David Rose On Intrastratal And Interstratal Realisation

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz on SYSFLING on 31 Dec 2024, at 14:06:

Oh, then we’d have to allow meanings to be made on two lg strata, that may be coupled to realise register!  

Jing Hao opens that meta-window wide for us in Analysing Scientific Discourse. (Essential reading, folks.) 

All I’d add here is that

1. Thing doesn't realise a discourse semantic entity (interstratally). 
2. It realises the grammatical feature [nominal group] (axially). 
3. It’s the nominal word (complex) realising Thing (rankwise) that realises an entity (interstratally). 
4. Thing and entity are distinct meanings. 
5. But as Thing is the core function of a nominal group, the whole nominal group may also realise the entity (along with clause participation). 
6. (Note [entity] is a discourse semantic feature, whereas ‘class’ implies a rank scale.) 
7. And yes, Jing unpicks ideational metaphor brilliantly. 
8. So, while axial relations make meaning within strata and ranks, 
9. it seems function/class relations enable discourse semantic features to be both realised by and coupled with lexicogrammatical features

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, SFL stratifies the content plane into meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar), but wording is interpreted in terms of its function of realising meaning. And register is a language subpotential that realises a contextual configuration of field tenor and mode, not the contextual systems of field tenor and mode. The latter is Martin's (1992) misunderstanding — see, e.g. here — but accepted without question by his students.

[2] To be clear, 'entity' is Hao's rebranding of the type of element known as a 'simple thing' in the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 182). It is congruently realised in lexicogrammar by a participant at clause rank, which is congruently realised by a nominal group, whose structure may include 'Thing' as a functional element.

[3] To be clear, axially, the system of the nominal group is realised by the entire structure, not just the function 'Thing'.

[4] To be clear, it is not the word realising Thing, but the entire nominal group (that realises a participant) that realises a simple thing (entity).

[5] To be clear 'Thing' is one function in nominal group structure in the lexicogrammar, whereas 'entity', as 'simple thing', is a type of participant in the semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[6] To be clear, 'entity' is Halliday & Matthiessen's semantic element 'simple thing' rebranded by Hao as a feature of Martin's discourse semantics.

[7] This is a bare assertion, without supporting evidence.

[8] To be clear, axial relations don't "make meaning". The syntagmatic axis (Token) realises the paradigmatic axis (Value). This is another example of the Martin-derived confusion of semogenesis (making meaning) with realisation, though this time applied axially instead of stratally.

[9] To be clear, on the one hand, this conclusion cannot be validated by the preceding series of misunderstandings. On the other hand, the claim is that an intrastratal relation of realisation in lexicogrammar enables an interstratal relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, both of realisation and coupling. 

With regard to realisation, there is no "enabling" here; it is just the same relation at different locations in the architecture. With regard to "coupling", this is a matter of instantiation, the selection of features during logogenesis, which is a distinct from the realisation relations between axes and strata.

David Rose On 'Chains Of Interlocking Relations'

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz on SYSFLING on 30 Dec 2024, at 10:26:

… So it’s OK to define features by their realisations as function structures, and functions by their realisations as classes, then vice versa...given that units at each level are defined in contrast with other units.

Eg (v simplified), 

1. a clause participant is realised by a nominal gp that contrasts with verbal gp realising process. 
2. Nom gps are realised most generally by a Thing function. 
3. Thing is realised by a nominal word class, that realises a discourse semantic entity, in contrast to verbs realising an occurrence. 
4. Nominal sub-classes specify an entity uniquely, or by person, proximity, number, gender, or by class. 
5. These criteria define the class labels proper noun, pronoun and common noun. 
6. They in turn are criteria for different types of nom gp, which in turn have different options for specifying, evaluating and ordering, and different functions in discourse.

Just an example of ‘chains of (interlocking) relations involved (which also includes the labelling of such relations)’ 

PS On such criteria, mine/ours/yours/theirs/hers/his could be defined as (possessive) pronouns, not determiners, since they realise Thing, not Deictic (despite the weight of old authority).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the argument here is:

Premiss: Units at each rank are defined in contrast with other units.
Conclusion #1: Features are defined by their realisations as function structures (and vice versa)
Conclusion #2: Functions are defined by their realisations as classes (and vice versa)

Analysis:

The argument is invalid, because neither conclusion follows from the premiss. The Premiss makes a claim about relations between form, whereas Conclusion #1 makes a claim about the axial relation between functions, features and structures, and Conclusion #2 makes a claim about the realisation relation between function and form.

