Mick O'Donnell On Semantics–Grammar Mappings

 Mick O'Donnell replied to David Rose on sys-func on 11/7/22 at 22:01:

Firstly, one example from a non-Martin model does not validate your claim that ALL Hallidayan models map 1-to-1 from Semantics to Grammar.

Secondly, Yes, I agree that there is an apparent one to one mapping from Speech Function to Grammatical Realisation in Geoff's model. But in this case, I take this as a good thing. If we take seriously the claim that differences in form relate to differences in meaning, there should be semantic differences between the different grammatical metaphors.

The problem really stems from whether you are looking at the mapping of partial semantic specifications (which should have alternative realisation possibilities) or whether you are looking at mapping full semantic specifications (which should constrain the possibilities down to a single form).

In things I have looked at, it is often the case that two sentences are ideationally the same, but textually (informationally) different (e.g., John gave Mary a book vs Mary was given a book by John; or John might be leaving vs. John is possibly leaving). Just looking at the ideational meaning in isolation, there are multiple ways the meaning can be realised. But when one takes ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning all together at once, the [sic] will ideally be a single utterance that realises that meaning.

(exceptions here:

i) I am ignoring here the possibility that some models allow Context of Situation to "skip" semantics and affect lexico-grammatical choices without mediation of semantic choices. Add to this Context of Culture difference (which may lead to different ways in which a meaning is mapped onto form)

ii) some differences in form may not have any correlation in meaning, e.g., is there a meaning difference between "the man that I saw" and "the man who I saw"? Or between [sic]

In the case of Geoff's network, the difference in ways to ask for information are not so much cross-metafunction, but intra-metafunction: the different sub-choices reflect different interpersonal strategies for getting information. And as this network offers a complete speech-functional account of the possibilities, the end-points can be attached to definite lxg realisations.

We only get a many-to-one mapping between semantics and form when we work on partial semantic descriptions (e.g., demand:information). As I say above, a complete specification of meaning should result in a complete specification of form (barring as I said above models where context skips semantics to directly affect form choices)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday's theory distinguishes between 'compact' and 'dispersed' grammatical realisations of semantic systems, and adds that compactly realised systems 'may become dispersed in their realisation through grammatical metaphor'  (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 666-7).

[2] To be clear, the speech function network under discussion is from Hasan (1983), and its gloss includes one-to-many mappings between semantic features and grammatical realisations; see the previous post.

[3] Here again O'Donnell follows Fawcett in misconstruing the semantics-grammar relation as a relation between meaning and form. To be clear, in SFL Theory, grammatical form is modelled as a rank scale, and forms (e.g. nominal group) are interpreted in terms of their function in realising meaning (e.g. Phenomenon). In the absence of metaphor, semantics and grammatical function agree (are congruent).

[4] To be clear, the notion of different forms realising different meanings is independent of grammatical metaphor, and grammatical metaphor is not a meaning-form relation, but an incongruence between the function of a form (grammar) and the meaning that it realises (semantics).

[5] To be clear, here O'Donnell introduces two 'red herrings': agnate structures and the integration of metafunctional meanings into a single syntagm, as evidence on the question of whether or not there are one-to-one mappings between semantic and lexicogrammatical features.

[6] To be clear, the notion of semantics being "skipped" is nonsensical. Linguistic strata are the same phenomenon viewed at different levels of symbolic abstraction. In terms of the ideational metafunction, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) write:

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning.

[7] To be clear, SPEECH FUNCTION is an interpersonal system, and since the network from Hasan (1983) is part of her SPEECH FUNCTION system, it is necessarily "intra-metfunction".

[8] To be clear, although O'Donnell begins by continuing his argument against Rose's false claim that Halliday's theory posits a one-to-one mapping between semantic and grammatical features (first paragraph), he soon forgets what side of the argument he is on, and switches to arguing for Rose's claim, and ends by concluding in its favour (final paragraph). The switch begins when O'Donnell assesses what he wrongly accepts as a one-to-one mapping as 'a good thing' (second paragraph).