David Rose On Symmetrical And Transitive Relations

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 14 Apr 2024, at 12:02:

Later in the chapter, Michael reveals that he is indeed talking to knowers of formal logic...

‘The relations of projection and expansion, which (when combined with parataxis and hypotaxis) constitute the ‘logical’ component of a natural language, are not reducible to elementary logical relations of a non-linguistic kind...’ (p460)

His use of symmetrical and transitive is indeed taken from formal logic...

A symmetric relation is a type of binary relation. An example is the relation "is equal to", because if a = b is true then b = a is also true.

Transitive relation, a binary relation in which if A is related to B and B is related to C, then A is related to C.

This usage is not explained, although the discussion is hard to understand without knowing it. Which makes things a little confusing for us benighted non-knowers. 

So Christian may like to adjust or explain this table and discussion for IFG5. While status and sequence are SFL categories, the use of symmetry and transitivity here are not.

This is pretty significant, as these terms are used to define parataxis and hypotaxis on p452, and a series of caveats on p460. Eg, ‘although each implies the other, they are not identical in meaning, because while parataxis is a symmetrical relationship, expansion is not’. Which is why I suggested to Jing that

My friend, John, ≠ John, my friend, ...

(in my ignorance)

 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is not true. The Halliday quote merely points out to the linguist reader that the logical relations of natural language are not reducible to the logical relations of designed systems.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. This usage has been explained in all four editions of IFG. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 452):

In principle, the paratactic relation is logically (i) symmetrical and (ii) transitive. This can be exemplified with the ‘and’ relation. (i) ‘salt and pepper’ implies ‘pepper and salt’, so the relationship is symmetrical; (ii) ‘salt and pepper’, ‘pepper and mustard’ together imply ‘salt and mustard’, so the relationship is transitive.

[3] This is misleading because it is not true. All four terms are used as properties of taxis in SFL Theory, as the table makes clear.

[4] To be clear, Rose had argued that the two were not equal on the basis of parataxis:

The thing about parataxis is it’s not reversible (realised by sequence), whereas hypotaxis is reversible (realised by status). So these two aren’t equivalent...

My friend John, ≠ John, my friend

but, as his Halliday quote explains, the asymmetry is in the expansion relation, elaboration, not in the paratactic relation.

David Rose On Parataxis

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 13 Apr 2024, at 15:53:

The thing about parataxis is it’s not reversible (realised by sequence), whereas hypotaxis is reversible (realised by status). So these two aren’t equivalent...

My friend John, ≠ John, my friend

and again at 20:11:

Funnily enough I was thinking of another line from the same tea party

they cried out when they saw Alice coming

...which is hypotactic and reversible (though not logically symmetrical). In contrast,

they saw Alice coming and then they cried out

...is paratactic and not reversible (which is what I meant).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis. Because parataxis is symmetrical, my friend, John does imply John, my friend. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 452):

Parataxis is the linking of elements of equal status…. Both the initiating and the continuing elements are free, in the sense that each could stand as a functioning whole. In principle, the paratactic relation is logically (i) symmetrical and (ii) transitive. This can be exemplified with the ‘and’ relation. (i) ‘salt and pepper’ implies ‘pepper and salt’, so the relationship is symmetrical; (ii) ‘salt and pepper’, ‘pepper and mustard’ together imply ‘salt and mustard’, so the relationship is transitive.

Hypotaxis is the binding of elements of unequal status… . The dominant element is free, but the dependent element is not. The hypotactic relation is logically (i) non-symmetrical and (ii) non-transitive. For example, ‘whe n’: (i) ‘I breathe when I sleep’ does not imply ‘I sleep when I breathe’; (ii) ‘I fret when I have to drive slowly’ and ‘I have to drive slowly when it’s been raining’ together do not imply ‘I fret when it’s been raining’.

[2] To be clear, in terms of parataxis, they saw Alice coming and they cried out imply they cried out and they saw Alice coming. It is the introduction of the logico-semantic relation of time (then) that backgrounds this paratactic symmetry.

[3] To be clear, this cannot be what Rose originally meant, since there was no temporal relation in his original example of parataxis my friend, John.

David Rose Endorsing Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Structure ("Subjacency Duplexes")

 David Rose wrote to sys-func on 13 Aug 2021, at 20:35:

Thank you to Jim for challenging our thinking again. Although you downplay it as just ‘relaxing’ the associations of multivariate and univariate structures, the idea of subjacency actually looks like a pretty big claim that could resolve a lot of conflicts, contradictions and blindspots in lg description. When I looked at Pitjantjatjara again recently, it was everywhere at group and word ranks.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the seminar (13/8/21), Martin falsely claimed that Halliday (1965) associated recursive systems with univariate structures and non-recursive systems with multivariate structures, despite producing a diagram from Halliday (1965) that associated recursive systems with both multivariate and univariate structures:

[2] In the seminar, Martin presented a new type of structure, a subjacency duplex, which he claimed is a univariate structure that realises a non-recursive system, thus violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. However, the claim does not survive close scrutiny.

To be clear, the term 'subjacency' is from Chomsky (1973), and the term 'duplex' is from Matthiessen (1995: 161) and simply means a univariate complex of two units. In his talk, Martin attributed 'duplex' to Rose (2001), instead of Matthiessen, and although Rose (2001) acknowledges Matthiessen, Rose did not correct Martin on the point during the seminar, or in this public response.

Martin presented the following as an example of a duplex structure:

Here Martin interprets the structure marker, of, as a clitic, and interprets the clitic and the preceding nominal group as a hypotactic duplex. Martin provided no argument in support of this interpretation. The problems here are as follows.

Firstly, the preposition of is the generalised marker of a structural relation between nominals (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 394). In this instance, it marks a structural relation between the nominals two litres and water. In Martin's analysis, however, of is misinterpreted as a Modifier of just one of those two nominal groups.

Secondly, the preposition of does not function as a Modifier, because it does not subcategorise the nominal group two litres; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389). Nor does of hypotactically expand the nominal group in terms of any other subtypes of elaboration, extension, or enhancement.

Thirdly, the nominal group two litres and the structure marker of do not form a duplex (a 2-unit complex). That is, they do not form a nominal group complex, a structure marker complex, a clitic complex, or any other type of complex.

In short, the reason why this type of univariate structure is not generated by a recursive system, is simply that it is not a univariate structure in the first place.

Martin then went on to compound the error by interpreting both the multivariate structure of prepositional phrases and paratactic nominal group complexes in terms of his subjacency duplexes:

∞

In the same seminar, Martin claimed that a nominal group with multiple Epithets is a multivariate structure realising a recursive system, thus also violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. His supporting argument was that each Epithet is independently related to the Thing:

The major theoretical problem here is that, in SFL Theory, recursive systems specify an iterative relation between formal units (e.g words), not functional elements (e.g. Epithets). The logical structure of the nominal group construes it as a group of words, rather than as an organic configuration, such that α is modified by β, which is modified by γ, which is ... , where the α word serves as the Head of the nominal group, and the series of subcategorisations of the Head serves as its Modifier. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389):

However, there are also problems in using Martin's model of structure to make the argument:

The problem here is that Martin's structural distinction between experiential and logical meaning actually construes the distinction between unequal status (of nucleus vs satellite) and equal status (of multiple nuclei). That is, Martin's structure typology misconstrues the metafunctional distinction between experiential (multivariate) and logical (univariate) as the interdependency distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis.

So, in interpreting the nominal group as an orbital structure, Martin is not actually interpreting it as a multivariate structure, but as a univariate structure, with each Epithet hypotactically related to the Thing.

A final internal inconsistency is that, in applying his model of orbital structure, Martin reverses the direction of the relation from nucleus to satellites to satellites to nucleus (Epithets to Thing), because it suits his argument to do so.

David Rose On Coordination And Proposition

David Rose replied to Tom Bartlett on sysfling on 11 May 2018 at 16:15:

Coordination is a grammatical term, for relations between grammatical units. Proposition is a discourse semantic term, for messages exchanging information.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, the traditional category of 'coordination' is interpreted as the logico-semantic relation of paratactic extension.  Logico-semantic relations obtain at the level of semantics (meaning) and are realised at the level of lexicogrammar (wording).

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'proposition' is 'the semantic function of a clause in the exchange of information' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 139).  The intrusion of the word 'discourse' reflects the fact that Martin (1992) rebranded Halliday's interpersonal semantic system as a 'discourse semantic' system.  ('Message' is a semantic unit of the textual metafunction.)

Margaret Berry On Beta Clause As Part Of The Alpha Clause

Margaret Berry wrote to sysfling and sys-func on 14 November 2016 at 00:47:

Geoff Thompson (2014) in the 3rd edition of his Introducing Functional Grammar, page 170, has a system network for Theme, in which one of the options for marked Theme is 'dependent clause'. He gives examples on page 160. 

It probably depends on whether you think a Beta clause is actually part of the Alpha clause. I do.

• After he'd finished his supper, he went straight to bed.
• After supper, he went straight to bed.

After he'd finished his supper and After supper have the same function, even though they differ in form. (SFL is supposed to be a functional grammar!) 

As you say, one has to decide what one wants to account for at what layer of organisation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the view of traditional grammar.  The explanatory advantages provided by the SFL distinction between tactic relations and embedding include the ability to distinguish:

• in expansion, between non-defining (hypotaxis) and defining (embedding) relative clauses, and
• in projection, between projected reports (hypotaxis) and pre-projected facts (embedding).