The premiss is invalid because it is false. In SFL Theory, rank units are distinguished 'from above': in terms of their functions in the structure in the rank above. 'Nominal' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'participant'; 'verbal' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'process'; and 'adverbial' is distinguished as the class of group that congruently serves the function 'circumstance'.

Conclusion #1 is invalid, because it is false. The features of a rank unit (Value) are realised by the function structure of the unit (Token), so in terms of 'definition', this conclusion is the exact opposite of what is true, since a definition is a Value assigned to a Token, not the reverse.

Conclusion #2 is invalid, because it is false. Different functions (Value) are realised by different classes of form (Token), so in terms of 'definition', this conclusion is the exact opposite of what is true, since a definition is a Value assigned to a Token, not the reverse.

[2] To be clear, like the two conclusions above, this again has the realisation relation backwards. It is the Thing function (Value) that is congruently realised by a nominal group (Token), not the other way 'round.

[3] To be clear, 'entity' an 'occurrence' are essentially rebrandings of 'participant' and 'process' in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) by Martin's former student Hao. To reframe this in terms of SFL Theory, a noun (word) realises a Thing (nominal group) which realises a participant (clause) which, in a congruent clause, realises a participant (figure) on the semantic stratum. By the same token, a lexical verb (word) realises an Event (verbal group) which realises a Process (clause) which, in a congruent clause, realises a Process (figure) on the semantic stratum.

[4] To be clear, subclasses of noun are not criteria for different types of nominal group, but different formal realisations (Token) of the function Thing (Value).

[5] As demonstrated above, Rose's self-congratulation here is unwarranted.

[6] This is misleading. To be clear, Rose here is unwittingly giving the very same view as the 'old authority' known as 'traditional grammar', and the 'old authority' known as Halliday (1985, 1994). For example, Halliday (1994: 313): 

The misinterpretation of possessive pronouns as Deictic determiners was introduced into IFG3&4 by Matthiessen. Compare the above table with the following in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 628):

David Rose Adding Classes To His Analysis Of An Adverbial Group

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 20 Feb 2024, at 20:30:

Adding classes doesn't tell us much more about this adv gp

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Halliday (1994: 210), there is no submodification in this adverbial group:

So

As can be seen, the dependency relations all obtain between words.

[2] To be clear, Rose proposes internal bracketing, or nesting, where there is none, giving the analysis:

β(β(β(βα)α)α)α 

which can be expanded as 

ββββ ^ βββα ^ ββαβ ^ ββαα ^ α

Rose then compounds the error by misinterpreting the nesting as the triple embedding of adverbial groups within the adverbial group, without realising that they must be embedded on this analysis. And, on the belief that the adverbial groups are not embedded, incongruously proposes 2-unit complexes (duplexes) consisting of units of different ranks: group and word.

David Rose Mistaking Realisation Rules For Function Structures And Paradigmatic Features For Syntagmatic Units

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 30/8/23 at 22:41:

Just some parameters...

In a rank scale, the initial entry condition for systems is a syntagmatic unit eg clause. Their features e.g. [indicative] are realised by function structures at that rank ↘︎S^F, and each function within that structure e.g. Subject is realised by a syntagm at the next rank ↘︎nom gp.

Phonemes are syntagmatic units at the base of a rank scale. Features at syllable rank are realised by function structures eg ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme, and each function is realised by a phoneme (complex). Phonemes are produced by tongue and lip postures with voicing, but these lie outside language in the biology of the vocal tract... Jim’s materiality (the ‘etics’ materialising ‘emics’)

So yes, it seems adult social semiosis minimally requires two syntagmatic ranks

Im interested in how that emerges from unranked protolg

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The entry conditions to paradigmatic systems are paradigmatic features, not syntagmatic units. The rank scale construes formal constituents as a system of features, with the selection of a feature satisfying the entry condition to the systems of that rank.

[2] This is very misleading because it is a serious misunderstanding. Features are not realised by function structures. Importantly, in Rose's first example, ↘︎S^F is not a function structure, but a realisation statement that specifies 'Subject before Finite'. Moreover, it is activated by the selection of the feature 'declarative', not 'indicative'. The feature 'indicative' activates the insertion of a Mood element (Subject and Finite). See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162).

