John Bateman Misunderstanding Realisation

John Bateman replied to Erich Steiner on sysfling on 16 May 2018 at 06:57:

I'd only ever use 'abstraction' as an interstratal relationship (I hope); I can't get my head around the other characterizations as concerning differences in level/degree of abstraction. … 

And the problem as always with considering 'realization' as 'encoding' is primarily the intellectual baggage that encoding/decoding brings with it. I prefer the technical term and go for metaredundancy. Relations between different levels of abstraction are interesting and I don't think any kind of 'coding' metaphor gets off on the right foot, because it can sound as if the descriptions have independent existence. Co-description does it better perhaps; co-articulation too. If we take the old prism metaphor, one colour does not 'encode' another (even if there *were* 'colours'). The extent to which any of these levels of abstraction may usefully be considered to have separate 'existence' is then subsequently surely, surprise surprise, also an empirical issue. :-)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the relation of symbolic abstraction (realisation), the fundamental semiotic relation, obtains not just between strata, but throughout the architecture of SFL theory.  For example, realisation obtains

• between axes: syntagmatic structures realise paradigmatic systems, and
• between form and function: formal syntagms (nominal group ^ verbal group) realise function structures (Medium ^ Process).

Less well known, however, are the intra-stratal realisation relations entailed by grammatical metaphor.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 288-9):

The metaphorical relation is thus similar to inter-stratal realisation in that it construes a token-value type of relation. Here, however, the relation is intra-stratal: the identity holds between different meanings, not between meanings and wordings. The metaphor consists in relating different semantic domains of experience: the domain of figures is construed in terms of the domain of participants, and so on (just as in a familiar lexical metaphor the domain of intensity is construed in terms of the domain of vertical space). It is the fact that metaphor multiplies meanings within the semantic system that opens up the possibility of metaphorical chains, with one congruent starting-point and another highly metaphorical end-point (A"' stands for A" stands for A' stands for A; e.g. 'engine failure' stands for 'the failing of an engine' stands for 'an engine failed'). The semantic system is being expanded along the dimension of the metaphorical token-value relation; but the expansion is still within the semantic system itself.

[2] This misunderstands realisation.  As a symbolic identifying relation (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 288), realisation construes an identity between two levels of symbolic abstraction, a lower token and a higher value, such that either can be construed as identifying the other.  When a token is used to identify a value, the identity is encoding: it encodes a value by reference to a token; when a value is used to identify a token, the identity is decoding: it decodes a token by reference to a value.

Applied to the inter-stratal realisation relation between lexicogrammar (token) and semantics (value), if lexicogrammar is used to identify semantics, the identity encodes semantics by reference to lexicogrammar; and if semantics is used to identify lexicogrammar, the identity decodes lexicogrammar by reference to semantics.

encoding semantics by reference to lexicogrammar:

lexicogrammar	realises	semantics
Identifier Token	Process: identifying	Identified Value

decoding lexicogrammar by reference to semantics:

lexicogrammar	realises	semantics
Identified Token	Process: identifying	Identifier Value

[3] Here Bateman misconstrues 'realisation', the technical term for an ordering principle, as a metaphor.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 7):

The sound system and the writing system are the two modes of expression by which the lexicogrammar of a language is represented, or realised (to use the technical term).

[4] This misconstrues metaredundancy as a relation between two strata and as an alternative to realisation.  As Halliday (1992: 23-5) explains, realisation is itself a redundancy relation, and metaredundancy is the redundancy in a series of redundancies:

But realisation is not a causal relation; it is a redundancy relation, so that x redounds with the redundancy of y with z. To put it in more familiar terms, it is not that (i) meaning is realised by wording and wording is realised by sound, but that (ii) meaning is realised by the realisation of wording in sound.  We can of course reverse the direction, and say that sounding realises the realisation of meaning in wording.

[5] Here Bateman again raises the notion of 'existence', despite previously claiming that it "detracts" from 'the main business of work'.  More importantly, levels of symbolic abstraction are different angles on the same phenomenon, so the notion of different levels having 'independent existence' is nonsensical.

[6] Invoking the 'old prism metaphor' demonstrates that Bateman understands neither levels of abstraction nor encoding.  The colours in the spectrum of visible light are all construed at the same level of abstraction, so the notion of one colour encoding another is nonsensical.

[7] Here Bateman again raises the notion of 'existence', despite previously claiming that it "detracts" from 'the main business of work'.  On the SFL model, colours are construals of experience as meaning, further reconstrued in the field of colour perception, for example, as varying according to the frequency of photon impacts on differently sensitive cone cells in the retina.

[8] To be clear, the interpretation of empirical evidence in terms of existence (ontology) depends on the epistemological assumptions of the field.

