David Rose Explaining 'Mere' By Coupling

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 8 Sept 2024, at 11:15:

Can I suggest we think in terms of coupling? 

...first of lexical items – e.g. attitudinal mere with a target entity such as housemaid, construing a value in a field, such as a person’s occupational status. 

...secondly of lexical choices with grammatical functions. Given that attitude is expressed prosodically through structures such as nom gps – how does the choice of gram function adjust the meaning?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'coupling' is merely Martin's term for grouping any selections.

[2] To be clear, this coupling of lexical items is merely taking a lexical perspective on APPRAISAL:

Under the [APPRECIATION] subcategory of `social value', the object, product or process is evaluated according to various social conventions. This domain is very closely tied to field in that the social valuation of one field will not be applicable or relevant in another.

[3] Trivially, 'entity' is not a type of lexical item, but a semantic category, and attitudes are interpersonal, and so enact (social relations as meaning); it is ideational systems that construe (experience as meaning).

[4] To be clear, the choice of lexical item adds different lexical (more delicate) features to a grammatical function, such as Epithet vs post-Deictic. Meaning is realised by all the lexicogrammatical features, from the most general (grammatical) to the most delicate (lexical).

David Rose Misconstruing 'Mere' As A Judgement Of Capacity

David Rose replied to Beatriz Quiroz Olivares on 7 Sept 2024, at 11:32:

Your questions always demand a bit of SF rigor. Quite right about the word class... I was blinded from above... manner degree so adverb... but mere/merely : adjective/adverb. …

And you’re right about gradability... in this context is it a judgement of capacity? Construing a series... a lowly scullery maid – mere housemaid – capable housekeeper

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the topic sentence ("hyper-Theme"), with 'rigour' being Rose's evaluation of what follows.

[2] To be clear, the meaning of 'mere(ly)' is interpersonal (counter-expectancy: limiting), not experiential (manner: degree). For example, in he merely said it wasn't cooked properly, the Adjunct merely is not circumstantial: it does not qualify the manner in which he said it.

[3] Clearly, 'a mere housemaid' is not a judgement of the capacity of a servant. Mere housemaids may be more capable or less capable. In terms of APPRAISAL, it might be seen as a negative appreciation of the status of 'housemaid' in terms of social value:

But the fact that I’d sort of gone from that status position down to merely a housemaid, you know? 

Mick O'Donnell On The Differences In Martin's Model

Mick O'Donnell replied to Attia Rasool on Sysling on 16/9/23 at 19:39:

My take on the differences in Martin's model:

1. What Halliday called "context of situation" was renamed as "Register" in the Martin approach. In the Halliday model, a register is "a variety of language, corresponding to a variety of situation", so is basically the language pattern appropriate to a context of situation. Martin lifted the term up to apply to the situation, not to the language used in the situation.

2. Martin and others (Rothery, Christie, etc.) added in a level of Genre above context of situation. As Annabelle said, this change was never adopted by Halliday, Hasan, and their followers. But it has proved popular in the area of Language Education, where it has proved useful to have individual genres existing as names in the theory, while in Halliday's approach, what a genre exists as a set of contextual features scattered across Field, Tenor and Mode (except since Matthiessen 2015 where terms like expounding, reporting, recreating, etc. are covered under Field).

3. Halliday's "Semantic" stratum is largely (but not entirely) a level of meaningful abstraction over the clause (or clause complex). Martin's "Discourse Semantics" has been described as "grammar above the clause", e.g., capturing patterns which don't respect the borders of clauses, e.g., reference, evaluation, logical relations, exchange, etc. Neither characterisation is totally true, but there is definitely a difference in orientation here. And certainly Hasan's work explored deeply patterns outside the clause (she introduced the notion of cohesion, cohesive harmony, schematic structure etc.)