In Rose's second example, ↘︎(Onset)^Rhyme is not a function structure, but a realisation statement of an unidentified feature that specifies 'optional Onset before Rhyme'.

[3] To be clear, the systems that specify phonemes are those that 'label tongue and lip postures with voicing' (and more), so this is not the distinction between phonology and phonetics. The difference is stratal: phonology is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than phonetics. Moreover, the materiality of phonetics is hardly Martin's discovery.

[4] Clearly, SFL Theory maintains that four ranks are required to model formal constituency in lexicogrammar and phonology. But rank only applies to the expression plane of semiotic systems without a lexicogrammar.

John Bateman On The Necessity Of Rank Across Semiotic Systems

John Bateman replied to David Rose on Sysfling on 28/8/23 at 21:03: 

picking up on [your]:

Not sure about necessity of ranks, since lowest lg ranks have only next stratum to operate in

this is an interesting modelling issue. Formally, I would tend to want to include a category even if it is not expanded if it is a logical consequence of other components of the theory. I take rank in this sense — i.e. without some unit of structure there is no place for axis to start its magic.

Also wrt Jim's :

“As systemicists interested in genesis, should we be proposing a major component of our cartography (i.e. a rank, a metafunction or a stratum) in the absence of a distinctive system of valeur?” [Martin 2010]

maybe one ranked unit is enough?

In any case, if I had to put my finger on one reoccurring (quite serious) problem with many many multimodal analyses that I see (including some waving the SFS flag), it would be lack of attention to rank — mostly signalled by system networks hanging wonderously in the air and curious 'multiple options' (e.g. 'either-and' systems) going along with that, mostly, I suspect, because the units aren't clear.

So, I'd be very hesitant to leave out rank.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See David Rose On Ranks, Axis And Strata In Protolanguage.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. Firstly, rank is a means of modelling formal constituency, so it only applies to strata that feature formal constituents. In language, these are lexicogrammar on the content plane and phonology and graphology on the expression plane. Since other semiotic systems do not have a lexicogrammar — they cannot be read aloud — rank can only apply to their expression plane. Rank is a local dimension, not a global dimension (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32).

Secondly, the SFL model of ideational semantics demonstrates that rank is unnecessary, since it has axis, system and structure, but no rank. Instead of a rank scale of forms, there are types of phenomenon: sequence, figure and element (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 49), with each type being the entry condition to systems.

[3] See David Rose On Ranks, Axis And Strata In Protolanguage.

[4] To be clear, the problem here not the absence of rank, but the absence of entry conditions. These are provided by rank units in lexicogrammar and phonology/graphology, but there are no rank units on the content plane of a semiotic system other than language, because only language has a lexicogrammar.

[5] See [2] and [4].

David Rose On Ranks, Axis And Strata In Protolanguage

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 27/8/23 at 7:14:

Not sure about necessity of ranks, since lowest lg ranks have only next stratum to operate in. Morphemes and phonemes aren’t configurations, are they? Protolg is not ranked, which may relate to Jim’s qu about materiality. Which reminds me of his 2010 intro in Making Meaning Matter, which contrasted two interpretations of axis and strata in protolg...

First is Xian following MAKH... “The content-expression organisation of protolanguage is thus simultaneously stratal and axial… The dimensions of stratification and axis are not independently variable at this stage: the content stratum is organised paradigmatically, while the expression stratum is an inventory of indivisible postural or gestural syntagms.” [Matthiessen 2007: 516]

Second is JRM... “As systemicists interested in genesis, should we be proposing a major component of our cartography (i.e. a rank, a metafunction or a stratum) in the absence of a distinctive system of valeur?” [Martin 2010]

Here’s MAKH [2004/2012] on Nigel @ 15 months reinterpreted by me as axis and strata...

Blogger Comments:

[1] Clearly, if this were true, it would be an argument against the necessity of rank in language (morpheme, phoneme). To be clear, rank is one way to model formal constituency, so the lowest rank, by definition, has no constituents. But a syntagm of lowest rank units realises the structural configuration of the higher rank: a syntagm of morphemes realises word structure; a syntagm of phonemes realises syllable structure. Moreover, as a rank unit of lexicogrammar, a morpheme does not "operate in" phonology, since lexicogrammar and phonology are different levels of symbolic abstraction.

[2] To be clear, the reason why rank does not apply to protolanguage is semiotic, not material. Protolanguage has no formal constituency, and so it has nothing to model as a rank scale.

