation... less likely choices are more marked. That gets you into knots with tone 1 imperatives here, which you say are ‘unmarked’ but are no more frequent than other tones in your data. A problem may be ambiguity of the term ‘neutral’. It can mean unmarked, but in Halliday’s key system it means neutral force, in contrast to mild, strong etc.

PS Key treats grammar/tone couplings as delicate mood choices, but another perspective is delicate speech function and appraisal choices... ‘what a command is trying to get done ‘

and on 3 Sept, at 13:27:

In contrast, marked/unmarked are used technically as feature labels in textual systems, theme and information focus. Could we perhaps avoid using these terms quasi-technically in pedagogic contexts, and reserve them for textual features? The ‘good reason’ is textual prominence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no problem here because markedness is not defined by frequency. Halliday (2005 [1991]: 68):

An unmarked term is a default condition: that which is selected unless there is good reason for selecting some other term. It is not defined by frequency, but it is likely to correspond to the more probable term in a system whose probabilities are skew.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 169) identify the different speech functions realised by imperative mood realised by different tones as follows:

command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)
invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)
request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t
plea: tone 4

The frequency of a selected tone will thus vary with the frequency of a selected speech function realised by imperative mood in a given text type, and this varies with the tenor relations of the interlocutors.

[2] This misunderstands the distinction between a feature and a classification of feature. In Halliday's system of KEY, Halliday & Greaves (2008: 208) 'neutral' is one of the features, not a classification of a feature as neutral or unmarked:

[3] This misrepresents the SFL model. To be clear, SPEECH FUNCTION (semantics) is realised by MOOD (lexicogrammar), and different features of KEY (lexicogrammar), realised by different features of TONE (phonology), differentiate the SPEECH FUNCTION of a MOOD into more delicate types. An example is the case of commands being differentiated into invitations, requests and pleas according to the tone selection, as in [1] above.

[4] To be clear, the unmarked/marked distinction is not restricted to features of textual systems, as demonstrated by the unmarked/marked distinction for the system of TONE, which realises interpersonal systems. Another interpersonal example is the unmarked choice of Subject; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 194):

For any clause, there is one choice of Subject that is ‘unmarked’ – that is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In a giving clause (offer or statement), the unmarked Subject is ‘I’; while in a demanding clause (question or command), the unmarked Subject is ‘you’.

An experiential example is unmarked/marked distinction for present tense, which varies according to PROCESS TYPE. 

[5] This misunderstands the 'good reason' principle. To be clear, 'textual prominence' is what choosing an element as Theme or New affords, and this is the case whether the choice is unmarked or marked. The 'good reason' principle, on the other hand, is what lies behind the choice of a marked option in preference to the unmarked option.

Brad Smith On Markedness Not Explained In Theoretical Terms

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 11:05:

Saying unmarked is the option one chooses except where there is 'some good reason', while helpful in learning how to analyse markedness, doesn't really explain the concept in theoretical terms. So far, until better educated, I am sticking with my discourse semantics motivation: imperative mood, phylogenetically and functionally, is the option to enact a command - to get that job done; and other options, co-selected with tone choices, are used to enact more complex moves such as polite command: '//1 ^ can I / start the order with your */ phone number please // ('give me your phone number' + deference)

and again at 14:17:

I guess my question with theoretical terms and concepts is, what am I asking this term/concept to do for me? We can never, sadly or not, get away from 'language turned back on itself' and all that implies... (including if we use multimodal semiotics as metadiscourse... mathematicians and scientists take note!)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is linguistic data produced by speakers and writers that are analysed, not markedness. Once data are theorised as a system network, relative markedness can be assigned by a linguist to alternative features in a system.

[2] To be clear, glossing 'unmarked' as the default or neutral choice explains the concept in everyday terms. On the other hand, Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7) explain the concept in terms of the theoretical dimensions of axis, instantiation and stratification:

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[3] To be clear, this is Halliday's theory, not Martin's discourse semantics.

[4] For some of the theoretical problems that invalidate the model of discourse semantics, see e.g.

• Review of English Text
• Review of Bateman's Review of English Text
• Review of Working With Discourse

[5] To be clear, like any theoretical concept, markedness is a means of understanding how language functions. For example, if a selection is marked, then there is a motivation for the selection to be sought. 

