David Rose On Symmetrical And Transitive Relations

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 14 Apr 2024, at 12:02:

Later in the chapter, Michael reveals that he is indeed talking to knowers of formal logic...

‘The relations of projection and expansion, which (when combined with parataxis and hypotaxis) constitute the ‘logical’ component of a natural language, are not reducible to elementary logical relations of a non-linguistic kind...’ (p460)

His use of symmetrical and transitive is indeed taken from formal logic...

A symmetric relation is a type of binary relation. An example is the relation "is equal to", because if a = b is true then b = a is also true.

Transitive relation, a binary relation in which if A is related to B and B is related to C, then A is related to C.

This usage is not explained, although the discussion is hard to understand without knowing it. Which makes things a little confusing for us benighted non-knowers. 

So Christian may like to adjust or explain this table and discussion for IFG5. While status and sequence are SFL categories, the use of symmetry and transitivity here are not.

This is pretty significant, as these terms are used to define parataxis and hypotaxis on p452, and a series of caveats on p460. Eg, ‘although each implies the other, they are not identical in meaning, because while parataxis is a symmetrical relationship, expansion is not’. Which is why I suggested to Jing that

My friend, John, ≠ John, my friend, ...

(in my ignorance)

 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is not true. The Halliday quote merely points out to the linguist reader that the logical relations of natural language are not reducible to the logical relations of designed systems.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. This usage has been explained in all four editions of IFG. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 452):

In principle, the paratactic relation is logically (i) symmetrical and (ii) transitive. This can be exemplified with the ‘and’ relation. (i) ‘salt and pepper’ implies ‘pepper and salt’, so the relationship is symmetrical; (ii) ‘salt and pepper’, ‘pepper and mustard’ together imply ‘salt and mustard’, so the relationship is transitive.

[3] This is misleading because it is not true. All four terms are used as properties of taxis in SFL Theory, as the table makes clear.

[4] To be clear, Rose had argued that the two were not equal on the basis of parataxis:

The thing about parataxis is it’s not reversible (realised by sequence), whereas hypotaxis is reversible (realised by status). So these two aren’t equivalent...

My friend John, ≠ John, my friend

but, as his Halliday quote explains, the asymmetry is in the expansion relation, elaboration, not in the paratactic relation.

David Rose On Parataxis

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 13 Apr 2024, at 15:53:

The thing about parataxis is it’s not reversible (realised by sequence), whereas hypotaxis is reversible (realised by status). So these two aren’t equivalent...

My friend John, ≠ John, my friend

and again at 20:11:

Funnily enough I was thinking of another line from the same tea party

they cried out when they saw Alice coming

...which is hypotactic and reversible (though not logically symmetrical). In contrast,

they saw Alice coming and then they cried out

...is paratactic and not reversible (which is what I meant).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis. Because parataxis is symmetrical, my friend, John does imply John, my friend. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 452):

Parataxis is the linking of elements of equal status…. Both the initiating and the continuing elements are free, in the sense that each could stand as a functioning whole. In principle, the paratactic relation is logically (i) symmetrical and (ii) transitive. This can be exemplified with the ‘and’ relation. (i) ‘salt and pepper’ implies ‘pepper and salt’, so the relationship is symmetrical; (ii) ‘salt and pepper’, ‘pepper and mustard’ together imply ‘salt and mustard’, so the relationship is transitive.

Hypotaxis is the binding of elements of unequal status… . The dominant element is free, but the dependent element is not. The hypotactic relation is logically (i) non-symmetrical and (ii) non-transitive. For example, ‘whe n’: (i) ‘I breathe when I sleep’ does not imply ‘I sleep when I breathe’; (ii) ‘I fret when I have to drive slowly’ and ‘I have to drive slowly when it’s been raining’ together do not imply ‘I fret when it’s been raining’.

[2] To be clear, in terms of parataxis, they saw Alice coming and they cried out imply they cried out and they saw Alice coming. It is the introduction of the logico-semantic relation of time (then) that backgrounds this paratactic symmetry.