[3] To be clear, Martin's model of protolanguage posits structure where there is none. A structure is the relationships between functional elements, but there is no configuration of functions in protolanguage. Each realisation is an individual and indivisible sound or gesture.

[4] Strictly speaking, these are not syntagms, since a syntagm is a sequence of classes, and the expression stratum of protolanguage involves no sequencing.

[5] To be clear, Martin has himself violated his own principle by proposing "a major component of our cartography", structure, "in the absence of a distinctive system of valeur" that specifies structural configurations.

[6] To be clear, Rose's reinterpretation of Halliday (2004/2012) 

• proposes structure where Halliday says there is none,
• misrepresents expression (an:a, dada) as content, and 
• mistakes the resonance feature 'nasal' for a type of (oral) closure.

David Rose Misunderstanding The Dimensions Of SFL Theory Through Biological Analogies

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 23 August 2023 at 21:02:

It’s a missing piece of other theories John, but central to SFS. 

It originates and is reproduced in interaction, the original replicating nucleus of semiosis, analogous with the original proteins of life... always replicating in/as a community. 

As those proteins make life possible, axis makes culture possible. 

Its ideational and textual functions are much later developments, like the eukaryotic cell... ranks the first multicellular organisms, strata the first complex ones (the proteins of which we still share with all other organisms).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is nucleic acids, not proteins, that replicate in biological systems. But even with this correction, the analogy is invalid, since if anything replicates in semiosis, it is in the semiotic system, not the interactions of meaners.

[2] To be clear, proteins make life possible in the sense that they are the expressions (Tokens) of genes (Values). Axis, on the other hand, in SFL Theory, is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Culture, by contrast, is the contextual semiotic realised by language and other social semiotic systems. Thus, it is not axis that makes culture possible but social semiosis.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstands the metafunctions as independent of one another. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not.

[4] To be clear, the eukaryotic cell was a phenotypic innovation in biological evolution, whereas the metafunctions were in language from the start as types of meaning that might be said to have "phenotypic effects".

[5] To be clear, multicellular organisms arose from the aggregation of eukaryotic cells, but ranks did not arise from the aggregation of the ideational and textual metafunctions. Rank is one way of modelling formal constituency.

[6] To be clear, complex multicellular organisms evolved from simpler multicellular organisms, but strata did not evolve from rank. Strata are different levels of symbolic abstraction, different perspectives on the one phenomenon, and are a dimension of all semiotic systems from the start, though only language has a stratified content plane.

David Rose Misrepresenting SFL As Rejecting "Form/Meaning Dualisms"

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 21 August 2023 at 10:27am:

… It also gives some context to SFL’s insistence on bidirectionality of realisation, and lexis as delicate grammar, as well as its rejection of form/meaning dualisms.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, 'dualism' means the division of something conceptually into two opposed or contrasted aspects, or the state of being so divided. Clearly, SFL does not reject the conceptual division of form and meaning as opposed or contrasted aspects, not least because it models grammatical form as a rank scale. 

SFL models grammatical form in terms of its function in realising meaning. The form-meaning relation ("dualism") is a Token-Value relation. This way of modelling is made possible by the 'natural' relation between form and meaning. Halliday (1985: xvii, xviii):

The relation between the meaning and the wording is not, however, an arbitrary one: the form of the grammar relates naturally to the meanings that are being encoded. A functional grammar is designed to bring this out; it is a study of wording, but one that interprets the wording by reference to what it means. …

What this means is that both the general kinds of grammatical pattern that have evolved in language, and the specific manifestations of each kind, bear a natural relation to the meanings they have evolved to express. … the distinction into word classes of verb and noun reflects the analysis of experience into goings-on, expressed as verbs, and participants in the goings-on, expressed as nouns; and so on.

David Rose Misunderstanding Halliday's "Axial Breakthrough"

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald to sys-func and sysfling on 5/8/22 at 8:34:

2.

Thanks to Ed, for the challenge presented by your reading of my diagram below as ‘(paradigmatic) "features" and (syntagmatic) "structures"’.