[6] To be clear, language is the most powerful semiotic system, so using language to model language is using the most powerful semiotic system to model language.

[7] To be clear, 'metadiscourse' is literally discourse about discourse. From an SFL perspective, what gets classified as metadiscourse is non-ideational meaning: aspects of interpersonal and textual meaning. It may be that Smith meant 'metalanguage', but this only applies to linguistic theory — language about language — not to (language about) mathematics and (language about) science.

Brad Smith On Phonological Congruence And His Problem With Markedness

Brad Smith replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 9:43 :

… in the SFL material I was browsing through yesterday afternoon, the terms unmarked and congruent seemed to be used more or less interchangeably.

I am not seeking to find the canonical definition to follow, but working out my own ideas on this (I believe, as a Doctor, this is not only my right but my responsibility!). The quoted passage from my YouTube lecture script, I think, is probably where I land on this: congruence, at least, relates, as you have said, to an inter-stratal relation, specifically what is being demanded of clause and tone group by the discourse semantics (that's my current take on this aspect). …

There are other, similarly troublesome issues of terminology and symbolism in SFL: for example, the same symbol, with minor, inconsequential adjustment, is used for both structural ordering and for a silent Ictus! …

In terms of intonation, however, unlike much of the rest of his work, this has not, relatively speaking, happened as much as I think Halliday wished or expected - for example, the functions of tonicity are still discussed in terms of (Given-New) structure; when the real game, for me, has always been, what gets chosen as focus against the background of what could have been chosen?...i.e. what is the systemic potential for a textual choice? (which, when you start to consider it, is a question with a lot of implications, including for theoretical accounts). 

Markedness is not a systemic description, it is a post hoc account of the valeur of certain choices: we consider, for example, which systemic option in the system of mood is unmarked; but this assignment of markedness, however, is not itself a systemic description - the systemic description of mood is declarative, polar interrogative etc. - We still have to work out what the actual potential for choice is for systems of tonicity, salience etc. (eg within/outside of the mood block can, in some texts, be consequential).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as demonstrated in the previous post, Smith's 'current take' on the interchangeability of 'unmarked' and 'congruent' is a theoretically invalid misunderstanding.

[2] To be clear, the troublesome issue here is using the symbol ^ for ordering (a^b) and the symbol ‸ for silent Ictus (/‸ /).

[3] To be clear, every non-tonic salient syllable realises what could have been selected as the tonic that realises the Focus of New information. The choice of the Given + New structure of an information unit, on the other hand, is a grammatical selection: tonicity is the phonological means of realising it.

[4] This misunderstands 'valeur'. To be clear, 'valeur' (Saussure) is the value of a term in a system in relation to the other terms.

[5] To be clear, descriptive terms like 'declarative', 'polar interrogative' etc. are features that describe language, whereas theoretical terms like 'unmarked' describe the features.

[6] To be clear, a selection of tonic placement realises a selection of a Focus of New information, which gives textual prominence to one or more functional elements of mood (and transitivity and thematic) structure.

Ed McDonald On Halliday's Linguistic Imperialism

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 8 Jul 2024, at 08:49:

We've often had this debate before, and presumably if music has no "grammar" it has no "semantics" either. I would agree, in the sense that those two terms are traditionally applied to language and so come with all sorts of associations and presuppositions. … 

But as a semiotic system - by definition (IMFFHO) - must have the two mutually defining strata of what in general terms I like to call interpretation and expression: specifically for music, what I call "phonotactics" and "e/motion" - see my 2021 paper in Language, Context, Text, then it presumably has a "grammar" of sorts, in the sense of distinctive patterns with significant interpretations. In a separate step, In relation to music, I also depart from orthodoxy in characterising the expression stratum of phonotactics as purely textural (= textual), with the other metafunctions coming in only at the stratum of e/motion, whether interactional (= interpersonal) or figurative (= ideational) (I haven't found the need to distinguish between experiential and logical). …

Halliday "privileging" language in this way for me invokes the spectre of what, following Horst Ruthrof, I call "linguistic imperialism"; and the fact that Social Semiotics (again IMFFHO) is shot through with linguistic imperialism for me explains why Ruqaiya for one didn't "believe in" multimodality, in the sense of a model of same that wasn't simply parasitic on the theory of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here McDonald is commenting on Halliday's view (2002[1996]: 388-9) that language is the only semiotic system that has a grammar, in his sense of the term.