See also John Bateman Misunderstanding Stratification And Realisation

David Rose On The Research Value Of Email List Discussions

After Bradley Smith wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 17:02:

This long, excellent discussion over the last few days reminds me of how interesting these academic list dialogues are (in terms of the history of dialogue in academia/science), as a type of text for study - I don't have the time myself, but is there someone ready to take on the task of studying the contemporary online academic dialogue (sysfling, sysfunc etc.)? (and the lack of intonation and rhythm in English orthography will be a crucial consideration, of course, whenever dialogue and debate/argument are involved).

David Rose replied at 17:56:

I suspect researchers may find our strings more interesting interpersonally than ideationally.

eliciting a further response from Bradley Smith at 18:21:

yes, that is what is interesting about written dialogic debate

Blogger Comments:

This particular researcher finds the extended discussions on the sysfling and sys-func lists fascinating, both interpersonally and ideationally.  On the one hand, in terms of the enactment of intersubjective relations, it is challenging and rewarding to use SFL theory to identify the linguistic techniques used by some interlocutors to bluff, counter-bluff and bully.  On the other hand, in terms of the construal of language as theory, it is challenging and rewarding to analyse the nature of the theoretical misunderstandings involved, and to devise the means of making effective pedagogical use of them on this blog.

John Bateman On Empirical Modes Of Discourse

John Bateman wrote to sysfling on 15 May 2018 at 16:34:

The additional power of empirical modes of discourse is that they co-articulate a (semiotically-grounded) 'real' predictively and offer further submodes of discourse that allow such discourses to develop, increasing their range of prediction. That's just called scientific method. It does not claim to be the only way of discoursing, but should be one that SFL can deal in and deal in rather centrally.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the difference between empiricism and rationalism is the relative status each gives to experience and reason, with empiricism identifying experience as the primary source of knowledge, and rationalism reason.  On the SFL model, knowledge is meaning, and ideational meaning comprises logical relations (reason) between experiential construals (experience).

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, modes of discourse are contextual modes (textual metafunction), such as spoken or written, that are realised by registers of language.  Empiricism, on the other hand, as an epistemological category, is a contextual field (ideational metafunction) that is realised by registers of language, or, more properly: a "meta-field", since epistemology is concerned with fields of fields, such as those of science or philosophy.

[3] In terms of the textual metafunction, the lexical repetition of 'co-articulate' here links cohesively back — see previous post —to 'co-articulate' in

In Peircean terms, the representamen, the interpretant and the object *co-art[i]culate* one another …

In interpersonal terms, what this repetition links is the proposition made of the Peircean triad to propositions made of 'empirical modes of discourse' and 'scientific method'.  In other words, it uses lexical cohesion to imply a proposition about the Peircean triad with regard to 'empirical modes of discourse' and 'scientific method' without presenting it as an explicit arguable proposition.

[4] Here Bateman construes an identity that encodes the additional power of empirical modes of discourse by reference to a fact:

The additional power of empirical modes of discourse	is	that they co-articulate a (semiotically-grounded) 'real' predictively and offer further submodes of discourse that allow such discourses to develop, increasing their range of prediction
Identified Value	Process: identifying	Identifier Token
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

The fact itself is realised by a clause complex within which the following relations obtain:

that they co-articulate a (semiotically-grounded) 'real' predictively	and offer further submodes of discourse that allow such discourses to develop	increasing their range of prediction
1	+ 2
	α	= β

By embedding these propositions in his fact, Bateman presents them as unarguable. However, they become arguable if they are analysed as ranking clauses. The first of these can be analysed as follows:

empirical modes of discourse	co-articulate		a (semiotically-grounded) 'real'	predictively
Sayer	Process: verbal		Verbiage	Manner: quality
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	Adjunct
Mood		Residue

The second proposition can be analysed as follows:

empirical modes of discourse	offer		further submodes of discourse that allow such discourses to develop
Identified Token	Process: identifying: possessive: benefaction		Identifier Value
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
Mood		Residue

Experientially, this construes a benefactive identity that decodes empirical modes of discourse by reference to a Value in which is embedded a further proposition:

further submodes of discourse	allow		such discourses	to develop
Creator	Process:		Existent	existential
Initiator	Process:		Actor	material: creative
Subject	Finite	Pre…	Complement	…dicator
Mood		Residue

The final proposition can be analysed as follows:

offering further submodes of discourse that allow such discourses to develop	increases		their range of prediction
Attributor	Process: qualitative		Carrier
Initiator	Process: transformative		Actor
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
Mood		Residue

Unsurprisingly, the combination of these abstract construals and unarguable propositions, all realising what is construed as a fact, silenced all Bateman's interlocutors on the matter.

[5] Here Bateman identifies his fact as scientific method:

That	's	just	called	scientific method
Identified Token	Process:		identifying	Identifier Value
Subject	Finite	mood Adjunct: intensity: counterexpectancy: limiting	Predicator	Complement
Mood			Residue

Cf the following dictionary definition:

scientific method: a method of procedure that has characterised natural science since the 17th century, consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses.