Wednesday, 30 August 2023

David Rose Misunderstanding The Ontogenetic Move From Protolanguage To Language

The syntagms of infant protolanguage can’t handle multiple functions. The ontogenetic breakthrough comes with coupling of interpersonal with ideational functions. That’s what the syntagms of language have evolved to enable. The infant recapitulates that phylogenesis through interaction with caregivers.



Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents protolanguage. To be clear, infant protolanguage does not have syntagms, since syntagms are sequences of classes of lexicogrammatical form, and protolanguage has no lexicogrammar, and so no lexicogrammatical form (e.g. words), an so no classes of lexicogrammatical form to sequence in syntagms.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. The ontogenetic move from protolanguage to language does not include the coupling of interpersonal and ideational functions in syntagms provided by protolanguage. This is not only because protolanguage does not provide syntagms, but also because all the metafunctions emerge together. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):
These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not.

[3] On the one hand, this misunderstands evolution. Properties don't evolve in order to function advantageously in some context (Cause: purpose); they are selected because they function advantageously in some context (Cause: reason).

On the other hand, Rose is taking the opposite perspective on semogenesis from the SFL perspective, viewing it 'from below' in terms of form (syntagm) instead of 'from above' in terms of system and function.

[4] Importantly, ontogenesis does not recapitulate phylogenesis; see Recapitulation Theory. For example, a child learning Modern English does not recapitulate the moves from Old English to Middle English to Modern English. Instead, an ontogenetic trajectory that emerged at an earlier time in phylogenesis is maintained at later times in phylogenesis.

Tuesday, 29 August 2023

David Rose Misunderstanding Axial Relations

Expanding our terms a little, the axial relation is abbreviated as system/structure, but is actually features/structures in systems. Systemic contrasts are simultaneously between features and the structures that realise them. Structures are more precisely function structures. Their functions are either interpersonal, ideational or textual (at least at higher ranks). They are realised by syntagms (or syntagmatic structures). In a metafunctional semiotic, syntagms must be able to realise multiple functions at once (eg nom gps realising Theme/Subject/Actor). This seems basic to semiotic organisation??


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The axial relation — the relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic orders of axis — is realisation. System is the dimension of the paradigmatic order, and structure is the dimension of the syntagmatic order. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20, 32):



[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. On the one hand, there are no structures in systems, since these are each different dimensions of different orders of axis. On the other hand, the axial relation, realisation, does not obtain between features and structures; for example, the clause feature [existential] entails the realisation statement 'insert Existent' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 355), which is the specification of a participant, not of the structure in which the participant figures.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. For example, a systemic contrast between features, such as [positive] vs [negative] POLARITY is not realised by a systemic contrast in (agnate) structures, since both are realised by the same structure, e.g. Subject^Finite^Predicator.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. A syntagm is a sequence of classes, whereas a structure is a configuration of functions. (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 60):
Such a sequence of classes is called a syntagm (e.g. Halliday, 1966a). However, this tells us very little about how it is organised or what it means. The significance of such a syntagm is that here it is the realisation of a structure: an organic configuration of elements, which we can analyse in functional terms.

Monday, 28 August 2023

David Rose On There Being No Such Things As Systems Or Structures

David Rose replied to Kieran McGillicuddy on Sysfling on 24 August 2023 at 4:36:

You’re quite right... there are actually no such things as systems or structures — they are merely generalisations from accumulated instances in the flow of discourse.




Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in this context, systems and structures are abstract things that serve as participants in clauses in the field of linguistic theory.

[2] To be clear, systems and structures are abstractions in the metalanguages that theorise languages.

∞

Postscript: McGillicuddy promptly denied that he held the view ascribed to him by Rose.

Sunday, 27 August 2023

David Rose Misunderstanding Axial Relations And Connotative Semiotics

Axis is the systemic in systemic functional. In this theory, the coupling of generalisation with abstraction in the axial relation is the basis of semiosis. It is not merely a formalism of the theory, rather the formalism mirrors the semiotic relation. There can be no structures outside of systems, and no systems without structures. This includes systems at each rank, stratum and metafunction, of denotative semiotics like language and image, and connotative semiotics like register and genre.

There are plenty of other theories out there, but axis is what sets this one apart. SFS has been influenced by many theories in lx and other disciplines. It proceeds by examining the objects of these theories through the lens of axis, with procedures designed by Halliday in the 1960s for phonology and grammar, and applied since to these and other strata and modalities.