[2] This misunderstands Halliday. On Halliday's model, if music is a social semiotic system, then it has content and expression, but its content is not stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar. For Cléirigh, on the other hand, in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy of complex systems, music is social, not semiotic. That is, it carries value, but not symbolic value. In terms of Edelman's neuroscientific theory, music selects perceptual categorisations of positive or negative value, and such value systems play an important rôle in the experience of emotions.

[3] Again, this misunderstands Halliday. For Halliday, the "two mutually defining strata" are the content and expression planes, following Hjelmslev. This is a prerequisite of semiotic systems, but it does not entail that content is stratified to include a grammar, in Halliday's sense, as 'an entirely abstract semiotic construct that emerges between the content and the expression levels of the original, sign-based primary semiotic system' (ibid.).

[4] To be clear, the problem with reconstruing 'content' as 'interpretation' is that the latter is the perspective of the listener only.

[5] This misunderstands the metafunctions. The metafunctions are types of meanings, and so are a dimension of the content plane only. For example, phonological systems are not metafunctional; they realise metafunctional meanings of the content plane.

[6] As demonstrated above, McDonald's accusation of "linguistic imperialism" is entirely unwarranted, since it derives only from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's theorising.

David Kellogg On Logic And Tone

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 9 Mar 2024, at 08:19:

Not one of the responses has really taken up b), the argument which says that logic cannot be "applied" directly to scientific problems, because the level of organisation at which and the concepts and data to which the logic must be applied are radically different, so logic itself develops as we move from arithmetic to statistics, and still more as we move from math to physics to chemistry to biology to socio-psychology to semiotics.

Now, in itself, these data points suggest to me that...well, that we are human, and the "tone" in which something is said is not simply part of the grammar (Halliday and Greaves, 2009) but also part of our semantics and part of the context of situation Chris's attempt to imagine argumentation where tone is not an essential part of the argument is chimerical. …

Halliday would say it somewhat differently: he would say that "logical" arguments, and even my meta-logical argument, are just everyday language (i.e. my aggressively intoned argument) which has been "tidied up", and he would probably agree that tidying up "tone" is, in the long run, impossible for humans to do: it is literally like trying to speak without any intonation at all.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, logical validity is argument–internal, since it is concerned with premisses and the reasoning from premisses to conclusions. Logical validity, therefore, does not vary with the field in which it is applied.

[2] To be clear, logical validity is a means of distinguishing arguments that are valid from arguments that are fallacious. Applied to scientific problems, logical validity is a means of distinguishing scientific solutions that rest on arguments that are valid from scientific solutions that rest on arguments that are fallacious.

[3] To be clear, this confuses the phonological system of TONE with tone in the sense of 'tone policing'.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. ChRIS — whose PhD thesis was on phonology — did not attempt to imagine argumentation without intonation. He simply informed the sys-func subscribers of the logical fallacy known as tone policing:

Tone policing – focusing on emotion behind (or resulting from) a message rather than the message itself as a discrediting tactic.

David Rose On Focus As Phonology And Jim Martin's Fastidiousness

David Rose replied to Rob Spence on asflanet on 20 Feb 2024, at 12:31:

I think you’ll find the term ‘focus’ is used in phonology for the name of a system information focus, whose features are realised by relations between the Tonic function and lexicogrammar. (More hill than ditch ;-) Focus isn’t used as a function term.

I think you’ll also find that Jim has always been fastidiously careful about distinguishing terms between strata, which I guess he learnt from Michael (all those years ago), and has been teaching others, as the canon has proliferated (all these years since).

He is also fastidiously careful about acknowledging those whose work he and colleagues are building on. How to show respect for others is nicely modelled in current work on register systems, carefully framed in relation to that of Halliday (53 refs), Hasan (42), Carmel Cloran, Cate Poynton and others...

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, INFORMATION is a system of lexicogrammar, not phonology. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 115):

… the system of INFORMATION. This is a system not of the clause, but of a separate grammatical unit, the information unit (cf. Halliday, 1967a, 1967/8; Halliday & Greaves, 2008: Section 5.1). The information unit is a unit that is parallel to the clause and the other units belonging to the same rank scale as the clause.

