Jim Martin Spruiking His Group's Work On Systemic Functional Semiotics

Jim Martin wrote to Sysfling on 25/8/23 at 11:43:

Cute, but let’s not be too cavalier about dismissing work that can reasonably be counted as SFS (such as that noted below). This work is explicit enough and comprehensive enough with respect to a range of semiotic modes that probing questions can be raised (and have been), including…

• Has enough attention been paid to materiality (the ‘etics’ materialising ‘emics’)?
• Has enough attention been paid to ‘constituency’ (ranks and taxis)?
• Has enough attention been paid to the interdependency of systems and their possible correlation with types of structure (re ‘metafunctions’)?
• Has enough attention been paid to stratification (is one stratum being made to do too much work)?
• Has enough attention been paid to instantiation (especially the modelling of abductive inferencing as texts unfold)?

The answer to each of these questions is some degree of “no”; in some cases extant SFL theory makes room for improvement (cf. van Leeuwen on the ‘materiality’ of sound or colour) and in other cases it is sorely lacking (e.g. how to model coupling, commitment and the abductive inferencing highlighted in the dynamic take on discourse semantics propagated by John and his colleagues).

The paper attached from the 2010 UTS ICOM meeting touches on many of the issues raised in this thread:

Multimodal semiotics: theoretical challenges. S Dreyfus, S Hood & M Stenglin [Eds.] Semiotic Margins: meaning in multimodalities. London: Continuum. 2011. 243-270.

images

Kress & van Leeuwen Reading Images

picture books

Painter et al. Reading Visual Narratives

animations

He ‘Towards a stratified metafunctional model of animation’ Semiotica 2021; 239; 1-35

paralanguage

Ngo et al. Modelling paralanguage using SFS

emoji

Zappavigna & Logi Emoji and Social Media Paralanguage (in press CUP)

infographics

Martin & Unsworth Reading Images for Knowledge Building

space

McMurtrie The Semiotics of Movement in Space

math symbolism

Doran The Discourse of Physics

chemistry symbolism

Yu Multimodal Knowledge Building in Secondary School Chemistry Textbooks (forthcoming Bloomsbury)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's concern here is not with whether theory has been understood and consistently applied in such work, but simply with whether the work is explicit and comprehensive enough to ask questions about what else needs to be done. The academic quality of the work is immaterial.

[2] To be clear, coupling and commitment are two of Martin's misunderstandings of SFL Theory. The notion of coupling derives from Martin's misunderstanding of metafunctions and strata as interacting modules (Martin 1992: 390ff). In fact, it merely makes the banal observation that features are selected with other features in instantiation. 

The notion of commitment derives from Martin's misunderstanding of delicacy and instantiation, namely: that speakers can choose the degree of delicacy they traverse in systems during instantiation, with greater delicacy corresponding to greater commitment. In fact, it is only by traversing the entire system to the most delicate features that lexical items can be specified.

[3] To be clear, abductive inferencing is not the best available mode of reasoning:

Abductive reasoning (also called abduction, abductive inference, or retroduction) is a form of logical inference that seeks the simplest and most likely conclusion from a set of observations. It was formulated and advanced by American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce beginning in the last third of the 19th century. Abductive reasoning, unlike deductive reasoning yields a plausible conclusion but does not definitively verify it. Abductive conclusions do not eliminate uncertainty or doubt, which is expressed in retreat terms such as "best available" or "most likely".

In later years his view came to be: 

Abduction is guessing. It is "very little hampered" by rules of logic. Even a well-prepared mind's individual guesses are more frequently wrong than right.

Moreover, abductive reasoning is formally equivalent to a logical fallacy:

Abductive reasoning allows inferring a as an explanation of b. As a result of this inference, abduction allows the precondition a to be abduced from the consequence b. Deductive reasoning and abductive reasoning thus differ in the direction in which a rule like "a entails b" is used for inference. As such, abduction is formally equivalent to the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent (or Post hoc ergo propter hoc) because of multiple possible explanations for b.

[4] Trivially, the papers in this publication are from the 2007 conference at the University of Sydney titled 'Semiotic Margins'. Non-trivially, Martin's paper in this collection includes his classic misunderstanding of Saussure and Hjelmslev. Martin (2011: 245):

To be clear, Saussure's signifié and signifiant correspond to Hjelmslev's content and expression, and it is these that are the focus of linguistics. The relation between these two levels of symbolic abstraction is simply realisation. 