[2] These two forms, the beta clause and the prepositional phrase, do have the same function: Theme.  The principal difference between them is the domain in which each functions as Theme.  The beta clause functions as Theme in a clause nexus, whereas the prepositional phrase functions as (marked) Theme in a clause.

[3] SFG is a functional grammar, but what this means, in terms of the theory, is generally not well understood.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 31):

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a ‘semanticky’ kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself. 

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is one of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not of stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness (agnation).

Robin Fawcett On Why Hypotaxis Is Unnecessary

Robin Fawcett wrote to the sysfling list on 30 June 2014 at 09:57:

Just consider the concept of Hypotaxis" for a moment. It models a relationship between, let us say, two clauses, such that one clause is said to be "dependent" on another, but without functioning as an element of it - so without "filling`' it, in Cardiff Grammar terms.

An IFG analysis of "She knows his name" would show that "his name" is a nominal group that fills a Complement/Phenomenon, whereas an analysis of "She knows that he is called Peter" would show "that he is called Peter" as a clause that would be said to be "dependent on" the "main" clause but without filling an element of it. But that misses out a central aspect of the functional analysis. i.e. that "that he is called Peter"Is a Phenomenon in the Process of "someone knowing something". Moreover, this analysis asks us to accept that "She knows" is a main clause. I find that a rather unpersuasive position to take, because we recognize it - don't we? - as an incomplete clause that requires its Complement/ Phenomenon to complete it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the case of mental projection, the distinction between embedded clauses and dependent clauses is a very useful and important one.  It is the distinction between a pre-projected fact (embedded clause) and a reported idea (dependent clause).  It is the distinction between a metaphenomenon that is the Range or Agent of the mental Process (embedded clause) and a metaphenomenon that is projected into semiotic existence by the mental Process.  See sample analyses here, and Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 441-482).

However, contrary to claim made by Fawcett, an IFG analysis of She knows that he is called Peter would not

"show "that he is called Peter" as a clause that would be said to be "dependent on" the "main" clause but without filling an element of it".  

The clause that he is called Peter is here an embedded fact, not a dependent clause — She knows (the fact) that he is called Peter — and as such, functions as the Phenomenon of the clause, thereby "filling an element" or "completing the clause" in Fawcett's terms.  See analysis  here.  Cf agnate receptive clause: (the fact) that he is called Peter is known by/to her; agnate theme predication clause: it is (the fact) that he is called Peter that she knows.

In other words, Fawcett has misunderstood and misrepresented the IFG analysis of this clause and then "argued" against his own misunderstanding/misrepresentation in favour of the default SFL analysis.

[2] Unlike Halliday & Matthiessen (2004), Fawcett provides no actual reasoned grammatical argumentation for his unintentional agreement with them, merely:

… the central aspect of the functional analysis …
I find that a rather unpersuasive position to take …
… we recognise it — don't we? — as …

This might be compared to what Fawcett wrote on the Sysfling list at 02:32:43 (GMT) on 9/1/12:

Not all readers will be comfortable with my next point, which is that I suggest that contributions to sysfling that relate to how a given piece of text should be analysed should be expressed in the framework of the assumption that we are scientists of language, i.e. scholars who are seeking, using scientific methods appropriate to our subject of investigation, to understand the nature of language. But this means that we should regard it as inadequate to simply say "I would analyse Text X as follows: ....", without giving reasons for preferring that analysis to others that might be proposed.

Mick O'Donnell Misconstruing Non-Finite Dependent Clauses As Circumstances [Revised]

On 17 September 2013, Claudia Stoian asked on the sys-func and sysfling email lists:

What do you think about the following clauses, are they adverbial or non-defining relative clauses?

Every night, at exactly 21:53, the Chief Yeoman Warder of the Tower emerges from the Byward Tower wearing his long red coat and Tudor bonnet and carrying a candle lantern and the Queen's Keys.

And Mick O'Donnell replied:

The clauses in yellow (wearing... and carrying...) are not relative clauses, but rather present participle clauses (one of the three infinitive clause types)

I have never liked the label "adverbial" used in traditional grammar: clauses are not adverbs. "Adverbial" (or adverb-like) is a holdover from grammars which only had one label for each item, (its class), while good grammars label items by both function (what it does in larger units) and structural class (what shape of unit it is). Because we have two kinds of label, rather than talk of adverbial clauses, we can talk of clauses functioning as Adjunct (or as Circumstance, pick your layer).

I would say these clauses are Circumstances, my best guess would be Manner (how did he emerge?) but I am not sure of that.