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Axis is a dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. The 'systemic' in 'systemic functional' is the paradigmatic order of axis only.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The axial relation is the (realisation) relation between the paradigmatic axis and the syntagmatic axis. It is not a "coupling of generalisation with abstraction".

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Structures are, by definition, "outside of systems" since the two are of different orders: structures are syntagmatic (chains), whereas systems are paradigmatic (choices).

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Hjelmslev's connotative semiotic is a semiotic that has a denotative semiotic as its expression plane. What Rose refers to as a connotative semiotic is only the content plane of the connotative semiotic. However, register and genre (text type) are varieties of a denotative semiotic: language. In terms of a connotative semiotic, register and genre are on its expression plane (language) not its content plane (context).

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. There was no Systemic Functional theory in the 1960s. Halliday's theory at that time was Scale-&-Category Grammar, which had no system networks and no metafunctions.

Saturday, 26 August 2023

David Rose Misunderstanding The Dimensions Of SFL Theory Through Biological Analogies

It’s a missing piece of other theories John, but central to SFS. 
It originates and is reproduced in interaction, the original replicating nucleus of semiosis, analogous with the original proteins of life... always replicating in/as a community. 
As those proteins make life possible, axis makes culture possible. 
Its ideational and textual functions are much later developments, like the eukaryotic cell... ranks the first multicellular organisms, strata the first complex ones (the proteins of which we still share with all other organisms).


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is nucleic acids, not proteins, that replicate in biological systems. But even with this correction, the analogy is invalid, since if anything replicates in semiosis, it is in the semiotic system, not the interactions of meaners.

[2] To be clear, proteins make life possible in the sense that they are the expressions (Tokens) of genes (Values). Axis, on the other hand, in SFL Theory, is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Culture, by contrast, is the contextual semiotic realised by language and other social semiotic systems. Thus, it is not axis that makes culture possible but social semiosis.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstands the metafunctions as independent of one another. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 532-3):

These three "metafunctions" are interdependent; no one could be developed except in the context of the other two. When we talk of the clause as a mapping of these three dimensions of meaning into a single complex grammatical structure, we seem to imply that each somehow "exists" independently; but they do not.

[4] To be clear, the eukaryotic cell was a phenotypic innovation in biological evolution, whereas the metafunctions were in language from the start as types of meaning that might be said to have "phenotypic effects".

[5] To be clear, multicellular organisms arose from the aggregation of eukaryotic cells, but ranks did not arise from the aggregation of the ideational and textual metafunctions. Rank is one way of modelling formal constituency.

[6] To be clear, complex multicellular organisms evolved from simpler multicellular organisms, but strata did not evolve from rank. Strata are different levels of symbolic abstraction, different perspectives on the one phenomenon, and are a dimension of all semiotic systems from the start, though only language has a stratified content plane.

Friday, 25 August 2023

David Rose Misunderstanding Axis And Realisation (Inter Alia)

I used realisation below as the interstratal relation. Axis is the feature/structure relation in systems (which is also confusingly called realisation). Both are abstraction (token/value) relations. Axis is a one-to-one relation between a feature (value) and a structure (token). It also implies the generalisation of a system, because it is a contrast between structures that realises a contrast between features (not individual structures).

It is that coupling of generalisation with abstraction that lies at the heart of semiosis, and hence of SFS theory.

Interstratal relations are not one-to-one. Hence tone choices can be coupled with various mood choices to realise variations in appraisal, //4 don’t you know//. …

Oh sorry Brad, how rude of me.

I meant to say, //5 don't you/know//


Blogger Comments:

[1] Here again Rose misunderstands axis. Axis is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic, whereas system is the dimension of the paradigmatic order of axis. Systems include realisation statements attached to features which specify structural realisations, but that is not 'axis'.

[2] To be clear, realisation is the relation between different levels of symbolic abstraction, and so it applies wherever that relation obtains: between system and structure, between strata, between function and form. It does not obtain between a feature and a structure, since a feature is not realised by a structure. Instead, a system (of a clause) is realised by a structure (of a clause). Importantly, a structure is not a functional element, but the relationships between such elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451): 

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

[3] To be clear this argument rests on an invalid premiss:

Premiss: Axis is a contrast between structures that realises a contrast between features
Conclusion: Axis implies a generalisation of a system

The premiss is invalid because this is not what axis is (see [1]). Moreover, a contrast in features is not realised by a contrast in structure. For example, the contrast between the POLARITY features positive and negative is not realised by a contrast in structure, since both are realised by the element Finite in the same structural configuration, e.g. Subject^Finite^Predicator.

