David Rose Misrepresenting IFG On Modality

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 25/7/22 at 17:44:

Thanks Chris, for another opportunity to compare the models.

Again, MODALITY is a described grammatical system, at clause rank in English, but the same term is used below for a semantic ‘domain’. And again, the account in IFG 1/2 differed from the account in IFG 3/4. In IFG1/2, MAKH described the implicit/explicit: subjective/objective orientations topologically, as interpersonal metaphors of modality. But in IFG 3/4 they are presented instead as features in the MODALITY system, within the MOOD system (Fig 4-13, Fig 4-23). The entry condition for this system is [clause], but the metaphorical realisations of subjective and objective orientations are projections and embedding (I think.../it is likely that...), blurring the line between grammar and semantics.

The described discourse semantic system is APPRAISAL: ENGAGEMENT: heterogloss, for which MODALITY is one resource to introduce additional voices into a discourse, alongside PROJECTION and CONCESSION.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading. Halliday (± Matthiessen) explicitly describes MODALITY as a semantic system. Halliday (1994: 356) and Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 691):

The reason this area of the semantic system is so highly elaborated metaphorically is to be found in the nature of modality itself … Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no – the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.

The fact that it is construed as a semantic system is also demonstrated by it having both congruent and metaphorical grammatical realisations. 

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Less importantly, it is only the explicit ORIENTATION that is metaphorical (Halliday 1994: 362). More importantly, the topological representation in IFG1/2 (and IFG3/4) does not describe MODALITY systems, but the relation of modality to polarity and mood. Halliday (1994: 367):

[3] This is misleading, because MODALITY is presented as a system network in IFG1/2 as well as IFG3/4. Halliday (1994: 358, 360):

Cf. Figure 4-23 in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 182):

[4] This is misleading. By including the system of MODALITY in his grammatical network of MOOD — Figure 4-15 in IFG3, Figure 4-13 in IFG4 — Matthiessen is interpreting grammatical form (modelled as a rank scale) in terms of its function in realising meaning, consistent with the modus operandi of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Contrary to Rose's claim, the rank of clause is the appropriate entry condition for clause rank complexing (projection) and  clause rank elements realised by embedded clauses.

[5] For some of the misunderstandings in Working with Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007) in this regard, see:

• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Usuality, Obligation, Inclination And Ability
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of Obligation
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Projections", "Polarity" And "Modality"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive But"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concession"
• On The Heteroglossic Function Of "Concessive Conjunctions"

Importantly, projection is not included as a logical system in discourse semantics (Martin 1992, Martin & Rose 2007). This is because the original intellectual source of Martin's CONJUNCTION is the system of cohesive conjunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976), and projection does not function cohesively. So, not only does discourse semantics fail to account for the semantics of projection, it also disables any attempt to account for grammatical metaphor in which projection is featured.

Shooshi Dreyfus On Circumstantial Meaning

Shooshi Dreyfus wrote to SYSFLING on 6 Mar 2022, 16:00:

Right, so here’s where I’d like to push us to think beyond clause constituents and up to circumstantial meaning, which can be realised a cross a range of grammatical structures. For example:

On the table (circumstance location place) there is a book

The book on the table (Qualifier) is mine

The book is on the table (Participant in relational clause – not going to argue about which)

How does one explain how this meaning can move around like this? By thinking of it as more than a clausal constituent. 

H&M and JRM point to this in different places but Jing Hao I have a paper on this if anyone is interested. 

It makes SO much more sense to think like this (sorry if that’s notional Jim) and helps students NOT make the errors of analysing beta enhancing clauses (eg when the book was on the table, I spilt my tea on it) and Qualifiers etc as Circumstances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday does far more than merely "point" to this — it is his model. Circumstantiation constitutes one domain of manifestation of the transphenomenal fractal types of expansion and projection — transphenomenal because they operate across various categories of phenomena, and fractal because they are organising principles across different scales; see, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 268).

That is, the meanings that are realised as circumstances are also realised across a range of other grammatical domains, as outlined by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 670-3), who exemplify this for 'cause' as follows:

[2] To be clear, this type of variation can be explained by the fact that a prepositional phrase that realises the meaning 'spatial location' can serve as a circumstance or circumstantial participant of a clause, or be rankshifted to serve as the Qualifier of a nominal group.

[3] To be clear, these types of student errors reflect an inability to analyse formal constituency, since:

• mistaking a β clause for a circumstance is mistaking a clause for a prepositional phrase, and
• mistaking a Qualifier for a circumstance is mistaking a rankshifted prepositional phrase for a ranking one.

