David Kellogg On Viewers Of Cave Paintings Not Requiring Language

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 5 Dec 2023, at 00:17:

Implicit in Halliday's last two sentences is either:

a) Prelinguistic infants are not engaged in human semiosis, or.

b) Language exists from birth.

It seems to me that both of these are clearly false.

Instead of Mondrian, consider the attached cave painting. Imagine that the floor of the cave preserves the footprints of the artists who made this mural.

1. The involuntary meaning of the footprints of the artists who made the mural. This seems no different from the meaning that deer tracks convey to a non-human predator. 

2. The intentional meaning of the picture of the herdsmen (hunters?) recording their labor. This seems very different, as it invites (because its intention is to allow) the viewer to "reverse engineer" the story, for amusement or profit. 

3. The strategically placed hand print done in red ochre. This too seems different again: although it resembles 1) in form and 2) in intension, it probably signals authorship and in that sense has a textual as well as an interpersonal function.

None of these seem to me to require the Hallidayan assumption that the viewer possesses language. All of them merely require the Vygotskyan assumption that the object (or "objective") can be inferred from the remains of the object-oriented action.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the last two sentences in the quote (Halliday 2003: 4) were:

All that needs to be said in the present context is that other human semiotics are dependent on the premise that their users also have language. Language is a prerequisite; but there is no need to insist that language can mean it all.

[2] To be clear, neither of these propositions are implicit in the quote, since Halliday's 'present context' is a discussion of human 'post-infancy' semiotic systems.

[3] This is true, as demonstrated by Halliday's extensive work on human protolanguage.

[4] To be clear, the observation of deer tracks by a non-human predator is, according to Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, simply perceptual categorisation on value. No linguistic meaning is involved. The observation of footprints by humans is the construal of experience as the first-order meaning of language.

[5] To be clear, according to comparative mythologist Joseph Campbell, cave paintings are expressions of mythic symbolism, and mythic symbolism is the use of (lexical) metaphor to adapt consciousness to its physical and social environments, which requires that the participants had language — as does the fact that the painting is, at most, only about 13,000 years old.

[6] To be clear, the cave painting is to be found in The Cave Of Hands, in Argentina, and since, according to comparative mythologist Joseph Campbell, such sites were used for male initiation rites in hunter-gatherer societies, the great number of hand images in this cave might be taken to suggest that they identify the initiates in those rituals. Again, this demonstrates that the participants had language.

[7] As the above demonstrates, this is the exact opposite of what is true. All three require that the human participants had language, and the dating of the cave art provides corroborating evidence.

Ed McDonald On The Largely Symbolic Nature Of Linguistic Signs

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 19 Nov 2023, at 14:02:

(3) … Can language be taken as the model / interpretant of all other semiotic systems …

 (McDonald 2013):

[F]rom the point of view of a general semiology, it is the very difficulty of accounting for the largely symbolic, unmotivated nature of linguistic signs that makes a clear understanding of linguistic meaning very hard to attain. At the same time, whether or not we regard language as functioning as the (potential) interpreter of all other semiotic systems, it is undeniable that it tends to be used that way by many semioticians, especially Social Semioticians, very often in the same breath as denying that language has any special status. A refocusing on communication as multimodal may well be being forced on us by developments in communicative technologies, as Machin suggests, but it also represents a long overdue recognition of the importance of embodied semiotics in much human interaction, as Ruthrof shows.… Much multimodal work in the Social Semiotic tradition seems curiously visually-biased, and at the same time largely unproblematically ‘analogising’ concepts from linguistics for the analysis of other semiotic systems, without seemingly feel much need, as Machin notes, to engage with existing scholarship in those areas.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a pair of bare assertions (ipse dixit), each without supporting argument. They are:

[A]: the largely symbolic nature of linguistic signs is difficult to account for.

[B]: [A] makes a clear understanding of linguistic meaning very hard to attain.

With regard to [A], the largely symbolic nature of linguistic signs is accounted for by the fact that it evolved in the species from symbolic protolinguistic signs (phylogenesis) and develops in the individual from symbolic protolinguistic signs (ontogenesis). So the question is, rather, why should protolinguistic signs be largely symbolic? On Halliday's model, the symbolic nature of protolinguistic signs can be understood as motivated by the general functions that protolanguage serves: the personal, interactional, instrumental and regulatory microfunctions.

With regard to [B], this is clearly false, since a clear understanding of linguistic meaning is demonstrated whenever the users of language understand each other's meaning, and a clear theoretical understanding of linguistic meaning is proposed by linguistic theories such as SFL.

[2] To be clear, McDonald provides no evidence in support of his ad hominem attack.

[3] To be clear, SFL Theory explicitly models language as "embodied" semiotics in human interaction. Halliday (2003: 13):

[4] To be clear, written language is also "visually-based".