[4] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 618) write:

The developmental dynamic of "generalisation — abstractness — metaphor" provides the semiotic energy for the grammar, enabling it to serve as the powerhouse for construing experience in the form of scientific knowledge.

But this bears no relation to Rose's use of the terms generalisation and abstraction. For example (op. cit.: 615):

This principle of generalisation — that is, naming general classes rather than specific individuals — is what makes it possible to construct an ideation base. …
General terms are not necessarily abstract; a bird is no more abstract than a pigeon. But some words have referents that are purely abstract — words like cost and clue and habit and tend and strange; they are construing some aspect of our experience, but there is no concrete thing or process with which they can be identified.

[5] This is misleading. To be clear, in the absence of grammatical metaphor, semantics and lexicogrammar are in agreement (congruent):

  • a statement (semantics) is realised by a declarative clause (lexicogrammar);
  • a question (semantics) is realised by an interrogative clause (lexicogrammar);
  • a command (semantics) is realised by an imperative clause (lexicogrammar);
  • an elaborating sequence (semantics) is realised by an elaborating clause complex (lexicogrammar);
  • a relational figure (semantics) is realised by a relational clause (lexicogrammar);
  • an element (semantics) is realised by a group or phrase (lexicogrammar).

[6] This is potentially misleading. The phonological system of TONE realises the grammatical system of KEY.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 168):

The tones are not, however, simply additional markers attached to the realisation of mood. They realise distinct grammatical systems of their own, which are associated with the mood categories. The general name for systems that are realised by tone is KEY. The term KEY covers a number of systems …
(1) declarative clauses
unmarked statement: tone 1
reserved statement: tone 4
insistent statement: tone 5
tentative statement: tone 3
protesting statement: tone 2

(2) WH- interrogative clauses
unmarked WH- question: tone 1
tentative question: tone 2
echo question: tone 2 with tonic on WH- element

(3) yes/no interrogative clauses
unmarked yes/no question: tone 2
peremptory question: tone 1

(4) imperative clauses
command: tone 1 (unmarked in positive)
invitation: tone 3 (unmarked in negative)
request (marked polarity): tone 13, with tonic on do/don’t
plea: tone 4

[7] Note that tones 4 and 5 are not used with yes/no interrogative clauses. Since Rose's question is peremptory, it would be realised by tone 1 if spoken. 

Thursday, 24 August 2023

David Rose Confusing Axis With System

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 23 August 2023 at 13:55:

Can I suggest when reading the various philosophers of language cited in this thread, to remember the one missing puzzle piece that lies at the heart of systemic functional semiotics... axis.


Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Rose confuses axis with system. Axis is a local dimension with two orders: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

System, on the other hand, is the dimension of the paradigmatic order of axis only. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 20):

Monday, 21 August 2023

David Rose Misrepresenting SFL As Rejecting "Form/Meaning Dualisms"

… It also gives some context to SFL’s insistence on bidirectionality of realisation, and lexis as delicate grammar, as well as its rejection of form/meaning dualisms.



Blogger Comments:

To be clear, 'dualism' means the division of something conceptually into two opposed or contrasted aspects, or the state of being so divided. Clearly, SFL does not reject the conceptual division of form and meaning as opposed or contrasted aspects, not least because it models grammatical form as a rank scale. 

SFL models grammatical form in terms of its function in realising meaning. The form-meaning relation ("dualism") is a Token-Value relation. This way of modelling is made possible by the 'natural' relation between form and meaning. Halliday (1985: xvii, xviii):
The relation between the meaning and the wording is not, however, an arbitrary one: the form of the grammar relates naturally to the meanings that are being encoded. A functional grammar is designed to bring this out; it is a study of wording, but one that interprets the wording by reference to what it means. …
What this means is that both the general kinds of grammatical pattern that have evolved in language, and the specific manifestations of each kind, bear a natural relation to the meanings they have evolved to express. … the distinction into word classes of verb and noun reflects the analysis of experience into goings-on, expressed as verbs, and participants in the goings-on, expressed as nouns; and so on.

