David Rose On There Being No Important Differences Between Martin And Halliday & Hasan

David Rose replied to Attia Rasool on SYSFLING on 16 Sept 2023 at 09:32:

There are no important differences between Martin’s, Halliday’s and Hasan’s approaches in SFL. Halliday’s major contribution was developing SFL theory in the process of describing lexicogrammar and intonation through the 1960-70s. He and Hasan used the work on lexicogrammar to describe structures of discourse as ‘cohesion’ in 1976. Hasan was also trained as a sociologist. She and Halliday both used the work on lexicogrammar to interpret aspects of social contexts in their later work.

Martin used Halliday’s and Hasan’s work on lexicogrammar and discourse to describe discourse semantic systems. His foundational English Text (1992) explains carefully how this work builds on their research. It should be read closely by anyone interested in SFL.

Martin also extended SFL theory to social context, describing field, tenor and mode as semiotic systems, realised in language, and genre as a semiotic system realised in field, tenor and mode. This work has been widely applied to research in education and other fields.

Martin and colleagues then built on Kress and van Leeuwen’s work on images to describe other modalities as semiotic systems. Martin and colleagues have also integrated Halliday’s, Hasan’s and others’ research on ‘users’ and ‘uses’ of language, as individuation and instantiation.

Work on individuation helps to understand various alignments within the SFL community in terms of affiliation, or bonding around icons. As the founder of the field, Halliday has been iconised, so that SFL work beyond his was sometimes seen as too different and less legitimate. This is not the view of younger generations.

Measured objectively, by far the most influential figures in SFL have been Halliday with [almost 200,000] citations, and Martin with almost 100,000 citations. Other leaders in SFL have only a fraction of these followers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because there are very many important irreconcilable differences, all deriving from Martin's misunderstandings of Halliday's theory. See some of the evidence at:

Review of Martin (1992)
Review of Bateman (1998)
Review of Martin & Rose (2007)
Review of Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (2010)
Review of Martin (2013)
Review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019)
Review of Martin & Doran (2023)

[2] This is potentially misleading. Halliday's "major contribution" was to actually formulate SFL theory, developing it, in the 1970s, from his 1960s theory, Scale & Category Grammar. The integration of all the dimensions that the theory assigns to language is Halliday's work. Without Halliday, SFL Theory does not exist; without Martin, it does. 

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Hasan (1976) theorises the lexicogrammatical systems of cohesion, a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction. Later, Martin (1992) rebranded his misunderstandings of their non-structural systems as his structural systems of discourse semantics. See the evidence at Review of Martin (1992).

[4] This is potentially misleading. In the 1960s, Hasan worked at the Sociolinguistic Research Centre with Basil Bernstein.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday & Hasan did not interpret context in terms of the lexicogrammar. Halliday used Hjelmslev's notion of a connotative semiotic to stratify context in relation to language, and projected the notion of metafunction onto context as the systems of field, tenor and mode.

[6] For the closest of all readings of Martin (1992), see  Review of Martin (1992).

[7] This is very misleading indeed, because it credits Martin with Halliday's work. It was Halliday who modelled context in terms of field, tenor and mode. Martin's "contribution" was to misunderstand context (the culture as semiotic system) as register (a diatypic variety of language). See the evidence at Review of Martin (1992).

[8] To be clear, Martin's genre is a confusion of text type (register viewed from the instance pole), mode (textual context) and semantics not organised by metafunction. It unwittingly proposes that stages of a narrative ("genre"), for example, are realised by the relative social status of the speaker and addressee (tenor). See the evidence here, here and here.

[9] For some of the misunderstandings in Martin's work on pictorial semiosis, see here (Working With Discourse) and here (Deploying Functional Grammar). For theoretical and ethical problems with "Martin's" work on "paralanguage", see Martin's Model Of Paralanguage.

[10] To be clear, Martin does not understand instantiation; evidence here, here and here. And as previously explained, Martin's model of individuation incongruously maps a meronymic taxonomy (affiliation) onto a hyponymic taxonomy (individuation). See the previous post David Rose On Martin's Context-Bound/Free And Individuation As Allocation/Affiliation.

[11] See The Tactics Of The Disciplinarian Head Of The Martin Faith Community.

[12] To be clear, here Rose implies that Martin's work has been rejected because it is too different or less legitimate, rather than because it is inconsistent with both SFL Theory and itself. See also The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

[13] To be clear, here Rose is talking of Martin's former and current students.

[14] To be clear, this confuses quantity (citations) with quality (theoretical integrity). The most reliable interpreter of Halliday, by far, is Christian Matthiessen. A meticulous review of his 700+ page book, Lexicogrammatical Cartography, warranted only 41 critiques.

[15] See The Culture Of 'Faith' In The SFL Community.

David Rose On Martin's Context-Bound/Free And Individuation As Allocation/Affiliation

David Rose replied to Ed McDonald on Sysfling on 12/9/23 at 16:55:

For recentish work on "context-bound" vs "context-free" see

Revisiting mode: Context in/dependency in Ancient History classroom discourse

JR Martin, E Matruglio

Studies in functional linguistics and discourse analysis 5, 72-95

Revisiting field: Specialized knowledge in secondary school science and humanities discourse

JR Martin

Onomázein, 111-148

SF work on coding orientation is now being reframed as individuation: allocation/affiliation

Discourse and Diversionary Justice: an analysis of youth justice conferencing

M Zappavigna, JR Martin

Palgrave Macmillan

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin mistakes language varieties, register and genre, for context. If register and genre are misunderstood as the context of language, then the claim is that language is either independent or dependent of the context it construes. In this case, the realisation relation between context and language is misunderstood as dependency.

But even if register and genre are understood as language varieties, the claim is that texts are either independent or dependent of the varieties of which are instances. In this case, the instantiation relation between register/genre and text is misunderstood as dependency.

 [2] To be clear, Halliday (2008: 114) explains Bernstein's coding orientation as follows:

… Bernstein’s concept of “code”, which he defined as sociolinguistic coding orientation […] with its opposition of “elaborated/restricted”, was the basic mechanism of cultural transmission: it was the different semiotic practices, or “meaning styles”, of different social classes that was responsible for transmitting social class distinctions across the generations.

See Misunderstanding Bernstein at Working With Discourse: Meaning Beyond The Clause (Martin & Rose, 2007).

[3] To be clear, Martin has presented two models of a 'cline of individuation': one derived from the work of Bernstein and the other from the work of his PhD student, Knight. The Bernstein-derived model is a cline from 'reservoir' to 'repertoire', where 'reservoir' refers to the potential of the community and 'repertoire' refers to the potential of the individual. Bernstein (2000: 157):

I shall use the term repertoire to refer to the set of strategies and their analogic potential possessed by any one individual and the term reservoir to refer to the total of sets and its potential of the community as a whole.

Applied to language, this is a model of the meaning potential of meaners (language users). The organising principle of the cline is elaboration and ascription (intensive attribution), since 'repertoire' is both a subtype of 'reservoir' (elaboration), and a member of the class 'reservoir' (ascription); cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145).

However, it is the Knight-derived model that is relevant here. Martin et al (2013):

A second, complementary perspective on individuation looks at how personæ mobilise social semiotic resources to affiliate with one another — how users attitude and ideation couplings, in Knight's (2010) terms, to form bonds, and how these bonds then cluster as belongings of different orders (including relatively "local" familial, collegial, professional, and leisure/recreational affiliations and more "general" fellowships reflecting "master identities" including social class, gender, generation, ethnicity, and dis/ability).

Like the Bernstein-derived model, the organising principle is again elaborating ascription, since each point on the cline is a subtype and member of the points above as types, but unlike the Bernstein-derived model, the individuation here is not of the meaning potential of meaners but of the meaners themselves. This inconsistency leads to a more serious inconsistency: the conflation of two different types of hierarchy.

Affiliation differs from individuation in that its organising principle is extension, not elaboration, since it is concerned with composition and association (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 146). That is, where individuation is a hyponymic taxonomy (an elaboration of types), affiliation is a meronymic taxonomy (a composition of parts).