[5] To be clear, scholarship framed in terms of other theories needs to be reframed in terms of the theory being used. In the immanent view of meaning that SFL Theory takes, there is no ultimate theory of phenomena that can be reached by cherry-picking from different theories. Instead, there are applications of each theory that are either valid or invalid in terms of that theory.

David Rose On Ranks, Axis And Strata In Protolanguage

David Rose replied to John Bateman on Sysfling on 27/8/23 at 7:14:

Not sure about necessity of ranks, since lowest lg ranks have only next stratum to operate in. Morphemes and phonemes aren’t configurations, are they? Protolg is not ranked, which may relate to Jim’s qu about materiality. Which reminds me of his 2010 intro in Making Meaning Matter, which contrasted two interpretations of axis and strata in protolg...

First is Xian following MAKH... “The content-expression organisation of protolanguage is thus simultaneously stratal and axial… The dimensions of stratification and axis are not independently variable at this stage: the content stratum is organised paradigmatically, while the expression stratum is an inventory of indivisible postural or gestural syntagms.” [Matthiessen 2007: 516]

Second is JRM... “As systemicists interested in genesis, should we be proposing a major component of our cartography (i.e. a rank, a metafunction or a stratum) in the absence of a distinctive system of valeur?” [Martin 2010]

Here’s MAKH [2004/2012] on Nigel @ 15 months reinterpreted by me as axis and strata...

Blogger Comments:

[1] Clearly, if this were true, it would be an argument against the necessity of rank in language (morpheme, phoneme). To be clear, rank is one way to model formal constituency, so the lowest rank, by definition, has no constituents. But a syntagm of lowest rank units realises the structural configuration of the higher rank: a syntagm of morphemes realises word structure; a syntagm of phonemes realises syllable structure. Moreover, as a rank unit of lexicogrammar, a morpheme does not "operate in" phonology, since lexicogrammar and phonology are different levels of symbolic abstraction.

[2] To be clear, the reason why rank does not apply to protolanguage is semiotic, not material. Protolanguage has no formal constituency, and so it has nothing to model as a rank scale.

[3] To be clear, Martin's model of protolanguage posits structure where there is none. A structure is the relationships between functional elements, but there is no configuration of functions in protolanguage. Each realisation is an individual and indivisible sound or gesture.

[4] Strictly speaking, these are not syntagms, since a syntagm is a sequence of classes, and the expression stratum of protolanguage involves no sequencing.

[5] To be clear, Martin has himself violated his own principle by proposing "a major component of our cartography", structure, "in the absence of a distinctive system of valeur" that specifies structural configurations.

[6] To be clear, Rose's reinterpretation of Halliday (2004/2012) 

• proposes structure where Halliday says there is none,
• misrepresents expression (an:a, dada) as content, and 
• mistakes the resonance feature 'nasal' for a type of (oral) closure.

David Rose Misunderstanding The Ontogenetic Move From Protolanguage To Language

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 24 August 2023 at 23:10:

The syntagms of infant protolanguage can’t handle multiple functions. The ontogenetic breakthrough comes with coupling of interpersonal with ideational functions. That’s what the syntagms of language have evolved to enable. The infant recapitulates that phylogenesis through interaction with caregivers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents protolanguage. To be clear, infant protolanguage does not have syntagms, since syntagms are sequences of classes of lexicogrammatical form, and protolanguage has no lexicogrammar, and so no lexicogrammatical form (e.g. words), an so no classes of lexicogrammatical form to sequence in syntagms.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. The ontogenetic move from protolanguage to language does not include the coupling of interpersonal and ideational functions in syntagms provided by protolanguage. This is not only because protolanguage does not provide syntagms, but also because all the metafunctions emerge together. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not.

[3] On the one hand, this misunderstands evolution. Properties don't evolve in order to function advantageously in some context (Cause: purpose); they are selected because they function advantageously in some context (Cause: reason).

On the other hand, Rose is taking the opposite perspective on semogenesis from the SFL perspective, viewing it 'from below' in terms of form (syntagm) instead of 'from above' in terms of system and function.

[4] Importantly, ontogenesis does not recapitulate phylogenesis; see Recapitulation Theory. For example, a child learning Modern English does not recapitulate the moves from Old English to Middle English to Modern English. Instead, an ontogenetic trajectory that emerged at an earlier time in phylogenesis is maintained at later times in phylogenesis.

David Rose Endorsing Martin's Misunderstandings Of Protolanguage

David Rose wrote to sys-func and sysfling on 7/8/22 at 16:52:

7. (final) Ed may be thinking of MAKH’s model of protolanguage consisting of content and expression planes (a la Hjelmslev), with grammar ‘emerging’ between them in the transition to mother tongue. Martin 2011 comments...

Again axis is sufficient. The axial model of protolanguage microfunctions is expanded by Painter 2003 as an affect system...

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Ed McDonald had questioned the view that axis is somehow more fundamental than the other dimensions that SFL uses to model language. Because this view is Martin's, Rose has bombarded the sys-func (and sysfling) list with what he falsely believes to be support for Martin's view; see below, and the previous 20+ posts.

