Wednesday 18 September 2024

David Rose Misconstruing Post-Deictic As Submodifier

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 8 Sept, 15:56:

But there’s also the issue that nominal group functions are realised at word rank. So is it just one Deictic function realised by a word complex?

Martin and co argue so for Classifiers and Epithets. 

(So can epithesis also be realised prosodically, before and/or after a Numerative?the same inevitable two stupid questions???

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the function of the post-Deictic is to identify a subset of the class of ‘thing’. Logically, it pre-modifies the Head. This analysis misrepresents its function as sub-modifying within the Pre-modifier; that is, it misconstrues same as modifying the, instead of thing.

[2] No, because Epithets don't precede Numeratives. Instead, attitude can be realised in post-Deictics and Epithets, as explained in previous posts.

At this point, Rose gives up his fight against Cléirigh's analysis of 'mere' as a post-Deictic.

Tuesday 17 September 2024

David Rose Misunderstanding 'Post-Deictic'

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 8 Sept 2024, at 14:23:

I think this is an important question... 'post-Deictic' is actually functionally defined in IFG p373
a second Deictic element in the nominal group, one which adds further to the identification of the subset in question
More specifically...
The post-Deictic identifies a subset of the class of ‘thing’ by referring to its fame or familiarity, its status in the text, or its similarity/dissimilarity to some other designated subset.
Examples follow, illustrating these identifying functions. But then...
Also found in the post-Deictic position in the nominal group are words expressing the speaker’s attitude
Examples follow that have no identifying function. They actually evaluate the Numerative+Thing...
the splendid three Pyramids
those miserable two miles of asphalt and concrete.
a lousy two weeks in New Jersey
an impressive 30 or 60 minutes of high-quality recordings.
a disappointing 9,000 copies.

With this in mind, here are the preceding examples of ‘non-attitudinal’ post-Deictics. Some are clearly identifying...
this same container
the whole four hours
the only right way

Others are evaluating, and less obviously identifying...
the necessary first step
the possible role
the customary grisly inhabitants of Tartarus
A typical elution curve

Epithets can also have an identifying function... 
if I say the long train, the specific Deictic the indicates that you can tell, and that the necessary information is contained in the experiential Epithet long. This particular train, in other words, is defined by its length [p376]

The functional difference between post-Deictics and Epithets seems fuzzy...

The words occurring as post-Deictic are adjectives, and may also occur in the function of Epithet but with a different sense. This different sense is not defined.

This seems like a potentially fruitful area for further research.


Blogger Comments:

At this point, Rose has finally given up disputing CLÉiRIGh's analysis of the aforementioned instances of 'mere' functioning as post-Deictics, and switched to questioning the theoretical status of 'post-Deictic'.

[1] To be clear, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 373) explicitly states: the function of the post-Deictic is to identify the subset of the class of Thing, and this is the case in all the examples they provide and which Rose quotes. Here Rose has misunderstood this use of the word 'identification' to mean Martin's discourse semantic system of IDENTIFICATION, which is itself a misunderstanding of grammatical reference (Halliday & Hasan 1976).

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. The different sense of an adjective functioning as post-Deictic vs Epithet is explained as the different function of post-Deictic vs Epithet. The function of the post-Deictic was quoted by Rose from Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 373):
The post-Deictic identifies a subset of the class of ‘thing’ by referring to its fame or familiarity, its status in the text, or its similarity/dissimilarity to some other designated subset.

The function of the Epithet, on the other hand, is clearly distinct from that of the post-Deictic. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 376):

The Epithet indicates some quality of the subset, e.g. old, long, blue, fast; since qualities are denoted by adjectives, Epithets are often realised by adjectives. … (i) The quality of the subset may be an objective property of the thing itself, construed as a depiction of the experience of the entity that it represents; or (ii) it may be an expression of the speaker’s subjective attitude towards it … . We refer to these as (i) experiential Epithets and (ii) interpersonal, or attitudinal, Epithets, respectively. … The principal difference is that experiential Epithets are potentially defining, whereas interpersonal ones are not.

[3] To be clear, adequate research has been done — just not by Rose.

Monday 16 September 2024

David Rose Explaining 'Mere' By Coupling

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 8 Sept 2024, at 11:15:

Can I suggest we think in terms of coupling? 

...first of lexical items – e.g. attitudinal mere with a target entity such as housemaid, construing a value in a field, such as a person’s occupational status. 

...secondly of lexical choices with grammatical functions. Given that attitude is expressed prosodically through structures such as nom gps – how does the choice of gram function adjust the meaning?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'coupling' is merely Martin's term for grouping any selections.