The diagram is meant to show that structures are part of systems, not opposed to them as the system/structure and paradigmatic/syntagmatic terms might suggest. Structures don’t realise systems, but features in systems. Structures are perceivable tokens of the abstract values of features. Each instance of structure is recognisable by its similarity to other instances of the same structure, and its difference from other types of structure. Similarity is represented in the diagram by hexagons, and difference by the system. The entry condition to a system is a more general similarity that is shared by its structures, e.g. the structure +Subject;+Finite is shared by the structures Subject^Finite and Finite^Subject. These similarities and differences in structure realise similarities and differences in features, such as indicative: declarative/ interrogative. Hence the system of features is a mirror of the system of structures. They are two faces of a system. This is my understanding of MAKH’s axial breakthrough.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[2] This is a very serious misunderstanding. Systems and structures are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction (elaboration + identity), whereas the relation that obtains between a whole and its parts is composition (extension). A part of a system is a subsystem, whereas a structure (e.g. of a group) is part of a larger structure (e.g. of a clause).

[3] This is a very serious misunderstanding. It is the entire system of a rank unit that specifies how its entire structure is realised, and this is achieved through realisation statements, not features.

[4] This confuses lower abstraction with perceivability. The structure of a nominal group cannot be perceived, unless, like its system, it is represented theoretically.

[5] This confuses the realisation (token-value) relation between structure and system with the instantiation (token-type) relation between instances and instance type.

[6] This confuses instance type (similarity) with paradigmatic order (difference).

[7] This confuses instance type (similarity) with the entry condition of a system. In the grammar, the first entry condition of a system is a formal unit on the rank scale.

[8] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Difference in system is difference between paradigmatic features, such as declarative vs interrogative, whereas difference in structure is difference in elements, such as Subject vs Complement.

[9] To be clear, the claim that "Halliday's axial breakthrough" is that system and structure are "two faces of a system" derives from the multiple misunderstandings identified above.

David Rose Misrepresenting Axis

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on 1/8/22 at 20:42:

Axis pairs perceivable forms with conceivable meanings, which makes semiosis possible. Turning your question around, what the others all have is axis. It’s also what makes SFL systemic.

and on 2/8/22 at 12:41:

I liked my bon mot ‘Axis pairs perceivable forms with conceivable meanings, which makes semiosis possible.’

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, axis is the local dimension whose orders are paradigmatic and syntagmatic, with system as the dimension of paradigmatic order and structure as the dimension of syntagmatic order (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20, 32).

Importantly, axis does not "pair forms with meanings". Form and meaning are located on both axes in the lexicogrammar. (There is meaning, but not form, on the semantic stratum, and form, but not meaning, on the expression plane.) Lexicogrammatical form is modelled as a rank scale, and rank units are interpreted in terms of their function in realising meaning. Paradigmatically, each formal rank unit is the entry condition to systems of such functions, and syntagmatically, each element of function structure is realised by a formal unit of the rank below.

With regard to "perceivabilty", lexicogrammar is 'a purely abstract level of representation "in between" the two faces of the sign' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 613).

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, the 'others' here are those identified by Ed McDonald:

I noted the reference to axis, and I'm a bit puzzled as to how and why this seems to have become the theoretical fons et origo. Do we really to trace everything back to that single distinction? And if so, why paradigmatic/syntagmatic (and not and / or system/text, content/form, synchronic/diachronic...)? Does it have a privileged relation to realisation and / or instantiation?

As McDonald implies, axis is but one dimension of language in the SFL model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

[3] This is misleading. What makes SFL systemic is the priority it gives to system over structure, just as what makes SFL functional is the priority it gives to function over form.

David Rose Misrepresenting Halliday's Development Of SFL Theory

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 29/7/22 at 13:21:

As quoted earlier, axis was the breakthrough that opened up metafunctions and rank scale system/structure cycles, which I’ve tried to symbolise with this diagram (hexagons borrowed from Giacomo Figueredo)...

But there was a tension with the earlier model predating axis, that assumed the abstraction relation lay between grammar as form and semantics as substance, and kept being repeated alongside axis...

The term «meaning» has traditionally been restricted to the input end of the language system: the «content plane», in Hjelmslev's terms, and more specifically to the relations of the semantic interface, Hjelmslev's «content substance». We will therefore use «meaning potential» just to refer to the semantic options (although we would regard it as an adequate designation for language as a whole).

This historically nuanced conditional formulation then gets reduced to a catchphrase...