[2] To be clear, the Martin (2011) extract seriously misunderstands protolanguage. As Halliday and Painter have demonstrated, protolanguage shows no evidence of structural realisations, so there are no system-structure cycles at all, whether protolanguage is modelled as two strata or one. In protolanguage, content choices are realised by expression choices.

On this basis, Martin's Figure 9 falsely includes structure, and his mono-stratal model misrepresents the stratal realisational relation between the content and expression planes as an axial realisational relation between system and structure.

It can be seen also that Martin fudges his argument for his mono-stratal model by misrepresenting the expression plane of the bi-stratal model as realisation statements instead of systems.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Axis is insufficient to model protolanguage or language in SFL Theory, because it is only one of several dimensions required. Others include stratification, instantiation, metafunction, and delicacy (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32).

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Painter's Figure 7 specifies how content plane features are realised on the expression plane. It does not relate system to structure. That is, the realisation relation is stratal, not axial.

David Rose On The Need For (Discourse) Semantics As A Separate Stratum

David Rose replied to Mick O'Donnell on sys-func on 12/7/22 at 21:36:

Re your earlier comment about ‘the need for Semantics as a separate stratum’... I think that takes us back to two first principles...

One is that features in systems are no more substantial than the probabilities of their realising structures being re-instantiated... more so for more general and less so for more delicate features.

The other is that the content planes of lg and other modalities have evolved to semioticise social relations, for which semiosis is a necessary condition. So the social and semiotic are two sides of the same coin.

The semiotic systems of most species are reproduced genetically. In some species these are augmented by learnt systems, i.e. culturally reproduced.

Lg evolved in humans in tandem with the complexity of our social relations. It required on one hand sufficient flexibility to manage variability in our ancestors’ sociality, and on the other a mechanism for replication fidelity to ensure its reproduction across multiple generations (on the model of genetic reproduction).

The tension between these selection pressures produced a bifurcation in lg’s content plane, still recapitulated in the transition from protolg to mother tongue in infants.

On one hand, LG systems provided the replication fidelity for reproduction over deep time (analogous with the reproductive role of DNA). Their features cement untold millions of re-instantiations, more so at higher ranks. One result is their more general features remain common across lgs (as humans share 85% of our DNA with mice, 60% with insects, and 50% with plants). It is probably also why grammatical systems encode such stable models of experience and exchange.

While stability is essential for cultural reproduction, it is insufficient for negotiating unfolding contingencies in human social relations. That is the task for which DS systems evolved (analogous with the role of RNA in managing intracellular functions).

Both LG and DS systems are necessary for human semiosis on phylogenetic and logogenetic timescales, but their functions are complementary. The fact that we are still trying to model the semantic stratum on what we known of LG systems is, I think, an accident of history. From 2500 years of grammatics, cryptogrammatics has struggled to emerge in the last 80, and DS systems are another order of covert reactances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) identify grammatical metaphor as the primary motivation for a semantic stratum:

If the congruent pattern had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[2] To be clear, features in systems are defined by their relations to other features, and each has a probability of being instantiated, varying for register, and actualised as frequencies in texts.

[3] It is undoubtedly true that semiosis is a necessary condition for semiotising social relations.

[4] To be clear, not all semiotic systems are social semiotic systems, as demonstrated by perceptual semiotic systems, which are somatic, not social. 

[5] This is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. The difficulty here lies in being able to distinguish, in Halliday's terms, systems that involve the exchange of value (social systems) from systems that involve the exchange of symbolic value (semiotic systems).

[6] To be clear, it is language that enabled the enactment of social relations to complexify beyond those of the other chimpanzees.

[7] To be clear, if it were these factors that produced the stratification of the content plane, then they should have done so for all species' protolanguages, not just human protolanguage.

[8] This is a false analogy, since it correlates generality with proportion (%).

[9] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, it misunderstands evolution: systems do not evolve in order to perform tasks (purpose); they evolve because they successfully perform tasks (reason). On the other hand, it is the grammar (MOOD) that construes the semantics (SPEECH FUNCTION) that makes symbolic negotiation possible.

[10] This a false analogy, since RNA is at the same level of abstraction as intra-cellular functions, whereas semantics is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than lexicogrammar.

[11] To be clear, the sense in which semantics and grammar are complementary is as complementary perspectives on the same phenomenon, the content plane of language, varying in terms of symbolic abstraction. With regard to the ideational metafunction, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) write:

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning.

[12] This is misleading. On the one hand, it is the grammar that construes the semantics. On the other, the false implication is that Martin's discourse semantic systems are not 'modelled in terms of what we know of lexicogrammatical systems'. To be clear, Martin's discourse semantic systems derive from non-structural textual grammar (cohesion) and from SPEECH FUNCTION, which is construed by the interpersonal grammar of MOOD and KEY. Evidence here.