[5] With regard to the work by Martin and his colleagues on paralanguage, see:

• Buyer Beware!
• Martin's Model Of Paralanguage

[6] For a critique of some of the theoretical misunderstandings in these works, see the earlier post Yaegan Doran On The Metafunctions In Mathematical And Chemical Symbolism.

David Rose On The Reluctance To Divorce Language From Consciousness

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 26 Mar 2023, 14:02:

A more general anxiety about relations between language and personhood exists in our own community. …

But SFL would not have progressed without separating out the systems from their uses and users.

One way our anxiety is expressed is a reluctance to divorce language from consciousness. Yet consciousness is a property of individual persons but language systems are a property of communities. They exist before, after and without the individual persons who use them.

By systems we mean both potential and actual – system and text. Instantiation is a relation between texts and systems, irrespective of persons.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday makes a useful distinction between 'person' as a social individual and 'meaner' (language user) as a socio-semiotic individual. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 610):

The human individual is at once a biological "individual", a social "individual" and a socio-semiotic "individual":

as a biological "individual", s/he is an organism, born into a biological population as a member of the human species.

as a social "individual", s/he is a person, bom into a social group as a member of society. "Person" is a complex construct; it can be characterised as a constellation of social roles or personae entering into social networks … .

as a socio-semiotic "individual", s/he is a meaner, born into a meaning group as a member of a speech community. "Meaner" is also a complex construct. 

[2] To be clear, this "progress" in SFL is Martin's confused model of individuation and affiliation (critiqued here). Martin et al (2013):

[3] To be clear, for neuroscientist Edelman (e.g 1992), it is language that distinguishes higher-order consciousness from the primary consciousness that humans share with many other species. For Halliday (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999), the theory of experience that has evolved in language equates the content plane of language with the content of consciousness. Ideationally, consciousness is the interior symbolic processing of sensing, and the exterior symbolic processing of saying, which create content through projection, and interpersonally, consciousness is the self enacted as meaner: as an interactant in exchanges.

[4] To be clear, on the SFL model, the collective nature of language entails that human consciousness is also collective. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

Edelman's interpretation of higher-order consciousness referred to above suggests that this form of consciousness (unlike primary consciousness) is constituted in language. Language is a socio-semiotic system, so it follows that higher-order consciousness is constituted socio-semiotically; and since socio-semiotic systems are collective, it follows that higher-order consciousness must also be collective. Collective consciousness is an attribute of human social groups — the members of a given culture. But we need to distinguish between the consciousness of a social group and the consciousness of a species, whose collective construal of experience is codified in the structure of the brain. All human populations have the same brain, and to that extent all construe experience in the same way. But humans live in social groups, and their local environments vary one from the other; to that extent, different groups construe experience in different ways. The significance of this for us is that language is the resource for both: both what is common to the species as a whole, and what is specific to the given culture. In the way these two components are construed in the grammar, we cannot tell them apart. But it is the role of language in the construction of experience as meaning — as shared activity and collaboratively constructed resource — that gives substance to the concept of collective consciousness as an attribute of the human condition.

Moreover, here Rose even contradicts the models that he is promoting. In Martin's models, a language user (persona) is an individuation of a culture, and their meaning potential (repertoire) is an individuation of the meaning potential of the community (reservoir).

[5] Clearly, languages do not exist without the individual persons who use them, as demonstrated by the phenomenon of 'language death'.

[6] This misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, 'system' refers to potential, and 'text' to the instance of that potential.

[7] This is not misleading, because it is true.

Jim Martin On Process Types

Jim Martin replied to Mick O'Donnell on SYSFLING on 10 Apr 2021 at 08:58:

It would be unusual to have a ‘process type’ which in effect crossclassifies the others:

They allowed us to leave/chat/ask/believe/be/have…

A case would need to be made.

When not involved in what IFG treats as a verbal group complex, these verbs typically take a complement realising a figure (or one of Hao’s activity or semiotic entities):

They allowed the application/petition/objection/extradition/extract…

I have tried to make a case for Tagalog relationals crossclassifying material, verbal and mental processes, most clearly perhaps in this in this paper:

Relational processes in Tagalog: A Systemic Functional perspective. (J.R. Martin & P. Cruz) in K. Rajandran & S.A. Manan (eds.), Systemic Functional Linguistics: South East Asian perspectives. Universiti Sains Malaysia Press. 2019. 225-251.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Martin misunderstands O'Donnell (see previous post). O'Donnell interpreted these types of instances as projection nexuses — clause complexes — not as clause simplexes in which one type of process "cross classifies" another type.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, the Complements of Martin's examples are nominalised processes, and as as such, realise elements not figures. On the other hand, apart from its function in verbal group complexes, and such metaphorical variants, the verb allow typically serves as a verbal Process, as in 

She allowed ['admitted'] that the penalty appeared too harsh for the crime

Bush allowed ['conceded'] that he himself could never support Trump

or a material Process, as in

I'll allow ['allocate'] you just ten minutes.