David Banks On "Complex Verbal Groups"

In answer to the query:

1. In a structure like: "Honey, don't forget to pay the bill before the week is over" should I say that 'forget to pay' is a complex verbal group? O should I say that 'forget' is a mental process that projects the clause complex 'to pay the bill before the week is over'? 

2. If I compare these two uses of "want":

1. "I want to visit the Vatican"
2. "I want Mary to visit the Vatican"

I'd say that in number 1, 'want to visit' is a complex verbal group, where 'want' shows inclination phase, while in number 2, 'want' is a process that projects 'Mary to visit the Vatican' am I right?  

3. Finally, a case similar to the one with 'forget': in a clause like "that afternoon, we decided to go over the wall" should I say that "decided to go" is a complex VG or should I say that "decided" is a mental process that projects "to go over the wall"

 David Banks wrote to sysfling on 5 October 2018 at 19:47:

1. It seems to me that you can only say that it is a complex verb group if there is only one process involved (e.g. continue to pay). Here, it seems obvious that forgetting and paying are quite separ[a]te processes, so it is not a complex verb group. 

2. It does not seem logical to have completely different analyses for these two examples. The fact that English "understands" the subject of "visit" in 1, to be the same as the subject of "want" does not alter the fact that it is basically the same structure as 2. 

3. The answer to this is the same as for No.1.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, a verbal group complex is not a complex verbal group.  The former is a complex of verbal groups, and a theoretical term, whereas the latter is a single verbal group deemed to be "complex".

[2] To be clear, it is important to distinguish between Process (clause rank) and Event (group rank).  A verbal group nexus construes two Events as one Process; examples provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 569, 574, 580, 587) include:

• decides to write
• would like to paint
• forget to do
• remind to do
• want to do
• ask to do
• anticipate doing
• profess to do.

That is, the instances in question, forget to pay and decided to go, can be interpreted as verbal group complexes that construe two Events as a single Process.

[3] The two different analyses correspond to the preferred analyses of Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584-6), who provide the reasoning on which the analytical distinction is based.

But, to be clear, the two instances do not have "basically the same structure", since, if both are interpreted as projecting clause nexuses, the second projected clause includes a topical Theme, an Actor and an explicit Subject, and so a Mood element, whereas the first has none of these.

However, a functional theory gives priority, in grammatical reasoning, to the view from above: to system and function, rather than to structure and form (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 49).  From above, the two instances differ in terms of the interpersonal meaning being realised.  In the first clause complex, I want to visit the Vatican, the desiderative Process projects an offer, whereas in the second, I want Mary to visit the Vatican, it projects a command.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 584) explain:

We saw in Chapter 7, Section 7.5.4.2 that a mental process of desideration projects an exchange of the goods-&-services type, i.e. a proposal. If the Subject of the projection is the same as that of the mental process clause, the proposal is an offer, as in she wants to do it; if the two are different, then the proposal is a command, as in she wants you to do it. In the first type, the Subject is not repeated, but is carried over from the desiderative clause. (It can then be made explicit by a reflexive, as in she wants to do it herself.)

Moreover, the second clause complex is also an instance of an interpersonal metaphor of modality, being the metaphorical counterpart of Mary should visit the Vatican; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 693).

David Rose Promoting Jim Martin's Discourse Semantics Model

David Rose continued his third reply to Erich Steiner on sysfling on 16 May 2018 at 11:47 as follows:

The discourse semantic model attempts to resolve this contradiction, by treating the discourse/grammar relation as stratal abstraction, rather than instantiation. That is, the discourse semantic stratum consists of feature/structure systems that are instantiated in the discourse patterns of texts. These discourse semantic patterns are realised inter-stratally as grammatical patterns, that instantiate grammatical systems.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the previous post for why the said contradiction only arises from Rose's misunderstandings of instantiation and cohesion.  This clause thus begins the logical fallacy known as a straw man argument:

A straw man argument is one that misrepresents a position in order to make it appear weaker than it actually is, refutes this misrepresentation of the position, and then concludes that the real position has been refuted. This, of course, is a fallacy, because the position that has been claimed to be refuted is different to that which has actually been refuted; the real target of the argument is untouched by it.

