Tom Bartlett Misunderstanding Meaning Potential, Delicacy And Instantiation

Tom Bartlett wrote to sysfling on 13 October 2017 at 15:43:

We can probably bring in a phylogenetic and logogenetic perspective too - focusing on the meaning potential of the lexeme across the language as well as the construal of the process in the text -

I think this would be in line with what Lise has suggested in a couple of plenaries recently.

Each lexeme (here verb) has developed a range of possible meanings and associations at the potential end of the cline,

and when used in text (to construe a process) this range of meanings and connotations is narrowed down (but not entirely) by both the grammatical structures used and the surrounding cotext.

As Lise was suggesting, we then also need to consider the middle ground - what sorts of meaning tend to be cut down under what sorts of conditions/in what sort of situation types.

Basically, it's looking at the system-instance cline from the perspective of the individual resources (for Lise, lexis, but I would say any meaning type including structures) rather than (or complementary to) the total range of meanings that are "at risk".

Again as pointed out by Lise, we need to consider the potential of the individual resources we can draw on in a particular situation as well as the potential range of meanings we can make.

What we end up uttering is the intersection of the two, and that may leave ambiguity, etc.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Theorising by focussing on the lexical item is neither systemic nor functional, and so, is inconsistent with the perspective of Systemic Functional Grammar.  The reason it is not systemic is that a lexical item is not (a feature in) a system; instead, a lexical item is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate features in lexicogrammatical systems (as a phoneme is the synthesis of phonological features).  The reason it is not functional is that lexical items are lower in symbolic abstraction than both the lexicogrammatical features they realise, and the semantic features that the lexicogrammatical features realise.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49) explain:

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a ‘semanticky’ kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself. 

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is one of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features.  Explaining something consists not of stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness (agnation).

By adopting a different perspective on the data, Bartlett is unwittingly using a different theory to interpret the data, thereby yielding interpretations at odds with the original theory.

[2] This confuses 'potential meaning' (of a lexical item) with 'meaning potential' (system).

[3] Here Bartlett contrasts the lexical with the grammatical contributions to the meanings realised by an instantial process.  In SFL, this is theorised by the scale of delicacy.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9):

… we can differentiate both processes and participants into finer and finer subcategories, until we reach a degree of differentiation that is associated with the choice of words (lexical items). Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations. 

[4] This confuses the lexical and grammatical notions of the 'word'.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568):

The folk notion of the "word" is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical and one grammatical.

(i) Vocabulary (lexis): the word as lexical item, or "lexeme". This is construed as an isolate, a 'thing' that can be counted and sorted in (alphabetical) order. … 

(ii) Grammar: the word as one of the ranks in the grammatical system. This is, not surprisingly, where Western linguistic theory as we know it today began in classical times, with the study of words varying in form according to their case, number, aspect, person etc.

[5] The potential pole of the cline of instantiation is the system.  Because lexical items are not systems — but synthetic realisations of features — it is inconsistent to construe them as systems at the potential pole of the cline.

[6] The midway point on the cline of instantiation is register, each of which a subpotential of the overall system that varies according to situation type.  Because lexical items are not systems, it is inconsistent to construe them as subpotentials at the midway point of the cline of instantiation.

[7] Here Bartlett contrasts looking at lexis in terms of the cline of instantiation with 'the total number of meanings that are "at risk" '.  As explained above, this is a contrast between, on the one hand, a misunderstanding of delicacy and instantiation, and on the other, the system of meaning potential.

[8] Here Bartlett misconstrues (syntagmatic) structures as being on the cline of instantiation that obtains between (paradigmatic) system and instance.  This is inconsistent in terms of axis.

[9] Here Bartlett summarises by claiming that instances (texts) involve 'the intersection' of

• the potential meanings of lexical items (and grammatical structures) at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, with 
• meaning potential (the system pole of the cline of instantiation), 

As demonstrated above, the first of these arises from misunderstandings of meaning potential, delicacy and instantiation, combined with a perspective on grammar that is neither systemic nor functional.

Tom Bartlett Confusing A 'Qualitative Process' With An 'Angle' Agnate

Tom Bartlett wrote to sysfling on 13 October 2017 at 19:09:

If something matters, it has to matter to somebody, that is why it so readily takes a Circumstance of Angle (a grammatical reactance that brings in a second participant, if outside the nucleus):

It matters to me

cf. the less likely (yes, I know, I need hard evidence....)

It's big to me. 