[3] To be clear, the reason why Martin introduces the irrelevant notion of cross classification here is simply to provide a pretext for promoting his own paper, in which he claims to provide the "case that needs to be made". The function of not clarifying the notion of 'cross classifying process types' is to bamboozle the theoretically naïve.

Jim Martin Misunderstanding SFL Methodology

Jim Martin responded on SYSFLING on 10 Sep 2020 at 12:13 to Ed McDonalds post on modelling music as a semiotic system:

What would music look like if instead of looking ‘notionally’ for kinds of meaning we looked for types of structure (particulate, prosodic and periodic) and worked out the systems behind each type of structure and then asked what their complementary functions were and only then compared music to language or image?

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Martin unwittingly advocates a theoretical approach that is the opposite of the methodology of SFL Theory: giving priority to the view 'from below' (structure and expression) instead of the 'view from above' (system and content). That is, what Martin dismisses as 'notionally' is actually SFL methodology. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49) explain:

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features (for an early statement, see Halliday, 1966a). Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness (agnation, a term introduced into linguistics by Gleason (1965: 199)…

More specific to the methodology itself, Halliday (1985: xiv) outlines the SFL approach, as part of his explanation that SFL does not take a syntactic approach to modelling language:

However, not even the SFL approach will succeed in modelling music as a semiotic system because music is not a semiotic system: the sounds of music do not realise meanings. Of course, music theory and notation are semiotic systems, as are the lyrics that accompany music, but the sounds themselves are not expressions of content. Instead, music activates what the neuroscientist Edelman calls 'value' systems in the brain, which, in turn, with other systems, underlie feelings and emotions. In terms of Halliday's (2002: 388) evolutionary typology of systems, music can be seen as social (value, but not symbolic value), like the pheromonal systems of eusocial insects. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):

A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" …. A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning". Meaning can be thought of (and was thought of by Saussure) as just a kind of social value; but it is value in a significantly different sense — value that is construed symbolically. … Semiotic systems are social systems where value has been further transformed into meaning.

Jim Martin Misrepresenting Cohesion

James Martin wrote to sysfling on 19 Jun 2019, 14:52:

During the 70s Halliday is something of an intellectual, institutional and political refugee, not concentrating on grammar, but turning his attention to cohesion …

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL theory, cohesion is a (non-structural) resource of the textual metafunction on the lexicogrammatical stratum.

The reason why it serves Martin to misrepresent cohesion as a resource distinct from the grammar, as he has at least since Martin (1992: 1), is that his model of discourse semantics takes the model of cohesion from Halliday & Hasan (1976), and removes it from the grammar by rebranding it as his own model of discourse semantics:

1. Martin's IDENTIFICATION is his rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's REFERENCE (confused with ELLIPSIS–&–SUBSTITUTION);
2. Martin's CONJUNCTION/CONNEXION is his rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's CONJUNCTION;
3. Martin's IDEATION is his rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's LEXICAL COHESION.

Moreover, Martin's misunderstandings of his source material serve to differentiate his model from Halliday & Hasan's, creating the false impression of genuine theoretical originality.  Evidence here.

Jim Martin On 'In Particular'

After Annabelle Lukin wrote to sys-func and sysfling on 16 Nov 2018 at 09:06:

Can anyone help me out? …

8(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.

… What kind of Adjunct is "in particular"??

Jim Martin responded on sysfling on 16 Nov 2018 at 19:19:

How about appraisal:graduation:focus:sharpen... as part of a paradigm:

in particular when
particularly when
just when
only when
when

• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes particularly when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.

The linking conjunction when would then need to be expanded as a hypotactic complex... beta (in particular) alpha (when)

Blogger Comment:

[1] The reason why the conjunctive Adjunct in particular does not realise 'appraisal: graduation: focus: sharpen' is that, in this instance, there is no appraisal to 'graduate: focus: sharpen'.  For many more of Martin's misunderstandings of Appraisal Theory, see here.

(On the other hand, Martin (1992: 211) rebrands the conjunctive function of in particular as comparative: similarity: reformulation: rework: generality: local: particularise.)

