If you have a look at Christian's chapter 'Language use in a social-semiotic perspective' in _The Routledge Handbook of Pragmatics_, especially pp. 459-60, there's a discussion of different orders of system that Christian has been using for a long time now (it appears in other publications too). I don't know if this is relevant for what Ruqaiya was saying or not, but it is relevant to discussions around whether 'social' and 'semiotic' are separable - or perhaps better, worth separating in modelling.
… interesting to see in Christian's paper that there are 'values' - meaningful distinctions - in the social system, but it's not classed as semiotic; and also, in Ruqaiya's extract, she uses the term 'significant' to refer to the social - so things signify without being semiotic.
These distinctions would seem to be in opposition to how Jay Lemke (2015) uses the term semiosis:
Meaning is a process, meaning-‐making, or semiosis. I do not use the term here to denote a relation (e.g. between signifier and signified, or among object, representamen, and interpretant as in Peirce) but rather the process of construing such relations, a process which takes place in a material system, is itself a material process (or functional system of interdependent material processes), and which functions to adapt an organism to its environment and give it enhanced capacities to alter that environment.
By Lemke's highly materialist (or biosemiotic) account or meaning, the act of associating a smell with the presence of a food source would count as semiotic. So, in this reading, a social system is a higher-level of organisation than semiosis — which is the view I was assuming when Ruqaiya's phrasing jarred. In other words, we seem to have different uses of the term semiosis even in the SFL literature - which is not a huge problem if we are aware of it.
Important to stress, though, is that none of this is to take issue with Ruqaiya's central point, but exactly the opposite, to emphasise it. Ruqaiya is making the point the use of language is related to socialisation and the social context at the time of utterance and that the meanings made through language in a situation can only be understood in connection with non-linguistic factors. The difference is that I would argue, adopting Lemke's approach, that this makes these non-linguistic factors 'semiotic' by definition, whereas Ruqaiya and Christian (via Michael and beyond) are using the term semiosis to refer to a language-like indexical system that can only arise after social organisation.
It's a bit more than just a matter or terminology, but with these distinctions in mind it's possible to consider the contribution of both uses of the term. For my own part, I think Lemke's position is more appropriate as part of a materialist and embodied account of adaptation/meaning/semiosis/language/society.
Yeah - I've always struggled with the idea of separating the social and the semiotic. At the same time, I think that there is probably a distinction worth making between the kind of meaning you get in social organisation and in language, especially if you want to talk about the emergence of language.
I agree totally, John, about the need for the theoretical distinction and, like you, I find +/- semiotic a little problematical.
Delving a bit deeper, though, I think I have a problem with the hierarchical formulation in that it suggests that language can only arise once the social is in place. I think it is more helpful to think about semiosis and sociality evolving in tandem, with the origins of both in material adaptations to the environment and with any stage in development including both in some form.
Blogger Comments:
[1] To be clear, here Bartlett misrepresents Halliday & Matthiessen's model*, which makes an important distinction between value and meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):
What then of semiotic systems? Once again with apologies for the inevitable oversimplifying, let us try and identify what it is that is added with each step in the systemic progression. A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" (which explains the need for a synoptic approach, since value is something that is manifested in forms of structure). A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning". Meaning can be thought of (and was thought of by Saussure) as just a kind of social value; but it is value in a significantly different sense — value that is construed symbolically. Meaning can only be construed symbolically, because it is intrinsically paradigmatic, as Saussure understood and built in to his own definition of valeur. Semiotic systems are social systems where value has been further transformed into meaning.
[2] To be clear, here Bartlett misunderstands the Hasan (2005: 73) quote:
The variation [between ways in which speakers use language]….can be described as a difference in the subjects’ ways of meaning, which itself arises from the internalisation of a different sense of what is relevant…. The social is as significant as the semiotic…
Hasan's point is that social difference is as important a factor in semantic variation as the semiotic, not that "things signify without being semiotic".
[3] To be clear, there is no opposition here, because Lemke is concerned with something else entirely: his identification of meaning with semogenesis, and the fact that such semiotic processes are realised in material processes of the body.
[4] To be clear, Lemke's account is not "highly materialist"; it merely relates semiosis to its material substrate.
[5] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur. The "act of associating a smell with the presence of a food source" — a mentally assigned relational process — says nothing whatsoever about the relation between semiosis and social systems, let alone their relative hierarchical locations.
[6] As can be seen from the preceding clarifications, this claim is not supported by the evidence adduced by Bartlett. In this post, the problem is merely Bartlett's multiple misunderstandings of the subject matter.
[7] This is misleading, because it is untrue. None of these authors restrict the term 'semiosis' to "a language-like indexical system". As the Halliday & Matthiessen quote in [1] above makes plain, the term 'semiotic' applies to all systems with the component 'meaning'. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 602-11) outlines different types of semiotic systems and their relation to language.
[8] As demonstrated in the clarifications above, it is Bartlett's understanding of 'semiotic' that is problematical.
[9] To be clear, this is a false dichotomy. The prior emergence of social systems does not preclude both systems "evolving in tandem". Halliday's example [p.c.] of a social system without the added component of meaning is that of eusocial insects — ants, bees and termites — where (non-symbolic) value is exchanged mostly through pheromones. An example of a semiotic system emerging from such a social system is the (symbolic) tail waggle dance of honeybees.
* Of course, this model only applies to social semiotic systems, like protolanguage, language and the epilinguistic systems made possible by language. If it is allowed that there are semiotic systems that are not social, then such systems do not emerge from social systems. Consider, for example, perceptual systems of the brain which transform impacts of photons on the retina into colours and edged surfaces, and impacts of acoustic waves on eardrums into sounds.
Halliday's distinction between value and meaning (symbolic value) has great explanatory potential. For example, biologists routinely interpret sexually selected features like the peacock's tail as signalling biological fitness to the female — that is, in semiotic terms — despite the fact that such a tail reduces the bird's ability to flee predators. If this is interpreted, instead, in social terms, as the exchange of value (cf the function of pheromones) rather than as symbolic of fitness, this contradiction vanishes. And in our own species, music is routinely assumed to semiotic, despite the fact that musical sounds do not specify meanings. Again, if music is interpreted, instead, in social terms, as value exchange, rather than symbolic exchange, this anomaly vanishes.
[7] This is misleading, because it is untrue. None of these authors restrict the term 'semiosis' to "a language-like indexical system". As the Halliday & Matthiessen quote in [1] above makes plain, the term 'semiotic' applies to all systems with the component 'meaning'. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 602-11) outlines different types of semiotic systems and their relation to language.
[8] As demonstrated in the clarifications above, it is Bartlett's understanding of 'semiotic' that is problematical.
[9] To be clear, this is a false dichotomy. The prior emergence of social systems does not preclude both systems "evolving in tandem". Halliday's example [p.c.] of a social system without the added component of meaning is that of eusocial insects — ants, bees and termites — where (non-symbolic) value is exchanged mostly through pheromones. An example of a semiotic system emerging from such a social system is the (symbolic) tail waggle dance of honeybees.
∞
* Of course, this model only applies to social semiotic systems, like protolanguage, language and the epilinguistic systems made possible by language. If it is allowed that there are semiotic systems that are not social, then such systems do not emerge from social systems. Consider, for example, perceptual systems of the brain which transform impacts of photons on the retina into colours and edged surfaces, and impacts of acoustic waves on eardrums into sounds.
Halliday's distinction between value and meaning (symbolic value) has great explanatory potential. For example, biologists routinely interpret sexually selected features like the peacock's tail as signalling biological fitness to the female — that is, in semiotic terms — despite the fact that such a tail reduces the bird's ability to flee predators. If this is interpreted, instead, in social terms, as the exchange of value (cf the function of pheromones) rather than as symbolic of fitness, this contradiction vanishes. And in our own species, music is routinely assumed to semiotic, despite the fact that musical sounds do not specify meanings. Again, if music is interpreted, instead, in social terms, as value exchange, rather than symbolic exchange, this anomaly vanishes.