The misunderstanding of INFORMATION as phonology can be sourced to Martin (1992: 384, 401).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, 'focus' refers to the lexicogrammatical element of structure that is realised by tonic prominence (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 116). Halliday (1992: 371):

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Martin uses the most of the terms from lexicogrammatical cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976) in rebranding it as his discourse semantics. Evidence here.

[4] To be clear, Martin (hypocritically) criticises Halliday for 'not distinguishing terms between strata'. Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 232):

… confusion invited by the use of grammatical terminology for semantic description in several SFL publications, particularly those dealing with grammatical metaphor (e.g. Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999).

But, in any case, the objection is based on a misunderstanding. A functional grammar interprets grammatical form in terms of its function, which is to realise meaning. In grammatical metaphor, the meaning of a grammatical form is incongruent with the meaning being realised. It is the use of meaning terminology on both strata that enables the systematic description of grammatical metaphor. And, as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) point out:

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning. If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[5] For the motivation behind this theological term for what in science would be called 'the standard theory', see The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

[6] This misleads through what it omits. It is true that Martin generally acknowledges his sources, though he doesn't always acknowledge that an idea comes from his source rather than himself. Evidence here. But more importantly, having acknowledged his sources, Martin then renames their ideas so that all future references will be to his work and not theirs, thereby giving himself credit for the ideas of others. See for example, here (Martin 1992) and here (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna 2022).

[7] To be clear, Martin named these scholars because they provided the source of his ideas. Martin then rebranded 'register' as his stratum of context, so all references to register by his readership refer to his model rather than Halliday's original model. Moreover, Martin's model of register is full of self-contradictions. For example, his register is context, not language, despite register being a functional variety of language (cf. beef and dairy cattle not being categorised as 'cattle'); and though it is context, not language, it is instantiated as text, which is language, not context. And this is just the tip of the iceberg.

ChRIS CLÉiRIGh On The Expression Plane Of Languaging Bonobos

ChRIS CLÉiRIGh replied to David Kellog on sysfunc at 9:07 on 12/11/23:

It is unlikely that Bill Greaves went on about Bonobo phonology, since the bonobos that were on the project express linguistic meaning by pointing to lexigrams, not by controlling the vocal tract.

Blogger Comments:

My false assumption when I wrote the above was that, although it is possible to study the phonetics of the languaging bonobos, they did not have a phonological system because they cannot realise the lexicogrammar phonologically.

The truth is almost the opposite. The languaging bonobos obviously do have a phonological system, since it is this that enables them to identify the words spoken by humans; and phonetic analysis provides an understanding of the physical limitations on realising their phonological system phonetically.

David Rose Mistaking Realisation Rules For Function Structures And Paradigmatic Features For Syntagmatic Units

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 30/8/23 at 22:41:

Just some parameters...

In a rank scale, the initial entry condition for systems is a syntagmatic unit eg clause. Their features e.g. [indicative] are realised by function structures at that rank ↘︎S^F, and each function within that structure e.g. Subject is realised by a syntagm at the next rank ↘︎nom gp.

Phonemes are syntagmatic units at the base of a rank scale. Features at syllable rank are realised by function structures eg ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme, and each function is realised by a phoneme (complex). Phonemes are produced by tongue and lip postures with voicing, but these lie outside language in the biology of the vocal tract... Jim’s materiality (the ‘etics’ materialising ‘emics’)

So yes, it seems adult social semiosis minimally requires two syntagmatic ranks

Im interested in how that emerges from unranked protolg

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The entry conditions to paradigmatic systems are paradigmatic features, not syntagmatic units. The rank scale construes formal constituents as a system of features, with the selection of a feature satisfying the entry condition to the systems of that rank.

[2] This is very misleading because it is a serious misunderstanding. Features are not realised by function structures. Importantly, in Rose's first example, ↘︎S^F is not a function structure, but a realisation statement that specifies 'Subject before Finite'. Moreover, it is activated by the selection of the feature 'declarative', not 'indicative'. The feature 'indicative' activates the insertion of a Mood element (Subject and Finite). See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162).

In Rose's second example, ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme is not a function structure, but a realisation statement of an unidentified feature that specifies 'optional Onset before Rhyme'.