[2] The reason why in particular does not modify when is that in particular — like a conjunctive Adjunct (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 158), but unlike a modifier in a conjunction group (not a hypotactic complex) — can be postponed to the end of the clause as an Afterthought:

The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes — when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, in particular.

See also analysis here. 

Jim Martin Strategically Confusing 'Polemic' With 'Critique'

Jim Martin wrote to sys-func on 9 May 2018 at 12:58:

“Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that we can recognize the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored, or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passions, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissable [sic] attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn't dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgement and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests, against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated or either surrenders or disappears.

Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theatre. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemnations, battles, victories, and defeats are no more than ways of speaking, after all. And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting, which are not without consequence. There are the sterilizing effects: Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited, not to advance, not to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the affirmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics wars, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one's killer instinct as possible. But it is really dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to truth by such paths, and thus to validate, even if in merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let is imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn't even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debates in the USSR over linguistics and genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all: they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended.” [Foucault in Rabinow [Ed.] 1984: 382-383]

Rabinow, P 1984 The Foucault Reader. Penguin.

We could perhaps rephrase Foucault’s question about the productivity of critique…

‘What productive developments in SFL theory, description and/or practice have arisen from the critiques noted in the list discussion?’

And further, how might we weigh the value of these against the costs?

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously noted here, this quote from Foucault is a polemic against polemics, made without a trace of self-irony.  (Martin previously posted the quote to the Sysfling list on 8 January 2016.)

[2] Here Martin misleads by strategically confusing polemic with critique.

[3] To be clear, the productivity of critiques of SFL theory depends on two general factors:

• the validity of the critiques themselves, and
• the willingness of academics to read, recognise and act on valid critiques.

[4] To be clear, the discussion of critiques of SFL occurred on the international list, Sysfling.  Here Martin has chosen instead to raise the issue on his local list, Sys-func.

[5] To be clear, valid critiques are essential for the development of any theory and the descriptions and practices it affords.  The more crucial question is: what is the cost of the absence of valid critiques to a theory and the descriptions and practices it affords.  What suffers?  Who benefits?

To kill an error is as good a service as, 

and sometimes even better than, 

the establishing of a new truth or fact.

— Charles Darwin

To free a person from error is to give, 

and not to take away.

— Arthur Schopenhauer

It is error only, 

and not truth, 

that shrinks from inquiry.

— Thomas Paine

Jim Martin On Lexical Density And "Reference"

Jim Martin wrote to sysfling on 12 March 2018 at 16:04:

The proportion of generic to specific reference as far as participant tracking is concerned is relevant, since with generic reference identity chains re-initiate more often, pushing up lexical density; I’m not sure, never having counted, but where the generic reference involves technical terms, this may push up the repetition and lexical density even further. 

Also, I don’t think the stylistic prescriptive taboo in English against repetition of lexical items holds for specialised or technical terms. 

In terms of mode, it is more sensitive to measure lexical density per ranking clause, rather than depend on context/function work ratios.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the distinction between generic and specific reference is not a distinction in the cohesive system of reference. It is Martin's (1992: 103-10) invention only, and forms a system within his IDENTIFICATION network. Martin's system of identification is his rebranding of Halliday's system of cohesive reference, which he misunderstands and relocates from (non-structural) lexicogrammar to (structural) discourse semantics. Martin's misunderstandings in this regard are identified in explanatory detail here.

In short, Martin confuses the textual system of referring with the experiential meanings of the referred to, the referents, as shown by the (unstructured) unit of this system, the participant.  This confusion also shows up in the distinction between generic and specific reference, where what is presented as a distinction of reference is actually a distinction in the referents.  Martin (1992: 103):

Generic reference is selected when the whole of some experiential class of participants is at stake rather than a specific manifestation of that class.

[2] Martin's 'participant tracking' derives from the notion of participant identification — introduced by the Hartford stratificationalists (Martin 1992: 95).  It is Martin's attempt to integrate their ideas with Halliday's notion of cohesive reference that leads to the confusion of the reference with the referent in Martin's model.  Martin's IDENTIFICATION is concerned with chains of instantial participants, and this naturally leads to confusion between reference chains of participants and lexical strings (documented here), the latter derived from Martin's misunderstandings of Halliday's lexical cohesion (as demonstrated here).

[3] This is a bare assertion, unsupported by argument or data.  The claim is that chains of a class of participant (e.g. 'human') restart in a text more often than chains of a specific manifestation of a class (e.g. 'Donald Trump').  Readers are invited to test this claim for themselves.