[2] To be clear, treating discourse and grammar as two strata of symbolic abstraction is reinterpreting the word 'discourse' to mean 'semantics'.  A complicating factor here is that the stratum of discourse semantics (Martin 1992) was not theorised with an understanding of strata as different levels of symbolic abstraction.  Instead, Martin misinterpreted all strata as interacting modules of meaning. Martin (1992: 390, 392, 488):

Each of the presentations of linguistic text forming resources considered above adopted a modular perspective. As far as English Text is concerned this has two main dimensions: stratification and, within strata, metafunction. …

The modularity imposed by stratification is also an important issue. Discourse systems generate structures which in principle cut across grammatical and phonological ones. …

In this chapter a brief sketch of some of the ways in which discourse semantics interacts with lexicogrammar and phonology has been presented. The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface? What is the nature of the conversation among components? 

[3] There is a sense in which the relation between grammar and discourse is one of instantiation, though not the sense understood by Rose.  The relation between grammatical systems and the grammar of a text is instantiation, and for Halliday (2008: 78), text and discourse are two views on the same phenomenon:

I do make a difference between these two; but it is a difference in point of view, between different angles of vision on the phenomena, not in the phenomena themselves. So we can use either to define the other:

• 'discourse' is text that is being viewed in its sociocultural context, while
• 'text' is discourse that is being viewed as a process of language.

[4] A most serious shortcoming of the discourse semantic model (Martin 1992), in this regard, is that its system networks do not specify how choices in discourse semantic systems are realised as discourse semantic structures.  Moreover, attempts to do so would expose deficiencies in the theorising of structure.  For example, on the one hand, discourse* semantic units are not structures, since they have no internal organisation; and on the other hand, the relations between Martin's discourse* semantic units are not structural, since they are rebrandings of Halliday's (non-structural) cohesive relations.  Moreover, the type of structure Martin interprets them to be, co-variate, was later acknowledged by its source, Lemke (1988: 159), as not being a type of structure after all.  For more detailed critiques of discourse semantic structure, see here.

[5] A most serious shortcoming of the discourse* semantic model (Martin 1992), in this regard, is that its system networks do not specify how choices in discourse semantic systems are realised as choices in grammatical systems.  Moreover, attempts to do so would expose deficiencies in the theorising.  Two examples will illustrate this fact.  On the one hand, the logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION does not recognise the three most general types of expansion: elaboration, extension and enhancement; because of this, most, if not all, realisation relations between discourse semantics an grammar are incongruent, whether metaphorical or not.  On the other hand, the logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION does not include the major logical semantic system of projection, and so cannot account for projection relations anywhere at the level grammar.

* Martin's interpersonal discourse semantics is a general exception, because it is largely a rebranding of genuinely semantic systems and structures, devised by others, not Martin.

David Rose Mistaking A Locution For A Fact

David Rose "corrected" Tom Bartlett on sys-func and Sysfling at 21:01 on March 20, 2015:

Sorry Tom 

What’s coordinated in your example are two nominal groups, a nominal group complex functioning as Verbiage 

What’s confusing is that one nominal group is an embedded clause 

Did he tell you / his real name or [[that he was called Hot Lover Boy?]]

Embedded facts can be found in section 7.5.7 of IFG 

The rank scale is a central component of systemic functional theory. Its description is developed throughout Chs 1 and 2 of IFG 

To help untangle these confusions see section 8.9 Logical organization: complexes at clause and group or phrase rank, and groups 

For the students
David

Blogger Comments:

[1] The projection that he was called Hot Lover Boy is not embedded, and so: not a fact, and not forming a nominal group complex functioning as Verbiage.  See analysis here.  It does not come pre-projected, but is projected into semiotic existence by the clause did he tell you, just as in did he tell you that he was called Hot Lover Boy?, did he tell you that he tends to arrive early? etc.  If it were a fact, it would be possible to render it as did he tell you the fact that he was called Hot Lover Boy?

Cf. fact as circumstance of Matter: did he tell you about the fact that he was called Hot Lover Boy?

In a recent post — here — Rose made the opposite blunder, mistaking an embedded fact for a projected locution.

[2] Rose would do well to take his own advice and consult the references he provides for Bartlett so that he can 'read to learn' — "for the students".

David Rose On Projection

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 3 February 2015 at 12:50pm:

How many projections?

Tony Abbott won't deny that Julie Bishop declined his request for a commitment not to challenge.

And he replied 5 February 2015 at 16:25pm:

One but it projects an exchange, realised lexically in a single clause

Tony Abbott won't deny that

A1 Julie Bishop declined

A2 his request

A1 for a commitment

A1 not to challenge

Even the projecting ‘deny' implies a K2/K1 exchange

How to render as congruent grammar?