Friday, 18 August 2023

Lise Fontaine On The Distinction Between Complement And Adjunct

Ed is making a very important point here and one that is often overlooked. I think linguistics generally has seen a lot of damage from imposed boundaries around ideas. Even a distinction between Complement and Adjunct is not always clear, especially as concerns spatial reference. There is great benefit in being open-minded about accounts and not being afraid to be wrong sometimes.


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. The distinction between Complement and Adjunct is clear on theoretical criteria. Difficulty only arises when the theory is not understood.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 153, 154, 155):

A Complement is an element within the Residue that has the potential of being Subject but is not; … Any nominal group not functioning as Subject will be a Complement (with the exception of certain circumstantial Adjuncts of Extent realised by nominal groups without the preposition for, e.g. 180 miles in he sailed 180 miles north on the Company’s armed schooner); and this includes nominal groups of one type which could not function as Subject as they stand, namely those with adjective as Head …
An Adjunct is an element that has not got the potential of being Subject; … (As noted above, certain circumstantial Adjuncts of Extent may be realised by nominal groups without the preposition for; contrast he had walked for miles with he had walked four miles.)

Fontaine's difficulty arises from taking the Formalist view 'from below' (forms: nominal group vs prepositional phrase) instead of the Functionalist view 'from above' (functions: Complement vs Adjunct). That is, the view 'from below' decodes forms by reference to functions, whereas the view 'from above' encodes functions by reference to forms. In other words, the view 'from below' begins with expressions and asks what they mean, whereas the view 'from above' begins with meanings and asks how they are expressed.

[2] To be clear, here Fontaine again engages in her promotion of the culture of anti-intellectualism (see here), reframing it as open-mindedness. Being afraid of being wrong is vitally important for producing high quality work, whether in academic publications or school exams. Ethically, not being afraid of being wrong is a licence to tell lies.

Wednesday, 16 August 2023

David Rose Misrepresenting Cohesion (Halliday & Hasan) As Discourse Semantics (Martin)

Check out Halliday & Hasan (1976) Cohesion in English for detailed discussion of substitution and ellipsis... very different explanation — as discourse semantic resources rather than grammatical constraints.




Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is not true. Halliday & Hasan (1976) was concerned with lexicogrammatical cohesion, not discourse semantics. Martin (1992) took Halliday & Hasan (1976) as his source and rebranded their lexicogrammatical cohesion as his own discourse semantics. Here Rose is participating in that deception.

Sunday, 14 May 2023

David Kellogg On Mathematical Equations [3]

This kind of physics does cover Quantum Mechanics, Relativity, Maxwell, Newton, Galileo... The equations are mathematical — i.e. they can be read backwards and forwards, and they are exactly what Yaegan claimed: a different, non-linguistic, semiotic with its own anti-linguistic logic.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is true. In as much as an equation construes the identity of two participants, it can be 'read backwards and forwards'. However, the meanings construed in each case will be different, as demonstrated in the comments of the previous two posts.  

[2] See the comments of the previous two posts for evidence of the misunderstandings on which this conclusion is based.

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, mathematics is a field that is realised in (designed) language and (ideographic) pictorial semiotic systems. There are many reasons for interpreting mathematical equations as language rather than as a non-linguistic semiotic system. Two will be provided here.

First, mathematical equations entail a stratified content plane in which wordings realise meanings. On the SFL model, language is the only semiotic system with a stratified content plane (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 604):

This deconstrual of the content plane into two strata, referred to in the first chapter, is a unique feature of the post-infancy human semiotic…

The fact that the content plane of mathematical equations is stratified with a lexicogrammar is demonstrated by the fact that, unlike non-linguistic semiotic systems, they can be read aloud. On the SFL model, what is verbally projected is the wording level of content ('locutions').

Second, the only difference between

  1. a² + b² = c², and
  2. a squared plus b squared equals c squared, and
  3. its spoken form
is the mode of expression. All three construe the same wording and the same meaning. If it is claimed that the first is not language, then someone hearing the spoken form (3) would have to ask whether it corresponded to non-language (1) or to language (2), and interpret it differently accordingly.

On the other hand, the claim that mathematical equations are 'a different, non-linguistic, semiotic with its own anti-linguistic logic' goes nowhere in terms of explanatory potential. In contrast, treating mathematical equations as linguistic explains the solving of an equation as the iterated elaboration of an identity relation, and the solution of an equation as the decoding of an unknown Token.