[2] To be clear, this coupling of lexical items is merely taking a lexical perspective on APPRAISAL:
Under the [APPRECIATION] subcategory of `social value', the object, product or process is evaluated according to various social conventions. This domain is very closely tied to field in that the social valuation of one field will not be applicable or relevant in another.
[3] Trivially, 'entity' is not a type of lexical item, but a semantic category, and attitudes are interpersonal, and so enact (social relations as meaning); it is ideational systems that construe (experience as meaning).

[4] To be clear, the choice of lexical item adds different lexical (more delicate) features to a grammatical function, such as Epithet vs post-Deictic. Meaning is realised by all the lexicogrammatical features, from the most general (grammatical) to the most delicate (lexical).

Sunday 15 September 2024

David Rose Misconstruing 'Mere' As A Judgement Of Capacity

Your questions always demand a bit of SF rigor. Quite right about the word class... I was blinded from above... manner degree so adverb... but mere/merely : adjective/adverb. …
And you’re right about gradability... in this context is it a judgement of capacity? Construing a series... a lowly scullery maid – mere housemaid – capable housekeeper


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the topic sentence ("hyper-Theme"), with 'rigour' being Rose's evaluation of what follows.

[2] To be clear, the meaning of 'mere(ly)' is interpersonal (counter-expectancy: limiting), not experiential (manner: degree). For example, in he merely said it wasn't cooked properly, the Adjunct merely is not circumstantial: it does not qualify the manner in which he said it.

[3] Clearly, 'a mere housemaid' is not a judgement of the capacity of a servant. Mere housemaids may be more capable or less capable. In terms of APPRAISAL, it might be seen as a negative appreciation of the status of 'housemaid' in terms of social value:
But the fact that I’d sort of gone from that status position down to merely a housemaid, you know? 

Saturday 14 September 2024

David Rose Misconstruing 'Mere' As An Adverb Of Manner Serving As Attitudinal Epithet

What would be for you the function of 'mere' in the structure of a nominal group? …
But the fact that I’d sort of gone from that status position down to a mere housemaid, you know? … 
Linguists who specialise in corpus studies tend to refer to themselves, rather disingenuously, as ‘mere data-gatherers’.
Could it be an Epithet?

I guess I’d ask what it’s doing in the nominal group (with clues from its word class and position). Isn’t it evaluating the Thing? So an attitudinal Epithet? ...realised by an adverb of manner:degree, preceding the Thing. Then how about ‘a mere three years later’ or ‘the mere mention of his name’



Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, some adjectives can serve as either Epithet or post-Deictic (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 373-4), and so can evaluate as either Epithet or post-Deictic. Here Rose is ignoring the fact that CLÉiRIGh had already (heteroglossically) identified the function of mere in these instances as post-Deictic realising counter-expectancy: limiting. That is, the meaning of a mood Adjunct of intensity is here realised in a different grammatical domain: as the post-Deictic of a nominal group. The mood Adjunct agnates of the two instances are:
But the fact that I’d sort of gone from that status position down to merely a housemaid, you know? … 
Linguists who specialise in corpus studies tend to refer to themselves, rather disingenuously, merely as ‘data-gatherers’.

[2] Clearly, 'mere' is an adjective, not an adverb, and Olivares subsequently informed Rose of the fact. 

Friday 13 September 2024

Brad Smith On Intonational Prominence

yes: 'good reason' is purpose, or function, which is stratal (in relation to higher strata). 
So far as intonational prominence goes, though, it is at the speaker's discretion whether to assign a marked/non-congruent choice greater prominence (eg whether a marked mood-tone co-selection, as realisation of complex interpersonal discourse semantics and tenor relations, is given textual prominence, eg through tonicity) — 
however, I do observe, as a general rule, that when a marked choice is made in an intonation system (eg marked tonicity), there is found to be a decided excess in the phonetic expression - speakers will make sure the listener hears the marked choice (in the same way they might more carefully articulate a particular lexical choice). But this is probably way too complex a topic for me to be delving into while in the middle of other work :)

 

and David Rose replied at 12:09:

//5 ^ ba / rill iant // 


Blogger Comments:

[1] This re-expresses a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[2] To be clear, looking to the higher stratum to find the reason for a marked choice is what the text analyst does, whereas making the marked choice is what the speaker does.

[3] As previously explained, in SFL Theory, 'marked' and 'non-congruent' are not synonymous. Congruence only applies to the natural relation between semantics and lexicogrammar on the content plane. Applying it to the relation between lexicogrammar and phonology invents the non-existent resource of "phonological metaphor".

[4] This confuses metafunctions and axes. To be clear, the tonic realises an element of structure as the Focus of New information (textual, syntagmatic), not a "marked mood-tone" co-selection (interpersonal, paradigmatic).