[3] To be clear, this cannot be what Rose originally meant, since there was no temporal relation in his original example of parataxis my friend, John.

David Kellogg On Non-Defining Relative Clauses

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 8 Apr 2024, at 21:32:

a) She tore up the letter, which upset me (because it was from someone I once loved).

b) She tore up the letter which upset me (because it was from someone who was blackmailing me.)

In b) the clause is indubitably rankshifted: it's a post-modifying qualifier in a nominal group--no different from "of England" in "the King of England's crown".

But why can't I consider the clause in a) to be a Circumstance of "She tore up" or some way of complexing the verbal group in the main clause? Why do I have to consider it a ranking clause in its own right?

and replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on sys-func on 10 Apr 2024, at 08:25:

I don't get why you are changing the subject, though. The question is about rank, The issue is whether the clause is part of a nominal group or part of a verb complex or (the standard interpretation) a clause complex. …

and again on 10 Apr 2024, 16:12:

I do not analyse the instance as a verbal group complex. In truth, I don't see any ambiguity whatsoever: one is a nominal group complex and the other is a hypotactic clause. 

If, however, I were applying Merge (or "subjacency"), I would have to argue that "which" is a merged conjunction and pronoun, and therefore the sentence is agnate to "She tore up the letter and upset me", which is a verbal group complex. One more reason for preferring the SFL account.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (a) is a hypotactic clause complex in which the elaborating dependent clause is a non-defining relative clause:

The fact that the relative clause is ranking, and not a constituent of the primary clause is demonstrated by the fact that, unlike true constituents, it cannot be made Theme of that clause.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (b) is a single clause in which the Qualifier of a nominal group is a defining relative clause, shifted to word rank:

[3] To be clear, the elaborating relative clause cannot serve as a clause circumstance because it is not a clause constituent — it cannot be thematised — and it does not serve as a Role, the only type of elaborating circumstance.

When confronted with the problems facing his 'circumstance' analysis, Kellogg falsely accused CLÉiRIGh of changing the subject (see here), and at the same time, without acknowledging the fact, moved the goalposts (a logical fallacy) so his claim now became that the relative clause is part of a nominal group, The problem here is that it treats a non-defining relative clause the same as a defining relative clause:

Then, perhaps as a correction to his first movement, Kellogg moved the goalposts again so his claim now became that the relative clause is embedded as one unit of a nominal group complex:

The problem here is that complexing is only possible with units of the same rank, and in hypotactic nominal group complexes, this means with adverbial groups or prepositional phrases. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 564):

While the dominant element has to be a nominal group, dependent elements can be adverbial groups or prepositional phrases.

[4] To be clear, after twice proposing a verbal group complex as a possible analysis, Kellogg owns that this is not his analysis. He then goes on to claim that She tore up the letter and upset me features a verbal group complex. However, in SFL Theory, a verbal group complex serves a single Process. In this instance, there are two distinct Processes, one material and one mental, so it is a clause complex, not a verbal group complex:

In Kellogg's analysis, where both verbal groups in the complex serve a single Process, neither the PROCESS TYPE nor any of the participants can be identified:

David Rose On 'Ago' And Premodified And Postmodified Adverbial Groups

David Rose replied to Rob Spence on asflanet on Feb 2024, at 14:17:

By ‘surface syntax’ do you mean the syntagm face of our structure-&-syntagm (function-&-class) pairings? If so, Qualifier is realised by an embedded clause or prep phrase, which excludes adverbs like ago. From above, the Qualifier function defines its Thing, probed by which (Thing)?, which also excludes adverbs like ago. This was Pin’s point, not subjectively perceived, but a consistently recurring functional criterion. I think you’re right that we need to be ‘strictly consistent about doubled-up Function-and-Class labelling’

For interest here’s another adv gp analysed in this way... 