Blogger Comment:

[1] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. On the SFL model, these clauses are non-finite clauses related to the primary clause by hypotactic elaboration, which makes them non-defining relative clauses. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 464):

The combination of elaboration with hypotaxis gives the category of non-defining relative clause (also called ‘non-restrictive’, ‘descriptive’). This functions as a kind of descriptive gloss to the primary clause…

See the clause complex analysis here.

[2] To be clear, labelling a clause 'adverbial' is not a claim that the clause is an adverb. However, in spite of his misgiving, O'Donnell nevertheless misconstrues these dependent clauses as circumstances, a function served by adverbs in adverbial groups.

In SFL, the traditional notion of an adverbial clause corresponds to a dependent clause in a relation of hypotactic enhancement.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 481):

The combination of enhancement with hypotaxis gives what are known in traditional formal grammar as ‘adverbial clauses’.

Mick O'Donnell On Non-Defining Relative Clauses [2]

On 18/9/13, Mick O'Donnell remarked about the linked post to previous post:

Except in this paraphrase, "A British nursery rhyme" is not a relative clause.

Paraphrasing is dangerous, two sentences can express the same ideational meanings but differ in grammatical form.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] The term 'relative clause' is from traditional grammar.  On the SFL model, ranking clauses like which is a British nursery rhyme are dependent elaborating finite clauses.  Such finite clauses have their non-finite agnates (counterparts), in this case being a British nursery rhyme as in:

• The house that Jack built, being a British nursery rhyme, is a cumulative tale.

As Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 403) point out for the non-finite agnates, 'when the non-defining clause is an 'intensive relational' one, the Process may be left implicit', as in:

• The house that Jack built, a British nursery rhyme, is a cumulative tale.

As Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 404) further point out, 'with non-finite elaborating hypotactic nexuses, there is a special construction where the dependent precedes the dominant', as in:

• A British nursery rhyme, the house that Jack built is a cumulative tale.

As they explain (ibid), 'these elaborating clauses are always 'intensive attributive relational' ones where the Process is implicit and the Attribute is typically the only explicit element of the clause', as in the example given above.  So the following two clause nexuses are agnates of each other — both are hypotactic elaborating clause nexuses, differing in textual prominence (and in finiteness in the dependent clause):

• The house that Jack built, which is a British nursery rhyme, is a cumulative tale.
• A British nursery rhyme, the house that Jack built is a cumulative tale.

[2] O'Donnell's use of the word 'paraphrase' suggests that he doesn't understand the important rôle that agnation plays in reasoning about grammar.

Mick O'Donnell On Non-Defining Relative Clauses

Mick O'Donnell wrote on 7 Sep 2013 on the sysfling list:

Myself, I would have treated the two 'which' clauses as nondefining relative clauses, and thus as part of the nominal group structure, and not as part of the clause complex structure.

and then again on 15 September 2013:

And yes, I did mention that I disagreed with the treatment in the example of nondefining relatives being related as part of a clause complex.

My reasoning is that they only ever occur immediately after the noun (with possible interceding Qualifier) with which the relative pronoun is grounded.

And semantically: They do not extend on a clause, but on a participant.
I don note the possible counter example of postponed nominal relatives,
e.g.,

• The man is here who you were waiting for.

But note that this case is only possible where the postponed relative is in a defining relationship. The above sentence corresponds to:

• The man who you were waiting for is here.

NOT TO:

• The man, who you were waiting for, is here.

Blogger Comment:

[1] O'Donnell's stated reason for treating non-defining relative clauses as 'part of nominal group structure' is  'that they only ever occur immediately after a noun (with a possible interceding Qualifier) with which the relative pronoun is grounded'.

The domain that non-defining relative clauses elaborate is not restricted to the nominal group; they can elaborate the whole of the primary clause or some part of it that is more than the nominal group' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 400).  For example:

He often accuses others of his own shortcomings, which is hypocritical. 

Here the non-defining relative clause which is hypocritical elaborates the whole primary clause he often accuses others of his own shortcomings.  Clearly, it is not a constituent of the preceding nominal group, as any attempt to analyse it as such will demonstrate.  Therefore, O'Donnell's position is based on a false premise.

For some reasoning about the difference between non-defining and defining clauses, see:

http://thethoughtoccurs.blogspot.com.au/2013/09/defining-vs-non-defining-relative.html

[2] Relative clauses generally elaborate the primary clause rather than extend it, though there is one group that strictly belong with extension.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 402-3) for the reasoning.

Mick O'Donnell Mistaking A Dependent Clause For A Circumstance

Michael O'Donnell wrote on sysfling on 3/7/12:

"we have been raised to love and care" 

Actor: -

Process: material (have been raised)

Goal: We

Circumstance: "to love and care" (which is maybe Result, as Reason/Purpose don't fit).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, O'Donnell's analysis here is:

However, systemically, the instance is agnate to 

The systemic difference here is just the finiteness of the dependent clause.

On this basis, the instance can be analysed as