Grammar is what the speaker CAN SAY, and is the realisation of what he means. Semantics is what he CAN MEAN

...which is later cemented as the commonsensical triad ‘meaning, wording, sounding’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. Halliday (2002: 12) summarises the development of his theorising as follows:

The steps that have seemed to me perhaps most critical in this endeavour might be summarised as: the unity of lexicogrammar; the priority of the view ‘from above’, from meaning and function; the move into systemics (system networks), freeing the grammar from the restrictions imposed by structure; the metafunctional foundation, disentangling the strands of meaning that are woven together in the syntax; the construction of language by children, from protolanguage to mother tongue; the decoupling and recoupling of lexicogrammar and semantics – the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor; the conceptualising of the relation between system and text (instantiation) and the probabilistic nature of linguistic systems.

That is, according to Halliday, it was not axis, but giving priority to the view 'from' above (meaning and function over form), and to system over structure, that opened up the development of Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[3] To be clear, the notion of axis, system vs structure, has appeared in Halliday's work since his first paper Some Aspects of Systematic Description and Comparison in Grammatical Analysis (Halliday 1957), though the term 'axis' was not used until Class in Relation to the Axes of Chain and Choice in Language (1963). 

That is, there is no Hallidayan model that predates the notion of axis, and the model that predates the term 'axis' is not Systemic Functional Grammar, but a different theory: Scale & Category Grammar, expounded in Categories of the Theory of Grammar (Halliday 1961). Any supposed tension then, is between a discarded theory and its replacement.

[4] This bare assertion bears no relation to the quote from Halliday (1972) that follows it as its support. The quote makes no mention of axis, and merely specifies how the term 'meaning potential' will be used, relative to traditional usages of 'meaning' (interpreted in terms of Hjelmslev's model).

[5] To be clear, the quote from Halliday (1972) that follows this misrepresentation of the previous quote as a 'historically nuanced conditional formulation' is not a reduced "catchphrase" of it. Where the previous quote is concerned with the term 'meaning potential', the quote that follows is concerned with the distinction between lexicogrammar and semantics, explaining that lexicogrammar is what can be verbally projected (say), semantics is what we can mentally project (mean), and the former realises the latter.

[6] To be clear, there is no "cementing" here, and these folk terms also cover phonology (sounding), which is not mentioned in the quotes that precede.

David Rose Misrepresenting Axis As Key To Semantics-Grammar Relations

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 18/7/22 at 21:11:

Axis is key...

Michael Halliday is the only linguist who has given priority to the paradigmatic axis and organised the theory and description of language around this axis... but at the same time, he maintains the connection with the syntagmatic, by means of realisation statements specifying fragments of structure, and the account of structure he developed is a sophisticated unification of different metafunctional strands of organisation.

Matthiessen, C. M., Wang, B., Ma, Y., & Mwinlaaru, I. N. (2022). Systemic Functional Insights on Language and Linguistics. Springer

...two very basic theoretical concepts in SFL, metafunction and rank, are in fact based on the even more fundamental dimension of axis... stratification, alongside metafunction and rank, is based on way in which systems bundle together with one another - axis in other words is key.

Martin, J. R., Wang, P., & Zhu, Y. (2013). Systemic functional grammar: a next step into the theory–axial relations. Beijing: Higher Education.

In broad terms, a system is a set of relations of abstraction and generality. Its features are generalisations based on recurrent similarity of function at higher strata. From this instantial perspective, a system is an accumulation of instances over time scales of phylogenesis and ontogenesis.

Rose, D. in press. Designing pedagogic registers: Reading to Learn. In J.R. Martin, D. Caldwell & J. Knox (eds.) Developing Theory: A Handbook in Appliable Linguistics and Semiotics. London: Bloomsbury, 103-125

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this quote from Matthiessen et al. (2022) is a statement on how SFL gives priority to the paradigmatic axis, with metafunctional structures of the syntagmatic axis specified by realisation statements associated with features in systems.

[2] To be clear, this quote from Martin et al. (2013) makes the false claims that stratification is based on the way systems bundle together, and that axis is fundamental to stratification, metafunction and rank.

On the first claim, stratification is based on the principle of realisation. Different strata constitute different levels of symbolic abstraction.

On the second claim, axis, stratification, metafunction and rank are distinct dimensions, each with distinct ordering principles, independent of those of the other dimensions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20,32):

[3] Some of the problems with this diagram were identified in the earlier post David Rose Misunderstanding Generalisation And Abstraction.

[4] To be clear, this quote from Rose (in press) presents several misunderstandings. Regarding the first sentence, it is delicacy that is the ordering principle of system, whereas (symbolic) abstraction is the relation between systems of different strata.

The second sentence confuses instantiation ('recurrent') with stratification ('higher strata'). To be clear, the features of a system represent the potential choices of instantiation for a specified entry condition.