 

IFG also discusses a type of comparative adv gp, that is post-modified with an embedded clause or phrase. It is isn’t named but I’ve used ‘esphoric’ here by analogy with esphoric reference in nom gps, like the children [in blue hats]

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In the nominal group some 4,600 million years ago, the Thing years is characterised by the embedded adverbial group ago. The fact that ago can be premodified demonstrates that ago is the Head of an adverbial group.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In the nominal group some 4,600 million years ago, the Thing years is characterised by the embedded adverbial group ago rather than the embedded adverbial group hence; that is, the Thing is characterised as 'in the past' rather than 'in the future'. See the examination of Pin Wang's argument here.

[3] This is true.

[4] To be clear, on the model of Halliday (1994), there is no submodification in this adverbial group. So:

That is, Rose proposes internal bracketing, or nesting, where there is none, giving the analysis:

α(β(βα)α)β 

which can be expanded as 

αββ ^ αβα ^ αα ^ β

Rose then compounds the error by misinterpreting the nesting as the double embedding of adverbial groups within the adverbial group, without realising that they must be embedded on this analysis. And, again, on the belief that the adverbial groups are not embedded, incongruously proposes 2-unit complexes (duplexes) consisting of units of different ranks: group and word.

[5] To be clear, 'esphora' is Martin's (1992: 123) rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) structural cataphora. See The Inconsistencies Created By Rebranding Structural Cataphora As Esphora.

[6] To be clear, on the model of Halliday (1994), there is no submodification in this adverbial group. So:

That is, Rose proposes internal bracketing, or nesting, where there is none, and includes the Postmodifier in the dependency relations, giving the analysis:

β(β(βα)α)α 

which can be expanded as 

βββ ^ ββα ^ βαβ ^ βαα ^ α

Rose again compounds the error by misinterpreting the nesting as the triple embedding of adverbial groups within the adverbial group, without realising that they must be embedded on this analysis. And, again, on the belief that the adverbial groups are not embedded, incongruously proposes 2-unit complexes (duplexes) consisting of units of different ranks: group and word.

And, even in terms of his own approach, Rose has neglected to analyse his final adverbial group so much as the subjacency duplex #βα.

David Rose Adding Classes To His Analysis Of An Adverbial Group

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 20 Feb 2024, at 20:30:

Adding classes doesn't tell us much more about this adv gp

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Halliday (1994: 210), there is no submodification in this adverbial group:

So

As can be seen, the dependency relations all obtain between words.

[2] To be clear, Rose proposes internal bracketing, or nesting, where there is none, giving the analysis:

β(β(β(βα)α)α)α 

which can be expanded as 

ββββ ^ βββα ^ ββαβ ^ ββαα ^ α

Rose then compounds the error by misinterpreting the nesting as the triple embedding of adverbial groups within the adverbial group, without realising that they must be embedded on this analysis. And, on the belief that the adverbial groups are not embedded, incongruously proposes 2-unit complexes (duplexes) consisting of units of different ranks: group and word.

David Rose On Layers Of Subjacency

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 11 Feb 2024, at 15:08: 

In IFG there’s an analysis of adv gp as recursive hypotaxis... 

 

This misses the interplay of comparison, intensification and negation in this adv gp. e.g. intensification ‘very much’; comparison ‘not so very much’. Here as layers of subjacency... 

not	so	very	much	more	easily
b comp					a
b intens				a
b comp		a
b neg	a	b intens	a

and again on 13 Feb 2024, 13:32:

Here again with formal function labels. Each function is realised by a subjacency duplex, i.e. by the a b relation. 

not	so	very	much	more	easily
Comparison
b					a
Degree
b				a
Comparison
b		a
Negation		Degree
b	a	b	a

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Rose simply rebrands logical structure as 'subjacency duplex'. More importantly, none of these satisfy its defining criterion of not being modifiable more than once.

[2] To be clear, as Halliday's analysis makes clear, there is only one level of modification in this adverbial group; that is, there is no internal bracketing. Moving from right to left in the structure simply involves increasing subcategorisation (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 389). So

How easily? more easily [comparison]
How more easily? much more easily [intensification]
How much more easily? very much more easily [intensification]
How very much more easily? so very much more easily [comparison]
How so very much more easily? not so very much more easily [negation]

Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism

Yaegan Doran wrote to Sysfling on 25 August 2023 at 7:09:

… we should be wary of metafunctions being considered a basic theoretical parameter for the description of semiotic resources in general.