4. Semantics was not highly specified by Halliday himself, and those who followed have proposed different components to the semantics. Most share some kind of Experiential and Logical semantics, and Speech Function as part of an Exchange semantics, some form of Thematic Progression, and Cohesion resources. The nature of these descriptions varies though, Hasan's "message semantics" takes a different turn that Eggin's (in the Martin camp) speech function network. And approaches to cohesive resources, while a common base in Hasan's work, varies in the way it is applied. Martin's model adds in other areas of semantics, e.g., Martin and White added in attitudinal, engagement and graduation models (part of Appraisal). And other components as well.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin (1992) rebranded Halliday's context — from potential to instance — as register. Context of situation is merely an instance of context. Despite modelling register as context instead of language, an instance of Martin's register is nevertheless an instance of language: a text. This inconsistency is exacerbated by Martin's acknowledgement that instantiation does not cross stratal boundaries (such as from context to the strata of language.

[2] To be clear, in Halliday's model, register is a subpotential of language, a point of variation at the midway point on the cline of instantiation between potential and instance. As such, it realises context at a point of variation at the midway point on the cline of instantiation between potential and instance: a situation type. Because situation is an instance of context, it is realised by an instance of language: text, not register.

[3] To be clear, this is a serious misunderstanding of the stratification of levels of symbolic abstraction. Locating genres, as text types, above context is misconstruing varieties of language as not being language and as more abstract than culture.

[4] To be clear, Martin's notion of genre is unwittingly scattered over various dimensions of SFL theory. As text type, genre is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. The types of genre are categories within rhetorical mode, context, and the stages of genres are semantic structures of text types.

[5] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) outline the explanatory advantages that motivate modelling semantics at a low level of abstraction above the grammar:

But in modelling the semantic system we face a choice: namely, how far "above" the grammar we should try to push it. Since the decision has to be made with reference to the grammar, this is equivalent to asking how abstract the theoretical constructs are going to be. We have chosen to locate ourselves at a low point on the scale of abstraction, keeping the semantics and the grammar always within hailing distance. There were various reasons for this.  

First, we wanted to show the grammar at work in construing experience; since we are proposing this as an alternative to cognitive theories, with an "ideation base" rather than a "knowledge base", we need to posit categories such that their construal in the lexicogrammar is explicit.  

Secondly, we wanted to present the grammar as "natural", not arbitrary; this is an essential aspect of the evolution of language from a primary semiotic such as that of human infants.  

Thirdly, we wanted to explain the vast expansion of the meaning potential that takes place through grammatical metaphor; this depends on the initial congruence between grammatical and semantic categories.

But in any case, it is not really possible to produce a more abstract model of semantics until the less abstract model has been developed first. One has to be able to renew connection with the grammar.

[6] To be clear, "patterns which don't respect the borders of clauses" are modelled in terms of cohesion in SFL Theory (Halliday & Hasan 1976). Martin (1992) rebranded these lexicogrammatical systems as his discourse semantic systems, rebranding reference and ellipsis-&-substitution as identification, lexical cohesion as ideation, and cohesive conjunction as conjunction (later connexion).

[7] To be clear, reference, evaluation, logical relations and exchange are all Halliday, not Martin. But see [10] below.

[8] This is misleading because it is untrue. See, for example, the 618-pages of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999). 

[9] This is potentially misleading, since speech function is Halliday, not Martin.

[10] The systems of APPRAISAL differ from all the other discourse semantic systems in that they were developed through the collective efforts of Martin's colleagues and PhD students, with a first, early version of the key subsystem of ATTITUDE set out in 1994 by Iedema, Feez and White in their monograph, Media Literacy. Martin is possibly often regarded as the founder of the theory on the basis of references he made to APPRAISAL in a 1997 paper ("Analysing Genre: Functional Parameters") and/or his fuller treatment in his 2000 paper ""Beyond Exchange: Appraisal Systems in English". (The 1997 chapter presented an account of the sub-system of APPRECIATION, which was also developed through collaboration, most notably through Rothery's work on visual arts education.) However, key elements of what is now the widely referenced version of the theory were first presented in White's 1998 PhD thesis and then in White's 2002 paper, "The Language of Evaluation and Stance" (Handbook of Pragmatics.)". The version of the theory now most widely deployed in textual analysis was outlined in Martin and White's 2005 The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English. It includes accounts of the following sub-systems: AFFECT (drawing on earlier work by Martin), JUDGEMENT (collaboration by Martin, Iedema, Feez and White), APPRECIATION (collaboration by Martin and Rothery), ENGAGEMENT (from White's 1998 PhD thesis), GRADUATION (White and Martin collaboration).