∞

In dismissing all the evidence that invalidates his view, and simply maintaining his original stance, Kellogg has deployed the invincible ignorance fallacy.

Saturday, 13 May 2023

David Kellogg On Mathematical Equations [2]

Thanks, Chris--very insightful! I hadn't really parsed out voice and coding, as you can tell; I had them rather muddled, I'm afraid. The clarity of analysis is astonishing, and adds a lot of understanding.

However, the understanding I get from it only reinforces the distinction that Yaegan Doran made in his presentation. Halliday emphasises that relational clauses are never redundant. As you say, there is a difference between operative "equals" and receptive "equalled by", and there is likewise a difference between encoding"v= eE/m " and decoding ""eE/m = v". When my father writes:


(i.e. w = pressure = the Rayleigh formula, (integral of pressure term + integral of velocity term) in case the math doesn't come out in the mail....)

He is decoding and then decoding again. Not reversible.

But that's the old man doing physics, not math. When he does the math, the math itself really is redundant and reversible: "equals" and "is equalled by" really are completely equivalent, viewed as math. The encoding and the decoding, viewed as math and not as physics, are completely interchangeable. 

This to me suggests that Yaegan was right--that there is a qualitative difference between math as a semiotic system and language as a semiotic system. The former CAN be redundant, and that is the very essence of an equation. The latter is NEVER fully redundant, and that is the essence of a relational process.


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because Halliday (1985, 1994) does not discuss relational processes in terms of redundancy. What he does say is that an identifying clause is not a tautology, and explains why this is so. Halliday (1994: 124):

In any ‘identifying’ clause, the two halves refer to the same thing; but the clause is not a tautology, so there must be some difference between them. This difference is one of form and function; or, in terms of their generalised labels in the grammar, of TOKEN and VALUE – and either can be used to identify the other.

To be clear, in the previous post, it was the introduction of the notion of asymmetry that was source of confusion, and in this post, the notion of redundancy plays that role.

[2] To be clear, it is true that the default direction of coding in a physics equation is decoding, but it is not true that this is not reversible. Such an equation becomes encoding when the Token is used to identify the Value, as when E is used to identify mc²:

Decoding

Encoding

[3] To be clear, in terms of meaning, equals and is equalled by are not completely equivalent. The operative voice of equals configures the participants as Token^Value, whereas the receptive voice of is equalled by, which is not used in mathematical formalisms, configures the participants as Value^Token. (The two also differ in choice of Subject and Theme.) What is consistent, irrespective of voice, is the identity of one participant (quantity) with another.

[4] To be clear, the direction of coding is distinct from the voice of an identifying clause. Operative and receptive clauses can be decoding or encoding. The direction of coding depends on which participant is used to identify the other: if the Value is used, then the clause is decoding; if the Token is used, then the clause is encoding.

To be clear, equations, whether used in mathematics or physics, can be decoding or encoding, though decoding is the default. However, it is not true that the two are equivalent in meaning, since they differ in which participant is used to identify the other. Again, what is consistent, irrespective of the direction of coding, is the identity of one participant (quantity) with another.

[5] See the above for evidence as to why this conclusion derives from multiple misunderstandings.

Friday, 12 May 2023

David Kellogg On Mathematical Equations [1]

David Kellogg wrote to sys-func on 24 April 2023 at 12:00:

I remember being vaguely dissatisfied with a presentation that Yaegon gave on this topic at University of Sydney, simply because he over-stressed the difference between mathematics and spoken language and at one or two points even argued for distinct origins in different kinds of logic. But now I see his point.

The terms "coding" and "decoding" imply asymmetry, and in fact asymmetry is the sine qua non of Halliday's understanding of relational processes. Understanding the grammar of a statement like "Tom is the tall one" (value-to-token, or encoding) or "Tom is the treasurer" (decoding) is really understanding that the sentence is NOT redundant — that the expressions are quite different when you reverse them. Encoding and decoding sentences are no more reversible than part-whole relationships, e.g. "All donkeys are animals" and "all animals are donkeys".  

But mathematical equations do not in themselves imply this asymmetry. For example, your equation could be reversed with very little or no difference in meaning,  "All donkeys are animals" is true and "all animals are donkeys" is false. But "c squared equals a squared plus b squared" is just as true and just as false as "a squared plus b squared equals c squared".