[5] This exemplifies a point made by a quote in the post that Smith (and Rose) are reacting to. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236):

In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’].
[6] See David Rose Positively Judging And Appreciating Brad Smith.

Thursday 12 September 2024

David Rose Solving The Non-Problem Of The Synonymy Of 'Unmarked', 'Default' And 'Neutral'

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 9 Sept, at 10:43:

Yep, the apparent synonymy of unmarked, default and neutral were pedagogic issues for Brad designing his intonation course (and perhaps for us all). A possible solution lies in their differing usage (instantial). 
Marked/unmarked are used as technical labels for features in textual systems, where the marked option realises textual prominence (stratal). 
Default tends to connote skewed frequency, which realises unmarked features (axial). 
Neutral tends to be used for ungraduated features in interpersonal systems (eg key)

My friend Giacomo Figueredo pointed out that description generalises (same stratum) but explanation abstracts (higher stratum). So look up for reasons (eg prominence in discourse).

*I meant to say ‘Default tends to connote skewed frequency *of structures*, which realise unmarked features (axial).


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'default' and 'neutral' are glosses for 'unmarked' as a description of an option in a system. There is no problem requiring a solution.

[2] To be clear, the marked/unmarked distinction is not restricted to the textual metafunction, but is used for systems realising any metafunction, e.g. TENSE and TONE.

[3] To be clear, both the marked and unmarked option of THEME assign textual prominence to an element of structure (axial, not stratal).

[4] To be clear, 'default' describes the 'unmarked' or 'neutral' choice in a system, so the structure that realises that systemic choice is the 'default' or 'unmarked' or 'neutral' structure (axis). Skewed probabilities are a system property, whereas skewed frequencies are an instance property (instantiation).

[5] To be clear, in the system of KEY, 'neutral' is a feature in the system, not a description of a feature as unmarked or default. 

[6] To be clear, here Rose is presenting part of the post he is reacting to (below) as if it hadn't already been stated in that post. Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7):

Many systems embody the distinction between an unmarked term and a marked one, and the distinction may be reflected in the descriptive names given to the terms, as in “unmarked theme” vs. “marked theme”. An alternative label for the unmarked term is “neutral”, as in the interpersonal of (declarative) KEY (e.g. Halliday & Greaves, 2008: 50), where ‘neutral’ key is unmarked and the other keys are marked (‘challenging’, ‘non-committal’, ‘reserved’, ‘strong’); another alternative label is “default”.
The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:
1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [ ↘ not]), voice (active/passive [ ↘ be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [ ↘ -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.
2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).
3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

Wednesday 11 September 2024

David Rose Misunderstanding Markedness

David Rose replied to Brad Smith on asflanet on 2 Sept 2024, at 21:21:

As you say, it’s related to instantiation, specifically the probability of instantiation... less likely choices are more marked. That gets you into knots with tone 1 imperatives here, which you say are ‘unmarked’ but are no more frequent than other tones in your data. A problem may be ambiguity of the term ‘neutral’. It can mean unmarked, but in Halliday’s key system it means neutral force, in contrast to mild, strong etc.
PS Key treats grammar/tone couplings as delicate mood choices, but another perspective is delicate speech function and appraisal choices... ‘what a command is trying to get done ‘
In contrast, marked/unmarked are used technically as feature labels in textual systems, theme and information focus. Could we perhaps avoid using these terms quasi-technically in pedagogic contexts, and reserve them for textual features? The ‘good reason’ is textual prominence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no problem here because markedness is not defined by frequency. Halliday (2005 [1991]: 68):

An unmarked term is a default condition: that which is selected unless there is good reason for selecting some other term. It is not defined by frequency, but it is likely to correspond to the more probable term in a system whose probabilities are skew.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 169) identify the different speech functions realised by imperative mood realised by different tones as follows:

command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)
invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)
request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t
plea: tone 4

The frequency of a selected tone will thus vary with the frequency of a selected speech function realised by imperative mood in a given text type, and this varies with the tenor relations of the interlocutors.

[2] This misunderstands the distinction between a feature and a classification of feature. In Halliday's system of KEY, Halliday & Greaves (2008: 208) 'neutral' is one of the features, not a classification of a feature as neutral or unmarked:


[3] This misrepresents the SFL model. To be clear, SPEECH FUNCTION (semantics) is realised by MOOD (lexicogrammar), and different features of KEY (lexicogrammar), realised by different features of TONE (phonology), differentiate the SPEECH FUNCTION of a MOOD into more delicate types. An example is the case of commands being differentiated into invitations, requests and pleas according to the tone selection, as in [1] above.

