David Rose Solving The Non-Problem Of The Synonymy Of 'Unmarked', 'Default' And 'Neutral'

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 9 Sept, at 10:43:

Yep, the apparent synonymy of unmarked, default and neutral were pedagogic issues for Brad designing his intonation course (and perhaps for us all). A possible solution lies in their differing usage (instantial). 

Marked/unmarked are used as technical labels for features in textual systems, where the marked option realises textual prominence (stratal). 

Default tends to connote skewed frequency, which realises unmarked features (axial). 

Neutral tends to be used for ungraduated features in interpersonal systems (eg key)

and at 11:47:

My friend Giacomo Figueredo pointed out that description generalises (same stratum) but explanation abstracts (higher stratum). So look up for reasons (eg prominence in discourse).

*I meant to say ‘Default tends to connote skewed frequency *of structures*, which realise unmarked features (axial).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'default' and 'neutral' are glosses for 'unmarked' as a description of an option in a system. There is no problem requiring a solution.

[2] To be clear, the marked/unmarked distinction is not restricted to the textual metafunction, but is used for systems realising any metafunction, e.g. TENSE and TONE.

[3] To be clear, both the marked and unmarked option of THEME assign textual prominence to an element of structure (axial, not stratal).

[4] To be clear, 'default' describes the 'unmarked' or 'neutral' choice in a system, so the structure that realises that systemic choice is the 'default' or 'unmarked' or 'neutral' structure (axis). Skewed probabilities are a system property, whereas skewed frequencies are an instance property (instantiation).

[5] To be clear, in the system of KEY, 'neutral' is a feature in the system, not a description of a feature as unmarked or default. 

[6] To be clear, here Rose is presenting part of the post he is reacting to (below) as if it hadn't already been stated in that post. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

Many systems embody the distinction between an unmarked term and a marked one, and the distinction may be reflected in the descriptive names given to the terms, as in “unmarked theme” vs. “marked theme”. An alternative label for the unmarked term is “neutral”, as in the interpersonal of (declarative) KEY (e.g. Halliday & Greaves, 2008: 50), where ‘neutral’ key is unmarked and the other keys are marked (‘challenging’, ‘non-committal’, ‘reserved’, ‘strong’); another alternative label is “default”.

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

David Rose Misunderstanding Markedness

David Rose replied to Brad Smith on asflanet on 2 Sept 2024, at 21:21:

As you say, it’s related to instantiation, specifically the probability of instantiation... less likely choices are more marked. That gets you into knots with tone 1 imperatives here, which you say are ‘unmarked’ but are no more frequent than other tones in your data. A problem may be ambiguity of the term ‘neutral’. It can mean unmarked, but in Halliday’s key system it means neutral force, in contrast to mild, strong etc.

PS Key treats grammar/tone couplings as delicate mood choices, but another perspective is delicate speech function and appraisal choices... ‘what a command is trying to get done ‘

and on 3 Sept, at 13:27:

In contrast, marked/unmarked are used technically as feature labels in textual systems, theme and information focus. Could we perhaps avoid using these terms quasi-technically in pedagogic contexts, and reserve them for textual features? The ‘good reason’ is textual prominence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no problem here because markedness is not defined by frequency. Halliday (2005 [1991]: 68):

An unmarked term is a default condition: that which is selected unless there is good reason for selecting some other term. It is not defined by frequency, but it is likely to correspond to the more probable term in a system whose probabilities are skew.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 169) identify the different speech functions realised by imperative mood realised by different tones as follows:

command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)
invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)
request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t
plea: tone 4

The frequency of a selected tone will thus vary with the frequency of a selected speech function realised by imperative mood in a given text type, and this varies with the tenor relations of the interlocutors.

[2] This misunderstands the distinction between a feature and a classification of feature. In Halliday's system of KEY, Halliday & Greaves (2008: 208) 'neutral' is one of the features, not a classification of a feature as neutral or unmarked:

[3] This misrepresents the SFL model. To be clear, SPEECH FUNCTION (semantics) is realised by MOOD (lexicogrammar), and different features of KEY (lexicogrammar), realised by different features of TONE (phonology), differentiate the SPEECH FUNCTION of a MOOD into more delicate types. An example is the case of commands being differentiated into invitations, requests and pleas according to the tone selection, as in [1] above.