Blogger Comment:

The clause that Julie Bishop declined his request for a commitment not to challenge is not a ranking clause that is projected by the clause Tony Abbott won't deny.  Instead, as Bob Hong had already suggested, it is a pre-projected fact, and so is embedded as a constituent, Verbiage, in a clause simplex.  See analysis here.

Reasoning:

(a) The clause can be rendered as Tony Abbott won't deny the fact that Julie Bishop declined his request for a commitment not to challenge.

(b) The clause that Julie Bishop declined his request for a commitment not to challenge is not projected into semiotic existence by the clause Tony Abbott won't deny.

For the projection distinction between hypotaxis and embedding, see here.

Robin Fawcett On Why Hypotaxis Is Unnecessary

Robin Fawcett wrote to the sysfling list on 30 June 2014 at 09:57:

Just consider the concept of Hypotaxis" for a moment. It models a relationship between, let us say, two clauses, such that one clause is said to be "dependent" on another, but without functioning as an element of it - so without "filling`' it, in Cardiff Grammar terms.

An IFG analysis of "She knows his name" would show that "his name" is a nominal group that fills a Complement/Phenomenon, whereas an analysis of "She knows that he is called Peter" would show "that he is called Peter" as a clause that would be said to be "dependent on" the "main" clause but without filling an element of it. But that misses out a central aspect of the functional analysis. i.e. that "that he is called Peter"Is a Phenomenon in the Process of "someone knowing something". Moreover, this analysis asks us to accept that "She knows" is a main clause. I find that a rather unpersuasive position to take, because we recognize it - don't we? - as an incomplete clause that requires its Complement/ Phenomenon to complete it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the case of mental projection, the distinction between embedded clauses and dependent clauses is a very useful and important one.  It is the distinction between a pre-projected fact (embedded clause) and a reported idea (dependent clause).  It is the distinction between a metaphenomenon that is the Range or Agent of the mental Process (embedded clause) and a metaphenomenon that is projected into semiotic existence by the mental Process.  See sample analyses here, and Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 441-482).

However, contrary to claim made by Fawcett, an IFG analysis of She knows that he is called Peter would not

"show "that he is called Peter" as a clause that would be said to be "dependent on" the "main" clause but without filling an element of it".  

The clause that he is called Peter is here an embedded fact, not a dependent clause — She knows (the fact) that he is called Peter — and as such, functions as the Phenomenon of the clause, thereby "filling an element" or "completing the clause" in Fawcett's terms.  See analysis  here.  Cf agnate receptive clause: (the fact) that he is called Peter is known by/to her; agnate theme predication clause: it is (the fact) that he is called Peter that she knows.

In other words, Fawcett has misunderstood and misrepresented the IFG analysis of this clause and then "argued" against his own misunderstanding/misrepresentation in favour of the default SFL analysis.

[2] Unlike Halliday & Matthiessen (2004), Fawcett provides no actual reasoned grammatical argumentation for his unintentional agreement with them, merely:

… the central aspect of the functional analysis …
I find that a rather unpersuasive position to take …
… we recognise it — don't we? — as …

This might be compared to what Fawcett wrote on the Sysfling list at 02:32:43 (GMT) on 9/1/12:

Not all readers will be comfortable with my next point, which is that I suggest that contributions to sysfling that relate to how a given piece of text should be analysed should be expressed in the framework of the assumption that we are scientists of language, i.e. scholars who are seeking, using scientific methods appropriate to our subject of investigation, to understand the nature of language. But this means that we should regard it as inadequate to simply say "I would analyse Text X as follows: ....", without giving reasons for preferring that analysis to others that might be proposed.

David Rose Confusing 'Inner Speech' With How The Grammar Construes Projection

At 15:42 on 13/2/14, David Rose wrote to sys-func:

Vygotsky tells that we think in 'inner speech', that develops from children thinking aloud… 'Egocentric speech, splintered off from general social speech, in time leads to inner speech, which serves both autistic and logical thinking.'

Vygotsky rejects the notion that thought is wordless... 'thought is born through words. A word devoid of thought is a dead thing; and a thought unembodied in words remains a shadow.' 

He even outlines the structural characteristics of inner speech... 'With syntax and sound reduced to a minimum, meaning is more than ever in the forefront. Inner speech works with semantics, not phonetics.' 