[4] This is another bare assertion, unsupported by argument or data.  The claim is that the more often reference chains restart, the higher the lexical density.  It can be seen that the former does not necessarily entail the latter, since the number of lexical items per clause can be entirely independent of how often a chain of participants restarts.

More to the point, the critical factor in increasing lexical density is ideational metaphor.  Halliday (2008: 163):

This [ideational metaphor] is a designed, or at least semi-designed, extension of the “experiential” way of looking at phenomena. It suits the “crystalline”, written mode of being; and in particular, as already said, it suits the elaborated discourses of organised knowledge, because it is good to think with — it enables you to build well-ordered conceptual structures and to spin tangled skeins of reasoning. High lexical density is the price to be paid.

[5] This is speculation based on a non-sequitur.  See [4].

[6] This is another bare assertion, unsupported by argument or data.

[7] To be clear, Martin misconstrues mode as a dimension of register, rather than a dimension of context that is realised in texts, registers and language as a whole (the cline of instantiation).

[8] This is a false dichotomy.  Lexical density is a measure of the number of lexical items per ranking clause, and nothing else.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 727):

To measure lexical density, simply divide the number of lexical items by the number of ranking clauses.

Jim Martin On ‘Subjunctive’

Jim Martin wrote to sysfling on 9 March 2018 at 09:05:

Some queries for those of you introducing the term ‘subjunctive’. 

Are you referring to a word class, a group class or a clause class? 

If a word class, which group class is it realising; if a group class, which clause class is it realising; if a clause class, are there relevant clause complex relations to consider? 

In each case, what is the relevant valeur, specified in terms of the entry condition to the relevant system and agnate features? And what is the realisation of the feature ‘subjunctive’? 

Then, reasoning from above, what is the discourse semantic system that the ‘subjunctive’ class is realising? Are we talking about appraisal engagement [heterogloss: expand: entertain] options? And/or are we talking about connexion [cause: contingency: condition] relations?

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the architecture of SFL theory.  In accordance with the principles of SFL theory, the term 'subjunctive' does not refer to a class of word (noun, verb etc.), nor to a class of group (nominal, verbal etc.), nor to a class of clause (adverbial etc.).  The term 'subjunctive' is a potential feature in systems whose entry conditions are the rank of word, group or clause.  Martin's focus here on classes of form, rather than functional features, takes a formal perspective, not a functional perspective.

[2] This misunderstands the architecture of SFL theory.  The relation between word, group and clause is not realisation, but composition: a clause is composed of groups/phrases, a group/phrase is composed of words.  With regard to the rank scale, realisation is the relation between function and form, as where an element of the function structure at clause rank, such as Process, is realised by a unit (simplex or complex) of the rank below, such as verbal group.

[3] According to Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 143n), in Modern English, the subjunctive tends to be restricted to the dependent clause of a hypotactic nexus of condition or projection:

Many languages also have an interpersonal system of the verb(al group) that has been referred to as ‘mood’: it involves interpersonal contrasts such as indicative/subjunctive, indicative/subjunctive/optative. To distinguish these verbal contrasts from the clausal system of MOOD, we can refer to them as contrasts in mode. The subjunctive mode tends to be restricted to the environment of bound clauses — in particular, reported clauses and conditional clauses having the sense of irrealis. In Modern English, the subjunctive mode of the verb is marginal, although there is some dialectal variation.

[4]  On the basis of Halliday & Matthiessen's characterisation, the relevant system is an interpersonal system termed MODE with the features indicative vs subjunctive.  The entry condition includes 'verb' at the rank of word, and the feature 'subjunctive' is realised by a reduced set of forms, relative to the indicative.

[5] On the basis of Halliday & Matthiessen's characterisation, the grammatical feature 'subjunctive' realises the semantic feature 'irrealis'.

[6] The stratum of discourse semantics is Martin's invention only.  As demonstrated in great detail here, it is theorised on fatal misunderstandings of SFL theory, with the result that it is inconsistent with SFL theory — as well as being inconsistent with itself.

[7] For some of the misunderstandings of the feature 'heterogloss' in the appraisal system of ENGAGEMENT in Working With Discourse (Martin & Rose 2007), see the explanatory critiques here.

[8] By 'connexion', Martin means his logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION, which is his rebranding of Halliday's conjunctive cohesion, misunderstood, relocated from grammar to discourse semantics, and applied inconsistently to both logical structures and non-structural textual relations alike, as demonstrated in great detail here.