David Rose Misunderstanding Axis And Realisation (Inter Alia)

David Rose replied to Brad Smith on Sysfling on 23 August 2023 at 15:47 and 16:26:

I used realisation below as the interstratal relation. Axis is the feature/structure relation in systems (which is also confusingly called realisation). Both are abstraction (token/value) relations. Axis is a one-to-one relation between a feature (value) and a structure (token). It also implies the generalisation of a system, because it is a contrast between structures that realises a contrast between features (not individual structures).

It is that coupling of generalisation with abstraction that lies at the heart of semiosis, and hence of SFS theory.

Interstratal relations are not one-to-one. Hence tone choices can be coupled with various mood choices to realise variations in appraisal, //4 don’t you know//. …

Oh sorry Brad, how rude of me.

I meant to say, //5 don't you/know//

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here again Rose misunderstands axis. Axis is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic, whereas system is the dimension of the paradigmatic order of axis. Systems include realisation statements attached to features which specify structural realisations, but that is not 'axis'.

[2] To be clear, realisation is the relation between different levels of symbolic abstraction, and so it applies wherever that relation obtains: between system and structure, between strata, between function and form. It does not obtain between a feature and a structure, since a feature is not realised by a structure. Instead, a system (of a clause) is realised by a structure (of a clause). Importantly, a structure is not a functional element, but the relationships between such elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451): 

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

[3] To be clear this argument rests on an invalid premiss:

Premiss: Axis is a contrast between structures that realises a contrast between features

Conclusion: Axis implies a generalisation of a system

The premiss is invalid because this is not what axis is (see [1]). Moreover, a contrast in features is not realised by a contrast in structure. For example, the contrast between the POLARITY features positive and negative is not realised by a contrast in structure, since both are realised by the element Finite in the same structural configuration, e.g. Subject^Finite^Predicator.

[4] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 618) write:

The developmental dynamic of "generalisation — abstractness — metaphor" provides the semiotic energy for the grammar, enabling it to serve as the powerhouse for construing experience in the form of scientific knowledge.

But this bears no relation to Rose's use of the terms generalisation and abstraction. For example (op. cit.: 615):

This principle of generalisation — that is, naming general classes rather than specific individuals — is what makes it possible to construct an ideation base. …

General terms are not necessarily abstract; a bird is no more abstract than a pigeon. But some words have referents that are purely abstract — words like cost and clue and habit and tend and strange; they are construing some aspect of our experience, but there is no concrete thing or process with which they can be identified.

[5] This is misleading. To be clear, in the absence of grammatical metaphor, semantics and lexicogrammar are in agreement (congruent):

• a statement (semantics) is realised by a declarative clause (lexicogrammar);
• a question (semantics) is realised by an interrogative clause (lexicogrammar);
• a command (semantics) is realised by an imperative clause (lexicogrammar);
• an elaborating sequence (semantics) is realised by an elaborating clause complex (lexicogrammar);
• a relational figure (semantics) is realised by a relational clause (lexicogrammar);
• an element (semantics) is realised by a group or phrase (lexicogrammar).

[6] This is potentially misleading. The phonological system of TONE realises the grammatical system of KEY.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 168):

The tones are not, however, simply additional markers attached to the realisation of mood. They realise distinct grammatical systems of their own, which are associated with the mood categories. The general name for systems that are realised by tone is KEY. The term KEY covers a number of systems …

(1) declarative clauses

unmarked statement: tone 1

reserved statement: tone 4

insistent statement: tone 5

tentative statement: tone 3

protesting statement: tone 2

(2) WH- interrogative clauses

unmarked WH- question: tone 1

tentative question: tone 2

echo question: tone 2 with tonic on WH- element

(3) yes/no interrogative clauses

unmarked yes/no question: tone 2

peremptory question: tone 1

(4) imperative clauses

command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)

invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)

request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t

plea: tone 4

[7] Note that tones 4 and 5 are not used with yes/no interrogative clauses. Since Rose's question is peremptory, it would be realised by tone 1 if spoken. 

Mick O'Donnell On The Appraisal In A Metaphorical Clause

Michael O'Donnell wrote to the lang-eval list on 13 Jan 2023, at 01:32:

'the bright sunlight gave a false impression of warmth'

The sunlight is being metaphorically construed as a conscious communicating being. Within the metaphorical domain, the sunlight could be said to be evaluated negatively for veracity. 

Ignoring the potential animalisation, I would need to say appreciation:quality, with "false" acting as a graduating token lessening the appreciation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The metaphorical clause construes the bright sunlight as the Token of a Value:

If the bright sunlight had been construed as 'a conscious communicating being', it would have been construed as the Sayer of a verbal process. And even unpacking the metaphor yields mental processes, not verbal processes:

when someone saw the bright sunlight, they falsely inferred that the weather was warm.

Here O'Donnell has engaged in the 'notional semantics' that he has previously denounced in others, instead of 'following the grammatical principles that Halliday established' that he has previously insisted upon; see Mick O'Donnell On Following SFL Analytical Principles.

[2] To be clear, in the metaphorical clause, the negative assessment is a feature of the Value a false impression of warmth, not the Token the bright sunlight. The negative judgement of the bright sunlight, in terms of veracity, derives from misconstruing the relational clause as verbal, with the Sayer deemed to be dishonest, for communicating a falsehood.

[3] To be clear, if the metaphor is ignored, then the congruent rendering becomes the focus of the analysis. In this case, the assessment is one of negative judgement, in terms of capacity: falsely inferred. The function of the metaphor, therefore, is to conceal this judgement, since it omits its target: someone.

[4] To be clear, the target of the negative appreciation is the impression of warmth in the metaphorical clause. However, false enacts the attitude itself, not a graduation of it. That is, false does not "lessen" the negative appreciation. From the Appraisal Theory website:

Graduation

Values by which (1) speakers graduate (raise or lower) the interpersonal impact, force or volume of their utterances, and (2) by which they graduate (blur or sharpen) the focus of their semantic categorisations.

1. (FORCE ) slightly, somewhat, very, completely
2. (FOCUS) I was feeling kind'v woozy, they effectively signed his death warrant; a true friend, pure folly

David Rose On 'Affect' As Exclusively Discourse Semantic

David Rose wrote to sys-func on 26 May at 14:42:

Check out Clare Painter’s work on interpersonal lg development, from a discourse semantic perspective 

http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/textspecial/painter-ontogenic.pdf 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, in the above cited paper, Clare Painter applies the notion of AFFECT to human protolanguage. The fact that this is possible demonstrates that such a system is not even restricted to language, let alone discourse semantics. The semantics of human language is but one manifestation of a basic distinction that precedes and transcends language: inclination (attraction) vs disinclination (aversion).

Most fundamentally, this distinction is a feature of perceptual semiotic systems. On Edelman's model of brain function, the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, the experience of an animal is perceptually categorised on the basis of inherited values that have proved adaptive to its ancestors, such as the positive or negative value of the perception of a light source. So, depending on the inherited value, an animal will be inclined to ("like") or disinclined to ("dislike") a perceived light source, and its (non-semiotic) behaviour accordingly satisfies the specific value in its perceptual system.

Further, the like/dislike distinction is manifested in non-semiotic social systems — on Halliday's linear taxonomy of systems (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 507-9) — such as those of eusocial insects: bees, ants and termites. In such cases, the context-specific exchange of (perceptual) like vs dislike values, via pheromones, is a means of co-ordinating behaviour, and so is a means of social organisation.

Furthermore, the like/dislike distinction is manifested in social semiotic systems, such as the protolanguage of social semiotic species, including humans, in giving positive or negative value to the symbols being exchanged.

The like/dislike distinction in human language, then, is just the latest manifestation of a more general phenomenon. Its application to human protolanguage, therefore, is not taking a specifically discourse semantic perspective.