I was just discussing this with my father, who has been working on some data from the Parker Solar Probe, now entering the sun's corona. He wants to demonstrate that the heating of the solar wind  is caused (or at least could be caused) by the damping of ion acoustic waves in the solar wind. He pointed out to me that his papers are usually written in a mixture of mathematics and English. Here, for example, he is discussing how to determine the motion of a particle in an electric field. He says::

"dv/dt  = eE/m   

"So that

"v= eE/m "

Because the equations are embedded in language, they are not reversible. But the non-reversibility (that is, the fact that they are decoding relationships, with the token on the left and the value on the right) is an artefact of the language and not a logical consequence of the mathematics, just as the order of "a squared plus b squared equals c squared" is an artefact of our alphabet. 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because Halliday (1985, 1994) does not discuss relational processes in terms of asymmetry. What Kellogg refers to as 'asymmetry' is the functional difference between the two participants of an identifying process: Token vs Value and Identified vs Identifier. In a decoding clause, the asymmetry is Token/Identified vs Value/Identifier, whereas in an encoding clause, the asymmetry is Token/Identifier vs Value/Identified.

[2] To be clear, understanding the grammar of identifying clauses is understanding the functions that each clause constituent realises: Token or Value, Identifier or Identified.

[3] To be clear, encoding and decoding are reversible, but changing the direction of coding changes the meaning that the identity construes: Value encoded by reference to Token vs Token decoded by reference to Value.

[4] To be clear, part-whole relationships are reversible, in terms of coding, when they are construed as identifying rather than attributive. For example, the sports centre comprises four buildings is decoding in contexts where four buildings identifies the sport centre, and encoding in contexts where the sport centre identifies four buildings.


[5] To be clear, attributive clauses are not reversible in terms of the direction of coding because coding is restricted to construals of identity, whereas attributive clauses construe class membership (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145-6), not an identity. (Trivially, reversing the participants in all donkeys are animals yields animals are all donkeys.)

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. If the participants in the clause a squared plus b squared equals c squared are reversed, all that is preserved is the identity of a squared plus b squared and c squared. The reversal changes not only what serves as Token and Value, but what serves as Theme and Rheme and what serves as Subject and Complement. Moreover, it can also involve a reversal the direction of coding:







[7] To be clear, the equations are reversible, though the reversal changes the functional role served by each nominal group in the equation, as explained in [6].

[8] To be clear, what makes these equations decoding is the conflation of Value with Identifier, not the sequence of Token and Value. If the Token on the left is used to identify the Value on the right, these equations are encoding.

[9] To be clear, the ordering Token^Value is given by the clause being operative in voice. But this is insufficient in itself to make the clause decoding; see [8]. 

Importantly, the mathematical equation uses the operative identifying clause as its template, and solving an equation involves repeatedly elaborating the equation, while preserving the identity relation, until each unknown is construed as a Token that is decoded by a Value.

[10] To be clear, this is the Pythagorean equation. The letters a and b stand for the two sides that meet at a right angle, and c stands for the hypotenuse.

Tuesday, 4 April 2023

David Rose On ChatGPT Recognising Canonical Structure

I’m just looking for the limits of GPT and whatever it is that ‘context’ is supposed be...
These are each instances of a pedagogic register type in which a learner solicits knowledge.
GPT recognises the canonical structure, even when it’s initiated with a statement...

 

 

speech

function

exch

role

register phase

interact

Mario

Your self is merely semiotic.

statement

K2

propose class

solicit knowledge

GPT

That is correct.

answer

K1

evaluate

approve

 

As an AI language model, my "self"

or programmed understanding of

my existence and capabilities is based

purely on symbols and algorithms. 

statement

K1

elaborate class

impart knowledge


Keep in mind that these are just labels for structures. We give them functional labels because that’s the relation we interpret between ranks and strata. But GPT doesn't have to interpret them as ‘functions’... just predict appropriate structures in response.

and later that day at 22:01:

But note that GPT is also negotiating affiliation with Mario... positioning itself outside of human communities... no doubt ‘trained’ by its developers.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, ChatGPT produces texts from the lexical collocation frequencies in a reservoir of instances, not from an individuated repertoire of systems that are realised as structures. On this basis, ChatGPT is not an individuated meaner.