Because of this difference, affiliation can not be mapped onto the cline of individuation. For example, the bonding of meaners through shared evaluations does not affiliate them as a master identity such as gender or ethnicity. Gender and ethnicity are not created by people making the same interpersonal assessments, and the meaners (personæ) of the same gender or ethnicity can differ markedly in their interpersonal assessments.

David Rose On The Reluctance To Divorce Language From Consciousness

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 26 Mar 2023, 14:02:

A more general anxiety about relations between language and personhood exists in our own community. …

But SFL would not have progressed without separating out the systems from their uses and users.

One way our anxiety is expressed is a reluctance to divorce language from consciousness. Yet consciousness is a property of individual persons but language systems are a property of communities. They exist before, after and without the individual persons who use them.

By systems we mean both potential and actual – system and text. Instantiation is a relation between texts and systems, irrespective of persons.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday makes a useful distinction between 'person' as a social individual and 'meaner' (language user) as a socio-semiotic individual. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 610):

The human individual is at once a biological "individual", a social "individual" and a socio-semiotic "individual":

as a biological "individual", s/he is an organism, born into a biological population as a member of the human species.

as a social "individual", s/he is a person, bom into a social group as a member of society. "Person" is a complex construct; it can be characterised as a constellation of social roles or personae entering into social networks … .

as a socio-semiotic "individual", s/he is a meaner, born into a meaning group as a member of a speech community. "Meaner" is also a complex construct. 

[2] To be clear, this "progress" in SFL is Martin's confused model of individuation and affiliation (critiqued here). Martin et al (2013):

[3] To be clear, for neuroscientist Edelman (e.g 1992), it is language that distinguishes higher-order consciousness from the primary consciousness that humans share with many other species. For Halliday (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999), the theory of experience that has evolved in language equates the content plane of language with the content of consciousness. Ideationally, consciousness is the interior symbolic processing of sensing, and the exterior symbolic processing of saying, which create content through projection, and interpersonally, consciousness is the self enacted as meaner: as an interactant in exchanges.

[4] To be clear, on the SFL model, the collective nature of language entails that human consciousness is also collective. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

Edelman's interpretation of higher-order consciousness referred to above suggests that this form of consciousness (unlike primary consciousness) is constituted in language. Language is a socio-semiotic system, so it follows that higher-order consciousness is constituted socio-semiotically; and since socio-semiotic systems are collective, it follows that higher-order consciousness must also be collective. Collective consciousness is an attribute of human social groups — the members of a given culture. But we need to distinguish between the consciousness of a social group and the consciousness of a species, whose collective construal of experience is codified in the structure of the brain. All human populations have the same brain, and to that extent all construe experience in the same way. But humans live in social groups, and their local environments vary one from the other; to that extent, different groups construe experience in different ways. The significance of this for us is that language is the resource for both: both what is common to the species as a whole, and what is specific to the given culture. In the way these two components are construed in the grammar, we cannot tell them apart. But it is the role of language in the construction of experience as meaning — as shared activity and collaboratively constructed resource — that gives substance to the concept of collective consciousness as an attribute of the human condition.

Moreover, here Rose even contradicts the models that he is promoting. In Martin's models, a language user (persona) is an individuation of a culture, and their meaning potential (repertoire) is an individuation of the meaning potential of the community (reservoir).

[5] Clearly, languages do not exist without the individual persons who use them, as demonstrated by the phenomenon of 'language death'.

[6] This misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, 'system' refers to potential, and 'text' to the instance of that potential.

[7] This is not misleading, because it is true.

David Rose On Individuation, Affiliation And ChatGPT

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 25 Mar 2023 at 14:24:

We’ve been arguing about realisation and instantiation, but from your discussion here, and posts by Mick and others on the machine ‘fooling’ us into interpreting its texts as human-like, the issue is actually individuation.

It can appear to negotiate affiliation, but the machine itself is not affiliated with any scale of community. Only perhaps the people who program it and feed it text corpora are so affiliated, and the users focusing its tasks.