[4] To be clear, the unmarked/marked distinction is not restricted to features of textual systems, as demonstrated by the unmarked/marked distinction for the system of TONE, which realises interpersonal systems. Another interpersonal example is the unmarked choice of Subject; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 194):

For any clause, there is one choice of Subject that is ‘unmarked’ – that is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In a giving clause (offer or statement), the unmarked Subject is ‘I’; while in a demanding clause (question or command), the unmarked Subject is ‘you’.

An experiential example is unmarked/marked distinction for present tense, which varies according to PROCESS TYPE. 

[5] This misunderstands the 'good reason' principle. To be clear, 'textual prominence' is what choosing an element as Theme or New affords, and this is the case whether the choice is unmarked or marked. The 'good reason' principle, on the other hand, is what lies behind the choice of a marked option in preference to the unmarked option.

Brad Smith On Markedness Not Explained In Theoretical Terms

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 11:05:

Saying unmarked is the option one chooses except where there is 'some good reason', while helpful in learning how to analyse markedness, doesn't really explain the concept in theoretical terms. So far, until better educated, I am sticking with my discourse semantics motivation: imperative mood, phylogenetically and functionally, is the option to enact a command - to get that job done; and other options, co-selected with tone choices, are used to enact more complex moves such as polite command: '//1 ^ can I / start the order with your */ phone number please // ('give me your phone number' + deference)

and again at 14:17:

I guess my question with theoretical terms and concepts is, what am I asking this term/concept to do for me? We can never, sadly or not, get away from 'language turned back on itself' and all that implies... (including if we use multimodal semiotics as metadiscourse... mathematicians and scientists take note!)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is linguistic data produced by speakers and writers that are analysed, not markedness. Once data are theorised as a system network, relative markedness can be assigned by a linguist to alternative features in a system.

[2] To be clear, glossing 'unmarked' as the default or neutral choice explains the concept in everyday terms. On the other hand, Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7) explain the concept in terms of the theoretical dimensions of axis, instantiation and stratification:

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:

1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.

2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).

3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[3] To be clear, this is Halliday's theory, not Martin's discourse semantics.

[4] For some of the theoretical problems that invalidate the model of discourse semantics, see e.g.

• Review of English Text
• Review of Bateman's Review of English Text
• Review of Working With Discourse

[5] To be clear, like any theoretical concept, markedness is a means of understanding how language functions. For example, if a selection is marked, then there is a motivation for the selection to be sought. 

[6] To be clear, language is the most powerful semiotic system, so using language to model language is using the most powerful semiotic system to model language.

[7] To be clear, 'metadiscourse' is literally discourse about discourse. From an SFL perspective, what gets classified as metadiscourse is non-ideational meaning: aspects of interpersonal and textual meaning. It may be that Smith meant 'metalanguage', but this only applies to linguistic theory — language about language — not to (language about) mathematics and (language about) science.

Brad Smith On Phonological Congruence And His Problem With Markedness

Brad Smith replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 9:43 :

… in the SFL material I was browsing through yesterday afternoon, the terms unmarked and congruent seemed to be used more or less interchangeably.

I am not seeking to find the canonical definition to follow, but working out my own ideas on this (I believe, as a Doctor, this is not only my right but my responsibility!). The quoted passage from my YouTube lecture script, I think, is probably where I land on this: congruence, at least, relates, as you have said, to an inter-stratal relation, specifically what is being demanded of clause and tone group by the discourse semantics (that's my current take on this aspect). …

There are other, similarly troublesome issues of terminology and symbolism in SFL: for example, the same symbol, with minor, inconsequential adjustment, is used for both structural ordering and for a silent Ictus! …

In terms of intonation, however, unlike much of the rest of his work, this has not, relatively speaking, happened as much as I think Halliday wished or expected - for example, the functions of tonicity are still discussed in terms of (Given-New) structure; when the real game, for me, has always been, what gets chosen as focus against the background of what could have been chosen?...i.e. what is the systemic potential for a textual choice? (which, when you start to consider it, is a question with a lot of implications, including for theoretical accounts). 