Jim Martin On 'In Particular'

After Annabelle Lukin wrote to sys-func and sysfling on 16 Nov 2018 at 09:06:

Can anyone help me out? …

8(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.

… What kind of Adjunct is "in particular"??

Jim Martin responded on sysfling on 16 Nov 2018 at 19:19:

How about appraisal:graduation:focus:sharpen... as part of a paradigm:

in particular when
particularly when
just when
only when
when

• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes particularly when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
• The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.

The linking conjunction when would then need to be expanded as a hypotactic complex... beta (in particular) alpha (when)

Blogger Comment:

[1] The reason why the conjunctive Adjunct in particular does not realise 'appraisal: graduation: focus: sharpen' is that, in this instance, there is no appraisal to 'graduate: focus: sharpen'.  For many more of Martin's misunderstandings of Appraisal Theory, see here.

(On the other hand, Martin (1992: 211) rebrands the conjunctive function of in particular as comparative: similarity: reformulation: rework: generality: local: particularise.)

[2] The reason why in particular does not modify when is that in particular — like a conjunctive Adjunct (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 158), but unlike a modifier in a conjunction group (not a hypotactic complex) — can be postponed to the end of the clause as an Afterthought:

The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes — when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, in particular.

See also analysis here. 

David Rose On Congruent Relations Between Semantics And Grammatical Classes Across Languages

David Rose replied to Waleed Othman on sysfling on 6 June 2018 at 11:58:

Useful discussion in 

Halliday, M.A.K. (1988). On the Ineffability of Grammatical Categories. James D. Benson, Michael J.Cummings and William S. Greaves (eds.) Linguistics in a Systemic Perspective. (CILT39). Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 27-51.

Otherwise, yes, linguists seem to assume grammatical classes across languages, that are defined semantically to some extent. Eg attached figure (Rose & Martin 2012) could apply to all the languages I know of.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday (1988) says nothing about the relation between semantic categories and grammatical classes across different languages (the subject of Othman's query).  Instead, it is concerned, on the one hand, with explaining why functional grammatical categories, such as Subject, cannot be theorised by decoding them from above (by reference to what they realise) and, on the other hand, with identifying ways around the problem, which in SFL, means encoding them from below (by reference to what realises them).

[2] To be clear, this figure is intended to represent relations between discourse semantic categories and grammatical classes.  Each of the five realisation relations can be examined in turn.

• Attitude realised by adjective.  The problem here is that the congruent realisation of attitude is not limited to the word class 'adjective', as demonstrated, for example, by the attitudinal potential of 'idiot' (noun), 'stupidly' (adverb), and 'deceive' (verb).

• Entity realised by nominal group.  The problem here is that, in the discourse semantic model, the term 'entity' is not a general category, but only features as a subtype of Range (Martin 1992: 309-11; Martin & Rose 2007: 96).  For Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177), the experiential semantic element congruently realised by the nominal group is 'participant'.

• Event realised by verbal group.  The problem here is that, in the discourse semantic model, the term 'event' is grammatical, not discourse semantic (Martin 1992: 325; Martin & Rose 2007: 97).

• Figure realised by clause. This is true, but misleading, because the term 'figure', and its congruent relation with the clause, do not derive from Martin's (1992) discourse semantic model, but from the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

• Activity sequence realised by clause complex.  In the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 49), it is the sequence that is congruently realised as a clause complex.  In Martin (1992: 321-5), activity sequences are located in field, the ideational dimension of context misconstrued as register.  In Martin & Rose (2007: 76), activity sequences are reinterpreted as discourse semantic: as an experiential system, IDEATION, Martin's misunderstanding and rebranding of Halliday's textual system of lexical cohesion, inter alia.  For the theoretical inconsistencies in activity sequences in Martin (1992), see here; for theoretical inconsistencies in IDEATION in Martin (1992), see here.

Jim Martin On Appraisal Theory Not Being A Theory

Martin (2017: 22):

In late 2012 I was approached by a very concerned research student who reported that some people were saying ‘Appraisal Theory’ wasn’t a theory at all, but just a description. To which I replied: “Yes, of course. That’s right. Systemic Functional Linguistics (hereafter SFL) is the theory. APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English”.

