In my own practice, I have added a 7th process type modal-process, to cater to this type of process. For example, in English:
He allowed me to smoke.
They required us to teach long hours.
Verbs such as allow/permit/authorise, require/oblige, all allow projection. Yet they are not verbal in the sense that they do not necessarily involve communication, no addressee, etc. They are not mental, in that they are externalised in the real world, not just mental activity.
One could say that these last exclusion criteria are notional, while process type classification should be based on grammatical reactance. But in practice, our process type classification has always been somewhat of a hybridisation of semantic classification linked to common grammatical reactance. Halliday actually groups together various subtypes of verbal process, such as "she blamed him ..." (which do not project), the central verbals (say/tell etc,) which do project, and sometimes the non-projecting verbs such as talk/grumble etc. which in some issues of IFG are verbal. The only thing these all have in common is the shared notional involvement of verbal activity, or expanding out, communicative activity. But in the case of these "modal" processes, there is no necessary explicit communicative activity.
I haven't seen Halliday dealing with these verbs explicitly, but I may have missed it.
Blogger Comments:
[1] Here O'Donnell mistakes allowed and required for Processes of a clause in a clause complex, and on the basis of that misunderstanding proposes a new 'modal' PROCESS TYPE. In SFL Theory, each of these is the primary verbal group of a verbal group complex that serves as a material Process:
In hypotactic verbal group complexes, it is the (last) secondary verbal group that realises the PROCESS TYPE. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 568):
It is the secondary group, or last secondary group if there is more than one, that realises the process type of the clause, e.g. [material:] she seemed to mend it, [behavioural:] she seemed to laugh, [mental:] she seemed to like him, [verbal:] she seemed to tell us, [relational:] she seemed to be nice.
[2] To be clear, there is no projection in either of O'Donnell's examples, both of which are clause simplexes, not complexes. The relation between the verbal groups in each nexus is enhancement. See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 580, 582-4) on modulation in enhancing causative verbal group complexes.
[3] To be clear, this argumentation is irrelevant to the analysis of the two examples; see [1] and [2] above.
[4] To be clear, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Analysis requires taking a trinocular perspective, while giving priority to the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 48-9):
We cannot expect to understand the grammar just by looking at it from its own level; we also look into it ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, taking a trinocular perspective (Halliday, 1978: 130–131; 1996). But since the view from these different angles is often conflicting, the description will inevitably be a form of compromise. …
Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a semanticky kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself.
[5] This is misleading, because it is not true. In the first edition of IFG (1985), the verbs talk and grumble do not feature at all. In the second edition (1994), these verbs are explicitly listed as exemplifying 'near verbal' behavioural processes. Halliday (1994: 139):
The two verbs are again listed as exemplifying behavioural processes in both the third edition (2004: 251), and the fourth (2014: 302).
[6] To be clear, what (genuine) verbal processes have in common is the symbolic exchange of meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 303, 304):
‘Saying’ has to be interpreted in a rather broad sense; it covers any kind of symbolic exchange of meaning … verbal processes might more appropriately be called ‘symbolic’ processes.
[7] To be clear, O'Donnell's notion of "modal" processes derives from a misunderstanding; see [1] above.
[8] When subsequently alerted to Halliday's (1994: 285Iff) analysis by Bartlett, O'Donnell replied:
Totally right, Tom. p287 actually gives examples of force/oblige/allow as causative structures.
Not that I will give up on my own approach.