I think this is crucial because we can use and grow our individuation toolset to analyse this dimension. As I think you are suggesting, our realisation and instantiation tools are inadequate on their own for describing it. That is why all I can see when I look at its texts is instantiation of systems at each stratum. I am told this is wrong but I haven’t been given any textual evidence against it – only the authority of its designers and their community.

When the machine tells

I don't have a subjective experience or consciousness that allows me to perceive or interpret those inputs in the same way that a human might.

...it’s talking about individuation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin has proposed two models of individuation, one in which meaning potential is individuated (derived from Bernstein), and one in which meaners are individuated (derived from his student Knight). Neither model applies to ChatGPT because its texts are not instances of a system of meaning potential individuated through ontogenesis. Instead, ChatGPT uses the collective ("unindividuated") lexical collocation probabilities derived from millions of instances (texts) to produce new instances. In Bernstein's terms, ChatGPT is not a 'repertoire of potential' but a 'reservoir of instances'. ChatGPT is thus not an individuated meaner producing texts as instances of an individuated system of potential.

[2] To be clear, the underlying principle of affiliation is different from that of individuation, but Martin confuses the two in his Knight-derived model. Where individuation is a hyponymic taxonomy (an elaboration of types), affiliation is a meronymic taxonomy (a composition of parts). The affiliation model does not apply to ChatGPT because it applies to individuated meaners producing texts as instances of an individuated system, and as demonstrated above, ChatGPT is not an individuated meaner producing texts as instances of an individuated system.

[3] To be clear, it is not that "our realisation and instantiation tools are inadequate", but that they are misapplied if ChatGPT does not operate with a model of stratified systems of potential.

[4] To be clear, this is wrong because there is no evidence whatsoever that any text produced by ChatGPT is "the instantiation of systems at each stratum". The texts are generated from other instances, not a system, and only use the graphological realisations of probabilistically collocated lexical items, not a stratified model of language.

[5] To be clear, here ChatGPT is telling anyone who would listen why it is not an individuated meaner.

David Rose Endorsing Martin's Misunderstandings Of Individuation

David Rose responded to a Halliday quote on Bernstein's code posted by ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on sys-func on 3/8/22 at 13:49:

The complexity of relations between code, register and language seems to be resolving with studies in individuation, such as this paper of yours...

Martin, J. R., Zappavigna, M., Dwyer, P., & Cléirigh, C. (2013). Users in uses of language: embodied identity in Youth Justice Conferencing. Text & Talk, 33(4-5), 467-496.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is not the case, as demonstrated below.

[2] To be clear, Martin is responsible for the misunderstandings (see below) in this paper. Cléirigh's contribution was to provide the model of body language that Martin & Zappavigna (2019) rebranded as their model of paralanguage. Evidence here.

[3] To be clear, Martin's model of individuation confuses an elaboration relation within language with an extension relation between language users. To explain:

Firstly, in this context, Bernstein's notion of reservoir and repertoire refer to the language of users, not to the language users themselves. The two differ in terms of order of experience: a language user is a first-order phenomenon, whereas the language that a user projects is a second-order phenomenon (metaphenomenon).

Secondly, the relation between reservoir and repertoire is elaboration, since varying repertoires are different subtypes of a reservoir, whereas an affiliation relation between language users, as association, is a subtype of extension (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 146).

[4] To be clear, Martin's Figure 4 takes the fundamental confusions outlined above and adds to them. On the one hand, if Bernstein's distinction is viewed as a cline of individuation, then in SFL terms, the cline is

reservoir — reservoir subpotential/repertoire type — repertoire

where each point on the cline is the stratal hierarchy of systems

context — semantics — lexicogrammar — phonology.

On the other hand, Figure 4

• treats a persona (a language user) as an individuation of culture (context potential);
• inserts a subtype (master identity) between culture and its named subtype (subculture);
• models affiliation as an elaborating relation between persona and culture, instead of an extending relation perpendicular to the cline (between personas, between subcultures etc.)

∞

For Halliday's distinction between socio-semiotic meaner and social persona, and Lemke's (1995) examination of the 'notion of the individual human subject', see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 610-1).

See also David Rose On Jim Martin's Individuation.