A basic argument I put in a paper once was:

‘If we take metafunctionality to be the one of the broadest means by which these traditions [SFL/Social Semiotics] conceptualize the intrinsic functionality of semiotic resources, by simply assuming metafunctions across semiosis, we run the risk of homogenizing descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described (i.e. English). That is, we risk watering down the specific functionality of each resource.’

Rather, following people working in language description at the time, I tried to tease these issues out for mathematical symbolism in the attached paper (and in more detail in my 2018 book Discourse of Physics), by attempting to ‘derive’ metafunctionality from axis (following Martin’s 2013 book on axis). Maths, I figured (with years of excellent help from many), would prove a useful point of contrast to language by virtue of regular common-sense comparisons that considered it to ‘be’ language/a language. But despite its comparability to language, I could find no evidence in the internal systemic/structural organisation of mathematical symbolism for an interpersonal component, and it was really pushing it to interpret an experiential component. But I tried to suggest that there was a major component comparable to the logical in language and a smaller independent one comparable to the textual. Nonetheless, I do think it much closer to language in this regard than most other resources, and so if even it struggles to fill out the full metafunctional complement, we should not assume it across the board (though metafunction is of course still a useful way in for analysis/application that is less concerned with descriptive/theoretical development – which I also tried to emphasise in the attached paper).

Along similar lines, Yu Zhigang followed this up by looking at the range of symbolism used in chemistry and concluded similarly – that the logical dominated, that there was little evidence for an interpersonal, that there was an even smaller textual component than maths, but there was in fact something comparable to an experiential. But he went a little further, and noted that some structuring principles that we often associate with interpersonal meaning in language – i.e. prosodic structure – occurred in various chemical symbolisms, but seemed to have become ‘ideationalised’ in that they were used to realise meaning related to field, not tenor.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not just an argument against the metafunctional dimension of the theory, but against any dimension of the theory, and so against the theory itself, since in this view, using a theory that was devised for English, SFL, runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. The same argument could be made against generalising Newton's theory of gravitation from falling apples to orbiting heavenly bodies, since it runs 'the risk of homogenising descriptions and making everything look like the first resource to be comprehensively described'. 

[2] To be clear, the metafunctions cannot be derived from axis, even if axis is properly understood. This is not least because they are independent dimensions, with different scopes, and organised according to different principles. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):

That is, the local distinction between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders of axis entails nothing about the global distinctions between construing experience as meaning, enacting intersubjective relations as meaning, and creating text from the two.

For some of the theoretical misunderstandings of axis in Martin (2013), see the review here.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, mathematics is a contextual semiotic that is realised in language (e.g. algebraic equations) and a pictorial semiotic (e.g. geometric diagrams). The proof that equations, for example, are language is that, unlike non-language, they can be read aloud. This is because what is projected by saying, locutions, constitutes the lexicogrammatical stratum, and language is the only semiotic system with a stratified content plane. This is why bi-stratal systems, like pictorial semiotics, cannot be read aloud.

[4] To be clear, this is the logical fallacy known as the Argument from ignorance:

Argument from ignorance (from Latin: argumentum ad ignorantiam), also known as appeal to ignorance (in which ignorance represents "a lack of contrary evidence"), is a fallacy in informal logic. It asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false or a proposition is false because it has not yet been proven true. This represents a type of false dichotomy in that it excludes the possibility that there may have been an insufficient investigation to prove that the proposition is either true or false.

Here Doran has misconstrued absence of evidence as evidence of absence. The evidence for the interpersonal metafunction in mathematical symbolism is manifold. For example, mathematical symbolism is language, so it enacts interpersonal meaning. As language, the equation E = mc² is a proposition realised by a declarative clause that can argued as valid or not whether it is expressed this way or as energy equals mass times the speed of light squared. If there were no interpersonal meaning in mathematical symbolism, then mathematicians would not be able to argue for or against their validity.