This is because mattering is evaluative while size is (construed as) objective - and it belongs in appreciation: impact. Now, appreciation and relational clauses are a pretty congruent mix, but as we know from Appraisal, appreciation: impact is borderline with affect, which has some sort of congruency relationship (deliberately vague formulation...) with mental processes. So from this perspective, just as we analyse interesting as appreciation: impact with a nod to affect: satisfaction (if it's interesting someone must be interested), we could also analyse matter as relational with a nod to mental (because of the reactances and the systemic relations, not just notionality). In other words, matter itself is relational, but it entails a separate mental process.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Bartlett confuses the mental Process agnate of a circumstance of Angle (to me) with a qualitative attributive Process (matters).  To be clear, in SFL theory, a circumstance of Angle is agnate to a projecting mental or verbal clause.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174-5):

This type of circumstance relates to projection rather than expansion, and specifically to the projecting not the projected component. Hence there is no agnate participant; instead, the Angle corresponds to the process of saying (grammatically, the projecting verbal clause in a ‘locution’ nexus) or the process of sensing (grammatically, the projecting mental clause of an ‘idea’ nexus). Thus according to the newspaper corresponds to the newspaper says; and to her students corresponds to her students think.

[2] To be clear, Angle is a circumstance, not a participant.  However, the Range of the prepositional phrase serving as Angle does constitute an indirect participant in the Process — indirect because it is mediated through the minor Process of the prepositional phrase.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 329):

The preposition, it was suggested, acts as a kind of intermediary whereby a nominal element can be introduced as an ‘indirect’ participant in the main process.

[3] Trivially, all second participants are 'outside the nucleus', since the Nucleus comprises only the Process and its Medium.

[4] This is attempt to justify (or obfuscate) the ideational confusion identified above in [1], by arguing from the interpersonal system of appraisal: attitude.

[5] To be clear, the term 'congruent' has a precise meaning in SFL theory.  It refers to two levels of symbolic abstraction, typically semantics (meaning) and lexicogrammar (wording), within the one metafunction, being in agreement, as is the case in the absence of grammatical metaphor.  Here Bartlett applies it to the relation between interpersonal meaning (appraisal: attitude: affect) and ideational wording (transitivity: mental process clauses).

David Rose On Process Type Features

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 12 Oct 2017 at 21:08:16:

… Fourth, as Mick points out there are consistent (but also fuzzy) relations between the grammatical categories and domains of experience denoted by certain verbs (for example). I don’t think labels like behavioural, mental and so on are semantic. Rather they denote general fields of experience, beyond language. The grammar organises these fields, while lexical items are far more variable. 

A question I’m interested in is where do these relations come from? I mean our experience is so complex, fluid and variable. It seems a miracle that the grammar organises it as neatly as it does, despite the fuzz.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the theory.  In SFL, the process type features are theorised as both semantic and lexicogrammatical.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 503):

… we treat transitivity both within semantics (the paradigmatic and syntagmatic organisation of figures) and within lexicogrammar (the grammar of transitivity): it is a system construed within the content plane of language — both in the ideational component in the lexicogrammar and in the ideation base. This two-stratal approach to transitivity makes it possible to model the resource of grammatical metaphor and is fundamental to work on multilingual systems for generating text.

[2] On the one hand, this can be read as consistent with SFL theory, and so, as contradictory of Rose's previous statement.  On this reading, process type features, as ideational semantics do realise (Rose's 'denote') field, in the sense of 'field' as ideational context (the culture as semiotic system).  But this is not Rose's meaning here — as suggested by the contradiction — since Rose follows Martin's error in treating 'field' as a dimension of register.

On the other hand, this can be read as inconsistent with the epistemological assumptions on which SFL theory was developed.  On this reading, 'fields of experience beyond language' refers to the experience that is construed as ideational meaning.  On the SFL model, meaning is located within semiotic systems ("immanent"), rather than being transcendent of them.

In claiming that process type features denote (realise) 'fields of experience beyond language', Rose is (a) ascribing meaning to the domain outside semiotic systems, and (b) construing this domain as more abstract meaning than the meaning of language.  See also Philosophical Realism.

[3] On the one hand, this can be read as consistent with SFL theory if 'fields' is understood as the experience that is transformed into meaning, and if 'organises' is understood as 'construes as meaning'.  But this is not Rose's meaning here.  For Rose, 'fields' refers to (transcendent) meanings outside language, and it is the rôle of the grammar to organise them.

[4] This misunderstands the relation between grammar and lexis.  In SFL, lexical items are the synthesis of features of the most delicate systems of the lexicogrammar (just as phonemes are the synthesis of phonological features).

[5] This puzzlement arises from the epistemological inconsistencies identified above in [2] and [3].  The 'relations' arise as ideational meaning, construed of experience, in the logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis of meaning potential.

Tom Bartlett Misrepresenting IFG On Behavioural Processes

Tom Bartlett replied to Michael O'Donnell on Sysfling on 12 October 2017 at 19:48:

When we discuss concepts such as transitivity on the list there are three (at least) possible things we are doing … 

2. Suggesting the IFG analysis is wrong in its own terms - i.e. accepting the logic of IFG but suggesting this logic has been wrongly applied. This often happens when we discuss behaviourals as they now seem to be dotted about in various self-contradictory places in IFG itself.

Blogger Comments:

This is manifestly untrue and, unsurprisingly, Bartlett cites no evidence. Inconsistent interpretations of behavioural processes do, however, appear in works other than IFG, such as Deploying Functional Grammar (Martin et al 2010), as documented here. Bartlett may be confused by the misunderstandings of Banks, critiqued here.

The reason interpreters of IFG have such trouble with behavioural processes is that they are the least distinct of all the process types, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 248-50, 255) explain:

They are the least distinct of all the six process types because they have no clearly defined characteristics of their own; rather they are partly like the material and partly like the mental. … ‘behavioural’ process clauses are not so much a distinct type of process, but rather a cluster of small subtypes blending the material and the mental into a continuum …

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 136) suggest:

These can be interpreted as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental.

Mick O'Donnell On The Number Of Process Types

 Michael O'Donnell wrote to Sysfling on 12 October 2017 at 19:20:

I think part of the problem here is the assumption that all clauses possible within the English language can be explained as belonging to one of 6 different grammatical categories: material, behavioural, mental, verbal, relational, existential. 

I do agree that the bulk of the clauses of the English language conform to basic prototypes within these categories. However, the English language has a long history, and occasionally we find examples which are structurally different from other sentences. "It matters" seems to be one of these. 

Remember, Halliday's process types are supposed to be grammatical categories, linked together not only by common semantics, but also by commonality of form. 

And I have always felt it strange that the "present tense" test has always been the primary (and often only) grammatical criterion given for classifying clauses. 

I also do not accept the criterion that "IFG says so" is a valid criteria, unless IFG contains reasoning to support the categorisation. 

Looking purely structurally, "It matters" is closer in form to:

Life evolved.
Something happened.
It appeared.
He abstained.
He apologised.
He breakfasted.
etc.

Looking through a list 2,700 verbs that cannot take a complement (intransitive verbs), they seem to fall into 2 main semantic patterns:

a) Those that explain happenings (material, no agent): evolve, happen, appear.
b) verbal activity with no verbiage nor addressee: abstain, apologise, snigger, yammer, soliloquize, snitch, compromise

...and maybe a set of (rare) items that do represent semantically a relation to another participant which can be specified via a "to" circumstance:

He mattered (to me)
It bonded (to the wall)
They conformed (to the regulations)

We could then shove such cases under relational, but then it seems our unstated but primary grammatical criteria is: All clauses can be categorised under one of the six named process types. ...even when the verbs at issue reflect substantially distinct structural patterns. That to me is the problem. We are b[e]ing too simplistic, trying to fit the language into a box which is too small for it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here O'Donnell offers the historical depth of the English language as support for his contention that the most general types of process — motivated by the data — number more than six.

[2] As O'Donnell makes clear, his approach to process types proceeds from the perspectives of structure and form.  Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, on the other hand, as the name implies, is theorised from the perspectives of system and function.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a ‘semanticky’ kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself. 

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is one of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features.  Explaining something consists not of stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness (agnation).

By adopting a different perspective on the data, O'Donnell is unwittingly using a different theory to interpret the data, thereby yielding interpretations at odds with the original theory.

[3] Strictly speaking, Halliday's process types are both grammatical and semantic.  The two are in agreement (congruent) except in the case of grammatical metaphor.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 503):

… we treat transitivity both within semantics (the paradigmatic and syntagmatic organisation of figures) and within lexicogrammar (the grammar of transitivity): it is a system construed within the content plane of language — both in the ideational component in the lexicogrammar and in the ideation base. This two-stratal approach to transitivity makes it possible to model the resource of grammatical metaphor and is fundamental to work on multilingual systems for generating text.

[4] Here O'Donnell maintains his steadfast ignorance of the trinocular perspective that Halliday used in theorising the grammar; see previous posts here, here, and especially here.  The theory of process types arises from looking at the grammar (1) from above (what meanings are being realised?), (2) from roundabout (what other systemic variants are possible?), and (3) from below (how are they realised?).

[5] This is a statement about the competence of the most intrusive list members, not about the criteria used by Halliday, as set out in IFG.  For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 354):

[6] In citing IFG, an analyst is, of course, referring the reader to both the theoretical assumptions and the reasoning on which an analysis is based.

[7] Trivially, the clause it bonded (to the wall) is material, not relational, both on the basis of what it means (from above), and what would be the unmarked present tense (from roundabout).

[8] This risks a misunderstanding.  The six named process types are the most general categories only.  The total number of process types construed by the SFL approach is enormous, but won't be known until these most general types are elaborated into more and more delicate categories, to the point where each lexical item is specified.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198):

… we can differentiate both processes and participants into finer and finer subcategories, until we reach a degree of differentiation that is associated with the choice of words (lexical items).