Markedness is not a systemic description, it is a post hoc account of the valeur of certain choices: we consider, for example, which systemic option in the system of mood is unmarked; but this assignment of markedness, however, is not itself a systemic description - the systemic description of mood is declarative, polar interrogative etc. - We still have to work out what the actual potential for choice is for systems of tonicity, salience etc. (eg within/outside of the mood block can, in some texts, be consequential).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as demonstrated in the previous post, Smith's 'current take' on the interchangeability of 'unmarked' and 'congruent' is a theoretically invalid misunderstanding.

[2] To be clear, the troublesome issue here is using the symbol ^ for ordering (a^b) and the symbol ‸ for silent Ictus (/‸ /).

[3] To be clear, every non-tonic salient syllable realises what could have been selected as the tonic that realises the Focus of New information. The choice of the Given + New structure of an information unit, on the other hand, is a grammatical selection: tonicity is the phonological means of realising it.

[4] This misunderstands 'valeur'. To be clear, 'valeur' (Saussure) is the value of a term in a system in relation to the other terms.

[5] To be clear, descriptive terms like 'declarative', 'polar interrogative' etc. are features that describe language, whereas theoretical terms like 'unmarked' describe the features.

[6] To be clear, a selection of tonic placement realises a selection of a Focus of New information, which gives textual prominence to one or more functional elements of mood (and transitivity and thematic) structure.

Brad Smith Confusing Markedness And Incongruence

Brad Smith wrote to asflanet on 2 September 2024 at 17:09:

With a yes/no question move, the polarity is at issue – that is what a yes/no question is all about! Hence, the unmarked, or congruent co-selection in mood and tone for a yes/no question is polar interrogative with rising pitch tone 2.

So when I say that the tone 1 imperative mood is the unmarked, or congruent choice for a command, I mean that these co-selections in clause and tone group are congruent with what a command is trying to get done with language – the issue of polarity is not at stake, hence we expect a command to have a falling tone 1 pitch contour. The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide (e.g polar interrogative + falling tone 1 for a polite command) are based on our understanding of what the congruent choices are, using such unconscious knowledge to motivate the use of language in non-congruent, or metaphorical ways.

The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide illustrate what happens when more complex contextual aspects are operating that make more demands of the language – and, in fact, such complexity is more common than not in social interactions!

Blogger Comments:

This confuses markedness with incongruence. Markedness is 'intra-system': whether a choice is the default/neutral one (unmarked) or not (marked). Congruence is 'inter-stratal' within content: whether the meaning and wording agree (congruent) or not (metaphorical). Importantly, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction only applies to the realisation relation between strata of the content plane, semantics and lexicogrammar, and is only made possible by the natural relation between them. 

That is, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction does not apply to the realisation relation between lexicogrammar and phonology — there is no "phonological metaphor". For example, in realising declarative mood, the relation between unmarked tone 1 and marked tone 2 is not metaphorical, since 'protesting statement' (tone 2) is not a metaphor for 'statement' (tone 1).

Ed McDonald On Halliday's Grammar-Centrism

Edward McDonald continued sys-func on 8 Jul 2024, at 14:44:

Ok, so this is not "linguistic imperialism" but it does seem like "grammar-centrism". It strikes me that, though I'm not aware if anyone has ever made this argument, that both (adult) language and music could equally be seen as "outgrowths" of protolanguage, particularly if we look at spoken language and singing. Given that music lacks the line of arbitrariness, i.e. that musical meanings are in the first instance indexical, not symbolic, the argument for the priority of grammar seems less convincing in this instance.

Any multimodalists like to weigh in here about other semiotic systems? Do they all depend on the prior existence of grammar? It would seem to me that systems depending on iconicity don't necessarily.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday's view that language is the only semiotic system with a grammar is merely the view that is consistent with his Systemic Functional Theory and the assumptions on which is based.