Regarding the third sentence, a system is built up at all three timeframes, including that of logogenesis, 'the creation of meaning in instantiation, maintained as a changing instantial system'. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384-5):

If we look at logogenesis from the point of view of the system (rather than from the point of view of each instance), we can see that logogenesis builds up a version of the system that is particular to the text being generated: the speaker/ writer uses this changing system as a resource in creating the text; and the listener/ reader has to reconstruct something like that system in the process of interpreting the text — with the changing system as a resource for the process of interpretation. We can call this an instantial system. … the instantial system is built up successively by the generation process; but as it is developed, it in turn becomes a resource for further instantiation.

David Rose On Incongruent Grammatical Realisations And 'Wording'

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 11/7/22 at 20:10: 

I’m happy to be mistaken but my understanding is that incongruent grammatical realisations of speech functions are treated as delicate features in message semantic systems. That is, each feature in the semantic systems has a particular grammatical realisation. … 

One issue with your synopsis below, is a suggested correlation of form and meaning with grammar and semantics. This is also suggested by the oft-used terms ‘wording’ vs ‘meaning’, as though grammar was not meaningful in itself. What makes grammar meaningful is axis... features realised as structures. The features are the meanings of the structures. Or rather the features and structures are two faces of the meanings, that MAKH showed us are made by the grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is clearly true, as 140+ posts on this blog demonstrate.

[2] This is a serious misunderstanding. Incongruent realisations are relations between strata, whereas delicacy is the ordering principle of the system of a stratum. Delicacy is the ordering of systemic features that may be realised congruently or incongruently on the stratum below.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, the "oft-used" distinction 'wording vs meaning' (Halliday 1970) does not correspond to the distinction between form and meaning. The term 'wording' is used in SFL Theory as the folk equivalent of 'lexicogrammar', and it refers to the interpretation of form in terms of its function of realising meaning, as when a formal constituent of a clause, a verbal group, is interpreted as serving the function of Process of a clause.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true that axis makes grammar meaningful. This is demonstrated by the fact that axis is a dimension of every stratum, including phonology. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32) explain, on each stratum, the dimension of axis has two orders: the paradigmatic (the dimension of system) and the syntagmatic (the dimension of structure).

[5] This is misleading. In SFL theory, grammatical systems (e.g. PROCESS TYPE) and the structures that realise them (e.g. Senser ^ Process) are both interpreted in terms of the meanings they realise.

[6] Rose is here drawing on Martin's misunderstanding of stratification as 'all strata make meaning', which is a statement of semogenesis, not stratification. This confusion leads Martin (1992) to misconstrue even phonology as a level of meaning. Evidence here.

David Kellogg On Rank, Axis And Metafunction

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 5/7/22 at 6:54:

Chris--your inventory of the architecture of SFL doesn't include RANK (or AXIS). Three possible reasons occur to me....

a) The Cardiff grammar is more strictly Firthian and works with "pieces" of language rather than with the clear hierarchy of units. We can actually see this in the diagramme because the arrow that connects "realization rules/statements" to "system networks" isn't realization or activation but rather "re-entry". So there actually isn't a rank scale. (This is also implicit in the rather vague expression "richly described tree structure", which my old syntax teacher Andy Radford would have heartily approved of....)

b) "Rank" is an organizing principle within Structure (just as System and Structure are principles within Axis). The inventory only includes the basic concepts from the IFG intro and not the points of origin, principles or meta-principles which order them. (It's an inventory and not an actual building!)

c) "Rank" isn't all pervasive in the way that, say, metafunction is. For example, Halliday and Matthiessen are agnostic about whether rank exists across the level of context or even semantics, but they have no such doubts about system, structure, instantiation, or metafunction. (On the other hand, H&M are agnostic about whether metafunction exists at the level of phonology and phonetics and I am much less so....)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the architectural dimensions are those provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20):

[2] To be clear, as dimensions, rank and axis are local, rather than global. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

[3] For a close examination of Fawcett's theory of functional syntax, the Cardiff Grammar, see here.

[4] To be clear, paradigmatic and syntagmatic are orders of the local dimension axis; see [2].

[5] See [1].