An SFL interpretation of this could be that inner speech is primarily lexical, less interpersonalised and less textualised than articulated 'social speech'. This seems consistent with my own introspective impressions. Is it with yours? 

Now grammatically, reported ideas are obviously at once wordings and meanings, as are quoted locutions, but the latter quote articulated speech, while the former report inner speech. 

Perhaps when we are consciously writing, we might get the impression that 'a phenomenon of experience is construed first as a meaning and then in turn as a wording', but in spontaneous speech - inner or outer - meanings and wordings are simultaneous (one and the same thing). 

Again may I ask if anyone can suggest evidence from the grammar that shows otherwise?

Blogger Comments:

[1] Grammatically, reported ideas are presented as meanings, since how the meanings are actually worded is not presented; whereas quoted locutions are presented as wordings: those used to realise meanings.

[2] On the stratification model, meanings and wordings, semantics and lexicogrammar, are not 'the same thing' but two angles on 'the same thing', differing in terms of level of symbolic abstraction.

David Rose On The Projection Of Meaning And Wording [Augmented]

David Rose wrote to sys-func at 18:17:

What Im asking is for help in seeing blindspots in my own reasoning 

E.g. my interpretation of 'Meaning is construed in the linguistic system as a whole' is that meaning is construed in relations between systemic potentials and instantiated structures at all ranks and strata of the linguistic system. 

From that perspective, restricting 'meaning' to one stratum and 'wording' to another sounds more like the folk model, as in 'what's that (word) mean?' or 'can you say that (meaning) in other words?' 

Similarly, construing hypotactic ideas as 'meaning' vs paratactic locutions as 'wording' resembles the folk model in which thoughts pre-exist the words that express them. 

This model is repeated throughout IFG3 section 7.5 on projection, with analogues from the folk model, such as cartoons, as in Fig 7-20. As far as I can see, none of the description of the grammar of projection depends on this model (the description of 'Reporting speech, quoting thought' explicitly contradicts it), but the model appears to have the same status of linguistic fact as the grammatical description. 

My difficulty is that I can't see the evidence in the grammar that 'in the case of a wording, where a phenomenon of experience is construed first as a meaning and then in turn as a wording'... that 'A wording is, as it were, twice cooked.' (p451) 

Can anyone else?

Blogger Comments:

Blindspot [1] is more in theoretical understanding, than reasoning. In the technical sense, there are no "instantiated structures". Instantiation is a relation between the system of potential and an instance of a system (i.e. actualised feature selections and realisation statements of a system of potential). Axially, a system is paradigmatic, a structure is syntagmatic.  The relation between system and structure is realisation, not instantiation, as explained previously here here and here.

Blindspot [2] is, again, more in theoretical understanding, than reasoning. The theoretical purpose of the stratification hierarchy is to parcel out the complexity of language into different orders of symbolic abstraction.  The strata, as different levels of abstraction, are different angles, or vantage points, on a single phenomenon (language).  They are not, for example, analogous to geological strata; they are not modules.

Blindspot [3] is, again, more in theoretical understanding, than reasoning. As levels of symbolic abstraction, strata are not ordered in time: higher strata do not precede lower strata.  The relation between strata, realisation, as the term 'realise' suggests, is an intensive identifying relation; it is not a temporal circumstantial identifying relation.

Blindspot [4] is as much in reasoning as in theoretical understanding. Halliday and Matthiessen's discussion of 'Reporting Speech, Quoting Thought' (2004: 453-7) does indeed contradict Rose's misreading that the level of projected content, meaning or wording, depends on the mode of projection, hypotactic or paratactic, rather than the level of projection, sensing or saying. This would have led most other readers to question their own grasp of the material.  (In reporting speech, a wording is presented as a meaning (op cit: 453), and in quoting thought, a meaning is presented as a wording (op cit: 456).

Blindspot [5] is more in epistemological understanding, than reasoning. Linguistic 'facts' are the data that are modelled, not the models themselves.  For example, in biology, the Theory of Natural Selection is not a fact; the data of evolution are the facts and the theory is an attempt to account for them.

Blindspot [6] is in theoretical understanding, since Rose follows Martin in confusing stratification with semogenesis, as epitomised by Martin's 'all strata make meaning'. Because Martin (1992) does not understand stratification as levels of symbolic abstraction, he misconstrues strata as 'modules', all of which are strata of meaning, even phonology. Because of this, the distinction between meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar) is lost to Martin, and so, to Rose.