[3] To be clear, the systems that specify phonemes are those that 'label tongue and lip postures with voicing' (and more), so this is not the distinction between phonology and phonetics. The difference is stratal: phonology is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than phonetics. Moreover, the materiality of phonetics is hardly Martin's discovery.

[4] Clearly, SFL Theory maintains that four ranks are required to model formal constituency in lexicogrammar and phonology. But rank only applies to the expression plane of semiotic systems without a lexicogrammar.

David Rose Misunderstanding Metafunctionality And Axis (Inter Alia)

David Rose replied to Yaegan Doran and John Bateman on Sysfling on 25 August 2023 at 8:40:

This makes excellent sense. Metafunctionality as I tried to suggest, is a property of lg that its syntagmatic structuring has evolved to enable, together with ranks and strata. So it’s basic to lg but not to semiotic modes in general.

My original point was that axis is the basis of semiosis and that these are all dimensions in which axis proliferates in lg. John singled out metafunction as less basic than the others (for his own ends we now see).

What about ranks and strata? Lg has a stratified content plane and elaborate rank systems in grammar and phonology. Again metafunctionality is enabled by the evolved syntagmatic structuring of texts, clauses, groups, words and morphemes, together with tone groups, feet and syllables.

How much of these are basic to other modalities?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Rose is endorsing Doran's misunderstanding of the metafunctions in mathematical and chemical symbolism. For detailed reasons as to why it does not make excellent sense, see the previous post Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism.

[2] To be clear, here Rose gives priority to the view 'from below', structure, and suggests that structure evolved to enable metafunctional meanings. This would mean, for example, that Theme^Rheme structure evolved to enable the textual metafunction. 

In SFL Theory, on the other hand, it is the other way round: priority is given to the view 'from above', system and meaning, and it is the different systems of metafunctional meaning that are realised as different types of structure. 

[3] It is not clear here, if Rose is suggesting that ranks and strata evolved to enable the metafunctions, or that ranks and strata were enabled by syntagmatic structuring. In any case, neither suggestion is tenable. Rank is a local dimension and the ordering principle of structure, and stratification is a global dimension whose organising principle is realisation. Metafunction is a distinct global dimension with a distinct ordering principle. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):

[4] To be clear, the insights of SFL Theory suggest the opposite point of view: that no all-purpose semiotic system could evolve without the metafunctions. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, axis is a local dimension whose orders are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Since there are semiotic systems without syntagmatic chaining, such as protolanguage, axis cannot be the basis of semiosis. A more fundamental dimension is Saussure's distinction between the two components of the sign, signified and signifier, which SFL Theory models as the dimension of stratification: content and expression.

[6] To be clear, here Rose gives priority to the view 'from below', phonological form, and suggests that phonological form evolved to enable metafunctional meanings. This would mean, for example, that the foot evolved to enable the textual metafunction.

In SFL Theory, on the other hand, it is the other way round: priority is given to the view 'from above', content, and it is metafunctional content that is realised by phonological forms.

David Rose Misunderstanding Axis And Realisation (Inter Alia)

David Rose replied to Brad Smith on Sysfling on 23 August 2023 at 15:47 and 16:26:

I used realisation below as the interstratal relation. Axis is the feature/structure relation in systems (which is also confusingly called realisation). Both are abstraction (token/value) relations. Axis is a one-to-one relation between a feature (value) and a structure (token). It also implies the generalisation of a system, because it is a contrast between structures that realises a contrast between features (not individual structures).

It is that coupling of generalisation with abstraction that lies at the heart of semiosis, and hence of SFS theory.

Interstratal relations are not one-to-one. Hence tone choices can be coupled with various mood choices to realise variations in appraisal, //4 don’t you know//. …

Oh sorry Brad, how rude of me.

I meant to say, //5 don't you/know//

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here again Rose misunderstands axis. Axis is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic, whereas system is the dimension of the paradigmatic order of axis. Systems include realisation statements attached to features which specify structural realisations, but that is not 'axis'.

[2] To be clear, realisation is the relation between different levels of symbolic abstraction, and so it applies wherever that relation obtains: between system and structure, between strata, between function and form. It does not obtain between a feature and a structure, since a feature is not realised by a structure. Instead, a system (of a clause) is realised by a structure (of a clause). Importantly, a structure is not a functional element, but the relationships between such elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451): 

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

[3] To be clear this argument rests on an invalid premiss:

Premiss: Axis is a contrast between structures that realises a contrast between features

Conclusion: Axis implies a generalisation of a system

The premiss is invalid because this is not what axis is (see [1]). Moreover, a contrast in features is not realised by a contrast in structure. For example, the contrast between the POLARITY features positive and negative is not realised by a contrast in structure, since both are realised by the element Finite in the same structural configuration, e.g. Subject^Finite^Predicator.

[4] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 618) write:

The developmental dynamic of "generalisation — abstractness — metaphor" provides the semiotic energy for the grammar, enabling it to serve as the powerhouse for construing experience in the form of scientific knowledge.

But this bears no relation to Rose's use of the terms generalisation and abstraction. For example (op. cit.: 615):

This principle of generalisation — that is, naming general classes rather than specific individuals — is what makes it possible to construct an ideation base. …

General terms are not necessarily abstract; a bird is no more abstract than a pigeon. But some words have referents that are purely abstract — words like cost and clue and habit and tend and strange; they are construing some aspect of our experience, but there is no concrete thing or process with which they can be identified.

[5] This is misleading. To be clear, in the absence of grammatical metaphor, semantics and lexicogrammar are in agreement (congruent):

• a statement (semantics) is realised by a declarative clause (lexicogrammar);
• a question (semantics) is realised by an interrogative clause (lexicogrammar);
• a command (semantics) is realised by an imperative clause (lexicogrammar);
• an elaborating sequence (semantics) is realised by an elaborating clause complex (lexicogrammar);
• a relational figure (semantics) is realised by a relational clause (lexicogrammar);
• an element (semantics) is realised by a group or phrase (lexicogrammar).

[6] This is potentially misleading. The phonological system of TONE realises the grammatical system of KEY.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 168):

The tones are not, however, simply additional markers attached to the realisation of mood. They realise distinct grammatical systems of their own, which are associated with the mood categories. The general name for systems that are realised by tone is KEY. The term KEY covers a number of systems …

(1) declarative clauses

unmarked statement: tone 1

reserved statement: tone 4

insistent statement: tone 5

tentative statement: tone 3

protesting statement: tone 2

(2) WH- interrogative clauses

unmarked WH- question: tone 1

tentative question: tone 2

echo question: tone 2 with tonic on WH- element

(3) yes/no interrogative clauses

unmarked yes/no question: tone 2

peremptory question: tone 1

(4) imperative clauses

command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)

invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)

request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t

plea: tone 4

[7] Note that tones 4 and 5 are not used with yes/no interrogative clauses. Since Rose's question is peremptory, it would be realised by tone 1 if spoken. 

David Rose On "Tonic Focus" As A Probe For Markedness

David Rose replied to Dongbing Zhang on SYSFLING on 18 Mar 2023, at 15:21:

Ah, but isn’t the probe for markedness tonic focus? (Themes underlined)...

unmarked

// those who have guns have them lègally //

marked

equative

// those who have gùns // are the ones who have them lègally //

predicated

// it is those who have gùns // who have them lègally //

So the textual function of the Qualifier is IDENTIFICATION rather than PERIODICITY. Back to Bea’s questions, those is esphoric to the embedded Attribute have guns and them is anaphoric to guns (per ET).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, "tonic focus" is not the probe for markedness. Tonic prominence is the phonological realisation of the focus of New information. An unmarked Theme can be realised by tonic prominence, making it New as well as unmarked Theme.

[2] As a spoken reading reveals, the most likely first tonic in these instances is hàve, not gùns, making the possessing of guns the focus of New information, which is consistent with the issue at stake.

[3] To be clear, the Theme in this thematic equative construction is unmarked, because it conflates with the Subject in a declarative clause:

[4] To be clear, this non-sequitur is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. The Qualifier in question is who have guns. IDENTIFICATION is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) grammatical system of reference as his discourse semantic system, and PERIODICITY is Martin's rebranding of writing pedagogy ('Topic Sentence' etc.) mixed with Halliday's grammatical systems of THEME and INFORMATION.

In terms of SFL Theory, textually, the Qualifier is the referent of a demonstrative reference item (those, the) in the same nominal group, and has the status of Given or New information in an unmarked Theme:

[5] This is essentially true, except for the misleading omission of the very important fact that the analysis actually derives from Cohesion In English (Halliday & Hasan 1976). The only contribution of English Text (Martin 1992) was to relabel Halliday & Hasan 'structural cataphora' as Martin's 'esphora' — a term adapted from Ellis (1971). It is very misleading indeed to credit Martin with Halliday & Hasan's original ideas.

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday (1961) And Halliday (1972)

David Rose wrote to sys-func and sysfling on 7/8/22 at 16:28:

6. Re ‘semantics (content) and phonology (form), with lexicogrammar as the "interlevel" between them’

MAKH 1961 was strongly influenced by Hjelmslev, whose stratal model contrasted content and expression planes, and within each plane, form and substance...

The ‘it’ that Firth rejected was the formal/functional dichotomy, since their models included both, as system/structure cycles in phonology and lexicogrammar.

MAKH didn't explicitly equate semantics with substance, but via Hjelmslev in this 1972 quote...

The term «meaning» has traditionally been restricted to the input end of the language system: the «content plane», in Hjelmslev's terms, and more specifically to the relations of the semantic interface, Hjelmslev's «content substance».

As quoted in 1. below, he regarded phonology and grammar as ‘two strata of linguistic form’, and semantics as an ‘interlevel’ or ‘interface’ between grammar and context.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday (1961), which outlined Scale & Category Grammar, not Systemic Functional Grammar, did not use Hjelmslev's notions of content and expression. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 39):

The only mention of Hjelmslev is the following distinction in footnote 7 (of 113). Halliday (2002 [1961]: 73):

Hjelmslev’s (1953: 8) distinction between “hypothesis” and “theory”

[2] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday (1961). It was Halliday that "rejected" the formal/functional dichotomy. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 51):

The “formal / functional” dichotomy is one of those which linguistics is better rid of;⁴⁵

In the footnote that Rose quotes, Halliday relates this dichotomy to others that Firth rejects.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 51) rejects the dichotomy on the following grounds:

The“formal / functional” dichotomy is one of those which linguistics is better rid of;⁴⁵ it is misleading to say even that classes are functionally determined, since they are set up with reference to the form of the unit next above – the whole description is both formal and functional at the same time, and “function” is merely an aspect of form.

Moreover, the notion of a system-structure cycle does not arise until the development of Systemic Functional Grammar, being first only foreshadowed in the description of 'realisational cycles', that relate content to expression, in Halliday (1979). Halliday (2002 [1979]: 204):

… the final output – the syntagm – that serves as input to the next realisational cycle.

[4] This is misleading. In this quote from 50 years ago, Halliday simply relates traditional uses of the term 'meaning' to Hjelmslev's term 'content substance'.

[5] This is misleading. While it is true that the quote (Halliday 2013) identifies 'wording or sound' as linguistic form, it does not identify "semantics as an ‘interlevel’ or ‘interface’ between grammar and context". This is because the latter describes Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) — see [1] above — not Systemic Functional Grammar. 

The Halliday (2013) quote in question, and Rose's misunderstandings of it, can be re-visited at:

• David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday On Axis

David Rose Misunderstanding Lexicogrammatical Form (inter alia)

David Rose wrote to sys-func and sysfling on 5/8/22 at 14:17:

3. Re linguistic ‘progress’...

The term realisation is also used for relations between strata. Like axis, it is a relation of abstraction, but of a different order.

In his foreword below, MAKH refers to phonology and grammar as ‘these two strata of linguistic form’. In the terms developed below, form is associated with perceivability of structures. The form of phonological structures is ‘sounding’ (i.e. patterns of sounds); the form of grammatical structures is ‘wording’ (patterns of words). The axial relation resolves the dualism of form and meaning, as patterns of forms at each stratum are at once patterns of meanings.

Relations between the strata are patterns-of-patterns... patterns of lexicogrammatical structures are realised by patterns of phonological structures. Discourse semantics proposes that the semantic stratum is also organised axially (as MAKH predicted in 1972). Its structures are discourse structures... and patterns of discourse structures are realised by patterns of both lexicogrammatical structures and phonological structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. Realisation is precisely the same relation (Token-Value) in each case. The difference lies in what is related: lower stratum to higher stratum (stratification) vs structure to system (axis).

[2] This again mistakes a lower level of abstraction for perceivability (see previous post).

[3] To be clear, 'sounding' refers to the stratum of phonology. A phonological system is not a 'pattern of sounds'; a phonological system models 'sounding' choices.

[4] This is a very serious misunderstanding. SFL Theory models lexicogrammatical form as a rank scale. The term 'wording' refers to lexicogrammar as a stratum, in which lexicogrammatical form (e.g. verbal group) is interpreted in terms of its function of realising meaning (e.g. process). A lexicogrammatical system is not a 'pattern of words'; a lexicogrammatical system models 'wording' choices.

[5] This is a very serious misunderstanding. The axial relation does not 'resolve the dualism of form and meaning'. Form and meaning are located on both axes in the lexicogrammar. (There is meaning, but not form, on the semantic stratum, and form, but not meaning, on the expression plane.)  Paradigmatically, each formal rank unit is the entry condition to systems of functions, and syntagmatically, each element of function structure is realised by a formal unit of the rank below.

[6] This misunderstands stratification. There are no 'patterns of form' on the semantic stratum, and no 'patterns of meaning' on the expression plane. On the lexicogrammatical stratum, form is interpreted in terms of its function in realising meaning.

[7] This is misleading. SFL Theory, as the name implies, gives priority to system over structure. Systemically, a pattern is a pattern of instantiation, that is: a pattern of selecting features and activating realisation statements. The notion that 'patterns of lexicogrammatical structures are realised by patterns of phonological structures' not only gives priority to structure, but also confuses instantiation ('patterns') with stratification ('are realised by').

[8] This is misleading by implication. Rose has previously falsely claimed that Halliday does not model semantics in terms of both system and structure, despite the role semantic structure plays in grammatical metaphor, and despite explicit contradictions such as the following provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones.

[9] This is misleading. Halliday (1972) weighs up the theoretical pros and cons of proposing structure for the semantic stratum, as demonstrated in previous posts. No "predictions" were made.

[10] This again gives priority to structure over system and confuses instantiation ('patterns') with stratification ('are realised by'); see [7] above.

David Kellogg On Rank, Axis And Metafunction

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 5/7/22 at 6:54:

Chris--your inventory of the architecture of SFL doesn't include RANK (or AXIS). Three possible reasons occur to me....

a) The Cardiff grammar is more strictly Firthian and works with "pieces" of language rather than with the clear hierarchy of units. We can actually see this in the diagramme because the arrow that connects "realization rules/statements" to "system networks" isn't realization or activation but rather "re-entry". So there actually isn't a rank scale. (This is also implicit in the rather vague expression "richly described tree structure", which my old syntax teacher Andy Radford would have heartily approved of....)

b) "Rank" is an organizing principle within Structure (just as System and Structure are principles within Axis). The inventory only includes the basic concepts from the IFG intro and not the points of origin, principles or meta-principles which order them. (It's an inventory and not an actual building!)

c) "Rank" isn't all pervasive in the way that, say, metafunction is. For example, Halliday and Matthiessen are agnostic about whether rank exists across the level of context or even semantics, but they have no such doubts about system, structure, instantiation, or metafunction. (On the other hand, H&M are agnostic about whether metafunction exists at the level of phonology and phonetics and I am much less so....)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the architectural dimensions are those provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20):

[2] To be clear, as dimensions, rank and axis are local, rather than global. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

[3] For a close examination of Fawcett's theory of functional syntax, the Cardiff Grammar, see here.

[4] To be clear, paradigmatic and syntagmatic are orders of the local dimension axis; see [2].

[5] See [1].

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 87):

At the rank of tone group:

• the system of TONALITY — choice in the distribution of tone groups — realises the distribution of information units (textual metafunction);
• the system of TONICITY — choice in the placement of tonic prominence — realises the culmination of New information (textual metafunction);
• the system of TONE — choice in the major pitch movement — realises the system of KEY (interpersonal metafunction);
• the systems of TONE SEQUENCE and TONE CONCORD realise the systems of TAXIS and LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE (logical metafunction).