Jim Martin On Appraisal Theory Not Being A Theory

Martin (2017: 22):

In late 2012 I was approached by a very concerned research student who reported that some people were saying ‘Appraisal Theory’ wasn’t a theory at all, but just a description. To which I replied: “Yes, of course. That’s right. Systemic Functional Linguistics (hereafter SFL) is the theory. APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English”.

[Martin (2017) The Discourse Semantics of Attitudinal Relations: Continuing the Study of Lexis, Russian Journal of Linguistics, vol. 21, No 1, 22-47]

Blogger Comments:

A. Martin's argument can be broken down to two exchanges:

An anonymous student's report of anonymous others: 'Appraisal Theory' isn't a theory…
Martin: Systemic Functional Linguistics is the theory. 

An anonymous student's report of anonymous others: 'Appraisal Theory' isn't a theory…
Martin: APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English..

Notice firstly that 'cause: reason' is entirely absent, both explicitly and implicitly, from both exchanges.  That is, neither exchange constitutes a reasoned argument.

Notice secondly that there are no explicit logico-semantic relations between Martin's replies and the anonymous claim.  That is, the reader is left to supply the implicit logico-semantic relation in both exchanges.

Notice thirdly that the implicit logico-semantic relation, in both cases, is 'extension: variation: replacive' (not X but Y).  That is, in both exchanges, Martin merely replaces one assertion with another.

In short, Martin has merely pontificated an opinion, unsupported by reasoning, and has disguised the lack of reasoning by leaving the logico-semantic relations implicit.

B. More shortcomings become evident, if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the implicit logico-semantic relation in both cases is one of 'cause: reason'.  This can be demonstrated by making the causal relation both explicit and structural:

1. 'Appraisal Theory' isn't a theory [because] Systemic Functional Linguistics is the theory.
2. 'Appraisal Theory' isn't a theory [because] APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English.

The two reasons attributed to Martin for the exclusion of 'Appraisal Theory' from the set of theories can be considered in turn.

The argument in (1) is that because Systemic Functional Linguistics is the theory, 'Appraisal Theory' is not a theory.  It can be seen that the one does not logically entail the other since, even if Systemic Functional Linguistics is the theory, it does not logically exclude the possibility that 'Appraisal Theory' is a theory.  Such matters depend on how 'theory' is defined, and Martin provides no definition of the term, thereby providing no opportunity for its negotiation.

Incidentally, the strategic use of the here also plays a rôle, given its function; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 367):

The word the is a specific, determinative Deictic of a peculiar kind: it means ‘the subset in question is identifiable; but this will not tell you how to identify it – the information is somewhere around, where you can recover it’. … Hence the is usually accompanied by some other element that supplies the information required … . If there is no such information supplied, the subset in question will either be obvious from the situation, or else will have been referred to already in the discourse …

The argument in (2) is that because APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English, 'Appraisal Theory' is not a theory.  Again, it can be seen that the one does not logically entail the other, since even if APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English, it does not logically exclude the possibility that 'Appraisal Theory' is also a theory.  Again, such matters depend on how 'theory' is defined, and Martin provides no definition of the term, thereby providing no opportunity for its negotiation.

Two questions that might occur to any discourse analyst capable of critical thinking are:

1. What is at stake for Martin?
2. Why would he want his readers to believe that Appraisal Theory is not a theory?

Jim Martin Inventing A New Tense

Jim Martin wrote to sysfling on 22 March 2017 at 07:03 and 08:51:

Here's one though that Halliday's [tense] system doesn't cope with:

if I had have done it

Blogger Comment:

Ignoring the if makes it clear that this is simply an instance of someone misinterpreting

I'd have done it

as

I had have done it 

instead of

I would have done it

The tense system provides the means of interpreting such instances — this one would be: "past-in-present-in-past" — and thus, the means of understanding why they are anomalous, and thus, why they are unlikely to scale the cline of instantiation and find a place in the general system of potential.

Googling 'had have' will demonstrate the infrequency of such instances.

For the discourse semantics of verbal groups (Martin 1992), see here, here and here.

Jim Martin On Phrasal Verbs As Behavioural

Jim Martin wrote on 30 October 2014 to sysfling:

My rule of thumb, when worrying if a phrasal verb is behavioural or mental/verbal, is that it is behavioural.

Blogger Comment:

As a caveat to this rule of thumb, it's worth noting some of the phrasal verbs that commonly serve as mental (or verbal) processes:

• figure out
• find out
• get over
• give away
• hold onto
• look forward to
• look into
• look up
• look up to
• make up
• mix up
• put up with
• sort out

Sample clauses featuring these verbs can be viewed here.
An alphabetical list of more than 1,000 phrasal verbs can be found here.