[5] To be clear, mathematical symbolism is deployed in many sciences precisely because it construes experience as meaning. As language, a mathematical equation is a figure of being realised by an intensive identifying relational clause, and the solving of an equation is the iterated elaboration of the clause until one or more unknown Tokens is decoded by reference to a Value.

[6] To be clear, the logical metafunction is concerned with the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection, so it requires experiential meanings to relate logically to one another. Every equation is an intensive identifying clause that construes an elaborating logical relation between a Token and a Value, and the solving of an equation entails a clause complex in which all clauses are logically related through elaboration. The logical relation of extension, for example, is manifested in processes of addition and subtraction.

[7] To be clear, none of the metafunctions is independent of the others. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not. There are — or could be — semiotics that are monofunctional in this way; but only very partial ones, dedicated to specific tasks. A general, all-purpose semiotic system could not evolve except in the interplay of action and reflection, a mode of understanding and a mode of doing — with itself included within its operational domain. Such a semiotic system is called a language.

More specifically, the textual metafunction requires the other metafunctions, since its function is to operationalise them. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8, 398):

The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared. … 

The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them…

Every mathematical equation is organised in terms of Theme and information; see [4] above.

[8] To be clear, given the explanatory power of the metafunctions, it would be more prudent to assume that they are a dimension of a semiotic system until it is proved otherwise. As explained above in [4], Doran mistook his inability to identify the metafunctions in mathematical symbolism for evidence that they are not a dimension of its systems. 

[9] To be clear, Yu Zhigang is Doran's collaborator, rather than a scholar working independently of Doran. More importantly, what is said above about mathematical symbolism also applies to chemical symbolism. For example:

∞

See also Yaegan Doran Failing To Recognise The Interpersonal Metafunction In Mathematics.

David Rose Endorsing Jim Martin's Misunderstandings Of Structure ("Subjacency Duplexes")

 David Rose wrote to sys-func on 13 Aug 2021, at 20:35:

Thank you to Jim for challenging our thinking again. Although you downplay it as just ‘relaxing’ the associations of multivariate and univariate structures, the idea of subjacency actually looks like a pretty big claim that could resolve a lot of conflicts, contradictions and blindspots in lg description. When I looked at Pitjantjatjara again recently, it was everywhere at group and word ranks.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the seminar (13/8/21), Martin falsely claimed that Halliday (1965) associated recursive systems with univariate structures and non-recursive systems with multivariate structures, despite producing a diagram from Halliday (1965) that associated recursive systems with both multivariate and univariate structures:

[2] In the seminar, Martin presented a new type of structure, a subjacency duplex, which he claimed is a univariate structure that realises a non-recursive system, thus violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. However, the claim does not survive close scrutiny.

To be clear, the term 'subjacency' is from Chomsky (1973), and the term 'duplex' is from Matthiessen (1995: 161) and simply means a univariate complex of two units. In his talk, Martin attributed 'duplex' to Rose (2001), instead of Matthiessen, and although Rose (2001) acknowledges Matthiessen, Rose did not correct Martin on the point during the seminar, or in this public response.

Martin presented the following as an example of a duplex structure:

Here Martin interprets the structure marker, of, as a clitic, and interprets the clitic and the preceding nominal group as a hypotactic duplex. Martin provided no argument in support of this interpretation. The problems here are as follows.

Firstly, the preposition of is the generalised marker of a structural relation between nominals (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 394). In this instance, it marks a structural relation between the nominals two litres and water. In Martin's analysis, however, of is misinterpreted as a Modifier of just one of those two nominal groups.

Secondly, the preposition of does not function as a Modifier, because it does not subcategorise the nominal group two litres; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389). Nor does of hypotactically expand the nominal group in terms of any other subtypes of elaboration, extension, or enhancement.

Thirdly, the nominal group two litres and the structure marker of do not form a duplex (a 2-unit complex). That is, they do not form a nominal group complex, a structure marker complex, a clitic complex, or any other type of complex.

In short, the reason why this type of univariate structure is not generated by a recursive system, is simply that it is not a univariate structure in the first place.

Martin then went on to compound the error by interpreting both the multivariate structure of prepositional phrases and paratactic nominal group complexes in terms of his subjacency duplexes:

∞

In the same seminar, Martin claimed that a nominal group with multiple Epithets is a multivariate structure realising a recursive system, thus also violating the association he falsely ascribed to Halliday (1965); see [1]. His supporting argument was that each Epithet is independently related to the Thing:

The major theoretical problem here is that, in SFL Theory, recursive systems specify an iterative relation between formal units (e.g words), not functional elements (e.g. Epithets). The logical structure of the nominal group construes it as a group of words, rather than as an organic configuration, such that α is modified by β, which is modified by γ, which is ... , where the α word serves as the Head of the nominal group, and the series of subcategorisations of the Head serves as its Modifier. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 389):

However, there are also problems in using Martin's model of structure to make the argument:

The problem here is that Martin's structural distinction between experiential and logical meaning actually construes the distinction between unequal status (of nucleus vs satellite) and equal status (of multiple nuclei). That is, Martin's structure typology misconstrues the metafunctional distinction between experiential (multivariate) and logical (univariate) as the interdependency distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis.

So, in interpreting the nominal group as an orbital structure, Martin is not actually interpreting it as a multivariate structure, but as a univariate structure, with each Epithet hypotactically related to the Thing.

A final internal inconsistency is that, in applying his model of orbital structure, Martin reverses the direction of the relation from nucleus to satellites to satellites to nucleus (Epithets to Thing), because it suits his argument to do so.

Robin Fawcett On Michæl Halliday's Grammatical Systems As Semantic

Robin Fawcett wrote to Sysfling on 23 Jun 2019 at 15:49:

My concern in my short memoir was to remind us all of his role in welcoming and re-enforcing the fundamental message of Halliday''s important 1966 paper — and in particular through his insightful introductions to the sections of the book. These were the first intimations of a concept that Halliday was exploring — and often seems completely committed to — in his writings on the late 1960s and early 1970s (and indeed in Halliday 1985, though less so in Halliday 1994). This was the concept that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and LOGIOC-SEMANTIC RELATIONS provide choices between meaning — i.e. semantic features), not forms …

Blogger Comments:

See the immediately preceding post.

For the second time in two days, Fawcett uses the tragic untimely death of a colleague as a pretext for promoting the SFL theoretical architecture that Halliday abandoned after 1978, largely because Fawcett mistakenly believes that Halliday's superseded model leaves room in the SFL architecture for his theory of syntax at the level below semantics.

For why Fawcett's model does not withstand close scrutiny, see the explanations here.

With regard to Fawcett and tragic untimely deaths, see here for Fawcett's public dishonest treatment of me at the time of my mother's cruel, premature death from mesothelioma.

Jim Martin On 'In Particular'

After Annabelle Lukin wrote to sys-func and sysfling on 16 Nov 2018 at 09:06:

Can anyone help me out? …

8(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.

… What kind of Adjunct is "in particular"??

Jim Martin responded on sysfling on 16 Nov 2018 at 19:19:

How about appraisal:graduation:focus:sharpen... as part of a paradigm:

in particular when
particularly when
just when
only when
when

• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes particularly when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.

The linking conjunction when would then need to be expanded as a hypotactic complex... beta (in particular) alpha (when)

Blogger Comment:

[1] The reason why the conjunctive Adjunct in particular does not realise 'appraisal: graduation: focus: sharpen' is that, in this instance, there is no appraisal to 'graduate: focus: sharpen'.  For many more of Martin's misunderstandings of Appraisal Theory, see here.

(On the other hand, Martin (1992: 211) rebrands the conjunctive function of in particular as comparative: similarity: reformulation: rework: generality: local: particularise.)

[2] The reason why in particular does not modify when is that in particular — like a conjunctive Adjunct (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 158), but unlike a modifier in a conjunction group (not a hypotactic complex) — can be postponed to the end of the clause as an Afterthought:

The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes — when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, in particular.

See also analysis here.