[4] To be clear, the unmarked/marked distinction is not restricted to features of textual systems, as demonstrated by the unmarked/marked distinction for the system of TONE, which realises interpersonal systems. Another interpersonal example is the unmarked choice of Subject; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 194):

For any clause, there is one choice of Subject that is ‘unmarked’ – that is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In a giving clause (offer or statement), the unmarked Subject is ‘I’; while in a demanding clause (question or command), the unmarked Subject is ‘you’.

An experiential example is unmarked/marked distinction for present tense, which varies according to PROCESS TYPE

[5] This misunderstands the 'good reason' principle. To be clear, 'textual prominence' is what choosing an element as Theme or New affords, and this is the case whether the choice is unmarked or marked. The 'good reason' principle, on the other hand, is what lies behind the choice of a marked option in preference to the unmarked option.

Tuesday 10 September 2024

Brad Smith On Markedness Not Explained In Theoretical Terms

Saying unmarked is the option one chooses except where there is 'some good reason', while helpful in learning how to analyse markedness, doesn't really explain the concept in theoretical terms. So far, until better educated, I am sticking with my discourse semantics motivation: imperative mood, phylogenetically and functionally, is the option to enact a command - to get that job done; and other options, co-selected with tone choices, are used to enact more complex moves such as polite command: '//1 ^ can I / start the order with your */ phone number please // ('give me your phone number' + deference)
and again at 14:17:
I guess my question with theoretical terms and concepts is, what am I asking this term/concept to do for me? We can never, sadly or not, get away from 'language turned back on itself' and all that implies... (including if we use multimodal semiotics as metadiscourse... mathematicians and scientists take note!)


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is linguistic data produced by speakers and writers that are analysed, not markedness. Once data are theorised as a system network, relative markedness can be assigned by a linguist to alternative features in a system.

[2] To be clear, glossing 'unmarked' as the default or neutral choice explains the concept in everyday terms. On the other hand, Matthiessen, Teruya & Lam (2010: 236-7) explain the concept in terms of the theoretical dimensions of axis, instantiation and stratification:

The contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is manifested in different ways:


1. In terms of the hierarchy of axis, the ‘unmarked’ term in a system tends to have a less prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis, the limiting case being absence of a syntagmatic marker [‘do nothing’], whereas the ‘marked’ term tends to have a more prominent realisation along the syntagmatic axis [‘do something’]. Typical examples are the systems of polarity (positive/negative [  not]), voice (active/passive [  be . . . v-en]) and number (singular/plural [  -s]). In addition, there is a tendency for the marked term to lead to systems of greater delicacy differentiating different kinds of marking.


2. In terms of the cline of instantiation, the contrast between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is skew: the unmarked term is selected much more frequently in text than the marked one, and this can be interpreted as a skew in probability between unmarked 0.9 and marked 0.1 (see, for example, Halliday, 1991c).


3. In terms of the hierarchy of stratification, the contrast in marking between ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ is subject to the good reason principle at the stratum above: the unmarked term is selected unless there is a good reason to select the marked one. Thus, while the selection of the marked term must be motivated, the selection of the unmarked one needn’t.

[3] To be clear, this is Halliday's theory, not Martin's discourse semantics.

[4] For some of the theoretical problems that invalidate the model of discourse semantics, see e.g.
[5] To be clear, like any theoretical concept, markedness is a means of understanding how language functions. For example, if a selection is marked, then there is a motivation for the selection to be sought. 

[6] To be clear, language is the most powerful semiotic system, so using language to model language is using the most powerful semiotic system to model language.

[7] To be clear, 'metadiscourse' is literally discourse about discourse. From an SFL perspective, what gets classified as metadiscourse is non-ideational meaning: aspects of interpersonal and textual meaning. It may be that Smith meant 'metalanguage', but this only applies to linguistic theory — language about language — not to (language about) mathematics and (language about) science.

Monday 9 September 2024

Brad Smith On Phonological Congruence And His Problem With Markedness

Brad Smith replied to ChRIS CLÉiRIGh on asflanet on 3 September 2024 at 9:43 :

… in the SFL material I was browsing through yesterday afternoon, the terms unmarked and congruent seemed to be used more or less interchangeably.

I am not seeking to find the canonical definition to follow, but working out my own ideas on this (I believe, as a Doctor, this is not only my right but my responsibility!). The quoted passage from my YouTube lecture script, I think, is probably where I land on this: congruence, at least, relates, as you have said, to an inter-stratal relation, specifically what is being demanded of clause and tone group by the discourse semantics (that's my current take on this aspect).

There are other, similarly troublesome issues of terminology and symbolism in SFL: for example, the same symbol, with minor, inconsequential adjustment, is used for both structural ordering and for a silent Ictus!