[2] To be clear, song lyrics are language, as are musical notation and theory. The question of whether music itself requires its makers to have language, depends on how music is defined. If music is narrowly defined as restricted to humans, then music is defined as requiring its makers to have language. However, if music is more broadly defined to include the structured use of rhythm and pitch variation in other species, most notably birdsong and whalesong, then music is not defined as requiring its makers to have language. This still leaves open the question of whether music is social (value) or semiotic (symbolic value), in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy of complex systems.

[3] Given that no evidence is given for musical meanings, or a natural indexical relation between such meanings and their expression, this is an instance of the bare assertion (ipse dixit) fallacy.

[4] Lest this be misunderstood, the question is whether the users of non-linguistic semiotic systems have a grammar. Halliday (2002[1996]: 389): 

On the other hand, human adults also develop numerous non-linguistic semiotic systems: forms of ritual, art forms, and the like; these have no grammar of their own, but they are parasitic on natural language – their meaning potential derives from the fact that those who use them already have a grammar.

[5] To be clear, one way to assess whether a semiotic system requires its users to have a grammar is to look for such a system in species without a grammar. To date, no other species have been demonstrated represent their experience iconically by drawing pictures, and the earliest evidence of human cave painting long postdates the estimated emergence of language.

Ed McDonald On Halliday's Linguistic Imperialism

Edward McDonald wrote to sys-func on 8 Jul 2024, at 08:49:

We've often had this debate before, and presumably if music has no "grammar" it has no "semantics" either. I would agree, in the sense that those two terms are traditionally applied to language and so come with all sorts of associations and presuppositions. … 

But as a semiotic system - by definition (IMFFHO) - must have the two mutually defining strata of what in general terms I like to call interpretation and expression: specifically for music, what I call "phonotactics" and "e/motion" - see my 2021 paper in Language, Context, Text, then it presumably has a "grammar" of sorts, in the sense of distinctive patterns with significant interpretations. In a separate step, In relation to music, I also depart from orthodoxy in characterising the expression stratum of phonotactics as purely textural (= textual), with the other metafunctions coming in only at the stratum of e/motion, whether interactional (= interpersonal) or figurative (= ideational) (I haven't found the need to distinguish between experiential and logical). …

Halliday "privileging" language in this way for me invokes the spectre of what, following Horst Ruthrof, I call "linguistic imperialism"; and the fact that Social Semiotics (again IMFFHO) is shot through with linguistic imperialism for me explains why Ruqaiya for one didn't "believe in" multimodality, in the sense of a model of same that wasn't simply parasitic on the theory of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here McDonald is commenting on Halliday's view (2002[1996]: 388-9) that language is the only semiotic system that has a grammar, in his sense of the term.

[2] This misunderstands Halliday. On Halliday's model, if music is a social semiotic system, then it has content and expression, but its content is not stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar. For Cléirigh, on the other hand, in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy of complex systems, music is social, not semiotic. That is, it carries value, but not symbolic value. In terms of Edelman's neuroscientific theory, music selects perceptual categorisations of positive or negative value, and such value systems play an important rôle in the experience of emotions.

[3] Again, this misunderstands Halliday. For Halliday, the "two mutually defining strata" are the content and expression planes, following Hjelmslev. This is a prerequisite of semiotic systems, but it does not entail that content is stratified to include a grammar, in Halliday's sense, as 'an entirely abstract semiotic construct that emerges between the content and the expression levels of the original, sign-based primary semiotic system' (ibid.).

[4] To be clear, the problem with reconstruing 'content' as 'interpretation' is that the latter is the perspective of the listener only.

[5] This misunderstands the metafunctions. The metafunctions are types of meanings, and so are a dimension of the content plane only. For example, phonological systems are not metafunctional; they realise metafunctional meanings of the content plane.

[6] As demonstrated above, McDonald's accusation of "linguistic imperialism" is entirely unwarranted, since it derives only from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's theorising.

David Rose On Homophoric Reference, Contact And Instantiation

David Rose wrote to SYSFLING on 24 Jun 2024, at 19:35:

Homophoric reference is characteristic of contraction, instantiating close contact, discussed in English Text, eg from p531... 

... 