Jim Martin On Behavioural & Verbal Processes

Jim Martin wrote 30 October 2014 to sys-func & sysfling:

It is hard to get beyond notional reasoning here. 

One possibility is to try to restrict the behavioural category to 'embodied physical' manifestations of mental or verbal processing, giving minimal pairs such as look/see, listen/hear, smile/like, shudder/fear, ponder/think… etc. This would seem to fit with what Mick reports from Thompson below, and with a suggestion in the Deploying Functional Grammar workbook. 

As a reactance, although in general behaviourals don't project (better to say 'don't report'), and this helps distinguish them from mentals and verbals, many can quote, in 'narrative' discourse, especially when following a quoted locution or idea… to describe the manner in which something is said or thought.

'I better get out of her', he shuddered.
'I think so', she smiled.
'You're wrong', they accused. 

But not:

*'They've arrived', he listened.
*'She's responsible', they gossiped. 

The 'accused' example above raises the classification of clauses of judgement as verbals in IFG (with a Target function) even though they take present in present tense and can't report.

I'm accusing you of forgetting.

Not

*I accuse you that you forgot.

Another issue.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6) provide some useful grammatical reactances of behavioural processes which can be viewed here.

[2] "To restrict the behavioural category to 'embodied physical' manifestations of mental or verbal processing" would ignore the fact that the processes of physiological behaviours pattern grammatically like the processes of psychological behaviours; eg the Medium is endowed with consciousness, as in mental clauses, but the unmarked present tense is 'present-in-present', as in material clauses, and the Range is restricted to behaviours, unlike the Range in material clauses.

[3] The treatment of behavioural processes in Deploying Functional Grammar is problematic, as argued here.

[4] In such cases of quoting, the effect is to attach a behavioural feature to a verbal or mental process.  That such cases are verbal or mental, and not behavioural, is shown by the unmarked present tense, the simple present — the same as verbal and mental — in contradistinction to behavioural and material processes; eg

'I don't understand' he frowns.

not

'I don't understand' he is frowning. 

[5] 'She's responsible', they gossiped seems fine enough, especially with the tonic on she's (or with the more obviously judgemental irresponsible as Attribute).

[6] If we consider a less unlikely clause, we see that the unmarked present tense for these targeting verbal processes is indeed the simple present, like other verbal processes:

you flatter/insult me

not the present-in-present of behavioural processes:

you are flattering/insulting me

[7] Projection is not a prerequisite for verbal clauses, any more than it is for mental clauses (emotion, perception).  The verbal clauses that take a Target are those in which the order of saying is activity, rather than semiosis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 302), which locates them topologically nearer the behavioural (and material) processes.

David Rose On What Counts As Grammar And What Counts As Discourse Semantics

At 09:33 on 9/5/14, Margaret Berry asked David Rose on sys-func:

how do you decide what counts as grammar and what counts as discourse semantics?

To which David Rose replied at 09:37:

What a great question! And what counts as discourse semantics or register?

and later at 12:50:

Technically, entry conditions for grammatical systems must be a grammatical rank.

Blogger Comments:

[1] It's an obvious and fundamental question, and one that should yield a ready answer, since it would have formed the basis of theorising discourse semantics as a stratum of language; yet Rose gives the impression, through his initial exclamation and ultimate inability to answer the question, of never having considered it before.

Since Martin (1992) proposes discourse semantics as a stratum above lexicogrammar on the content plane, and strata represent levels of symbolic abstraction, "what counts as discourse semantics" is linguistic content that is more symbolically abstract than "what counts as lexicogrammar".  Because the relation between strata is one of realisation, "what counts as discourse semantics" is realised by "what counts as lexicogrammar", and "what counts as lexicogrammar" realises "what counts as discourse semantics".

This means that the systems of each stratum have to be accounted for with respect to those of the other.  This includes specifying congruent lexicogrammatical realisations of discourse semantic features and distinguishing them from metaphorical realisations.

It also means that relations between grammatical units, such as clauses, need to be first specified at that level of abstraction, that is: lexicogrammar, and such relations then be related to the discourse semantic features they realise.  It is not sufficient to model the relations between clauses only at the level discourse semantics.