[Martin (2017) The Discourse Semantics of Attitudinal Relations: Continuing the Study of Lexis, Russian Journal of Linguistics, vol. 21, No 1, 22-47]

Blogger Comments:

A. Martin's argument can be broken down to two exchanges:

An anonymous student's report of anonymous others: 'Appraisal Theory' isn't a theory…
Martin: Systemic Functional Linguistics is the theory. 

An anonymous student's report of anonymous others: 'Appraisal Theory' isn't a theory…
Martin: APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English..

Notice firstly that 'cause: reason' is entirely absent, both explicitly and implicitly, from both exchanges.  That is, neither exchange constitutes a reasoned argument.

Notice secondly that there are no explicit logico-semantic relations between Martin's replies and the anonymous claim.  That is, the reader is left to supply the implicit logico-semantic relation in both exchanges.

Notice thirdly that the implicit logico-semantic relation, in both cases, is 'extension: variation: replacive' (not X but Y).  That is, in both exchanges, Martin merely replaces one assertion with another.

In short, Martin has merely pontificated an opinion, unsupported by reasoning, and has disguised the lack of reasoning by leaving the logico-semantic relations implicit.

B. More shortcomings become evident, if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the implicit logico-semantic relation in both cases is one of 'cause: reason'.  This can be demonstrated by making the causal relation both explicit and structural:

1. 'Appraisal Theory' isn't a theory [because] Systemic Functional Linguistics is the theory.
2. 'Appraisal Theory' isn't a theory [because] APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English.

The two reasons attributed to Martin for the exclusion of 'Appraisal Theory' from the set of theories can be considered in turn.

The argument in (1) is that because Systemic Functional Linguistics is the theory, 'Appraisal Theory' is not a theory.  It can be seen that the one does not logically entail the other since, even if Systemic Functional Linguistics is the theory, it does not logically exclude the possibility that 'Appraisal Theory' is a theory.  Such matters depend on how 'theory' is defined, and Martin provides no definition of the term, thereby providing no opportunity for its negotiation.

Incidentally, the strategic use of the here also plays a rôle, given its function; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 367):

The word the is a specific, determinative Deictic of a peculiar kind: it means ‘the subset in question is identifiable; but this will not tell you how to identify it – the information is somewhere around, where you can recover it’. … Hence the is usually accompanied by some other element that supplies the information required … . If there is no such information supplied, the subset in question will either be obvious from the situation, or else will have been referred to already in the discourse …

The argument in (2) is that because APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English, 'Appraisal Theory' is not a theory.  Again, it can be seen that the one does not logically entail the other, since even if APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English, it does not logically exclude the possibility that 'Appraisal Theory' is also a theory.  Again, such matters depend on how 'theory' is defined, and Martin provides no definition of the term, thereby providing no opportunity for its negotiation.

Two questions that might occur to any discourse analyst capable of critical thinking are:

1. What is at stake for Martin?
2. Why would he want his readers to believe that Appraisal Theory is not a theory?

David Rose Following Jim Martin In Confusing Description With Theory

Responding to a post by Annabelle Lukin, David Rose wrote to sys-func and sysfling on 11 February 2016 at 07:24:

Great point 

The theory is SFL 

Appraisal is an SFL description, alongside other discourse semantic systems 

The description of appraisal filled a void that is not accounted for in grammar, so lots of people have adopted it without recognising other discourse semantic systems, hence ‘appraisal theory’. 

We don’t talk about ‘transitivity theory’. Many imagine that transitivity is sufficient to account for experiential meaning, that tabulating process types describes what a text means. They can't see the void.

Blogger Comments:

[1] A theory provides an explanatory framework for some observation, and from the assumptions of the explanation follows a number of possible hypotheses that can be tested in order to provide support for, or challenge, the theory.

Given Martin's dichotomy of theory versus description, the systems of appraisal are not description; they are part of SFL linguistic theory.  Description is what theory affords. Theory provides the potential for describing (construing) phenomena — in its terms.  For Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 55), a description is an account of a particular language, whereas a theory is an account of language in general.  Appraisal Theory is an account of language in general.

In any case, the term 'appraisal theory' originates from Martin and White (2005: xi, 6, 29) — in which publication can also be found the term 'register and genre theory' (p24).

And, interestingly, although Martin does not regard appraisal theory as a theory, he does regard editorials as theoretical texts.  Martin (1992: 518):

Genre-structured texts are divided into those which review field-structured texts (e.g. movie reviews), and so are partially determined by their activity sequences, and theoretical texts which are not organised around a sequence of events in any respect (e.g. editorials).

[2] In SFL theory, linguistic content is viewed from two perspectives: two levels of symbolic abstraction.  The higher level is meaning (semantics), the lower level is wording (lexicogrammar).  In the absence of grammatical metaphor, the two perspectives are in agreement (congruent).  This stratification means that systems of linguistic content can be viewed from either perspective.  Halliday (2008: 49) provides the view of appraisal from the perspective of lexicogrammar:

Some interpersonal meanings are highly generalised, like the enactment of dialogic rôles (speech function) … .  With options in the way something is evaluated (“I approve / I disapprove”), or contended (“I agree / I disagree”), the borderline between grammar and lexis is shaded over; systems of appraisal, as described by Martin & White (2005), represent more delicate (more highly differentiated) options within the general region of evaluation.

On the appraisal system of attitude, Halliday (2008: 179) writes:

This is a grammatical system that is realised by a selection of lexical items. Each such item is uniquely identified as a set of intersecting grammatical features; eg complicated is

appraisal: attitude: appreciation: composition: ( complexity : complex /  polarity: negative …)

as well as other general grammatical features (e.g. as distinct from confusing, which is “effective”, as in it confuses me, complicated is “descriptive”).  Note that I am interpreting the feature "undesirable" (the "snarl" member of the "purr/snarl" opposition) as negative in the environment of the interpersonal.

But it is important to understand that it is the lexicogrammar that makes the type of semantics that language has possible — as demonstrated by the limitations of semiotic systems without stratified content.  As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 512) put it, it is the grammar that construes 'semantic space': 

In all these metafunctions, the language does not take over and reproduce some readymade semantic space. There is no such space until the grammar comes along to construe it.

[3] This is misleading.  See the two Halliday (2008) quotes above in [2] or at The Thought Occurs.

[4] Reasons for 'adopting' appraisal theory include the facts that it is very easy to use with very little linguistic knowledge — it can stand independently of SFL, let alone discourse semantics — and that it pays huge dividends for very little investment, as exemplified here.

[5] This is the motivation for misrepresenting appraisal as description rather than theory: its use without the recognition of its inclusion within discourse semantic systems.  For critiques of discourse semantic systems, see here.

[6] The systems of 'transitivity', within the grammatics, are part of SFL theory.  They are metalinguistic potential.  See [1].  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 514) are quite clear on the matter:

This part of the grammar, then — the grammar of clauses — , constitutes a theory about the types of process that make up human experience.

[7] This is the logical fallacy known as the straw man fallacy — an argument based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position. A straw man is a common form of argument and is an informal fallacy based on giving the impression of refuting an opponent's argument, while actually refuting an argument which was not advanced by that opponent.

It also exemplifies the form of argument termed 'polemic' (which Jim Martin warned us about on the sysfling list on 8/1/16, by means of a quote from Foucault).

A polemic is a contentious argument that is intended to support a specific position via attacks on a contrary position. Polemics are mostly seen in arguments about controversial topics. The practice of such argumentation is called polemics. A person who often writes polemics, or who speaks polemically, is called a polemicist or a polemic. The word is derived from Greek πολεμικός (polemikos), meaning "warlike, hostile", from πόλεμος (polemos), meaning "war". 

Along with debate, polemics are one of the most common forms of arguing. Similar to debate, a polemic is confined to a definite thesis. But unlike debate, which may allow for common ground between the two disputants, a polemic is intended only to affirm one point of view while refuting the opposing point of view.

See Foucault's polemic against polemics here.