Leaving homophoric ‘the’ unsaid instantiates even closer contact.

and again at 21:27:

This little quote from Working with Discourse Ch 9 encapsulates it...

Contraction refers to the amount of work it takes to exchange meanings, and the idea that the better you know someone the less explicitness it takes... Technically speaking, the less information a homophoric reference contains, the tighter the community it constructs and the more people it excludes.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the instance under discussion is:

in the scene where the couple realise they are being stalked by the iconic masked killers, they get into the car trying to escape and the guy says:

[1] To be clear, if the speaker had said the car won't start, the reference would be exophoric to the car they are sitting in, not homophoric (self-specifying). But he could also have used other Deictics, such as our or my, which do not serve as reference items.

[2] To be clear, the proposed relation here would be realisation, not instantiation, since this is concerned with the relation between context and language. Instantiation is the relation between potential and instance.

[3] Rose's claim here is that the reason why the Deictic could be omitted in this instance is because of the amount of contact between the interlocutors, husband and wife. This suggests that if the speaker's addressee, sitting beside him in the car, had been a hitchhiker he had just met, and he had said simply car won't start, the addressee would need to have the referent clarified, with something like which car?

David Rose On Adverbial Group Agnation

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 16 Apr 2024, 20:00:

agnation for the consumer

and again on 17 Apr, at 15:11:

... as subtypes of intensification

The nominal realisation is downranked and metaphorical (as with [in the past]). Like congruent adverbial realisations, it can be further intensified and combine with polarity and comparison (but not identically).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is part of Rose's argument that 4.5 billion years ago is an adverbial group. Here he claims that it is agnate with the adverbial group long ago, in that the two are related through the adverbial group system of intensification. There are two problems with this claim.

First, intensification is not a system of the adverbial group, so the two variants are not systemically related through intensification. Instead, 'intensification' describes a type of adverb serving as a Premodifier. Clearly, an embedded nominal group is not a type of adverb. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 420-1):

The items serving as Premodifiers are adverbs belonging to one of three types – polarity (not), comparison (more, less; as, so) and intensification. … Those of intensification indicate higher or lower intensity; they are either general intensifiers that are interpersonally neutral (very, much, quite, really, completely, totally, utterly; rather, fairly, pretty; almost, nearly), including the interrogative adverb how, or specific ones that derive from some interpersonally significant scale (amazingly, astonishingly, awfully, desperately, eminently, extraordinarily, horribly, incredibly, perfectly, terribly, terrifically, unbelievably, wonderfully).

Second, if the nominal group 4.5 billion years is interpreted as premodifying ago, then it specifies the temporal extent of ago, not its intensification.

Instead, 4.5 billion years [ago] is a nominal group that is agnate with the nominal group 4.5 billion years [in the past], since they differ only in how a feature of the QUALIFICATION system is realised: as an embedded adverbial group (ago) or an embedded prepositional phrase (in the past). Matthiessen (1995: 669):

On the basis of Matthiessen's network, the feature they both realise is enhancing qualification: time: past.

[2] To be clear, in the case of the two nominal groups, 4.5 billion km away and 4.5 billion years ago, the Qualifiers away and ago are embedded adverbial groups, not ranking adverbs (as Rose would have it). This can be shown by the potential for modification:

• 4.5 billion km further away [than that]
• 4.5 billion years longer ago [than that]

[3] As demonstrated above, it is the adverbial group ago that downranked like the prepositional phrase in the past, not 4.5 billion years.

[4] To be clear, this potential is available to nominal groups:

not so very many years [as that]

David Rose On Focus Structures

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 14 Apr 2024, at 22:17:

The argument in IFG 6.2.5 is elegantly designed to explain nom gps with two Heads, ‘a phenomenon that from one point of view appears as a single entity and from another point of view as two’.

It begins by positing a dual experiential/logical structure at group rank, in order to then posit a post-modifier function in the logical structure, in which the experiential Thing is embedded in the Complement of a downranked prep phrase. This model is then applied to a series of nom gp structures, culminating with this one.