[2] What counts as discourse semantics or register only becomes problematic when register, a functional variety of language, is misconstrued as a stratum of context above semantics (Martin 1992), and thus, misconstrued as being more symbolically abstract than semantics (as argued elsewhere on this site).  The problem is further compounded by misconstruing context as language — Martin's register and genre — instead of as a semiotic system that is realised in language (as argued elsewhere on this site).  One potential pitfall of this latter misconstrual is that discourse analysts, in dealing with texts, run the risk of confusing field and tenor, the ideational and interpersonal dimensions of the situational context, with the ideational and interpersonal meanings of the text itself.  This confusion is one source of Rose's difficulty of distinguishing "what counts as discourse semantics" from "what counts as register".

[3] This raises the issue of entry conditions for discourse semantic systems.  It is a theoretical requirement that the entry conditions for all systems be specified.

Martin’s Cline Of Instantiation Applied To Martin’s Stratification

Martin's stratification: 

genre, register, discourse semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology

Martin's cline of instantiation: 

system, genre/register, text type, text, reading.

On this model,

(A)

(1) genre is simultaneously more abstract than register (in terms of stratification), and a sub-potential of register (in terms of the latter stratum's instantiation) — which is logically incoherent;

(2) register is simultaneously more abstract than discourse semantics (in terms of stratification) and a sub-potential of discourse semantics (in terms of the latter stratum's instantiation) — which is logically incoherent;

(B)

(1) genre is simultaneously a stratal system and a sub-potential of itself (in terms of that stratum's instantiation) — which is logically incoherent;

(2) register is simultaneously a stratal system and a sub-potential of itself (in terms of that stratum's instantiation) — which is logically incoherent;

etc …

Halliday & Matthiessen On Martin's Theme, Method Of Development And Field

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 407):

Thematic spaces in an ideational semantic network can be seen as a model of the systemic understanding of Theme and method of development articulated by Martin, where [Martin’s] “field” corresponds to what has been discussed here in terms of ideational semantic networks in the ideation base.

That is:

(1) Halliday & Matthiessen's thematic spaces in an ideational semantic network

is a systemic understanding of

Martin's Theme and method of development

(2) Halliday & Matthiessen's ideational semantics

corresponds to

Martin's field

Halliday & Matthiessen On Martin's Transitivity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 504): 

As we have already noted, Martin, in his systemic treatment of processes in Tagalog, offers a different interpretation of nuclear transitivity: he defines it in terms of orientation, rather than configuration, and hence operates with a significantly different concept of participant function.

Two Reasons Why Halliday’s And Martin’s Models Of Stratification Cannot Be Integrated

1) They do not mean the same thing by ‘register’.

For Halliday, ‘register’ means a functional variety of language (with roots back to the Prague School and Firth).

Martin, on the other hand, equates ‘register’ with Halliday’s ‘context’, which removes the notion of register as a functional variety of language from the model. This is because a higher stratum is not a functional variety of a lower stratum; eg lexicogrammar is not a functional variety of phonology.

2) They do not mean the same thing by ‘context’.

For Halliday, ‘context’ is

• what people do with language (H&M 1999: ix),
• the ‘semiotic environment’ of language (p375),
• the “culture”, considered as a semiotic potential (p606).

Halliday’s ‘context’ is a level of abstraction that is realised by language.

Martin, on the other hand, in describing his model of stratification writes (1992: 496):

… the size of the circles also reflects the fact that the analysis tends to focus on larger units as one moves from phonology to ideology.  Thus the tendency at the level of phonology to focus on syllables and phonemes, at the level of lexicogrammar to focus on the clause, at the level of discourse semantics to focus on an exchange or "paragraph", at the level of register to focus on a stage in a transaction, at the level of genre to focus on whole texts …

As this quote makes clear, Martin’s ‘context’ refers to levels within language, since 'a stage in a transaction' and 'whole texts' are units of language.

Halliday & Matthiessen On Martin's Register

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 27n):

Here the term ‘register’ thus refers to a functional variety of language. It has also been used in a related, but different way, to refer to the contextual values associated with such a functional variety (see Martin, 1992; cf Matthiessen 1993).

Martin's Claim That All Strata Make Meaning

Grammatically, this is an abstract creative material clause.

All strata : Actor
make : Process: material: creative
meaning : Goal

It is consistent with the notion of 'semogenesis': the creation of meaning.

On the other hand, an attributive reading, such as 'All strata have meaning' is not consistent with either 'semogenesis' or the dimension of stratification.

Meaning is not an attribute of every stratum.

Meaning is but one stratum in the levels of symbolic abstraction.

Wording [lexicogrammar] realises meaning [semantics].

Sounding [phonology] realises the realisation of meaning [semantics] in wording [lexicogrammar].