The notion of wording being 'twice cooked' means that it is at two removes from experience. At one remove, experience is construed as meaning (semanticised), and at two removes, it is reconstrued as wording (grammaticalised). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 517-8):

Something that is projected as a meaning is still a phenomenon of language – it is what was referred to above as a ‘metaphenomenon’; but it is presented at a different level – semantic, not lexicogrammatical. When something is projected as a meaning it has already been ‘processed’ by the linguistic system – it is a phenomenon of experience that has been construed as a meaning; but processed only once, not twice as in the case of a wording, where a phenomenon of experience is construed first as a meaning and then in turn as a wording. So, for example, the phenomenon of water falling out of the sky may be construed as a meaning, by a mental process of cognition, in (she thought) it was raining; but when the same phenomenon is represented by a verbal process, as in (she said:) ‘it’s raining’, it is the meaning ‘it is raining’ that has been reconstrued to become a wording. A wording is, as it were, twice cooked. This is symbolised in an interesting way by the punctuation system of English, which uses both single and double quotation marks; in principle, single quotation marks stand for a meaning and double quotation marks stand for a wording. We are unconsciously aware that when something has the status of a wording it lies not at one but at two removes from experience; it has undergone two steps in the realisation process. … We have described the process ‘from above’, from the point of view of how experience is first construed as meaning (‘semanticised’) and then as wording (‘grammaticalised’).

David Rose On The Projection Of Content

David Rose wrote on sys-func on 11 February 2014 at 13:38:

Christian's reasoning in this paper makes much of the contrasting tendency for hypotactic projection of mental processes vs paratactic projection of verbal processes. This is reconstrued as sensing projecting 'meaning' vs saying projecting 'wording', which are them mapped diagrammatically onto language strata as meaning realised by wording. 

Christian sees this as highly significant... 'the differentiation between the projection of ideas and locutions has evolved to reflect and reveal a fundamental aspect of the stratal organization of language', and uses it to support a stratal model of meaning realised by wording that later emerges as a theoretical model for H & M's Construing Experience through Meaning. 

My difficulty is that both paratactic and hypotactic projections involve both meaning and wording. There is no meaning without wording and vice versa. The difference between these types of projection cannot be meaning vs wording, but perhaps 'rewording', as in direct v indirect speech. 

Furthermore the characterisation of content strata as meaning vs wording seems to conflict with Christian's statement that 'Meaning is construed in the linguistic system as a whole - in the sense that language is a meaning-making system' (p 197). 

Christian argues cogently that cognitive science 'is basically an elaborate variety of a folk model'. But it seems to me that a model of language as 'meaning expressed by wording expressed by sounding' also appears to be an elaboration of a folk model, that contains multiple contradictions.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The defining factor as to whether meaning or wording is projected is whether the projecting figure is one of sensing or saying ('level of projection'), not whether the interdependency relation is paratactic or hypotactic ('mode of projection').  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 443):

Through projection, one clause is set up as the representation of the linguistic “content” of another — either the content of a ‘verbal’ clause of saying or the content of a ‘mental’ clause of sensing. … There are thus two kinds of projections.  On the one hand, the projection may be a representation of the content of a ‘mental’ clause — what is thought; we call such projections ideas.  On the other hand, the projection may be a representation of the content of a ‘verbal’ clause — what is said; we call such projections locutions.  Projection may thus involve either of the two levels of the content plane of language — projection of meaning (ideas) or projection of wording (locutions).

The mode of projection, quoting vs reporting, is concerned with orders of experience, first vs second. For a semantic angle on this, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111).

For the reasons why quoting locutions and reporting ideas are the natural default condition, see Halliday & Matthiessen (ibid.).

[2] The meaning vs wording distinction is one of symbolic abstraction, the organising principle behind the stratification hierarchy.  Meaning in the general sense of language as a meaning-making system refers to semogenesis, not stratification. This is a distinction Rose clearly cannot grasp, since he keeps making the very same mistake over and over again, as demonstrated here here and here on these pages.

[3] Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 599-601) outline an extension of the (evolved) folk model that could be used to enrich the (designed) scientific model.

[4] Any "multiple contradictions" in the stratification hierarchy are least likely to be found by someone who does/will/can not understand the model.

But what's particularly disturbing about Rose's misunderstanding is the utter contempt he obviously has for the intellectual ability of Halliday and Matthiessen, in imagining them to have made such a simple-minded blunder.  As Conan Doyle observed:

Mediocrity knows nothing higher than itself, but talent instantly recognises genius.