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 87):

At the rank of tone group:

• the system of TONALITY — choice in the distribution of tone groups — realises the distribution of information units (textual metafunction);
• the system of TONICITY — choice in the placement of tonic prominence — realises the culmination of New information (textual metafunction);
• the system of TONE — choice in the major pitch movement — realises the system of KEY (interpersonal metafunction);
• the systems of TONE SEQUENCE and TONE CONCORD realise the systems of TAXIS and LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE (logical metafunction).

Mick O'Donnell Confusing SFL's Architecture Of Language With Models

After ChRIS CLÉiRIGh wrote to sys-func on 28/6/22 at 11:54:

When someone uses the architecture of SFL, they mean what the theoretical architecture means. Inconsistencies arise when the architecture is not understood.

Mick O'Donnell responded on sys-func on 28/6/22 at 19:37:

Your language implies that you believe that there is one architecture of SFL. I have always enjoyed the plural nature of SFL, with multiple alternative architectures to choose from.

To me, the biggest threat to SFL as a continuing school is the attitude that only the word of God (MAKH) is true, and everything else is heresy. …

Pluralism is good. Even if it involves different choices in fundamental architecture. Choice is good. What is not good is continual sniping at those who choose to differ from Halliday in details (but not in fundamentals).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, SFL does propose only one architecture for language. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20) outline its dimensions as follows:

Importantly, all models proposed within SFL Theory use this architecture, including those of Martin and Fawcett. Importantly, because these dimensions are precisely specified, they can be used to identify models that misunderstand the architecture. For example, it can be seen that Fawcett's model (2010: 36) — which O'Donnell supports — misunderstands stratification and confuses axis with instantiation: 

[2] To be clear, here O'Donnell confuses the architecture with models using that architecture. The 'multiple alternatives' are the models, not the architecture.

[3] For me, "the biggest threat to SFL" is the inability of its community of users to understand the theory and, consequently, to detect misunderstandings of the theory.

[4] To be clear, here O'Donnell betrays his own religious orientation by projecting it onto others. Importantly, SFL Theory is a scientific theory, in the sense that its theoretical architecture of language is systematically organised and precisely specified. This means that models within the theory are subject to scientific criteria, not just chosen like the sacred text of a preferred religious sect. 

[5] To be clear, here O'Donnell reduces all the reasoned argumentation on this blog, using hard-won knowledge of SFL Theory, to "continual sniping'. The validity of the argumentation is of no interest to O'Donnell. The pedagogical value of blog is of no interest to O'Donnell.

[6] To be clear, the type of pluralism that O'Donnell advocates is not good. It exemplifies just the type of anti-intellectualism deplored by Asimov:

David Rose On The Realisation Of Process Type

David Rose replied to Johanna Salomonsson on Sysfling on 4 Mar 2022, at 09:58:

Two points about SFL that could help your readers…  

1. It differs from traditional grammars that gloss each word and morpheme. In SFL, process type is a clause rank system realised by relations between lower rank units, such as verbs. The whole clause is material or relational. (This is sometimes confused by labelling verbal groups as process types.)

2. Analyses are multiperspectival. In Halliday’s model, process type is a transitive perspective on a clause, and the ergative perspective is complementary.

As you show, your second examples are caused attributive relations, in which Attributor is additional Agent from ergative perspective. The complementary perspectives help to show why clauses such as Tom’s ‘We painted the wall red’ look similar in agency, but differ in process type.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is nonsense. Systemically, PROCESS TYPE is a system of the clause, and a clause consists of groups, including the verbal group, each of which is the entry condition to its systems. Structurally, the Process of a clause is realised by a verbal group.

"Relations between verbs", on the other hand, refers to relations between lexical items, each item being specified by the most delicate lexicogrammatical features. Rose's misunderstanding, therefore, is that a grammatical system is realised by a lexical set.

[2] To be clear, what Rose refers to here is the widespread practice of classifying verbal groups in terms of  PROCESS TYPE, instead of considering the function of each group in a clause. 

But, on the other hand, 'Process' is the function label of a verbal group in a clause.

[3] To be clear, the "second examples" in the discussion were:

A happy baby makes a happy mother

Your happy Glaxo baby will make you a happy mother

but only the second of these is an attributive clause with an Attributor. The first is an identifying clause, with no agency:

That is, the clause identifies a happy baby with a happy mother; it does not construe a happy baby as a member of the class a happy mother, as would an attributive clause.

This is a fact that escaped all interlocutors in this Sysfling discussion, including Jim Martin.

Postscript:

Ten hours after this post was published, David Rose correctly reanalysed the clause in question as identifying. See the next post.