John Bateman On Reality And Actual Existence

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 16:34:

For example, observations that we cannot get to reality itself and that protons, quarks, etc. do not (might not) actually exist at all are, well, obvious aren't they? Does anybody anymore try to come up with proofs of the existence of the real?

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Bateman uses ideational metaphor in order to limit arguability:

For example	observations [[[that we cannot get to reality itself || and that protons, quarks, etc. do not (might not) actually exist at all ]]]	are	well	obvious	aren't	they
	Carrier	Process: attributive		Attribute
conjunctive Adjunct	Subject	Finite		Complement	Finite	Subject

Neither the proposition we cannot get into reality itself nor the proposition protons, quarks, etc do not (might not) actually exist at all is presented by Bateman as arguable.  All that is presented as arguable is the proposition that both of these propositions are obvious.  (This is the language of bullying: if they are not obvious to you, you must be uninformed or stupid, right?)

[2] On the SFL model, 'reality' — "thinginess" — is the ideational meaning we construe of experience, as material and semiotic orders.

[3] On the SFL model, propositions as to whether protons, quarks, etc. exist are interpersonally assessed as valid or invalid according to criteria interpersonally assessed as valid in the field of physics.