What if we were to argue instead from this example backwards? As facet is just one of the semantic options for this type of structure (richly captured in IFG Table 6-11), we could generalise its function name, e.g. as Focus. While the Deictic and Thing in this nom gp are realised by words, the Focus is realised by a downranked nom gp, that is linked to the hills by the structure marker ‘of’, whose function we could label LK for Linker.

As the Thing in the Focus nom gp is downranked, do we need an additional logical structure in which the primary Thing is downranked?

Working backwards, similar structures are analogous with this one, such as those classified as Classifier/Head in IFG.

Or Epithet/Head

This last one is ‘a more restricted type’ which seems to have evolved as an idiomatic realisation of attitude, on the model of the more common Focus structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is not true. To be clear, a nominal group has only one logical Head. Rose's misunderstanding is resolved by the part of the quote he omitted. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 396): 

In all such nominal expressions where Head and Thing are not conflated although both are clearly present, what is being construed is a phenomenon that from one point of view appears as a single entity and from another point of view as two.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. To be clear, the experiential Thing is not embedded. It is the nominal group serving as Facet that is embedded in the experiential analysis. The Thing in the experiential structure conflates with the Head of an embedded nominal group in the logical structure.

[3] To be clear, this merely describes the general function of the Extended Numerative in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 395), with Matthiessen's 'Extended Numerative' rebranded as Martin's 'Focus'.

[4] To be clear, this creates a theoretical inconsistency, since 'linker' is a class of conjunction that marks a paratactic relation, whereas of is not a conjunction and does not mark a paratactic relation.

[5] To be clear, there is no Thing function in the logical structure of a nominal group. Moreover, the logical structure is necessary in such instances to show that the Head and Thing are dissociated.

[6] To be clear, these analyses fail to (i) recognise the dissociation of Head and Thing, (ii) distinguish between Classifier and Epithet, and (iii) distinguish these structures from Extended Numeratives. As such, they have reduced explanatory power, and can be discarded on that basis.

[7] This is a bare assertion since it is unsupported by evidence: the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit.

David Rose On Symmetrical And Transitive Relations

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 14 Apr 2024, at 12:02:

Later in the chapter, Michael reveals that he is indeed talking to knowers of formal logic...

‘The relations of projection and expansion, which (when combined with parataxis and hypotaxis) constitute the ‘logical’ component of a natural language, are not reducible to elementary logical relations of a non-linguistic kind...’ (p460)

His use of symmetrical and transitive is indeed taken from formal logic...

A symmetric relation is a type of binary relation. An example is the relation "is equal to", because if a = b is true then b = a is also true.

Transitive relation, a binary relation in which if A is related to B and B is related to C, then A is related to C.

This usage is not explained, although the discussion is hard to understand without knowing it. Which makes things a little confusing for us benighted non-knowers. 

So Christian may like to adjust or explain this table and discussion for IFG5. While status and sequence are SFL categories, the use of symmetry and transitivity here are not.

This is pretty significant, as these terms are used to define parataxis and hypotaxis on p452, and a series of caveats on p460. Eg, ‘although each implies the other, they are not identical in meaning, because while parataxis is a symmetrical relationship, expansion is not’. Which is why I suggested to Jing that

My friend, John, ≠ John, my friend, ...

(in my ignorance)

 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is not true. The Halliday quote merely points out to the linguist reader that the logical relations of natural language are not reducible to the logical relations of designed systems.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. This usage has been explained in all four editions of IFG. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 452):

In principle, the paratactic relation is logically (i) symmetrical and (ii) transitive. This can be exemplified with the ‘and’ relation. (i) ‘salt and pepper’ implies ‘pepper and salt’, so the relationship is symmetrical; (ii) ‘salt and pepper’, ‘pepper and mustard’ together imply ‘salt and mustard’, so the relationship is transitive.

[3] This is misleading because it is not true. All four terms are used as properties of taxis in SFL Theory, as the table makes clear.

[4] To be clear, Rose had argued that the two were not equal on the basis of parataxis:

The thing about parataxis is it’s not reversible (realised by sequence), whereas hypotaxis is reversible (realised by status). So these two aren’t equivalent...

My friend John, ≠ John, my friend

but, as his Halliday quote explains, the asymmetry is in the expansion relation, elaboration, not in the paratactic relation.