David Rose On 'Semantics Instantiating Grammar'

David Rose wrote to Annabelle Lukin on sys-func and Sysfling on 26 March 2015 at 09:20:

The main problem with your argument is that it hinges on this partial quoting of me

in (b), semantics is 'merely instantiating grammar systems in text’

This section of my analysis actually discussed ‘discourse semantic systems’ not ‘semantics'

The models differ in their view of discourse semantic systems, such as conjunction, ideation, appraisal 

In a) discourse semantic systems are not possible, as semantics is consumed with grammatical functions, in b) they merely instantiate grammar systems in texts, In c) grammatical structures realise higher rank functions, but structure and function are properties of both grammatical and semantic strata

Blogger Comments:

[1] Semantics does not instantiate grammar, regardless of whether Rose is discussing semantics or 'discourse semantic systems'.  Instantiation is the relation between system and instance, not the relation between strata, such as semantics and grammar.

Using the verb 'instantiate' is problematic, because it does not serve as an attributive Process, and instantiation is an attributive relation.  Rose's use of the verb results in a construal of discourse semantic systems as less abstract, a lower stratum, than grammar systems:

discourse semantic systems	merely	instantiate	grammar systems	in texts
Token		Process: identifying	Value	Location

[2] The 'discourse semantic systems' conjunction and ideation are Martin's (1992) rebranding of two of Halliday's lexicogrammatical resources of cohesion: conjunction and lexical cohesion (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 524ff).  Martin took Halliday's textual lexicogrammatical systems and reconstrued them as ideational systems — conjunction is logical, ideation is experiential — on a higher stratum of content.  Doing so violated the meaning of both stratification and metafunction.

[3] Appraisal is a genuine interpersonal semantic system realised in, and construed by, the lexicogrammar.  Viewed from below, it lies within evaluation, between grammar and lexis.  Halliday (2008: 49):

With options in the way something is evaluated (“I approve / I disapprove”) or contended (“I agree / I disagree”), the borderline between grammar and lexis is shaded over; systems of appraisal, as described by Martin & White (2005), represent more delicate (more highly differentiated options within the general region of evaluation.

David Rose On Major Theoretical Differences Between 3 SFL Models: Discourse Semantic Systems

David Rose wrote to sys-func and Sysfling on 23 March 2015 at 08:35:

The models differ in their view of discourse semantic systems, such as conjunction, ideation, appraisal

In a) discourse semantic systems are not possible, as semantics is consumed with grammatical functions, 

in b) they merely instantiate grammar systems in texts, and 

in c) they are distinct systems, where grammar and discourse both contribute to meaning

Blogger Comments:

[1] These 'discourse semantic' systems could easily be incorporated in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, as systems (functions) on the higher stratum of context, and as structures (forms) on the lower stratum.  Given that some of them derive from Halliday's grammatics (textual cohesion), this may already be the case. 

[2] This reflects Rose's ongoing confusion of instantiation with realisation (see elsewhere on this blog).  Semantic systems do not instantiate grammar systems ('in texts' or anywhere else).  Semantic systems are realised by lexicogrammatical systems.

Regarding the systems Rose mentions, while 'appraisal' is a genuine interpersonal semantic system, construed by the interpersonal grammar — the word 'discourse' is redundant — the others are a mixed bag. For example, Martin's logical 'discourse semantic' system of conjunction derives, at least in part, from Halliday's textual grammatical system of conjunction, and Martin's experiential 'discourse semantic' system of ideation derives both from Halliday's (non-structural) textual grammatical system of lexical cohesion and his (structural) experiential grammatical system of transitivity.

[3] As [2] indicates, integrating these diverse systems as Martin's 'discourse semantic' systems creates theoretical inconsistencies in terms of both metafunction and level of symbolic abstraction.

[4] This reflects Rose's ongoing confusion of semogenesis with stratification (see elsewhere on this blog).  All strata make meaning, in the sense of semogenesis, but stratification is a means of parcelling out the complexity of language as a hierarchy of symbolic abstraction, in which meaning (semantics) is realised by wording (lexicogrammar).  Does discourse "contribute" to meaning, or is it a semogenic process?