In terms of intonation, however, unlike much of the rest of his work, this has not, relatively speaking, happened as much as I think Halliday wished or expected - for example, the functions of tonicity are still discussed in terms of (Given-New) structure; when the real game, for me, has always been, what gets chosen as focus against the background of what could have been chosen?...i.e. what is the systemic potential for a textual choice? (which, when you start to consider it, is a question with a lot of implications, including for theoretical accounts). 
Markedness is not a systemic description, it is a post hoc account of the valeur of certain choices: we consider, for example, which systemic option in the system of mood is unmarked; but this assignment of markedness, however, is not itself a systemic description - the systemic description of mood is declarative, polar interrogative etc. - We still have to work out what the actual potential for choice is for systems of tonicity, salience etc. (eg within/outside of the mood block can, in some texts, be consequential).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as demonstrated in the previous post, Smith's 'current take' on the interchangeability of 'unmarked' and 'congruent' is a theoretically invalid misunderstanding.

[2] To be clear, the troublesome issue here is using the symbol ^ for ordering (a^b) and the symbol ‸ for silent Ictus (/‸ /).

[3] To be clear, every non-tonic salient syllable realises what could have been selected as the tonic that realises the Focus of New information. The choice of the Given + New structure of an information unit, on the other hand, is a grammatical selection: tonicity is the phonological means of realising it.

[4] This misunderstands 'valeur'. To be clear, 'valeur' (Saussure) is the value of a term in a system in relation to the other terms.

[5] To be clear, descriptive terms like 'declarative', 'polar interrogative' etc. are features that describe language, whereas theoretical terms like 'unmarked' describe the features.

[6] To be clear, a selection of tonic placement realises a selection of a Focus of New information, which gives textual prominence to one or more functional elements of mood (and transitivity and thematic) structure.

Sunday 8 September 2024

Brad Smith Confusing Markedness And Incongruence

With a yes/no question move, the polarity is at issue – that is what a yes/no question is all about! Hence, the unmarked, or congruent co-selection in mood and tone for a yes/no question is polar interrogative with rising pitch tone 2.

So when I say that the tone 1 imperative mood is the unmarked, or congruent choice for a command, I mean that these co-selections in clause and tone group are congruent with what a command is trying to get done with language – the issue of polarity is not at stake, hence we expect a command to have a falling tone 1 pitch contour. The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide (e.g polar interrogative + falling tone 1 for a polite command) are based on our understanding of what the congruent choices are, using such unconscious knowledge to motivate the use of language in non-congruent, or metaphorical ways.

The marked, or metaphorical choices in the examples in the previous slide illustrate what happens when more complex contextual aspects are operating that make more demands of the language – and, in fact, such complexity is more common than not in social interactions!


Blogger Comments:

This confuses markedness with incongruence. Markedness is 'intra-system': whether a choice is the default/neutral one (unmarked) or not (marked). Congruence is 'inter-stratal' within content: whether the meaning and wording agree (congruent) or not (metaphorical). Importantly, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction only applies to the realisation relation between strata of the content plane, semantics and lexicogrammar, and is only made possible by the natural relation between them. 

That is, the congruent vs metaphorical distinction does not apply to the realisation relation between lexicogrammar and phonology — there is no "phonological metaphor". For example, in realising declarative mood, the relation between unmarked tone 1 and marked tone 2 is not metaphorical, since 'protesting statement' (tone 2) is not a metaphor for 'statement' (tone 1).

Wednesday 10 July 2024

Bob Hodge On Understanding What Grammar Is

Bob Hodge wrote to sys-func on 8 Jul 2024, at 17:50:

Thanks for this great intervention, which raises so many important issues about the architectures of SFL, as proposed by Halliday and can be hypothesised now.

Two points:
  1. I don't think Halliday had entirely settled views on grammar in his social phase. 'Grammaticality' seems to have a multimodal scope, yet 'grammar' often is restricted to verbal language. I'm not sure how much that difference should be insisted on.
  2. Whatever it is, it seems to be something that comes in late in the evolutionary process. A kind of emergent structure. If it is something which comes in earlier, then it should be different in some key respects from what we understand as grammar drawing on adult language.
Whatever we come to think of it, I suggest that all linguists, SFL included, should be less sure that we understand what grammar is


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday was quite definite on grammar, in the SFL sense, being restricted to language, a decade after his retirement (Halliday 1996; Halliday & Matthiessen 1999). Moreover, it is the only interpretation that is consistent with his theory, given his definition of grammar.

[2] Cf. Halliday (2002[1996]: 388):

We could locate grammatico-semantic systems within the framework of an evolutionary typology of systems, as in Figure 1. In this frame, semiotic systems appear as systems of a fourth order of complexity, in that they are at once physical and biological and social and semiotic. Within semiotic systems, those with a grammar in them are more complex than those without.

[3] To be clear, SFL Theory is formulated in the tradition of the 'immanent' orientation to meaning. This means that its epistemological stance is that meaning does not transcend semiotic systems — a position that is supported by the experimental findings of Quantum Physics. This means that the meaning of 'grammar' — "what grammar is" — does not transcend semiotic systems. This means that "what grammar is" is a construal of a semiotic system, such as a linguistic theory. This means that each linguistic theory determines for itself "what grammar is". This, in turn, depends on the assumptions on which the theory is based. The validity of a theory and its assumptions are a separate matter.

It is the theory which decides what we can observe.
— Albert Einstein

Tuesday 9 July 2024

Ed McDonald On Halliday's Grammar-Centrism

Ok, so this is not "linguistic imperialism" but it does seem like "grammar-centrism". It strikes me that, though I'm not aware if anyone has ever made this argument, that both (adult) language and music could equally be seen as "outgrowths" of protolanguage, particularly if we look at spoken language and singing. Given that music lacks the line of arbitrariness, i.e. that musical meanings are in the first instance indexical, not symbolic, the argument for the priority of grammar seems less convincing in this instance.

Any multimodalists like to weigh in here about other semiotic systems? Do they all depend on the prior existence of grammar? It would seem to me that systems depending on iconicity don't necessarily.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday's view that language is the only semiotic system with a grammar is merely the view that is consistent with his Systemic Functional Theory and the assumptions on which is based.

[2] To be clear, song lyrics are language, as are musical notation and theory. The question of whether music itself requires its makers to have language, depends on how music is defined. If music is narrowly defined as restricted to humans, then music is defined as requiring its makers to have language. However, if music is more broadly defined to include the structured use of rhythm and pitch variation in other species, most notably birdsong and whalesong, then music is not defined as requiring its makers to have language. This still leaves open the question of whether music is social (value) or semiotic (symbolic value), in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy of complex systems.

[3] Given that no evidence is given for musical meanings, or a natural indexical relation between such meanings and their expression, this is an instance of the bare assertion (ipse dixit) fallacy.

[4] Lest this be misunderstood, the question is whether the users of non-linguistic semiotic systems have a grammar. Halliday (2002[1996]: 389): 

On the other hand, human adults also develop numerous non-linguistic semiotic systems: forms of ritual, art forms, and the like; these have no grammar of their own, but they are parasitic on natural language – their meaning potential derives from the fact that those who use them already have a grammar.

[5] To be clear, one way to assess whether a semiotic system requires its users to have a grammar is to look for such a system in species without a grammar. To date, no other species have been demonstrated represent their experience iconically by drawing pictures, and the earliest evidence of human cave painting long postdates the estimated emergence of language.

Monday 8 July 2024

Ed McDonald On Halliday's Linguistic Imperialism

We've often had this debate before, and presumably if music has no "grammar" it has no "semantics" either. I would agree, in the sense that those two terms are traditionally applied to language and so come with all sorts of associations and presuppositions. … 
But as a semiotic system - by definition (IMFFHO) - must have the two mutually defining strata of what in general terms I like to call interpretation and expression: specifically for music, what I call "phonotactics" and "e/motion" - see my 2021 paper in Language, Context, Text, then it presumably has a "grammar" of sorts, in the sense of distinctive patterns with significant interpretations. In a separate step, In relation to music, I also depart from orthodoxy in characterising the expression stratum of phonotactics as purely textural (= textual), with the other metafunctions coming in only at the stratum of e/motion, whether interactional (= interpersonal) or figurative (= ideational) (I haven't found the need to distinguish between experiential and logical). …

Halliday "privileging" language in this way for me invokes the spectre of what, following Horst Ruthrof, I call "linguistic imperialism"; and the fact that Social Semiotics (again IMFFHO) is shot through with linguistic imperialism for me explains why Ruqaiya for one didn't "believe in" multimodality, in the sense of a model of same that wasn't simply parasitic on the theory of language.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here McDonald is commenting on Halliday's view (2002[1996]: 388-9) that language is the only semiotic system that has a grammar, in his sense of the term.

[2] This misunderstands Halliday. On Halliday's model, if music is a social semiotic system, then it has content and expression, but its content is not stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar. For Cléirigh, on the other hand, in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy of complex systems, music is social, not semiotic. That is, it carries value, but not symbolic value. In terms of Edelman's neuroscientific theory, music selects perceptual categorisations of positive or negative value, and such value systems play an important rôle in the experience of emotions.

[3] Again, this misunderstands Halliday. For Halliday, the "two mutually defining strata" are the content and expression planes, following Hjelmslev. This is a prerequisite of semiotic systems, but it does not entail that content is stratified to include a grammar, in Halliday's sense, as 'an entirely abstract semiotic construct that emerges between the content and the expression levels of the original, sign-based primary semiotic system' (ibid.).

[4] To be clear, the problem with reconstruing 'content' as 'interpretation' is that the latter is the perspective of the listener only.

[5] This misunderstands the metafunctions. The metafunctions are types of meanings, and so are a dimension of the content plane only. For example, phonological systems are not metafunctional; they realise metafunctional meanings of the content plane.

[6] As demonstrated above, McDonald's accusation of "linguistic imperialism" is entirely unwarranted, since it derives only from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's theorising.

Tuesday 25 June 2024

David Rose On Homophoric Reference, Contact And Instantiation

David Rose wrote to SYSFLING on 24 Jun 2024, at 19:35:

Homophoric reference is characteristic of contraction, instantiating close contact, discussed in English Text, eg from p531... 
... 
Leaving homophoric ‘the’ unsaid instantiates even closer contact.

and again at 21:27:

This little quote from Working with Discourse Ch 9 encapsulates it...
Contraction refers to the amount of work it takes to exchange meanings, and the idea that the better you know someone the less explicitness it takes... Technically speaking, the less information a homophoric reference contains, the tighter the community it constructs and the more people it excludes.


Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the instance under discussion is:
in the scene where the couple realise they are being stalked by the iconic masked killers, they get into the car trying to escape and the guy says:


[1] To be clear, if the speaker had said the car won't start, the reference would be exophoric to the car they are sitting in, not homophoric (self-specifying). But he could also have used other Deictics, such as our or my, which do not serve as reference items.

[2] To be clear, the proposed relation here would be realisation, not instantiation, since this is concerned with the relation between context and language. Instantiation is the relation between potential and instance.

[3] Rose's claim here is that the reason why the Deictic could be omitted in this instance is because of the amount of contact between the interlocutors, husband and wife. This suggests that if the speaker's addressee, sitting beside him in the car, had been a hitchhiker he had just met, and he had said simply car won't start, the addressee would need to have the referent clarified, with something like which car?

Sunday 21 April 2024

David Rose On Adverbial Group Agnation

David Rose wrote to asflanet on 16 Apr 2024, 20:00:
agnation for the consumer


... as subtypes of intensification

The nominal realisation is downranked and metaphorical (as with [in the past]). Like congruent adverbial realisations, it can be further intensified and combine with polarity and comparison (but not identically).


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is part of Rose's argument that 4.5 billion years ago is an adverbial group. Here he claims that it is agnate with the adverbial group long ago, in that the two are related through the adverbial group system of intensification. There are two problems with this claim.

First, intensification is not a system of the adverbial group, so the two variants are not systemically related through intensification. Instead, 'intensification' describes a type of adverb serving as a Premodifier. Clearly, an embedded nominal group is not a type of adverb. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 420-1):
The items serving as Premodifiers are adverbs belonging to one of three types – polarity (not), comparison (more, less; as, so) and intensification. … Those of intensification indicate higher or lower intensity; they are either general intensifiers that are interpersonally neutral (very, much, quite, really, completely, totally, utterly; rather, fairly, pretty; almost, nearly), including the interrogative adverb how, or specific ones that derive from some interpersonally significant scale (amazingly, astonishingly, awfully, desperately, eminently, extraordinarily, horribly, incredibly, perfectly, terribly, terrifically, unbelievably, wonderfully).
Second, if the nominal group 4.5 billion years is interpreted as premodifying ago, then it specifies the temporal extent of ago, not its intensification.

Instead, 4.5 billion years [ago] is a nominal group that is agnate with the nominal group 4.5 billion years [in the past], since they differ only in how a feature of the QUALIFICATION system is realised: as an embedded adverbial group (ago) or an embedded prepositional phrase (in the past). Matthiessen (1995: 669):

On the basis of Matthiessen's network, the feature they both realise is enhancing qualification: time: past.

[2] To be clear, in the case of the two nominal groups, 4.5 billion km away and 4.5 billion years ago, the Qualifiers away and ago are embedded adverbial groups, not ranking adverbs (as Rose would have it). This can be shown by the potential for modification:
  • 4.5 billion km further away [than that]
  • 4.5 billion years longer ago [than that]

[3] As demonstrated above, it is the adverbial group ago that downranked like the prepositional phrase in the past, not 4.5 billion years.

[4] To be clear, this potential is available to nominal groups:

not so very many years [as that]

Saturday 20 April 2024

David Rose On Focus Structures

The argument in IFG 6.2.5 is elegantly designed to explain nom gps with two Heads, ‘a phenomenon that from one point of view appears as a single entity and from another point of view as two’.

It begins by positing a dual experiential/logical structure at group rank, in order to then posit a post-modifier function in the logical structure, in which the experiential Thing is embedded in the Complement of a downranked prep phrase. This model is then applied to a series of nom gp structures, culminating with this one.


What if we were to argue instead from this example backwards? As facet is just one of the semantic options for this type of structure (richly captured in IFG Table 6-11), we could generalise its function name, e.g. as Focus. While the Deictic and Thing in this nom gp are realised by words, the Focus is realised by a downranked nom gp, that is linked to the hills by the structure marker ‘of’, whose function we could label LK for Linker.


As the Thing in the Focus nom gp is downranked, do we need an additional logical structure in which the primary Thing is downranked?

Working backwards, similar structures are analogous with this one, such as those classified as Classifier/Head in IFG.


Or Epithet/Head


This last one is ‘a more restricted type’ which seems to have evolved as an idiomatic realisation of attitude, on the model of the more common Focus structures.


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is not true. To be clear, a nominal group has only one logical Head. Rose's misunderstanding is resolved by the part of the quote he omitted. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 396): 

In all such nominal expressions where Head and Thing are not conflated although both are clearly present, what is being construed is a phenomenon that from one point of view appears as a single entity and from another point of view as two.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. To be clear, the experiential Thing is not embedded. It is the nominal group serving as Facet that is embedded in the experiential analysis. The Thing in the experiential structure conflates with the Head of an embedded nominal group in the logical structure.

[3] To be clear, this merely describes the general function of the Extended Numerative in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 395), with Matthiessen's 'Extended Numerative' rebranded as Martin's 'Focus'.

[4] To be clear, this creates a theoretical inconsistency, since 'linker' is a class of conjunction that marks a paratactic relation, whereas of is not a conjunction and does not mark a paratactic relation.

[5] To be clear, there is no Thing function in the logical structure of a nominal group. Moreover, the logical structure is necessary in such instances to show that the Head and Thing are dissociated.

[6] To be clear, these analyses fail to (i) recognise the dissociation of Head and Thing, (ii) distinguish between Classifier and Epithet, and (iii) distinguish these structures from Extended Numeratives. As such, they have reduced explanatory power, and can be discarded on that basis.

[7] This is a bare assertion since it is unsupported by evidence: the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit.

Friday 19 April 2024

David Rose On Symmetrical And Transitive Relations

David Rose wrote to sysfling on 14 Apr 2024, at 12:02:
Later in the chapter, Michael reveals that he is indeed talking to knowers of formal logic...
‘The relations of projection and expansion, which (when combined with parataxis and hypotaxis) constitute the ‘logical’ component of a natural language, are not reducible to elementary logical relations of a non-linguistic kind...’ (p460)
His use of symmetrical and transitive is indeed taken from formal logic...
A symmetric relation is a type of binary relation. An example is the relation "is equal to", because if a = b is true then b = a is also true.

Transitive relation, a binary relation in which if A is related to B and B is related to C, then A is related to C.
This usage is not explained, although the discussion is hard to understand without knowing it. Which makes things a little confusing for us benighted non-knowers. 
So Christian may like to adjust or explain this table and discussion for IFG5. While status and sequence are SFL categories, the use of symmetry and transitivity here are not.
This is pretty significant, as these terms are used to define parataxis and hypotaxis on p452, and a series of caveats on p460. Eg, ‘although each implies the other, they are not identical in meaning, because while parataxis is a symmetrical relationship, expansion is not’. Which is why I suggested to Jing that
My friend, John, ≠ John, my friend, ...
(in my ignorance)


 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is not true. The Halliday quote merely points out to the linguist reader that the logical relations of natural language are not reducible to the logical relations of designed systems.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. This usage has been explained in all four editions of IFG. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 452):
In principle, the paratactic relation is logically (i) symmetrical and (ii) transitive. This can be exemplified with the ‘and’ relation. (i) ‘salt and pepper’ implies ‘pepper and salt’, so the relationship is symmetrical; (ii) ‘salt and pepper’, ‘pepper and mustard’ together imply ‘salt and mustard’, so the relationship is transitive.

[3] This is misleading because it is not true. All four terms are used as properties of taxis in SFL Theory, as the table makes clear.

[4] To be clear, Rose had argued that the two were not equal on the basis of parataxis:

The thing about parataxis is it’s not reversible (realised by sequence), whereas hypotaxis is reversible (realised by status). So these two aren’t equivalent...
My friend John, ≠ John, my friend

but, as his Halliday quote explains, the asymmetry is in the expansion relation, elaboration, not in the paratactic relation.