David Rose On Nominal Group Structure

David Rose replied to Christian Matthiessen on SYSFLING on 14 Apr 2024, at 08:36:

here are some of the examples from your nom gp table described as Focus structures. From above the types of Focus are semantic categories (class/part/facet/group), from around they are compared with agnate examples, from below they are all linked by the structure marker ‘of’.

class (+/- attitude)

[my hero] of a friend

[my kind] of a friend

[that genius] of a student

[that type] of a student

part

[the city] of Rome

[the suburbs] of Rome

facet (abstract)

[the concept] of friendship

[the reality] of friendship

My own preference for this analysis is its simplicity, compared with a double experiential/logical analysis with moveable Head. My students also find it relatively simple. Their main difficulty is distinguishing ‘of’ as structure marker of Focus, from ‘of’ as preposition in Qualifier.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 394):

[2] To be clear, the experiential function that Martin merely rebrands with the textual term 'Focus' was previously described as

• Pre-Deictic and Pre-Numerative in Halliday (1985, 1994),
• Facet in Matthiessen (1995), and
• Extended Numerative in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004, 2014).

[3] To be clear, 'part' is a relation of extension, whereas the relation here is elaboration.

[4] To be clear, the 'Focus' analysis is an experiential analysis. It doesn't dispense with the need for a logical analysis. On the contrary, the analysis only arises from comparing the experiential and logical functions.

[5] To be clear, the logical Head does not move. In the above examples, it is always served by the word that precedes the structure marker of. What varies here is the experiential function that conflates with the logical Head.

[6] Trivially, of is both a structure marker and preposition in both cases.

David Rose On Parataxis

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 13 Apr 2024, at 15:53:

The thing about parataxis is it’s not reversible (realised by sequence), whereas hypotaxis is reversible (realised by status). So these two aren’t equivalent...

My friend John, ≠ John, my friend

and again at 20:11:

Funnily enough I was thinking of another line from the same tea party

they cried out when they saw Alice coming

...which is hypotactic and reversible (though not logically symmetrical). In contrast,

they saw Alice coming and then they cried out

...is paratactic and not reversible (which is what I meant).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis. Because parataxis is symmetrical, my friend, John does imply John, my friend. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 452):

Parataxis is the linking of elements of equal status…. Both the initiating and the continuing elements are free, in the sense that each could stand as a functioning whole. In principle, the paratactic relation is logically (i) symmetrical and (ii) transitive. This can be exemplified with the ‘and’ relation. (i) ‘salt and pepper’ implies ‘pepper and salt’, so the relationship is symmetrical; (ii) ‘salt and pepper’, ‘pepper and mustard’ together imply ‘salt and mustard’, so the relationship is transitive.

Hypotaxis is the binding of elements of unequal status… . The dominant element is free, but the dependent element is not. The hypotactic relation is logically (i) non-symmetrical and (ii) non-transitive. For example, ‘whe n’: (i) ‘I breathe when I sleep’ does not imply ‘I sleep when I breathe’; (ii) ‘I fret when I have to drive slowly’ and ‘I have to drive slowly when it’s been raining’ together do not imply ‘I fret when it’s been raining’.

[2] To be clear, in terms of parataxis, they saw Alice coming and they cried out imply they cried out and they saw Alice coming. It is the introduction of the logico-semantic relation of time (then) that backgrounds this paratactic symmetry.

[3] To be clear, this cannot be what Rose originally meant, since there was no temporal relation in his original example of parataxis my friend, John.

David Rose On Qualifiers

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 13 Apr, at 12:25:

Qualifiers specify a Thing, so the semantic probe (from ‘above’) is which or whose Thing?

Which year?

The year [1920]

Which city?

The city [of Rome]

and again at 12:45:

Focus attends to some aspect of the Thing – a facet, part, class or group. The Thing doesn't specify the Focus. Focus is realised by an embedded nom gp, usually linked to the nom gp by the structure marker ‘of’.