[2] To be clear, by 'context' Rose means Martin's misunderstanding of register as a stratum of context. So here Rose is presenting a text (language) as an instance of a type of context, despite context being opposed to language in Martin's stratification model.

[3] To be clear, importantly, it is not ChatGPT that recognises 'the canonical structure' but Rose. See [1] above.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'acknowledgement' is the expected response to a statement (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 137).

[5] To be clear, ChatGPT does not 'predict structures', because that is not how it operates; see [1] above.

[6] To be clear, ChatGPT is not 'negotiating affiliation', because ChatGPT is not an individuated meaner; see [1] above.

Monday, 3 April 2023

David Rose On What Makes Us Human And Fooled

David Rose wrote to Sysfling on 31 Mar 2023 at 9:23:
I was thinking of Shooshi’s what makes us human... dirty jokes ;-))
Re pickiness of humans... I have a sneaking suspicion GPT’s telling us something important about us, not just itself. How much are we fooled by our synoptic view of systems and texts? We can see emergent patterning when we stare at enough printed text, and then represent it as weighted options in systems. But how much do we actually know about how we process text above the lower ranks of expression? What actually is the relation between structural probabilities in text production and ‘meaning’.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Halliday, it is the stratified content plane of language that "makes us human". Halliday (2002 [1996]: 388):
The more complex type of semiotic system is that which evolves in the form of Edelman’s “higher order consciousness”. This higher order semiotic is what we call language. It has a grammar; and it appears to be unique to mature (i.e. post-infancy) human beings. In other words, it evolved as the “sapiens” in homo sapiens.
Halliday (2003 [1995]: 390, 430n):
In this paper I have tried to identify, and to illustrate, certain aspects of language which seem to me critical to a consideration of language and the human brain. In doing so I have assumed that language is what defines the brain of homo sapiens: what constitutes it as specifically human.
The emergence of grammar … is the critical factor in the development of higher-order consciousness; homo sapiens = homo grammaticus. See Halliday (1978a, 1979b); Painter (1984, 1989); Oldenburg (1986).
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 25):
This stratification of the content plane had immense significance in the evolution of the human species – it is not an exaggeration to say that it turned homo ... into homo sapiens (cf. Halliday, 1995b; Matthiessen, 2004a). It opened up the power of language and in so doing created the modern human brain. 

[2] To be clear, in the case of ChatGPT, "we" are not fooled by "our synoptic view of systems and texts", but by ascribing systems to an AI model of language that generates texts from (the lexical collocation probabilities of) instances, not systems.

[3] To be clear, this relation is given by the architecture of language proposed by SFL Theory: structures are specified systemically in the realisation statements attached to features whose probability of instantiation varies according to register. 'Meaning', in the narrower sense, is the stratum of semantics: its systems that are realised as structures, and instantiated as texts.

But importantly, ChatGPT does not use systems that specify structural probabilities to generate texts. Instead, it uses the lexical collocation probabilities garnered from a 'reservoir' of texts, each of which is the instance of the system of the meaner who produced it. (In lexicogrammar, collocation is the syntagmatic dimension of lexis, whereas structure is the syntagmatic dimension of grammar.)

Sunday, 2 April 2023

David Rose On Why Language Needs A Stratified Content Plane

The way GPT ‘reads’ and ‘writes’ text as probabilistic strings of tokens highlights the question of why language needs a stratified content plane. It sounds something like dynamic processes of DS, as foreshadowed by Firth’s notion of ‘mutual expectancy’. The multiple ‘levels’ of its design could enable it to simultaneously predict and review appropriate structures at several scales and various functions, e.g. figures and figure sequences, lexical strings, reference chains, method of development, evaluation prosodies, exchange roles... [just *predicting structures* not making meanings as persona semiotica].

But lang requires these various scales of DS processes to be (re)organised in local processes of LG. Why?


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is not that language "needs" a stratified content plane, but that, on the SFL model, a stratified content plane is what distinguishes language from other socio-semiotic systems.

[2] To be clear, here Rose is merely promoting Martin's discourse semantics, which confuses Halliday's textual grammar (lexical cohesion, reference etc.), Fries' textual grammar (method of development), Halliday's ideational semantics (figures and sequences), inter alia.

More importantly, the dynamics of one stratum, discourse semantics, are irrelevant to the stratification of content, because stratification is the relation between levels of abstraction, and so what stratification affords is the decoupling of congruent relations between strata to open up the enormous semogenic potential of grammatical metaphor. Moreover, as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) point out:

If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[3] This is misleading. Martin's discourse semantics is not organised into 'multiple levels' and 'several various scales'.

[4] On the one hand, this misunderstands the relation between strata, and on the other hand, it is very misleading. Semantics and lexicogrammar constitute different levels of symbolic abstraction, so the lower level (Token) is not a local reorganisation of the higher level (Value): the lower level (lexicogrammar) is a realisation of the higher level (semantics). 

In all of Martin's work, which Rose continually promotes, there is a failure to understand strata as different levels of symbolic abstraction. For example, Martin (1992) misunderstands strata as modules (of the same level of abstraction), and confuses stratification with semogenesis ('all strata make meaning').

The reason why this is misleading is that it presents Halliday's lexicogrammar as a "reorganisation" of Martin's discourse semantics, whereas, in terms of theorising, Martin's discourse semantics is a reorganisation of Halliday's lexicogrammar (cohesion) and semantics (speech function). 

Saturday, 1 April 2023

David Rose On The Reluctance To Divorce Language From Consciousness

A more general anxiety about relations between language and personhood exists in our own community. …

But SFL would not have progressed without separating out the systems from their uses and users.

One way our anxiety is expressed is a reluctance to divorce language from consciousness. Yet consciousness is a property of individual persons but language systems are a property of communities. They exist before, after and without the individual persons who use them.

By systems we mean both potential and actual – system and text. Instantiation is a relation between texts and systems, irrespective of persons.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday makes a useful distinction between 'person' as a social individual and 'meaner' (language user) as a socio-semiotic individual. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 610):
The human individual is at once a biological "individual", a social "individual" and a socio-semiotic "individual":
as a biological "individual", s/he is an organism, born into a biological population as a member of the human species.

as a social "individual", s/he is a person, bom into a social group as a member of society. "Person" is a complex construct; it can be characterised as a constellation of social roles or personae entering into social networks … .

as a socio-semiotic "individual", s/he is a meaner, born into a meaning group as a member of a speech community. "Meaner" is also a complex construct. 

[2] To be clear, this "progress" in SFL is Martin's confused model of individuation and affiliation (critiqued here). Martin et al (2013):


[3] To be clear, for neuroscientist Edelman (e.g 1992), it is language that distinguishes higher-order consciousness from the primary consciousness that humans share with many other species. For Halliday (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999), the theory of experience that has evolved in language equates the content plane of language with the content of consciousness. Ideationally, consciousness is the interior symbolic processing of sensing, and the exterior symbolic processing of saying, which create content through projection, and interpersonally, consciousness is the self enacted as meaner: as an interactant in exchanges.

[4] To be clear, on the SFL model, the collective nature of language entails that human consciousness is also collective. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

Edelman's interpretation of higher-order consciousness referred to above suggests that this form of consciousness (unlike primary consciousness) is constituted in language. Language is a socio-semiotic system, so it follows that higher-order consciousness is constituted socio-semiotically; and since socio-semiotic systems are collective, it follows that higher-order consciousness must also be collective. Collective consciousness is an attribute of human social groups — the members of a given culture. But we need to distinguish between the consciousness of a social group and the consciousness of a species, whose collective construal of experience is codified in the structure of the brain. All human populations have the same brain, and to that extent all construe experience in the same way. But humans live in social groups, and their local environments vary one from the other; to that extent, different groups construe experience in different ways. The significance of this for us is that language is the resource for both: both what is common to the species as a whole, and what is specific to the given culture. In the way these two components are construed in the grammar, we cannot tell them apart. But it is the role of language in the construction of experience as meaning — as shared activity and collaboratively constructed resource — that gives substance to the concept of collective consciousness as an attribute of the human condition.

Moreover, here Rose even contradicts the models that he is promoting. In Martin's models, a language user (persona) is an individuation of a culture, and their meaning potential (repertoire) is an individuation of the meaning potential of the community (reservoir).

[5] Clearly, languages do not exist without the individual persons who use them, as demonstrated by the phenomenon of 'language death'.

[6] This misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, 'system' refers to potential, and 'text' to the instance of that potential.

[7] This is not misleading, because it is true.