[green leaves of] the trees, [some historic buildings of] Rome

Qualifier is realised by an embedded clause or prep phrase

In The city [of Rome], ‘of’ is a preposition, specifying which city.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the Deictic, Numerative, Epithet, Classifier all serve to characterise the Thing (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 382), so the probe 'Which Thing?' does not uniquely identify a Qualifier. For example,

• which year? this year: Deictic
• which year? the third year: Numerative
• which year? a good year: Epithet
• which year? a leap year: Classifier

Likewise

• which city? her city: Deictic
• which city? the next city: Numerative
• which city? a polluted city: Epithet
• which city? the eternal city: Classifier

[2] To be clear, 'Focus' is Martin's use of a textual concept to rebrand embedded experiential elements preceding the Thing in a nominal group.

[3] This should go without saying, since it is the Thing that is characterised in a nominal group.

[4] To be clear, these are simply nominal groups with Qualifiers:

• green leaves [of the trees]
• some historic buildings [of Rome]

[of the trees] qualifies leaves in terms of type, [of Rome] qualifies buildings in terms of location.

[5] Trivially, Qualifier is also realised by an embedded adverbial group, as in

• some 4,000 million years [ago]

[6] Clearly, the structure-marking preposition of does not specify which city:

• which city? of.

David Kellogg On Non-Defining Relative Clauses

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 8 Apr 2024, at 21:32:

a) She tore up the letter, which upset me (because it was from someone I once loved).

b) She tore up the letter which upset me (because it was from someone who was blackmailing me.)

In b) the clause is indubitably rankshifted: it's a post-modifying qualifier in a nominal group--no different from "of England" in "the King of England's crown".

But why can't I consider the clause in a) to be a Circumstance of "She tore up" or some way of complexing the verbal group in the main clause? Why do I have to consider it a ranking clause in its own right?

and replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on sys-func on 10 Apr 2024, at 08:25:

I don't get why you are changing the subject, though. The question is about rank, The issue is whether the clause is part of a nominal group or part of a verb complex or (the standard interpretation) a clause complex. …

and again on 10 Apr 2024, 16:12:

I do not analyse the instance as a verbal group complex. In truth, I don't see any ambiguity whatsoever: one is a nominal group complex and the other is a hypotactic clause. 

If, however, I were applying Merge (or "subjacency"), I would have to argue that "which" is a merged conjunction and pronoun, and therefore the sentence is agnate to "She tore up the letter and upset me", which is a verbal group complex. One more reason for preferring the SFL account.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (a) is a hypotactic clause complex in which the elaborating dependent clause is a non-defining relative clause:

The fact that the relative clause is ranking, and not a constituent of the primary clause is demonstrated by the fact that, unlike true constituents, it cannot be made Theme of that clause.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, (b) is a single clause in which the Qualifier of a nominal group is a defining relative clause, shifted to word rank:

[3] To be clear, the elaborating relative clause cannot serve as a clause circumstance because it is not a clause constituent — it cannot be thematised — and it does not serve as a Role, the only type of elaborating circumstance.

When confronted with the problems facing his 'circumstance' analysis, Kellogg falsely accused CLÉiRIGh of changing the subject (see here), and at the same time, without acknowledging the fact, moved the goalposts (a logical fallacy) so his claim now became that the relative clause is part of a nominal group, The problem here is that it treats a non-defining relative clause the same as a defining relative clause:

Then, perhaps as a correction to his first movement, Kellogg moved the goalposts again so his claim now became that the relative clause is embedded as one unit of a nominal group complex:

The problem here is that complexing is only possible with units of the same rank, and in hypotactic nominal group complexes, this means with adverbial groups or prepositional phrases. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 564):

While the dominant element has to be a nominal group, dependent elements can be adverbial groups or prepositional phrases.

[4] To be clear, after twice proposing a verbal group complex as a possible analysis, Kellogg owns that this is not his analysis. He then goes on to claim that She tore up the letter and upset me features a verbal group complex. However, in SFL Theory, a verbal group complex serves a single Process. In this instance, there are two distinct Processes, one material and one mental, so it is a clause complex, not a verbal group complex:

In Kellogg's analysis, where both verbal groups in the complex serve a single Process, neither the PROCESS TYPE nor any of the participants can be identified: